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ABSTRACT AND OVERVIEW  
 
This dissertation offers a new perspective from which to view and understand the WTO 
regime and its participants. The central feature of that new perspective is the concept of legal 
indigenization. This term generally refers to the process or ideology in which domestic 
authorities make and implement international or domestic rules in a way appealing to their native 
features (especially legal traditions), as responses to globalization led by a defective global legal 
system. The dissertation’s core thesis is that the key elements of the legal tradition and culture of 
a society or political system inevitably and fundamentally influence the ways in which WTO 
members propose multilateral trading rules and imple ent their WTO obligations – in ways that 
have not, until now, been adequately explored and explained in the extensive literature relating 
to international trade law. 
In developing and elaborating on that core thesis, th  dissertation has six chapters, 
following an Introduction that summarizes the significance, structure and approach, and 
terminology of the dissertation.  
 Chapter 1, Review of Literature, comprises two parts. The first part surveys the key 
academic, professional, and official literature regarding a range of issues that are pertinent to this 
dissertation. These include such topics as the general character and structure of the WTO regime, 
specific trade mechanisms, the relationship between WTO law and domestic law, the relationship 
between WTO law and general international law, principles and interpretation of WTO 
agreements, the position of developing countries in the multilateral trading system, strategies 
pursued in international trade negotiations, domestic trade legislation, Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs), dispute settlement mechanism, and domestic adjudication of trade issues. The second 
part of this chapter offers the main findings of the relevant literature. It is those findings, of 
course, that serve as the foundation as well as starting point for further research as reflected in 
this dissertation. The findings of the literature have helped formulate two hypotheses of the 
dissertation. One is that the insufficiencies of the WTO legal regime provide the possibility and 
necessity for the WTO Members to indigenize WTO lawby resorting to their own legal 
 
iv 
traditions and cultures. The other hypothesis is that t e WTO Members’ practices in dealing with 
the WTO have demonstrated their willingness and efforts to indigenize WTO law.  
Chapter 2, Concept of Legal Indigenization, develops the fundamental concept of this 
dissertation – legal indigenization. This chapter sa t  in Section I by reviewing legal 
fragmentation in international trade before World War II. The disaster of world war brought 
about by legal fragmentation called for international responses thereto, which resulted in (legal) 
globalization. Then, the section proceeds into the exploration of the problems of (legal) 
globalization – both inherent and acquired – which explain the need to rely on legal 
indigenization. Section II of this chapter defines the concept of legal indigenization, based on the 
various concepts of indigenization that exist in various other disciplines such as anthropology 
and culture, and dissects the concept of legal indigenization further for clarification. In that same 
vein, the latter part of this section compares this term with other two relevant terms – that is, 
globalization and localization. 
Based on the concept of legal indigenization defined i  Chapter 2, the succeeding three 
chapters proceed to apply this concept to the specific a tions adopted by China, the United States, 
and the EU regarding their interaction with the WTO. Chapter 3, Legal Indigenization of WTO 
Law in China, examines four aspects of legal indigenization. Section I focuses on China’s 
participation in international trade rule-making. It explains how China emphasizes Special and 
Differential (S&D) treatment as well as substantive and procedural issues in the Chinese 
proposals submitted to the WTO. The sources of pertinent features of the Chinese proposals 
submitted to the WTO are located, partially, in the Chinese legal tradition and culture. Section II 
of this chapter finds that China’s participation in the settlement of international trade disputes 
reflects certain Chinese ideologies that have been challenged by its trading partners. Those 
ideologies bear on such issues as whether legal protecti n is to be provided for subjects 
involving some illegality, the relationship between publications and public morality, state control 
of trading rights, and the necessity of criminal thresholds regarding protection of intellectual 
property rights. This section examines how these featur s have taken shape, based on Chinese 
legal tradition and culture. Section III examines ky characteristics of the overall Chinese 
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domestic trade legislation, such as the degree of specification of laws at different levels, the use 
of “temporary” legislation, and a focus on “management.” This section explains these features 
from the perspective of the Chinese legal tradition, f cusing specifically on various forms of law 
in dynastic China and China’s contemporary legal system. Section IV examines domestic 
adjudication of trade disputes arising within China. It reviews administrative and judicial 
regimes relating to trade issues. Although China has complied with its WTO obligation to 
provide judicial review of administrative determinations, it still treats adjudication of trade 
issues as having unique characteristics that other WTO members might find odd or objectionable 
but that reflect deeply rooted elements of Chinese l gal tradition and culture.  
Chapter 4, Legal Indigenization of WTO Law in the United States, examines the process of 
legal indigenization (again, relating to trade law) taking place within the United States. Section I 
explores several aspects of U.S. proposals submitted to the WTO on both substantive and 
procedural issues, as well as S&D treatment. It also gives some attention to U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) negotiations. This section characterizes U.S. proposals to the WTO from 
several perspectives – the tendency to submit a series of proposals, to exhibit cautiousness 
toward S&D treatment, to address institutional refom, to emphasize international rule of law, to 
pursue procedural justice, etc. This section traces th e practices to roots in U.S. legal tradition 
and culture and specifically in the emphasis on procedural fairness in the common law tradition, 
the U.S. leadership in the WTO, U.S. reliance on recip ocity, its belief in rule of law, and 
segmentation of power in its political regime. Section II examines international trade disputes 
involving the United States as respondent and reveals c rtain U.S. ideologies challenged by its 
trading partners, such as the relationship between sovereignty and unilateralism and 
extra-territorial application of U.S. domestic law. This section also attributes these features to 
U.S. legal tradition and culture, especially to vestiges of unilateralism. Section III explores 
domestic legislation on trade within the United States and highlights some of its key 
characteristics, such as the urge for comprehensive content and codification as well as a 
subordination of international trade agreements. The origins of these characteristics in U.S. legal 
tradition and culture mainly involve a mixture of the civil law and common law traditions, the 
fluctuation of trade policies in the U.S. legal history, and dualism with respect to the relationship 
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between international law and domestic law. Section IV examines domestic adjudication of trade 
issues arising within the United States. After reviewing pertinent administrative agencies and 
judicial bodies relating to trade adjudication, thediscussion emphasizes certain characteristics of 
domestic adjudication of trade issues within the United States, such as the use of administrative 
segmentation and specialized courts. The U.S. legaltradition and culture can help explain these 
characteristics – for example, in the U.S. deference to “expertise.”  
Chapter 5, Legal Indigenization of WTO Law in the European Union, analyses the process 
of legal indigenization of WTO law within the EU. Section I examines how the EU has 
participated in international trade rule-making and explains the EU’s emphasis on certain topics, 
such as the constituents of the Dispute Settlement Body, the style of proposals, the importance of 
sustainable development and S&D treatment, the establishment of principles guiding 
negotiations of specific rules, and the role of independent experts in the multilateral dispute 
settlement mechanism. The origins of the special attention accorded to these topics can be found 
in the legal tradition and culture of the EU, and particularly in the role of judges in the civil law 
tradition, the center stage given to general principles, a high status given to jurists, and the heavy 
importance of sustainable development in the EU. Section II examines international trade 
disputes involving the EU as respondent. On the grounds of a review of pertinent cases, this 
section identifies some EU ideologies that seem confli ti g with those of its trading partners, 
such as its broad methods of interpreting WTO agreements, its attitude towards the relationship 
between trade preferences in the FTAs and multilateral principles, and its application of general 
principles of law in its arguments. Some of the factors that contribute to the formulation of these 
features appear also in continental European legal tradition and culture, especially in the civil 
law’s approach to interpretation of international agreements. Section III of this chapter explores 
the “domestic” trade legislation within the EU. Based on an overview of EU “domestic” trade 
legislation, this section points out some EU-specific approaches to trade legislation. These 
features find their roots in continental European lega  tradition and culture, especially in the 
concept of the legal rule as adopted by the civil law tradition and in theories about the 
relationship between EU law and domestic laws of its member states. Section IV, after reviewing 
pertinent administrative agencies and courts involved in adjudication of trade issues within the 
 
vii  
EU, characterizes such “domestic” adjudication of trade issues as giving special emphasis to the 
judicial protection of individual rights, to the application of general principles of law, to 
procedural justice, and to the direct application of WTO agreements. Once again, the shared 
corpus of legal tradition and culture that predominates in the EU can partially account for these 
features, as explained at the end of Chapter 5.  
Chapter 6, Legal Indigenization and the WTO, explores these issues from a more integrated 
perspective. Its aim is to explain how, at a more multilateral level, the WTO provisions have 
been indigenized by each of these three individual members’ legal tradition and culture. Section I 
reviews how existing WTO provisions or practices were influenced by the legal tradition and 
culture of certain members. It does this by studying three examples: the United States and the 
multilateral antidumping mechanism, rules developed by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) for 
applying the principle of “legitimate expectations,” and the admissibility of amicus curiae 
submissions in the DSB. Section II focuses on legal indigenization in the context of further 
negotiations. This section examines competing (indigenized) views from three members – China, 
the United States, and the EU – on S&D treatment, environmental issues, fisheries subsidies, and 
reform of the DSB. Section III addresses on the general implications of legal indigenization for 
the WTO both in the short term and in the long run.  
The text of the dissertation closes with a Conclusion that summarizes the main findings of 
all the above chapters.  
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INTRODUCTION  
– The Aim, Structure, Terminology, and Limitations of This Dissertation 
 
Now the man of perfect virtue, wishing to be established himself, seeks also to establish others; 
wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks to enlarge oth rs.   
— Confucius, the Analects (Yong Ye) 
The above proverbs of Confucius, recorded in the Analects, points out the attitude and 
approach that a person who wants success should adopt: if a person wants success and respect, 
he should be ready to respect others and to help others succeed. In order to do that, of course, it 
is first essential that he should know how to respect others and how to help others succeed. In 
short, mutual understanding constitutes a prerequisite for success.  
It is true that understanding is the source of trust and catholicity. Considering that trust and 
catholicity have become more and more difficult to establish in this rapidly changing world, the 
significance of understanding should be highlighted today more than ever. Therefore, this 
dissertation – instead of purporting to be about “good and bad,” “benevolent and evil,” or “right 
and wrong” – is about “understanding.” 
Goals 
The year 2012 marks the 17th anniversary of the establishment of the World Trade 
Organization and the 11th anniversary of the launching of the WTO’s first round of multilateral 
trade negotiations – the Doha Development Agenda. The frustrations this Round has 
encountered so far have resulted in mountainous literature,1 most of which focuses on exploring 
                                                 
1 For example, see generally Terence P. Stewart, AFTER DOHA: THE CHANGING ATTITUDE AND IDEAS OF THE 
NEW WTO ROUND (2002); Ross P. Buckley ed., WTO AND THE DOHA ROUND: THE CHANGING FACE OF WORLD 
TRADE (2003); Ross P. Buckley ed., WTO AND THE DOHA ROUND: THE CHANGING FACE OF WORLD TRADE (2003); 
Brian Hindley, TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN AVIATION SERVICES: CAN THE DOHA ROUND FREE FLIGHT? (2004); Alex F. 
McCalla & John Nash (ed.), REFORMING AGRICULTURAL TRADE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: KEY ISSUES FOR A 
PRO-DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME OF THE DOHA ROUND (2007); Alex F. McCalla & John Nash (ed.), REFORMING 
AGRICULTURAL TRADE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: KEY ISSUES FOR A PRO-DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME OF THE 
DOHA ROUND (2007); Harald Hohmann, AGREEING AND IMPLEMENTING THE DOHA ROUND OF THE WTO (2008); 
and Gary C. Hutbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott & Woan Foong Wong, FIGURING OUT THE DOHA ROUND (2010). 
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the causes of and solutions to the problems that have pl gued these negotiations. Furthermore, it 
seems apparent that some WTO members, especially those at are eager to conclude the Round 
as soon as possible, have lost much of their patience, as evidenced by more and more criticisms 
emerging from the negotiations.2 It seems that the necessity still exists to explore the real causes 
and realistic resolutions to the troublesome impedim nts.  
The general purpose of this dissertation is to provide a new angle to understand the WTO 
regime and its participants – that is, an analysis revolving around the concept of legal 
indigenization on the grounds of legal tradition and culture. Briefly, it refers to the process,  
ideology, or outcome in which domestic authorizes make and implement international or 
domestic rules in a way appealing to their native features (especially legal tradition), as 
responses to globalization led by a defective global legal system. One of the reasons that we 
should not ignore the influence of legal tradition and culture on the multilateral trading system is 
that it is inevitable that the WTO Members will proose multilateral rules and implement their 
WTO obligations on the grounds of their own legal tr ditions and cultures. Another reason might 
be that the legal tradition and culture is relatively stable compared with a member’s immediate 
political and economic interests – interests that are likely to be affected by both domestic and 
international developments of a rather transitory nature. Thus, the influences of the legal 
tradition and culture are more predicable than those of political and economic factors. However, 
the aim of this dissertation is by no means to make legal aspect weigh over any other factor. A 
third reason is that, no matter how huge the influeces that other factors may exert on the 
multilateral trading system, these influences usually have to be transformed ultimately into legal 
form. However, an examination of current literature shows that there still is a great gap between 
the significance the legal tradition and culture should have received and that it has received. This 
dissertation attempts to help fill that gap. 
One of the biggest challenges encountered by this dissertation is how to present both (1) an 
overall picture of legal indigenization of WTO law and (2) detailed explanations of the specific 
                                                 
2 For example, see generally US Slams China, India at WTO Talks, available at 
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2008-07-28-voa22.html, last visited on Feb. 27, 2012. 
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manifestations of such indigenization. It would seem to be an almost impossible undertaking to 
address all the aspects of legal indigenization taking place in all the WTO Members within the 
covers of this dissertation. Therefore, this dissertation selects three WTO members – China, the 
United States, and the European Union3 – as research subjects. On the one hand, considering 
that each of these entities reflects one of the great legal traditions – that is, the Chinese law, 
common law, and civil law traditions – a study of legal indigenization within the WTO can show 
the influences of legal tradition and culture on the multilateral trading system. In addition, a 
comparison of legal indigenization of the WTO regime ight contribute to recognition of the 
generality and diversity of the “indigenization” process in other contexts as well.  
Naturally, the emphasis attached in this dissertation to legal tradition and culture does not 
mean to deny the significance of other factors – such as economic and political interests – that 
also have great influence on an individual member’s participation in WTO activities.  
Structure and Approach 
The text of this dissertation comprises six chapters, in addition to the Introduction and the 
Conclusion. Chapter 1 reviews the literature pertinnt to various aspects of this dissertation. 
Chapter 2 develops the concept of legal indigenization. Using this concept, Chapters 3, 4, and 5 
explore legal indigenization of WTO law in China, the United States, and the European Union.  
All of these offer a “vertical” (or “temporal”) comparison. By “vertical” comparison, I 
mean a process of studying the contemporary practices of each member from a historical 
perspective. A second approach is a “horizontal” (or “spacial”) comparison – which means 
“across legal traditions.” The “spacial” comparison is the main approach adopted in Chapter 6, 
which explores different influences of the three memb rs on the rule-making and adjudication 
issues. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 follow a same model of analysis – that is, exploring the process of 
indigenization in four aspects: international rule making, international trade disputes settlement, 
domestic legislation on trade, and domestic adjudication of trade issues. Among the four aspects, 
                                                 
3 Although the European Union is not an individual member in a strict sense, it adopts the uniform voice within 
the WTO and is regarded as a unit of its member states. 
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the analysis on international rule making focuses on the outward direction of the process of 
indigenization – that is, how the members make efforts t  influence international trade 
negotiations by their legal tradition and culture. The analysis on the other three aspects 
concentrates on the inward direction of the process of indigenization – how the members 
indigenize the WTO obligation domestically on the ground of legal tradition and culture. 
Chapter 6, which also discusses the outward direction of the process, concentrates on different 
indigenized WTO rules and practices, as well as some general implications of legal 
indigenization for the organization. The structure of this dissertation is also exhibited in Chart 
1.1.  
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Chart 1.1 Structure of the dissertation 
 
 
  
 
6 
In addition to the two types of comparison mentioned above – vertical (or temporal) and 
horizontal (or spacial) comparison – I would offer a couple of comments regarding the 
“approach” of this work. Overall, this dissertation adopts a 1-2-3-4 model in its analysis – that is, 
it covers one theme (i.e., legal indigenization), two directions (i.e., outwards and inwards), three 
legal traditions (i.e., the Chinese legal tradition, the common law tradiion, and the civil law 
tradition), and four aspects (i.e., international trade rule-making, international dispute settlement, 
domestic legislation on trade, and domestic adjudication of trade issues.)  
There are definitely various approaches of developing the topic of this dissertation. One of 
them is to wrap together the presentation of cases or facts with analyses. However, I opt for a 
different approach. For example, in the following chapters, in order to make it clear for 
presentation, characteristics of one member’s behavior would be separated from its pertinent 
legal tradition. One of the considerations is to make it more logical for the reader to understand 
or to gradually construct the contour before he gets into the deeper analysis of these 
characteristics. The other consideration is that the identified characteristics themselves can also 
be regarded as a part of the preliminary findings of this dissertation, which serves, in turn, as the 
foundations of further conclusions. They deserve an independent part for identification and 
explanation also. Therefore, this dissertation adopts the current structure and organization of 
argument.  
Likewise, there would also be various ways to characterize pertinent practices of each 
member. Consequently, there would be more “characteristics” of those practices than the ones 
identified in this work. For the purpose of this disertation, the approach I have adopted is to 
underscore the aspects that could distinguish one member’s behavior from those of the others on 
the ground of its own legal tradition and culture. In other words, in this dissertation, these listed 
characteristics warrant special attention and further analysis. 
Conceptual Terminology  
In this dissertation, I adopt the following understandings of some fundamental concepts that 
might be unfamiliar to some readers. The most fundamental of all, of course, is that of legal 
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indigenization; as noted above, all of chapter 2 is devoted to explaining that concept. Other key 
concepts include the following:   
 Legal tradition. A legal tradition, as the term is used in the following pages, is not a set 
of rules of law about contracts, corporations, and crimes, although such rules will 
almost always be in some sense a reflection of that tradition. Rather, as posited by John 
Henry Merryman of Stanford, it is “a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned 
attitudes about the nature of law, about the role of aw in the society and the polity, 
about the proper organization and operation of a leg l system, and about the way law is 
or should be made, applied, studies, perfected, and taught.”4 The legal tradition is, as 
Merryman goes on to explain, a partial expression of the overall culture in which a 
legal system has developed. A society’s legal tradition puts the legal system into 
cultural perspective.  
 Legal culture. In this dissertation, I adopt the definition of legal culture proposed by 
Friedman. According to him, legal culture is a mix of “ideas, attitudes, expectations and 
opinions about law, held by people in some given society. It is the network of values 
and attitudes … which determines when and why and where people turn to law or 
government or turn away. It is thus the immediate source of legal change, whatever the 
ultimate source may be. The term covers those thoughts and ideas which act as motives 
or incentives for ‘legal behavior’ – behavior orient d toward or away from legal rules, 
legal institutions, or the uses or nonuses of law.”5 Consequently, the term “legal 
tradition and culture” incorporates both historical and contemporary elements – that is, 
both legal tradition and various attitudes that have been reflected by a broad array of 
legal behaviors of a given society in fairly recent ra. The concept of legal culture is 
complex, some specific definitions and description of methods that I have used in 
studying “legal culture” are discussed in this Introduction and elsewhere throughout the 
dissertation. Legal culture is such a central concept to this dissertation because it is a 
kind of “filter” throughout the legal indigenization. I have drawn from a variety of 
sources to define and work with the concept of “lega  culture.” These sources include 
not only those already cited, but also numerous others.6 However, this dissertation is 
not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of that term. I have tried to draw a wide 
enough range of sources to inspire some confidence. 
 Legal system. A legal system can be understood as comprising “a relatively effective 
                                                 
4 John Henry Merryman, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION ii (2d ed., 1985). 
5 Lawrence M. Friedman, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW, AUTHORITY, AND CULTURE 213 (1990). 
6 For example, Friedman, supra note 5; John W. Jackson, AMERICAN LEGAL CULTURE (1981) [hereinafter 
Jackson-Culture]; H. Patrick Glenn, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD (4th ed., 2010); Merryman, supra note 4; 
Sara McLaughlin Mitchell & Emilia Justyna Powell, DOMESTIC LAW GOES GLOBAL: LEGAL TRADITIONS AND 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS (2011); Jinfan Zhang, THE TRADITION AND MODERN TRANSITION OF CHINESE LAW (2009) 
[hereinafter Zhang-Transition]; Herbert J. Liebesny, FOREIGN LEGAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1981); 
Max Rheinstein & Bea Verschraegen, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW (vol. XVII, 1981); 
and B. Aguilera, Law as a Limit to Power – the Origins of the Rule of Law in the European Legal Tradition, in 
JUDICIAL REVIEW: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS INSIDE THE EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEM (Susana Galera ed.) 1 (2010). 
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mixture of rules and institutions that govern relations among individuals and groups in 
a society – typically the population of a nation-state or some other substantially 
autonomous political entity – and that also regulate the role and powers of the 
government of that entity.”7 
 The civil law tradition. The civil law tradition, in brief, is what has developed over the 
course of about 2,450 years in Western Europe, originating with the famous Twelve 
Tables8 issued in 450 BCE. Indeed, the civil law tradition could also be referred to as 
“the Romanist” or the “Romano-Germanic” legal tradition. These names draw attention 
to the fact that this legal tradition originated with Roman law and later interacted with 
Germanic laws and influences.9 In contemporary world, the components of the civil 
law tradition still find home in the European continent. They are shared by all the EU 
countries (except the United Kingdom). 
 The common law tradition. The common law tradition is much younger than the civil 
law tradition and finds its origin in 11th century England. English common law – that is, 
the law that was gradually seen to be (or made to be) “common” to all of England – 
displaced the local customary rules of behavior because of the unprecedented strength 
of William the Conqueror and others who followed him as monarch in England. 
English common law developed in a peculiar way because of internal political 
developments and conflicts between the centralized monarchy and provincial political 
leaders as well as between the monarchy and the parliamentary (legislative) authorities. 
None of those peculiar and internal developments would be of lasting significance if 
England had not extended its political, economic, and cultural influence around the 
world. But it did exactly that, quickly challenging (and often out-maneuvering) those 
states of continental Europe in the great frenzy of conquest and colonization that 
occurred in the 1600s through the 1800s. Hence the common law, with its peculiar 
preference for judge-made rules, its penchant for “equity” (as made manifest by an 
entirely separate set of courts arising in about the 16th century), and its high degree of 
comfort with legal disorganization, clearly qualifies as one of the “great legal 
traditions.”10 “The influence of the common law throughout the world results from the 
campaign of colonization and conquest that England engaged in the beginning in the 
16th century.”11 The United States is of course a most typical representative of the legal 
family of the civil law tradition in the world.12 
                                                 
7 John W. Head, GREAT LEGAL TRADITIONS 6 (2011). 
8 The Twelve Tables was the legal code that sits at he very foundation of Roman law and therefore of the civil 
law tradition. For elaborations, see id. at 51-53. 
9 Id. at 19.  
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 371. 
12 For more elaborations on the “transplantation” of the common law tradition in the United States, see H ad, 
supra note 6, at 378-382.  
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 The Chinese legal tradition. Chinese law, unlike the civil law and common 
law traditions, did not leave its birthplace and spread widely around the world. Instead, 
reflecting the inward-looking nature of Chinese culture, Chinese law extended in 
application only over the central portion of what is oday the People’s Republic of 
China, only gradually moving northward and westward to encompass the Mongolian 
highlands, western deserts, and Tibetan plateau. Nevertheless, Chinese law qualifies as 
a “great legal tradition” for at least two reasons: (i) the size of the population subject to 
Chinese law has been huge for many centuries and now constitutes about one-fifth of 
the world’s population; (ii) the level of continuity in its development, and especially in 
its characteristic legal codes, is unmatched by any other legal tradition. Chinese law is 
remarkable also for its highly sophisticated but (from a Western viewpoint) highly 
unusual internal conflict between Confucianism and Legalism – two seemingly 
incompatible concepts of law and governance.13 “China’s legal identity … features a 
remarkably long legal history that is largely unbroken, at least from the days of the Qin 
dynasty (in the third century BCE) through the end of the Qing dynasty in 1911 
CE….China’s law is in a league of its own when judge  in terms of age, stability, and 
effectiveness…. [U]nlike the other two great legal tr ditions, which encountered 
tumultuous political changes and numerous episodes f splintering, reunification, 
colonization, and independence, Chinese law remained in place, with little fundamental 
change, in a country that (despite some periods of isunity) was from at least the sixth 
century CE owned always assumed to consist of a single state. This special character of 
Chinese law makes it unique, and uniquely fascinating…. [A]n understanding of 
modern Chinese law (or indeed a meaningful grasp of any aspect of modern China) is 
impossible without some familiarity with the rich tapestry of dynastic Chinese 
history…. [D]dynastic Chinese law [is] not only an e gaging story worthy of study in 
its own right but also … a key that can help us unlock the door to understanding the 
essence of contemporary Chinese law.”14  
 FTA. Free Trade Agreement. An agreement among two or more countries (more 
specifically, customs territories) to drop all international trade barriers as among the 
countries.15 In this dissertation, accordingly, FTAs comprises both bilateral and 
regional trade agreements. 
Limitations 
This dissertation attempts to address a very broad set of topics. It could, of course, have 
been broader still. In the course of my research, countless related topics and intriguing 
                                                 
13 Id. at 19-20. 
14 John W. Head, CHINA’S LEGAL SOUL: THE MODERN CHINESE LEGAL IDENTITY IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
xiii-xv (2009) [hereinafter Head-Soul]. 
15 Raj Bhala, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 194 (2008) [hereinafter Bhala-Dictionary]. 
 
10 
perspectives have presented themselves. I have not been able, given constraints of time and 
capacity, to explore and develop them for inclusion in this dissertation. The dissertation would 
be richer for them, but it could not have been finished within a reasonable time or number of 
pages. 
Having said that, I wish to offer a brief description of several of the most interesting 
“related topics and perspectives” that certainly warrant study. Indeed, an exploration of the 
following points provides helpful insight into some of the findings and conclusions I have made 
in these pages – or might indeed alter and improve s me of those findings and conclusions. I 
identify them here with that acknowledgement. 
• A perspective of institutional economics: The discipline of institutional economics 
focuses on understanding the role of the evolutionary process and the role of institutions in 
shaping economic behavior. From an institutional economics perspective (including transaction 
cost economics and information economics), an important factor influencing rule making is how 
the rules being considered affect the costs of organizing the economic, political and social 
activities that the entity is set up to perform. Pertin nt theories in this field can prompt research 
on indigenization to explore how it can make the newly adopted rules more compatible with 
existing economic, legal and socio-political institutions and thus amenable to implementation 
with greater effectiveness or at a lower cost. 
• A perspective of negotiation behavior: It is certainly natural that a country will 
attempt to gain an advantageous position in globalization when it negotiates new international 
rules or adopts existing rules as it enters a new iternational organization such as the WTO. Both 
economists and psychologists have studied negotiation behaviors. More recently, behavioral 
economics combines game theoretic models and experiments with insights from cognitive and 
social psychology to show that the sense of justice affects a party’s negotiation positions and 
tactics. What a party’s own tradition and culture considers to be normal, right or just could 
“color” the lens that the party uses in assessing both its own negotiation position and those of its 
opponents. Such “colored” lenses can sometimes bias one’  view (due to genuine belief) and 
sometimes motivate the party to use local tradition and culture merely as a bargaining chip (due 
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to a perceived bargaining advantage). Consequently, research on indigenization can also proceed 
to examine whether the domestic tradition and culture have influenced person’s genuine belief 
about right and wrong or their awareness of using such beliefs as bargaining tools.  
• A perspective of sociology: Some sociologists (such as the new institutionalists) 
regard the behaviors of social agents (including governmental organizations) as dependent on the 
perception of legitimacy due to what they call embeddedness and isomorphism. Further research 
on indigenization may continue to explore whether t government officials of a country feel 
constrained by the existing traditions and social norms of the country when they try to negotiate 
new international rules or the adoption of the rules of an existing international organization that 
the country is joining. 
• A perspective of social welfare: It will be also significant to study the process and 
outcome of indigenization from a perspective of social welfare, by examining whether in general 
it will promote the welfare of the international community or primarily help individual countries 
gain at the expense of others as well as pertinent ssues. 
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CHAPTER 1.  REVIEW OF L ITERATURE  
 
The exploration of “legal indigenization” of WTO law is not an easy process. Fortunately, 
some literature on the WTO has covered certain aspect  of the process of legal indigenization, 
even if the main works in that literature do not adopt the term “indigenization.” The topics 
concentrated on in the relevant literature, as wellas the conclusions drawn by numerous 
observers, have provided guidance and inspiration in the development of this dissertation. 
In this chapter, major contributory works relating to the concept or process of legal 
indigenization are enumerated and examined in two sections – the Survey of the Key Sources and 
the Analysis of the Key Sources. The Survey of the Key Sources focuses on the main literature 
that gives some attention to the topics relating to “legal indigenization” and explains the reasons 
why it matters. This first section is short; its key aim is simply to acquaint the reader with the 
main contributions to the literature (mainly books) that bear on the subject of this dissertation. 
For an extended explanation of these contributions, the readers may refer to Appendix 1.1 
(directly following this chapter), where some further details appear. Based on the brief 
introduction in that first section, the second section – the Analysis of the Key Sources – actually 
explains the relevant substantive findings and conclusions reported in these works. These have 
provided the foundation for this dissertation and have illustrated the need for further research. 
I. Survey of the Key Sources 
Many of the key pertinent sources examine (a) the WTO mechanisms and (b) the 
interaction between the WTO and its Members. These sources provide, in aggregate, a picture of 
both the possibilities and the willingness for the M mbers to indigenize WTO law.  
A. WTO Mechanisms 
The literature giving attention to the WTO mechanisms provides us with the background of 
why WTO law could be legally indigenized. To be specific, the literature focused on a cluster of 
topics: (1) an overall assessment of the world trading system, (2) certain WTO mechanisms, (3) 
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the relationship between WTO law and the Members’ domestic law, (4) multilateral trade 
negotiations, (5) the relationship between WTO law and general international law, (6) the 
principles and approaches of the Members in interpreting WTO agreements, and (7) the status of 
developing countries in the WTO. Taken together, these all help explain the background of legal 
indigenization at the multilateral level. 
1. Overall assessment 
The first group of sources in the extensive literature on the WTO institutions deals with 
nearly all aspects of the WTO regime in order to give readers an overall impression and 
assessment. Many of the works in this category – all of which are cited and briefly summarized 
in Appendix 1.1 – are descriptive in character. While some aspects of the descriptions have no 
direct relevance to the issue of indigenization, they ave considerable indirect relevance because 
they explain the incompleteness of the WTO regime and the overall international legal system 
into which it fits. This incompleteness leads not only to some serious problems with the WTO – 
which are explored more below in the Analysis of the Key Sources – but also to both the need 
and the opportunity for WTO member countries to engage in indigenization.  
The sources in this category are:  
 John H. Jackson, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON TREATY 
LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS (2000). 
 William Davey & John H. Jackson ed., THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
(2008). 
 Peter-Tobias Stoll & Frank Schorkopf, WTO: WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER, WORLD 
TRADE LAW (2006). 
 WTO Secretariat, FROM GATT TO THE WTO: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM IN 
THE NEW M ILLENNIUM  (2000). 
 Peter Gallagher, FIRST TEN YEARS OF THE WTO 1995-2005 (2005). 
 T.K. Bhaumik, WTO: A DISCORDANT ORCHESTRA (2006). 
 Rorden Wilkinson, WTO: CRISIS AND THE GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL TRADE (2006). 
 Bernard Hoekman & Petros Mavroidis, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (2007). 
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 Kym Anderson & Bernard Hoekman ed., WTO’S CORE RULES AND DISCIPLINES (2006). 
 Bernard Hoekman & Michel Kostecki, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING 
SYSTEM (2009). 
 Debra Steger ed., REDESIGNING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY (2009). 
 Kent Jones, DOHA BLUES (2010). 
2. On certain mechanisms 
Some contributions to the literature narrow their focus on certain mechanisms of the 
multilateral trading system such as the dispute settlement mechanism, the mechanism of regional 
trade agreements (RTAs), the antidumping and countervailing systems, and the S&D treatment 
principles. All of these specific mechanisms have attracted intense attention and scrutiny, 
especially insofar as they raise issues of sovereignty. For instance, the dispute settlement 
mechanism is criticized for its alleged violation of state sovereignty and its procedural 
shortcomings. Likewise, the mechanism of regional trade agreements has promoted criticism, 
particularly in three respects: its controversial roles in multilateral trading system, the tensions it 
causes among different levels of governance, and inadequate surveillance from the WTO – have 
been examined carefully. The literature focusing on these and other specific WTO mechanisms is 
cited and briefly summarized in Appendix 1.1, and the particular ways in which that literature 
bears directly on the subject of this dissertation are explored below in the Analysis of the Key 
Sources. 
The sources themselves are:  
 Matthias Oesch, STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2003). 
 Federico Ortino & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 
1995-2003 (2004). 
 Petros Mavroidis & Alan Sykes ed., WTO AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW/DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT (2005). 
 WTO, HANDBOOK ON THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (2004). 
 Tomer Broude, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE IN THE WTO: JUDICIAL BOUNDARIES AND 
POLITICAL CAPITULATION (2004). 
 Rufus Yerxa & Bruce Wilson ed., KEY ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE 
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FIRST TEN YEARS (2005). 
 Yang Guohua, Bryan Mercurio & Li Yongjie, WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
UNDERSTANDING: A DETAILED INTERPRETATION (2005). 
 Giorgio Sacerdoti, Alan Yanovich & Jan Bohanes ed.,WTO AT TEN: THE 
CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (2006). 
 Dan Horovits, Daniel Moulis & Debra Steger ed., TEN YEARS OF WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT (2007). 
 Yasuhei Taniguchi, Alan Yanovich & Jan Bohanes ed.,WTO IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, NEGOTIATIONS AND REGIONALISM IN ASIA (2007). 
 Andrew Mitchell, LEGAL PRINCIPLES IN WTO DISPUTES (2008). 
 Isabelle Van Damme, TREATY INTERPRETATION BY THE WTO APPELLATE BODY (2009). 
 Robert Lawrence, UNITED STATES AND THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 
(2007). 
 James Mathis, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE GATT/WTO: ARTICLE XXIV  
AND THE INTERNAL TRADE REQUIREMENT (2002). 
 Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino ed., REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO 
LEGAL SYSTEM (2006). 
 Richard Baldwin & Patrick Law ed., MULTILATERALIZING REGIONALISM (2009). 
 Rafael Leal-Arcas, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW (2010). 
3. The WTO and domestic law 
A third group of contributions to the literature examines the vague relationship between the 
WTO and domestic legal frameworks – by discussing, for example, how WTO agreements and 
DSB reports function within domestic legal systems. The following two works represent this 
group of literature:  
 Gaetan Verhoosel, NATIONAL TREATMENT AND WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: 
ADJUDICATING THE BOUNDARIES OF REGULATORY AUTONOMY (2002). 
 Sharif Bhuiyan, NATIONAL LAW IN WTO LAW: EFFECTIVENESS AND GOOD 
GOVERNANCE IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (2007). 
4. The WTO and international law 
A fourth group of pertinent literature tries to figure out the relationship between WTO law 
and general international law. Various works cover such issues as the extent to which general 
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international law should function in justifying or interpreting the WTO agreements, the amount 
of sovereignty the WTO could “infringe” upon, and the conflicts and coordination between the 
WTO and other international rules.  
A significant focus of this group of works is on the relationship and consistency between 
international trade law and general international law, international environmental law, and 
human rights law. In addition, the literature also gives some attention to the sovereign issue in 
the context of such interaction. Both the interaction between international trade law and other 
fields of international law and pertinent sovereignty issues provide a further understanding of the 
process of indigenization.  
The works falling into this category include:  
 Joost Pauwelyn, CONFLICTS OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO 
LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003). 
 Bradly Condon, ENVIRONMENTAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE WTO: TRADE SANCTIONS 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006). 
 Stefan Griller ed., AT THE CROSSROADS: THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AND THE DOHA 
ROUND (2008). 
 Petros Mavroidis, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE: A COMMENTARY 
(2005). 
 John Jackson, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006). 
5. Principles and interpretation of WTO agreements 
A fifth group of contributions to the literature pays attention to legal principles and 
interpretation of the WTO agreements. The understanding of legal principles established by the 
organization and the methods of interpreting pertinnt agreements constitute an important clue to 
understanding of legal indigenization. Current litera ure mainly focuses on how to understand 
them at the multilateral level, which further prompts us to explore application or understanding 
at the domestic level.  
The following two publications represent this kind of literature: 
 MarionPanizzon, GOOD FAITH IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE WTO: THE PROTECTION 
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OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS (2006). 
 Markus Gehring & Marie-Claire Segger ed., SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD 
TRADE LAW (2005). 
6. Design of WTO agreements 
This group of literature gives attention to the design of WTO agreements. Its main purpose 
is to identify the shortcomings of existing agreements, to find out the gaps between the reality 
and the future relating to certain trade issues, to explain the rationale behind the agreements, to 
analyze how the these agreements are expected to be implemented, and to elaborate how the 
agreements should function efficiently. The flaws of existing agreements as well as the gaps 
between expectations and reality further justify the significance of the topic of this dissertation.  
This group of literature includes: 
 Melaku Geboye Desta, LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS: 
FROM GATT 1947 TO THE WTO AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE (2002). 
 Jayashree Watal, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES (2001). 
 Marc Benitah, LAWS OF SUBSIDIES UNDER THE GATT/WTO SYSTEM (2001). 
 Won-Mog Choi, ‘LIKE PRODUCTS’ IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: TOWARDS A 
CONSISTENT GATT/WTO JURISPRUDENCE (2003). 
 WTO Trade in Services Division, HANDBOOK ON THE GATS AGREEMENT (2005). 
 Joseph McMahon, WTO AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE: A COMMENTARY (2006). 
 Alan Sykes, WTO AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS: A COMMENTARY (2006). 
 Kyle Bagwell, George Berman & Petros Mavroidis ed., LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
CONTINGENT PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (2010). 
 Tania Voon, CULTURAL PRODUCTS AND THE WTO TRADE ORGANIZATION (2007). 
 Tracey Epps, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HEALTH PROTECTION: A CRITICAL 
ASSESSMENT OF THE WTO’S SPS AGREEMENT (2008). 
 Simon Schropp, TRADE POLICY FLEXIBILITY AND ENFORCEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION (2009). 
7. The position of developing countries in the WTO 
A seventh group of contributions to the literature analyzes the position of developing 
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countries in the WTO legal system. Theoretically, on the one hand, the developing Members 
have acquired at least special and differential tretm nt which aims to guarantee them better 
positions in multilateral trade negotiations and implementation. Practically, on the other hand, 
they usually complain about the insufficiency of the mechanism with regard to protecting their 
benefits. The aim of this group of literature is mainly to help the developing countries to find a 
more advantageous position by taking advantage of existing system. For example, some scholars 
address how developing countries can benefit from specific WTO articles. The corresponding 
actions of developing countries reflect their experiences of legal indigenization.  
The two works below represent this group of literatu e: 
 Peter Gallagher, GUIDE TO THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2000). 
 Chantal Thomas & Joel Trachtman ed., DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL 
SYSTEM (2009). 
8. Domestic context 
Foreign relations, cultural divergence, and domestic politics also constitute some influential 
factors in forming the WTO Members’ attitude toward the relationship between domestic 
enforcement and international trade law. This group f literature provides a broad context of 
indigenization of WTO law, which is not limited to legal factors only.  
This type of literature includes:  
 Fiona Smith, AGRICULTURE AND THE WTO (2009). 
 Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods ed., POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION (2009). 
 Rafael Leal-Arcas, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW (2010). 
B. International Negotiation and Rule Making 
The process of international trade negotiation and rule making provides the WTO Members 
with a stage on which some of them can impose theirown preferences on others while some 
have yet to develop their strategies and priorities n international trade. 
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1. Current multilateral negotiations 
This group of works looks into current round of multilateral trade negotiations – the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA). The reasons that the DDA is scarcely expected to be concluded in 
the near future have been explored attentively by the academy. These reasons vary from 
powerful politics and changing circumstances to declining U.S. leadership and non-trade social 
values. The works describe the changing context of the world trading system, the expected 
direction of reforms or improvements of the WTO by availing of the Doha Round, and the 
strategies as well as the techniques to concluding current trade negotiations. This kind of 
literature examines the current platform of legal indigenization at the multilateral level.  
This category of literature includes: 
 Terence P. Stewart, AFTER DOHA: THE CHANGING ATTITUDE AND IDEAS OF THE NEW 
WTO ROUND (2002). 
 Ross Buckley ed., WTO AND THE DOHA ROUND: THE CHANGING FACE OF WORLD 
TRADE (2003). 
 Sam Laird, David Vanzetti & Santiago Fernadez de Cordoba, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: 
MAKING SENSE OF THE WTO INDUSTRIAL TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS (2006). 
2. Power of rule-making 
It is not surprising that some leading members, typically the United States and the EU, have 
played a determinant role in international trade rul -making. Actually, the attention given to the 
power of rule-making originates from the desire to differentiate the different influence of 
individual members. This imbalance of power determines that the effect of legal indigenization 
(especially, the outward direction) will be different among members. 
This category of literature includes: 
 Ronald Wolf, TRADE, AID, AND ARBITRATE: THE GLOBALIZATION OF WESTERN LAW 
(2004). 
 Charan Deveraux, Robert Lawrence & Michael Watkins, CASE STUDIES IN US TRADE 
NEGOTIATION (vol. 1, 2006). 
 Douglas Irwin, Petros Mavroidis & Alan Sykes, GENESIS OF THE GATT (2008). 
 Soo Yeon Kim, POWER AND THE GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL TRADE (2010). 
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3. Strategies or priorities 
Because they appear to lack adequate power in trade negotiations or dispute settlement, 
developing countries turn to addressing appropriate strategies and priorities in international trade 
negotiation and dispute resolution. This helps account for the surge of literature on developing 
countries’ experience and participation in the WTO. his type of literature aims to guide certain 
types of countries to develop their strategies and priorities in WTO negotiations and 
implementation. Although not using the term indigenization, these works have addressed a 
similar process of indigenization. 
This kind of literature includes:  
 Giovanni Anania ed., AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORM AND THE WTO: WHERE ARE WE 
HEADING? (2004). 
 Peter Gallagher, Patrick Low & Andrew Stole ed., MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF 
WTO PARTICIPATION: 45 CASES STUDIES (2005). 
 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., REFORMING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LEGITIMACY, 
EFFICIENCY, AND DOMESTIC GOVERNANCE (2005). 
 Roman Grynberg ed., WTO AT THE MARGINS: SMALL STATES AND THE MULTILATERAL 
TRADING SYSTEM (2006). 
 George Bermann & Petros Mavroidis ed., WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
(2007). 
 Dominique Njinkeu & Philip English ed., AFRICAN COUNTRIES IN THE NEW TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS (2008). 
 John Odell ed., NEGOTIATION TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO AND 
NAFTA (2006). 
 Donna Lee & Rorden Wilkinson ed., WTO AFTER HONG KONG (2007). 
C. Domestic Legislation and Policy Making 
In domestic legislation and regional trade agreements, WTO Members can incorporate their 
own approaches and understanding into the way in whch t ey implement their WTO obligations. 
Several books examine this phenomenon. Some focus mainly on legislation, some mainly on 
FTAs, and some on other issues. 
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1. Legislation 
This type of literature examines several issues such as the interaction between domestic law 
and WTO rules, theoretical and practical aspects of an individual member’s handling of pertinent 
WTO rules, comparative analysis of domestic laws in the context of the multilateral system and 
the ways the members avail of domestic trade legislation to implement their particular trade 
policies. These works actually have touched on the issue of indigenization in terms of how 
legislation has been crafted to appeal to their interests, but in most cases the works end without 
further explorations of supporting forces and factors. 
This type of literature includes: 
 Carlos Correa, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO, AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS (2000). 
 Michael Cardwell, Margaret Grossman & Christopher Rodgers ed., AGRICULTURE AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: LAW, POLICY AND THE WTO (2003). 
 Federico Ortino, BASIC LEGAL INSTRUMENTS FOR THE LIBERALISATION OF TRADE: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EC AND WTO LAW (2004). 
 Konstantinos Adamantopoulos & Maria Pereyra, EU ANTISUBSIDY LAW AND PRACTICE 
(2007). 
 Luca Rubini, DEFINITION OF SUBSIDY AND STATE AID (2009). 
 Wolfgang Muller, Nicholas Khan & Tibor Scharf, EC AND WTO ANTI-DUMPING LAW 
(2009). 
 Jan Hoogmartens, EC TRADE LAW FOLLOWING CHINA’S ACCESSION TO THE WTO 
(2004). 
 Edwin Vermulst, WTO ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT: A COMMENTARY (2005). 
 George Bermann & Petros Mavroidis ed., TRADE AND HUMAN HEALTH AND SAFETY 
(2006). 
 Koen Byttebier & Kim Van der Bourght ed., WTO BLIGATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES: 
CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTATION (2007). 
 Edward Luck & Michael Doyle ed., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION: 
CLOSING THE COMPLIANCE GAP (2004). 
 Anwarul Hoda & Ashok Gulati, WTO NEGOTIATIONS ON AGRICULTURE AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2007). 
 Marc Froese, CANADA AT THE WTO (2010). 
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2. FTAs 
Three areas of the world – namely, Europe, North America, and East Asia – have 
accumulated experience in regional integration, but in different ways. Several books examine 
that experience. These works examine, for instance, how the WTO rules are applied to regional 
trade agreements, the different use of RTA mechanisms within certain WTO members and the 
contents of certain RTAs, especially those go beyond the WTO rules.  
This type of literature includes: 
 Yoshi Kodama, ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND THE GATT-WTO REGIME 
(2000). 
 Mitsuo Matsushita & Dukgeun Ahn ed., WTO AND EAST ASIA: NEW PERSPECTIVES 
(2004). 
 J.H.H. Weiler ed., EU, THE WTO, AND THE NAFTA: TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE (2000). 
 David Gantz, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS (2009). 
 Francis Snyder, REGIONAL AND GLOBAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
(2002). 
 Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino ed., REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO 
LEGAL SYSTEM (2006). 
 Gary Horlick, WTO AND NAFTA RULES AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION: SELECTED ESSAYS 
ON ANTI-DUMPING, SUBSIDIES AND OTHER MEASURES (2003). 
3. Domestic (and regional) influence on the international regime 
Some new and important literature concentrates on the at itudes of individual countries (or 
a region) that will influence the focuses of or approaches adopted by the international regime, 
rather the power enjoyed by them to control the process or outcome f international rule-making. 
In the past few years, a new strand of thought emerged. It revolves around the concept of 
“Eastphalia,” which is briefly expressed as an Asia-centric international system.  
The following essays represent this type of literature: 
 Tom Ginsburg, Eastphalia as the Perfection of Westphaia, 17 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 27 (2010). 
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 Chang-fa Lo, Values to be Added to an “Eastphalia Order” by the Emerging China, 17 
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 13 (2010). 
 David P. Fidler, Eastphalia Emerging?: Asia, International Law, and Global 
Governance, 17 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2010).  
D. Participation of Members in Multilateral Disputes Settlement 
The Members’ participation in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism comprises an 
important feature of their participation in the multilateral trading system more generally. The 
United States, the EU, Asian countries, and African members could all provide distinct and 
valuable opinions on how to use this mechanism based on their own experience. Several 
contributions to pertinent literature illustrate th experiences of individual members in handling 
trade dispute settlement, which relate also to certain aspect of legal indigenization.  
This type of literature includes: 
 Gregory Shaffer, Victor Mosoti & Asif Qureshi, TOWARDS A 
DEVELOPMENT-SUPPORTIVE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM AT THE WTO (2003). 
 Yasuhei Taniguichi, Alan Yanovich & Jan Bohanes ed., WTO IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, NEGOTIATIONS, AND REGIONALISM IN ASIA (2007). 
 Nicholas Perdikis & Robert Read, WTO AND THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE: RECENT TRADE DISPUTES BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED 
STATES (2005). 
 Charan Deveraux, Robert Lawrence & Michael Watkins, CASE STUDIES IN US TRADE 
NEGOTIATION (vol.2, 2006). 
 Chad Bown & Joost Pauwelyn ed., LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RETALIATION IN 
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (2010). 
II.  Analysis of the Key Sources 
The foregoing enumeration of books and other publications – all of which are more fully 
cited and identified in Appendix 1.1 – reflects thevery extensive WTO-specific bibliographical 
foundation for this dissertation. The aim of the Survey of the Key Surveys was to provide a 
snapshot of the range and character of works that have been found relevant to the study of the 
WTO in this dissertation. (Numerous other sources rega ding the laws and cultures of China, the 
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United States, and the EU will of course be cited in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, below, and a broad 
literature on “indigenization” will be explored in Chapter 2.)  
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to providing an analysis of the actual content of 
the literature surveyed above insofar as it bears on the subject of this dissertation – that is, 
indigenization and the WTO. 
Generally, the pertinent literature demonstrates that some attention from academia has been 
given to the possibility of indigenization of WTO law – by identifying the contractual gaps, 
discretion of legislation, or the Members’ authorizat ons. Indeed, some authorities have hinted at 
the reality of some facets of indigenization of WTO law, as appearing in certain negotiating 
strategies and approaches to trade dispute settlement. However, what little analysis appears 
along these lines very seldom adopts the same terms and concepts as are used in this dissertation. 
It is worth explaining that in the pages that follow, the comments, critiques, and conclusions 
that are being summarized in order to explore the general landscape of literature that is relevant 
to this dissertation are not necessarily m  own view – and indeed many of them definitely are not. 
The summaries below might therefore be read as if each one were preceded with the phrase 
“[a]ccording to some views expressed in the relevant literature, …” In some passages, I have 
included language of that sort as a reminder of this po nt. 
A. WTO Mechanisms 
The literature referred to in Section I above provides a broad foundation for constructing a 
general framework that explains the current status of the WTO. That framework encompasses 
WTO mechanisms, international trade negotiations, ad trade-related action at the national 
(domestic) level. Perhaps the most widely-discussed of these is the first one: WTO mechanisms.  
1. Overall assessment 
Much of the commentary on the WTO regime reflects a grim and pessimistic overall 
assessment. The following paragraphs highlight some bs rvations regarding the challenges that 
face that regime.  
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The rapid developments of the world between 1990 and 2000 – which reflect political, 
economic, and technological changes – brought the WTO to a turning point. The WTO’s agenda 
now includes such issues as how investment and competition laws affect market access, whether 
differing labour or environmental standards confer a trade advantage and how this should be 
dealt with, whether taxation and innovation policies constitute a subsidy, whether governments 
should be allowed to regulate content on the Internet, and how to advance free trade.16 
The political conflicts that have played out during various WTO ministerial meetings are 
the inevitable product of the way the organization was created and has since developed. The 
specific purposes for which multilateral trade regulation was created built into the organization 
an asymmetry of economic opportunity that has been extended and amplified through time. This 
asymmetry has come to shape the interaction of member states in such a way that contests over 
the shape and direction of the trade agenda – and on occasion the collapse of a ministerial 
meeting – are inevitable. However, rather than significantly disrupting the development of the 
multilateral trade regulations, the collapse of ministerial meetings may actually have helped 
move the system forward.17 
The WTO faces inevitable institutional problems of an organization buffeted by a growing 
and changing global economy, and it must change and adapt in order to overcome these 
problems. The main institutional problems, in the ey s of Jones, include lengthy and burdensome 
accession process, weakening of the so-called green room process,18 the weak position of 
developing countries, and unsuccessful cross-agency coordination. The solution, he says, is to 
strengthen domestic reform in Members, WTO internal eform and policy coherence among 
                                                 
16 See generally WTO, FROM GATT TO THE WTO: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM IN THE NEW 
M ILLENNIUM  (2000) [hereinafter WTO-Millennium]. 
17 See generally Rorden Wilkinson, THE WTO: CRISIS AND THE GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL TRADE (2006) 
[hereinafter Wilkinson-Governance]. 
18 The Green Room refers to a process, rather than a specific location, in which heads of delegation seek 
consensus informally under the chairmanship of the Dir ctor-General. Green Room meetings serve a useful purpose 
in that their informal nature allows negotiators to explore new approaches to settling difficult issues. Ministerial 
Green Room consultations deal with the most sensitive political issues — including tariff or subsidy cuts, or the 
degree of flexibility regarding those cuts. Green Room meetings often run until the early hours of the morning and 
can stretch out for days. They can also be tense and dramatic settings in which nerves are taut and tempers evident. 
See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/meet08_org_e.htm, last visited January 27, 2011.  
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international organizations.19 (Kent Jones, 2010) Institutional reform of the WTO is called for 
by Steger, in five critical areas: (1) transparency, (2) decision- and rule-making procedures, (3) 
internal management structures, (4) participation by ongovernmental organizations and civil 
society, and (5) relationships with regional trade greements.20 
The existence of trade policy flexibility leaves room for the Members’ manipulation rooted 
in their own interests. Trade policy flexibility mechanisms are designed to deal with contractual 
gaps in the WTO system because the organization amounts to an incomplete contract among 
sovereign countries. The mechanisms are backed up by enforcement instruments which allow for 
punishment of illegal extra-contractual conduct. After assessing the interrelation between 
contractual incompleteness, trade policy flexibility mechanisms, contract enforcement, and the 
WTO Member’s willingness to cooperate and to commit to trade liberalization, a reform should 
be offered to improve the WTO institutions.21 
2. On certain mechanisms 
Studies of the DSB’s operations reveal skepticism from the academy on this mechanism. 
Some concerns arise relating to the aspects of such operations that involve domestic ideologies, 
practices, or interests of individual members. Some scholars cast their doubts on the DSU’s 
effectiveness in respect of developing countries’ participation in this mechanism.  
An examination of the DSB’s operation in mediation, decision-making, compliance and 
reparation, anti-dumping cases, SPS cases, and GATS cases – as well as the developing countries’ 
participation – shows that the DSU’s effectiveness is under doubt and needs reforms.22  
WTO panels and the Appellate Body have been too timid in using principles of good faith, 
due process, proportionality, and S&D treatment, which should play a crucial role in the WTO 
                                                 
19 See generally Kent Jones, DOHA BLUES (2010). 
20 See generally Debra Steger ed., REDESIGNING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
(2009). 
21 See generally Simon Schropp, TRADE POLICY FLEXIBILITY AND ENFORCEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION (2009). 
22 See generally Dan Horovits, Daniel Moulis & Debra Steger ed., TEN YEARS OF WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
(2007). 
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dispute settlement.23 Both the emphasis on legal principles per se and the specific attention to 
the principles of good faith and proportionality reflect the civil law tradition. 
Damme challenges the DSB’s technique of interpreting WTO law and argues that such 
interpretation should aim to balance the power betwe n (and the interest of) the WTO Members 
as well as to preserve the integrity of the DSB (and the WTO).24 
Some experts find that the attitudes among North America, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific 
region toward the interrelations among multilateral dispute settlement, multilateral trade 
negotiations, and regional trade agreements are different.25  
Some scholars discover that the success of the DSB’s operations lies in the WTO Members’ 
serious participation in the system and through their respect for the decisions being rendered by 
the WTO’s adjudicating bodies.26  
Some authorities express their concerns about the relationship between the DSB and 
national authorities. Generally, for them, the remedies provided by the dispute settlement 
mechanism for legal obligations under the WTO cannot stop aggressive unilateralism adopted by 
the WTO members.27  
Broude expresses his concerns about the DSB as an inherently and structurally powerful 
judicial body by design, on the grounds that in practice the membership of the WTO has 
collectively granted the dispute settlement system far greater normative influence than originally 
prescribed by the WTO agreements, to the point of a political capitulation of governance in 
many important instances. This gap, between design and practice, form and function, is a 
product of the unwillingness of the membership of the WTO to fulfill its normative function and 
to bear the full burden of political decision-making. This reluctance is in turn explained as the 
                                                 
23 See generally Andrew Mitchell, LEGAL PRINCIPLES IN WTO DISPUTES (2008). 
24 See generally Isabelle Van Damme, TREATY INTERPRETATION BY THE WTO APPELLATE BODY (2009). 
25 See generally Yasuhei Taniguichi, Alan Yanovich & Jan Bohanes ed., WTO IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, NEGOTIATIONS, AND REGIONALISM IN ASIA (2007). 
26 See generally Rufus Yerxa & Bruce Wilson ed., KEY ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE FIRST TEN 
YEARS (2005). 
27 See generally Petros Mavroidis, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE: A COMMENTARY (2005). 
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aggregate outcome of several cumulative motivations that lead the Membership to prefer and 
even invite judicial decision-making in lieu of the political process envisioned by the WTO 
agreements. The defining element of governance in the WTO is not, therefore, the enhanced 
intrinsic power of the dispute settlement system, as regularly assumed by proponents and critics 
of the WTO alike, but rather the prescriptive remissness of the membership.28 
3. The WTO and domestic law 
It is a bit ironic that the relationship between GATT/WTO law and national legal systems 
has not yet been clarified, even though the former on  has influenced, guided, even constrained 
the latter ones for over sixty years. Despite the prevailing opinion that the WTO undertakings 
should be treated as general international legal obligations, opinion is divided on the issue of 
how much national law is permitted to differ from WTO law, to what extent WTO law is 
effective domestically, and which areas of national law are subject to the surveillance of WTO 
law. 
The WTO treaties, which contain a set of far-reaching obligations, establish a systemic and 
constitutional framework of interaction between WTO law and national law. The WTO dispute 
settlement system operates as an international layer of judicial review of national laws and 
administrative, judicial, or quasi-judicial measures. Consequently, many of the WTO dispute 
settlement decisions and rulings relate in different ways to Members’ national laws. The WTO is 
facing an increasingly complex. Challenge of establishing a correct treatment of national law in 
international law – one that can ensure effectiveness of international rules and promote good 
governance within nation-state.29 
The institutional system, the basic principles and the vast variety of rules of the WTO have 
defined the world’s trade relations and also have exercised an enormous impact on both 
                                                 
28 See generally Tomer Broude, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE IN THE WTO: JUDICIAL BOUNDARIES AND 
POLITICAL CAPITULATION (2004). 
29 See generally Sharif Bhuiyan, NATIONAL LAW IN WTO LAW: EFFECTIVENESS AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN 
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (2007). 
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European and national economic law.30 
The main WTO parameters defining the interface betwe n the WTO and domestic legal 
orders have been construed to some extent by the WTO adjudicators (panels and Appellate 
Body). Flaws and weakness, however, have been found in these quasi-judicial solutions. In an 
attempt to identify a more proper balance between WTO law and regulatory autonomy, an 
innovative interpretation of the National Treatment obligations are called for as requiring a 
necessity test, drawing upon compelling arguments from legal, logic and economic theory.31 
4. The WTO and international law 
Considering that the WTO Members are the ultimate implementers of WTO law as well as 
other branches of international law, the competing views as to the relationship between the WTO 
law and international provide multiple choices for the Members in implementing their WTO 
obligations. The following paragraphs illustrate such competing views. 
The WTO agreements constitute the institution’s inter ational. At the same time, they are 
subject, on certain occasions, to the general princi les established by other international 
covenants. The dual legal status of WTO law accounts in part for the uncertain interaction 
between it and general international law. 
The WTO treaties must be construed and applied in the context of international law, which 
can overrule WTO norms. WTO law must thus be united with other public international law, 
through a process of both vertical integration (that is, in its relationship to other sub-systems) 
and horizontal integration (that is, vis-à-vis general international law). Other law, in particular 
more specific law, must be recognized as capable of overruling WTO law so as to take account 
of the diversity between WTO members. There is no need to expand the mandate of the WTO as 
an international organization for the WTO to take account of other non-trade concerns (including 
those going beyond the exceptions provided for in, for example, GATT Art. XX). The fact that 
                                                 
30 See generally Peter-Tobias Stoll & Frank Schorkopf, WTO: WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER, WORLD TRADE LAW 
(2006). 
31 See generally Gaetan Verhoosel, NATIONAL TREATMENT AND WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: ADJUDICATING 
THE BOUNDARIES OF REGULATORY AUTONOMY (2002). 
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the WTO legal system is a part of international lawshould suffice. That way, the WTO can 
continue to produce trade norms; other international rganizations and conferences can produce 
other types of norms. Each should stay within its own field of competence, but once it comes to 
resolving a particular dispute, all relevant and applicable norms must be resorted to – both WTO 
norms and other norms – in order to settle the dispute “in accordance with international law.”32 
WTO law, international environmental law and general international law are generally 
consistent with each other. No law reforms are currently needed to facilitate further 
harmonization among them. The current WTO rules are adequate to resolve conflicts between 
the GATT and MEA provisions and to determine the circumstances in which unilateral measures 
should be permitted. However, WTO jurisprudence would benefit from a more explicit analysis 
of the way that panel decisions fit into the general framework of international law. This will 
require further analysis of how the relevant rules of other branches of international law affect the 
interpretation of WTO law.33 
The individual members also face the challenges arising from the rapid development of 
other branches of international law. Therefore, they ave to cope with, by themselves, in some 
cases, the changing long-held assumptions of international law (such as the consent basis of 
international law norms, equality of nations, restrictive or text-based treaty interpretations and 
applications, the monopoly of internal national power, and non-interference).34 
5. General principles and interpretation of WTO agreements 
Emerging social values such as sustainable developmnt ight shape into new principles 
against which the WTO agreements must be read. The DSB functions in a sense as an interpreter 
of the WTO agreements at the international level, but carries out at responsibility unsatisfactorily. 
The following opinions illustrate the potential challenges that might arise from the interpretation 
                                                 
32 See generally Joost Pauwelyn, CONFLICTS OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW 
RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003). 
33 See generally Bradly Condon, ENVIRONMENTAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE WTO: TRADE SANCTIONS AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006). 
34 See generally John Jackson, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2006). 
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of WTO law. These challenges, of course, will invoke diversity among the individual members 
with regard to fulfill their WTO obligations. 
Oeskh points out that, the DSB is less consistent in respect of the interpretation of domestic 
law.35 Some scholars present a new perspective to interpre  WTO agreements – that is, 
sustainable development. In their view, the concept of sustainable development has influences 
many aspects of the multilateral trading system, including (1) the growing interest and 
involvement of the world health community in trade debates, (2) innovations in investment 
arbitration procedure, (3) the implications of these new trends for transparency and questions of 
public policy, and (4) the use of the precautionary principle to justify regulations related to 
uncertain risks. Moreover, the ongoing international trade negotiations are viewed differently by 
developed and developing country perspectives based on differing perspectives on the concept of 
“sustainable development.”36  
Panizzon challenges the inconsistency within the DSB in respect of the application of 
general principles of law, such as the principle of g od faith. Panels and the Appellate Body 
reports have made different use of it. The Appellat Body has shown itself prepared to apply the 
principle to WTO provisions only, while Panels use it more freely and substantively, applying 
good faith to fill lacunae in any of the WTO covered agreements. Additionally, adjudicators use 
the principle to strike a balance between the obligation to liberalize trade and the right to invoke 
an exception from trade liberalization for the protection of the environment, culture, public 
morals, and human life or health. In this way, good faith safeguards the gains of multilateral 
trade liberalization against disgenuine interests, such as disguised protectionism.37 
6. The design of WTO agreements 
These observations about the design of the WTO-covered agreements and mechanisms, and 
perceived defects in them, are directly relevant to the thesis of this dissertation – that WTO 
                                                 
35 See generally Matthias Oesch, STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2003). 
36 See generally Markus Gehring & Marie-Claire Segger ed., SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD TRADE 
LAW (2005). 
37 See generally Marion Panizzon, GOOD FAITH IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE WTO: THE PROTECTION OF 
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS (2006). 
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Members have found it necessary to indigenize WTO law in order to overcome such defects. 
Multilateral trade rules and disciplines that presumably lie at the heart of the WTO regime – 
such as non-discrimination rules, reciprocity rules, the notification and surveillance of trade 
policy, the modalities for negotiating market access, and the conversion of non-tariff trade 
measures into tariffs – are in fact not without contr versy.38 (For example, the regulatory 
framework of contingent protection in the WTO – antidumping, countervailing duties, and 
safeguards – has caused considerable interpretation and implementation issues.39 
One author, for instance, focuses on the TRIPs Agreement. By examining (1) how that 
agreement was negotiated at the Uruguay Round, (2) how various countries have implemented it 
so far, and (3) how the WTO monitors compliance, that author concludes that the developing 
countries can interpret TRIPs to their best advantage, relying on the “constructive ambiguity” 
that characterizes the agreement.40  
Other observers also highlight ambiguities in WTO agreements. One such observer calls for 
an effective definition of “like products,” as well as other consistent principles, to be established 
in trade law through interpretation of the WTO agreem nts.41 Even official WTO publications 
acknowledge that differences of understanding of the GATS from its main users create 
challenges and opportunities for the ongoing GATS negotiations.42 
The Agreement on Agriculture has also been characterized as a WTO treaty with difficulties 
a full legal analysis of the obligations imposed by that agreement on the WTO Members, and of 
the complex history of the Agreement’s negotiation and revision and the controversy 
surrounding its effect on international development, reveal problems in the Agreement’s 
                                                 
38 See generally Kym Anderson & Bernard Hoekman ed., WTO’S CORE RULES AND DISCIPLINES (2006). 
39 See generally Kyle Bagwell, George Berman & Petros Mavroidis ed., LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CONTINGENT 
PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (2010). 
40 See generally Jayashree Watal, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
(2001). 
41 See generally Won-Mog Choi, ‘LIKE PRODUCTS’ IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: TOWARDS A CONSISTENT 
GATT/WTO JURISPRUDENCE (2003). 
42 See generally WTO Trade in Services Division, HANDBOOK ON THE GATS AGREEMENT (2005). 
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accommodation of and impact on developing countries.43 
Safeguard measures under WTO law are usually justified, although not without controversy, 
on the basis of economic and legal concerns. There, too, ambiguity exists. The interpretation of 
the most important requirements of “causation” and “non-attribution” under Article XIX of the 
GATT and the Agreement on Safeguards has thus far been plagued, according to one observer, 
by confusion in WTO case law. It is unclear what questions are being asked, let alone how to 
answer them. The requirement in safeguards law of a finding of “unforeseen developments,” and 
of a linkage between those developments and the import surge, also raises daunting conceptual 
and practical issues. The legal uncertainty associated with safeguard measures presents a 
substantial hurdle for any WTO Member that wishes to use them without fear of successful legal 
challenge. Safeguard measures in the WTO system thus operate in something of a legal limbo.44  
The WTO SPS Agreement has also attracted criticism for not striking an appropriate 
balance between conflicting domestic health protection and trade liberalization objectives. 
However, although some aspects of the rationale undrlying the SPS Agreement’s science-based 
framework are considered questionable, this provides countries with considerable flexibility to 
respond to scientific uncertainties and public sentiment.45 
In sum, numerous observers highlight flaws and ambiguities in the design of WTO 
agreements. These features tend to permit and even encourage indigenization of the sort that will 
be explored in Chapter 2. 
7. The position of developing countries in the WTO 
A theme emerging from the literature surveyed above in Section I is that the  position of 
developing countries in the WTO legal system is somewhat “awkward.” Developing countries 
should theoretically benefit from S&D treatment given by the WTO agreements. However, the 
findings of some authorities tell a different story.  
                                                 
43 See generally Joseph McMahon, WTO AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE: A COMMENTARY (2006). 
44 See generally Alan Sykes, WTO AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS: A COMMENTARY (2006). 
45 See generally Tracey Epps, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HEALTH PROTECTION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF 
THE WTO’S SPS AGREEMENT (2008). 
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For example, Mathis establishes this finding on his ob ervations of the United States’ and 
the EU’s strategies of FTAs, and concludes that such trategies cannot help realize the purpose of 
the Enabling Clause46.47  
8. Domestic context 
The significance of domestic contexts with respect to the implementation of WTO 
agreements has also been highlighted by the following findings. Some scholars point out that 
whatever the final framework is to be for international trade, the critical decisions about 
institutional form and content will be decided in a emerging global political arena. By 
examining the laws and politics in the EU and Asian countries, some experts try to find the 
domestic roots of this emerging global political arena.48  
The challenge faced by the WTO does not lie principally in knowing how to improve the 
multilateral trading system but in summoning the political will of individual members to do it. 
The peculiar political challenge is that in all countries small vested interest groups will fight far, 
far harder to avoid being prejudiced by trade liberalization than the average person will fight to 
benefit from it. When the vested interests are those of multinational corporations or other 
developed nation constituencies, and the common interests are of the poorer members of 
developing countries, the power imbalance leads to many of the problems identified by critics.49 
Similarly, some scholars find out that success or failure of participating in the WTO is 
strongly influenced by how governments and private sector stakeholders organize themselves at 
home. When the system is accessed and employed effectively, it can serve the interests of poor 
and rich countries alike. However, a failure to communicate among interested parties at home 
often contributes to negative outcomes on the international front. Above all, case studies 
demonstrate that the WTO creates a framework within w ich sovereign decision-making can 
                                                 
46 The Enabling Clause refers to special and differential treatment under Part IV of GATT. 
47 See generally James Mathis, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE GATT/WTO: ARTICLE XXIV  AND THE 
INTERNAL TRADE REQUIREMENT (2002). 
48 See generally Francis Snyder, REGIONAL AND GLOBAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (2002). 
49 See generally Ross Buckley ed., WTO AND THE DOHA ROUND: THE CHANGING FACE OF WORLD TRADE 
(2003). 
 
35 
unleash important opportunities or undermine the pot ntial benefits flowing from a rules-based 
international environment that promotes open trade.50 
B. International Negotiation and Rule Making 
The preceding observations, drawn from the literature s rveyed in Section I, focuses on a 
variety of WTO mechanisms and agreements. Many observers have focused attention more 
narrowly on negotiations and rulemaking in the inter ational trade law regime. 
There is hardly any doubt that the creation and evolution of the WTO regime is attributable 
to the power and willingness of only some, rather all, members. Now, not surprisingly, more and 
more members are trying to speak with louder voices in the organization. The following findings 
address (1) how the multilateral trade negotiations have been influenced by the power of 
rule-making enjoyed by individual members and (2) how the different strategies or priorities of 
individual members have contributed to increasing discrepancies among them in trade 
negotiations.  
1. Current multilateral negotiations 
Generally, the plight of the DDA stimulates or excuses the use of regional and domestic 
leverage. The DDA’s difficulties stem from a number of problems, especially structural issues, 
now facing the WTO. Trade negotiations are hampered by concerns over the characteristics of 
“judicial governance” of the WTO, over S&D treatment, egotiating leverage to force 
compliance, and over the treatment of trade in servic s.51  
2. The power of rule-making 
From a historical perspective, the United States and the United Kingdom have most heavily 
influenced the shaping the GATT /WTO.52 The United States played an especially strong role in 
GATT negotiations, though power-based bargaining for tariff reductions and other mechanisms 
                                                 
50 See generally Peter Gallagher, Patrick Low & Andrew Stole ed., MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF WTO 
PARTICIPATION: 45 CASES STUDIES (2005). 
51 See generally William Davey & John H. Jackson ed.,FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (2008). 
52 See generally Douglas Irwin, Petros Mavroidis & Alan Sykes, GENESIS OF THE GATT (2008). 
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that catered largely to U.S. domestic politics and European integration.53  
The United States still takes advantage of opportunities in multilateral trade negotiations to 
set rules internationally, such as in the TRIPs, the proposed (but aborted) Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment, China’s WTO Accession, and that U.S.-EU Mutual Recognition Agreement.54  
Through these influences, the WTO spawns legal globalization and, according to some 
observers, globalization of western law. By some accounts, this globalization hastens l gal 
globalization and abrogates national sovereignty over international trade issues.55  
3. Strategies or priorities 
Some experts find that the agricultural negotiations in the DDA has been complicated 
taking into the facts that domestic and trade policies in the previous ten years across developed 
and developing countries have evolved greatly and hence have varied the proposals made in the 
agricultural negotiation regarding market access, export subsidies and domestic support.56  
Some scholars perceive the efforts from developing countries to form their own strategies 
and coalition in trade negotiation as well as to influence other participants’ belief. (John Odell 
ed., 2006) Developing countries aims to influence both the process and substance of negotiations. 
Some other scholars attribute these perceived efforts t  a gap between what was expected by 
developing countries from the WTO and what the WTO does actually for developing countries.57  
Some experts call for African countries to be aware of their priorities in WTO negotiations, 
for example, the agriculture and services sector, to acquire more benefits from S&D treatment, to 
change their negotiating strategies, to strengthen capacity building, to make initiatives to 
response the TRIPs.58  
                                                 
53 See generally Soo Yeon Kim, POWER AND THE GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL TRADE (2010). 
54 See generally Charan Deveraux, Robert Lawrence & Michael Watkins, CASE STUDIES IN US TRADE 
NEGOTIATION (vol.2, 2006). 
55 See generally Ronald Wolf, TRADE, A ID, AND ARBITRATE: THE GLOBALIZATION OF WESTERN LAW (2004). 
56 See generally Giovanni Anania ed., AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORM AND THE WTO: WHERE ARE WE 
HEADING? (2004).  
57 See generally George Bermann & Petros Mavroidis ed., WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2007). 
58 See generally Dominique Njinkeu & Philip English ed., AFRICAN COUNTRIES IN THE NEW TRADE 
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In addition to developing countries, developed countries also have their own priorities in 
trade negotiations, which are largely different from those of the developing countries. For 
example, some scholars point out that The U.S. trade deficit makes the conclusion of the DDA 
more difficult.59 The United States and the EU also have different ngotiation parameters within 
WTO framework such as negotiations regarding digital products.60  
C. Domestic Legislation and Policy Making 
Domestic legal practices within individual members of the WTO have also drawn much 
attention from the academy. The findings that follow demonstrate how the members incorporated 
their own political and economic objectives into pertinent domestic legislation on trade and  
how they address the same interests in their FTA negotiations.  
1. Legislation 
Some scholars discover that the agriculture policy and law in the EU as well as Americas 
have received fundamental impact of both the Agreement on Agriculture and pertinent domestic 
law and policy.61  
Horlick concludes that the GATT regulations on antidumping and countervailing duties and 
the dispute settlement mechanism have been challenged by the U.S. law.62 Moreover, 
Hoogmartens discovers that the EU relied on its ownresponses, instead of multilateral leverages, 
towards China’s accession to the WTO. These responses i clude typically its application of 
special safeguard measures and nonmarket methodologies in antidumping investigations. Such 
application aims to counterbalance of the insecurity of certain EC industries and to balance its 
                                                                                                                                                
NEGOTIATIONS (2008). 
59 See generally Donna Lee & Rorden Wilkinson ed., WTO AFTER HONG KONG (2007). 
60 See generally Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, THE WTO, THE INTERNET AND TRADE IN DIGITAL PRODUCTS: EC-US 
PERSPECTIVES (2006). 
61 See generally Michael Cardwell, Margaret Grossman & Christopher Rodgers ed., AGRICULTURE AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: LAW, POLICY AND THE WTO (2003). 
62 See generally Gary Horlick, WTO AND NAFTA RULES AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION: SELECTED ESSAYS ON 
ANTI-DUMPING, SUBSIDIES AND OTHER MEASURES (2003). 
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trade deficit with China.63  
By examining South Korea’s compliance behavior with the WTO, some authorities 
conclude that: (1) the nature of a domestic enforcement mechanism seems to be more influential 
in determining compliance behavior than the degree of institutionalization of the relevant 
international regime; (2) on some issues, cultural nderpinnings and the patterns of political 
socialization can be an important factor in shaping compliance and enforcement behavior of an 
individual member; (3) compliance behavior cannot be separated from the political calculus of 
contending actor; and (4) compliance with international regimes should be understood in an 
iterated fashion rather than by a snapshot approach.  
The above observations present, in turn, several policy prescriptions to the WTO, some of 
which relate to the topic of this dissertation. These pertinent prescriptions include: (1) 
international organizations need to enhance their enforcement mechanisms with clearly defined 
incentives and disincentives; (2) international organizations need to pay constant attention to the 
characteristics of the enforcement gap in individual countries; and (3) international organizations 
should take into account the social and cultural contexts of compliance efforts.64  
Some scholars observe the differences between WTO agreements and pertinent domestic 
laws. For example, although the EU terminologically follows faithfully the SCM Agreement in 
defining the concepts of “subsidy” and “specificity” and specifying the criteria for calculating 
countervailing duties, its Basic Regulation still provides some significant differences in EU 
countervailing law and those of the SCM.65 Furthermore, in “domestic” legislation, the EU 
adopts the concept of state aid which is similar to subsidy but easy to cause misunderstanding or 
disputes. This also led to a problem of the notion of subsidy.66  
Froeses casts doubt on the WTO’s capability to trigger changes of domestic policies within 
individual members. He argues that the WTO cannot punish countries that do not adhere fully to 
                                                 
63 See generally Jan Hoogmartens, EC TRADE LAW FOLLOWING CHINA’S ACCESSION TO THE WTO (2004). 
64 See generally Edward Luck & Michael Doyle ed., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION: CLOSING THE 
COMPLIANCE GAP (2004). 
65 See generally Konstantinos Adamantopoulos & Maria Pereyra, EU ANTISUBSIDY LAW AND PRACTICE (2007). 
66 See generally Luca Rubini, DEFINITION OF SUBSIDY AND STATE AID (2009). 
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international trade agreements. Reputation matters a g eat deal in the multilateral trading system. 
Dispute settlement did not lead to policy change. For example, although the federal government 
is in charge of Canada’s external relations, such as multilateral representation, the provinces set 
natural resource policy in their own jurisdictions. Cases analysis suggests that the WTO has less 
direct influence on policy than domestic groups. Power is a significant and illusive variable in 
Canada’s network of bargains. Relational power (to get others to do what you want them to do) 
and structural power (to set the rules of the game).67  
2. FTAs 
Some scholars point out that the FTAs are outcomes of the interplay of various political, 
policy, economic and legal factors. The U.S., EU and Asian RTAs could all be examined from 
these perspectives.68 The experience of East Asian countries in the WTO system provides these 
countries a particular perspective to see their regonal economic integration as well as the WTO 
issues.69 Furthermore, it is perceived that FTAs concluded by the United States and the EU have 
been employed by these members to promote changes i partners’ national laws and policies.70  
Some experts even argue that African countries, developing countries, Asia-Pacific 
countries should adopt different attitude towards concluding FTAs. Some argue that the 
multilateral trading system has proved ineffectual in the surveillance of regional agreements. 
Some others, however, hold that only multilateral system can response to the proliferation of 
RTAs.71  
3. Domestic (and regional) influence on the international regime 
As surveyed in Section I, a new strand of thought emerged in the past few years, which 
focuses on the influences of domestic (and regional) i fluences from Asian countries on the 
international regime – which is described as “Eastphalia.” This strand provides a new 
                                                 
67 See generally Marc Froese, CANADA AT THE WTO (2010). 
68 See generally David Gantz, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS (2009). 
69 See generally Mitsuo Matsushita & Dukgeun Ahn ed.,WTO AND EAST ASIA: NEW PERSPECTIVES (2004). 
70 See generally David Gantz, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS (2009). 
71 See generally Richard Baldwin & Patrick Law ed., MULTILATERALIZING REGIONALISM (2009). 
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perspective to study the interaction between internatio al regime and domestic regime. As 
Ginsberg defines it, Westphalia stands for principles of mutual noninterference, and emphasis on 
sovereignty, and formal equality of states. Eastphalia will emphasize similar structures, putting 
an end to the brief interlude of European universalism and global constitutionalism that 
intensified after the Second World War. He observes that Asian states have stood for application 
of relatively conservative principles to guide inter ational order, principles oddly reminiscent of 
Westphalia. If this approach represents an enduring set of commitments, an Asian-centric world 
would likely emphasize a return to classical principles of state sovereignty and noninterference 
at the expense of human rights.72 
D. Participation of Members in Multilateral Disputes Settlement 
How to participate in the dispute settlement mechanism directly reflects an individual 
members’ capacity in respect of multilateral regime. The literature finds that some leading 
Members have accumulated valuable experience and developed feasible strategies in trade 
dispute resolution. By contrast, some other countries still have difficulties utilizing the DSU. 
Findings of the literature surveyed above demonstrate hat the capacity to make use of the 
dispute settlement mechanism varies among the members. 
For example, a study on trade-related disputes between the United States and the EU 
testifies to the fact that the political economy of protection still exists in the WTO framework 
and challenges the efficacy of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.73 Furthermore, the 
United States adopted different strategies in trade dispute settlement.74 By contrast, developing 
countries are in a bad need for their own strategies to participate in the WTO dispute settlement 
system.75 The effectiveness of retaliation measures differs within WTO members, which 
                                                 
72 See generally Tom Ginsburg, Eastphalia as the Perfection of Westphaia, 17 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 27 
(2010). 
73 See generally Nicholas Perdikis & Robert Read, WTO AND THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: 
RECENT TRADE DISPUTES BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES (2005). 
74 See generally Charan Deveraux, Robert Lawrence & Michael Watkins, CASE STUDIES IN US TRADE 
NEGOTIATION (vol.2, 2006). 
75 See generally Gregory Shaffer, Victor Mosoti & Asif Qureshi, TOWARDS A DEVELOPMENT-SUPPORTIVE 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM AT THE WTO (2003). 
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manifests that the members have adopted different strategies in using retaliation measures.76  
The analysis of the surveyed literature, on the one hand, shows that the international 
trading system, although having been strengthened significantly in the past decades, is not strong 
enough to prevent individual members from relying o alternative or supplementary approaches 
with regard to their participation in multilateral trade relations. On the other hand, an 
examination of the WTO’s operations at the domestic level demonstrates that domestic contexts 
within individual members have manifest the Members’ ffort to incorporate their own political 
or economic interests into their implementation of WTO obligations, even if such incorporation 
might undermine the mandates of the multilateral trading system. 
Summary 
The broad literature on the WTO regime, as surveyed in Section I above, provides a solid 
foundation for exploring the theme of this dissertation. The examination in Section II of the 
pertinent content revealed in that broad literature has particularly important features. An 
overriding feature, of course, is that opinions differ. Some observers emphasize the achievements 
of the DSB, the adequate coverage of the WTO agreements, and the efficiency of the WTO’s 
surveillance over RTAs. This variety of views emerging from the review of literature undertaken 
in this chapter tends to confirm the (intended) objectivity of the review. However, among the 
many commentators who emphasize the difficulties and f ilings of the current international trade 
law system, these themes dominate: 
• The significance of the theme of this dissertation – that is, the legal indigenization of WTO 
law in its Members – is verified by the literature on both the WTO mechanisms and the 
interaction between the WTO and its Members. The def cts and contractual gaps in the 
WTO mechanisms provide the possibility for the WTO Members to incorporate their own 
understandings of WTO law and preferred approaches to implementing WTO obligations. 
The interaction between the WTO and its Members demonstrates the willingness and even 
                                                 
76 See generally Chad Bown & Joost Pauwelyn ed., LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RETALIATION IN WTO 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (2010). 
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the practices of the latter to incorporate their preferred understanding or approaches 
regarding international issues.  
• The capacity, degree, willingness, and approaches to incorporating their own preferred 
understandings and approaches in their WTO participation vary among different Members 
due to various domestic elements.   
Despite the above findings, the existing literature has not addressed certain crucial facets. 
Principal among them is this: in addition to the contemporary political and economic interests of 
an individual WTO member, what is the role of legal tradition and culture in shaping its 
participation in the WTO system? Starting from this facet of insufficiency in the literature, two 
further questions arise accordingly:  
• How will the legal tradition and culture of an ind vidual member influence the WTO’s 
operations at the multilateral level? 
• How will the legal tradition and culture of an ind vidual member influence the WTO’s 
operations at the domestic level? 
In sum, although the current state of the literature on the WTO regime is consistent with the 
underlying assumption of this dissertation – that WTO Members can and do engage in legal 
indigenization (of the sort to be explored more fully in Chapter 2), the literature does not in fact 
explore this issue directly, and it seems to have fil d entirely so far to address it from the 
perspective being emphasized here – that is, by examining whether and how a WTO member’s 
participation in the multilateral trading regime is influenced by its legal tradition and culture.  
  
 
43 
Appendix 1.1 
(Pertinent passages in main text are found largely in subsection IA1 of Chapter 1) 
Extended Survey of Key Literature 
 
A. WTO Mechanisms 
1. Overall assessment 
 John H. Jackson, JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON TREATY LAW 
AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS (2000). 
It contains a collection of essays written by John H. Jackson during the previous four 
decades. Its comprehensive coverage improves the understanding of the whole trading system. 
 William Davey & John H. Jackson ed., FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
(2008). 
The essays contained in this work examine various issues confronting the international 
economic regime today, and cover a wide range of international economic institutions such as 
the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO. They pay particular attention to examining the WTO 
and its regulatory scope, its systemic and structural deficiencies, its role in development and in 
liberalizing trade in services, and its tense relationship to regionalism and to trade-related issues 
such as environment, competition and dispute settlement in the field of investment. 
 Peter-Tobias Stoll & Frank Schorkopf, WTO: WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER, WORLD 
TRADE LAW (2006). 
The book describes the WTO’s institutional system, basic principles, and various rules. It 
aims at clarifying the structure and general concepts within the multilateral trading system. It 
gives special notice to the controversial WTO rules and tries to give a unified interpretation. 
 WTO Secretariat, FROM GATT TO THE WTO: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM IN 
THE NEW M ILLENNIUM  (2000). 
The book takes a fresh look at the future of the global trading system and gives a 
fascinating analysis of the new trade agenda.  
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 Peter Gallagher, FIRST TEN YEARS OF THE WTO 1995-2005 (2005). 
The bookcovers the principal activities of the WTO as the successor to the GATT as well as 
the steps taken by the organization to establish a global trading system. 
 T.K. Bhaumik, WTO: A DISCORDANT ORCHESTRA (2006). 
The work recapitulates all the interesting events ad developments that the world has 
witnessed on the trade front since the establishment of the GATT back in 1947 until it was 
replaced by the WTO. 
 Rorden Wilkinson, WTO: CRISIS AND THE GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL TRADE (2006). 
The book explores the reasons for the collapse of the Ministerial Meetings held within the 
WTO (as in Seattle in 1999 and Cancun in 2003) and the political conflicts that arose therein. 
 Bernard Hoekman & Petros Mavroidis, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (2007). 
The observations provide an overview of the WTO’s history, structure and policies, as well 
as a discussion of the future of the organization. It also addresses the criticisms directed toward 
the WTO and assesses their validity. 
 Kym Anderson & Bernard Hoekman ed., WTO’S CORE RULES AND DISCIPLINES (2006). 
The book WTO’s Core Rules and Disciplines (Kym Anderson & Bernard Hoekman ed., 
2006) collects some excellent papers that provide an overview of the WTO rules and disciplines 
from a historical perspective and addresses some curr nt and future issues that confront the 
multilateral trading system. The first volume of this work focuses on the need for and the genesis 
of multilateral trade rules and disciplines, and examines the core nondiscrimination rules. The 
second volume looks into the reciprocity rule, the notification and surveillance mechanism 
regarding trade policy, the modalities for negotiating market access, and the difficulty in 
converting non-tariff trade measures into tariffs.  
 Bernard Hoekman & Michel Kostecki, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING 
SYSTEM (2009). 
The aim of this work is to explain how the WTO functions, why the GATT had been very 
successful in reducing tariffs, and why it has proven much more difficult to expand the reach of 
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multilateral disciplines to domestic policies impacting on trade under the WTO regime.  
 Debra Steger ed., REDESIGNING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY (2009). 
The book explains why institutional reform of the WTO is necessary at this so-called 
critical juncture in world history, and provides innovative and practical proposals for 
modernizing the WTO to respond to the challenges of the twenty-first century. 
 Kent Jones, DOHA BLUES (2010). 
Kent Jones points outthat all the issues faced by the WTO could be attributed to its 
institutional problems. 
2. On certain mechanisms 
 Matthias Oesch, STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2003). 
The book addresses, in the first place, the tense relationship that exists between 
international interdependence and national sovereignty which challenges the legitimacy of the 
WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. The book then examines the notion of standards of 
review as one of the crucial elements in shaping the balance of power and responsibility of the 
DSB for decisions on factual and legal issues. The current status of adjudicative practices 
emerging in panel and Appellate Body reports is then analyzed, showing the evolution of, and 
the inconsistencies amongst, the relevant DSB cases. Th  operation of the DSB reflects the 
controversial aspects of the relationship between WTO law and the Members’ domestic law. 
 Federico Ortino & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 
1995-2003 (2004). 
The essays covers both legislative and judicial activities encompassed by the WTO dispute 
settlement system, and challenges the legitimacy and foundation of the DSB’s function. 
 Petros Mavroidis & Alan Sykes ed., WTO AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW/DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT (2005). 
The work brings together some papers evaluating various aspects of the dispute settlement 
mechanism, such as its scope and function of the dispute resolution system, its relationship with 
national authorities, the remedies it offers for breach of WTO obligations, and the role of 
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unilateralism in enforcing the GATT commitments. 
 WTO, HANDBOOK ON THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (2004). 
The work tries to explain all the elements of the dispute settlement procedure, starting from 
initiating a case through implementing a final decision, along with pointing out some flaws of 
the mechanism.  
 Tomer Broude, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE IN THE WTO: JUDICIAL BOUNDARIES AND 
POLITICAL CAPITULATION (2004). 
The author overviews the operation of the WTO dispute settlement system. 
 Rufus Yerxa & Bruce Wilson ed., KEY ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE 
FIRST TEN YEARS (2005). 
The contributors provide insights into how the system has been operated in practice and 
how the lessons of its operation of the first decad can be applied to make the system even more 
successful in the years to come. 
 Yang Guohua, Bryan Mercurio & Li Yongjie, WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
UNDERSTANDING: A DETAILED INTERPRETATION (2005). 
Through article-by-article interpretation of the DSU, the work analyses how panels and the 
Appellate Body have interpreted the DSU provisions. The authors provide detailed analysis on 
each article of the DSU, with commentary on how panel d Appellate Body reports and arbitral 
awards affect the interpretation and application of various DSU provisions. 
 Giorgio Sacerdoti, Alan Yanovich & Jan Bohanes ed.,WTO AT TEN: THE 
CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (2006). 
The bookgives some comments on the operation of the dispute settlement mechanism and 
its relationship with multilateral trade negotiations. 
 Dan Horovits, Daniel Moulis & Debra Steger ed., TEN YEARS OF WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT (2007). 
The essaysgive analyses on jurisdiction, interpretation and accommodation of the WTO 
laws from the perspective of dispute settlement. 
 Yasuhei Taniguchi, Alan Yanovich & Jan Bohanes ed.,WTO IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, NEGOTIATIONS AND REGIONALISM IN ASIA (2007). 
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The book examines the issues of dispute settlement, ul ilateral negotiations, regional 
integration, and the interaction among them. In addition, some of its contributors focus their 
attention on the Asia-Pacific region, its participat on in the WTO dispute settlement and 
negotiation mechanisms and recent trends within it towards greater regional integration. 
 Andrew Mitchell, LEGAL PRINCIPLES IN WTO DISPUTES (2008). 
In this book, the author tries to establish a framework for addressing key issues of the 
dispute settlement mechanism. These issues include legal basis of applying a given principle, 
whether this given principle is being applied in an interpretative manner or as applicable law, 
and the meaning of the principle in public international law. The adoption of such a framework 
should allay fears and misconceptions about the applic tion of WTO principles and ensure that 
they are applied in a justifiable manner, so as to improve the quality of applied dispute 
settlement. 
 Isabelle Van Damme, TREATY INTERPRETATION BY THE WTO APPELLATE BODY (2009). 
The work analyzes how the Appellate Body uses particular principles of general 
international law in interpreting the WTO-covered agreements. 
 Robert Lawrence, UNITED STATES AND THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 
(2007). 
The author summarizes the successes of the WTO since its reation in 1995 and argues that 
radical changes to the system are ill-advised. Lawrence nonetheless suggests several areas for 
reform, from steps that require multilateral negotiations (such as improving opportunities for 
non-state actor participation in and enhancing transp rency of the process) to changes the United 
States could make in its own behavior. 
 James Mathis, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE GATT/WTO: ARTICLE XXIV  
AND THE INTERNAL TRADE REQUIREMENT (2002). 
The author discusses (1) whether RTAs are “stepping stones” to a world of freer trade, and 
(2) whether the WTO Members remain unsettled on a criterion for determining the compatibility 
of agreements with the multilateral trading system. This book addresses legal aspects of GATT 
Article XXIV and its “internal” trade requirements as they define the WTO gateway for regional 
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trade agreements. 
 Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino ed., REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO 
LEGAL SYSTEM (2006). 
The essays focus on problematic relations between rgional trade agreements and the WTO 
system. 
 Richard Baldwin & Patrick Law ed., MULTILATERALIZING REGIONALISM (2009). 
In the book, the mechanism of regional agreements covers under examination in the context 
of multilateral trading system. 
 Rafael Leal-Arcas, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW (2010). 
The tensions among three levels of governance – multilateral, regional, and bilateral – in 
the global political economy are discussed in the book. 
3. The WTO and domestic law 
 Gaetan Verhoosel, NATIONAL TREATMENT AND WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: 
ADJUDICATING THE BOUNDARIES OF REGULATORY AUTONOMY (2002). 
The author brings together the main WTO parameters d fining the interface between the 
WTO and domestic legal orders in an integrated analytic  framework, and examines how WTO 
adjudicators – panels and the Appellate Body – have construed those rules. The book points out 
the vagueness of the relationship between WTO law and domestic law. 
 Sharif Bhuiyan, NATIONAL LAW IN WTO LAW: EFFECTIVENESS AND GOOD 
GOVERNANCE IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (2007). 
The book examines also the relationship between WTO law and national laws of the WTO 
Members. 
4. The WTO and international law 
 Joost Pauwelyn, CONFLICTS OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO 
LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003). 
The observations target the question of how trade agr ements interact with human rights or 
environmental protection. That work also examines the relationship between international trade 
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law and general international law. 
 Bradly Condon, ENVIRONMENTAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE WTO: TRADE SANCTIONS 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006). 
The author examines how WTO law can contribute to achieving consistency among general 
international law, international environmental law nd international trade law and to avoiding 
conflicts between trade liberalization and global environmental protection. 
 Stefan Griller ed., AT THE CROSSROADS: THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AND THE DOHA 
ROUND (2008). 
The book discusses both fundamental issues of world trade law – such as its position in the 
system of public international law and topics of legitimacy and democratic control – and some 
practical facets of the DDA. 
 Petros Mavroidis, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE: A COMMENTARY 
(2005). 
The work explains the amount of sovereignty that natio s lose by joining the World Trade 
Organization. 
 John Jackson, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006). 
The book discusses also the interface between WTO law and general international law, 
giving much attention to the sovereignty issue. 
5. Principles and interpretation of WTO agreements 
 MarionPanizzon, GOOD FAITH IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE WTO: THE PROTECTION 
OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS (2006). 
It accounts for what the principle of good faith stands for in international trade law. The 
book describes how, why, and when the concept of god faith bridges WTO agreements with 
public international law. 
 Markus Gehring & Marie-Claire Segger ed., SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD 
TRADE LAW (2005). 
The work interprets, from the perspective of sustainable development, some developments 
in WTO negotiations and recent decisions of the WTO Appellate Body. It also surveys relevant 
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developments in trade and economic agreements at the regional level. Its constituent essays 
focus on sustainable development aspects of trade negotiations regarding the Singapore Issues 
(investment, competition, trade facilitation, and government procurement), intellectual property 
rights, investment arbitration, and the linkage between the WTO and multilateral environmental 
accords. The significance of this collection lies in that it analyzes comprehensive trade issues 
from a perspective of sustainable development. 
6. Design of WTO agreements 
 Melaku Geboye Desta, LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS: 
FROM GATT 1947 TO THE WTO AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE (2002). 
The author analyses the reality and future prospect of global trade in agricultural products. 
It seeks to explain the rationale behind the exemption of agricultural trade from the overall 
international trade regime – by examining a variety of domestic policy reasons that generate this 
crucial counter-current to the general sweep of trade liberalization. This book identifies defects 
in the Agreement of Agriculture as well as the Membrs’ responses thereto. 
 Jayashree Watal, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES (2001). 
The book provides a detailed account of (1) how the TRIPs was negotiated at the Uruguay 
Round, (2) how various countries have implemented it so far, and (3) how the WTO monitors 
compliance. It also reveals how the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has worked to date in 
cases involving the TRIPs, and how the DSB is likely to deal with new pertinent disputes that 
will arise. Most importantly, it explains how developing countries can interpret the TRIPs to 
their best advantage, and how they will ensure that the “constructive ambiguity” that 
characterizes the agreement remains flexible. 
 Marc Benitah, LAWS OF SUBSIDIES UNDER THE GATT/WTO SYSTEM (2001). 
The aim of this book is to alter our understanding of subsidies in international economic 
law. The significance of this book lies in the particular attention it gives to the flaws existing in 
the Agreement of Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM). 
 Won-Mog Choi, ‘LIKE PRODUCTS’ IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: TOWARDS A 
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CONSISTENT GATT/WTO JURISPRUDENCE (2003). 
The work focuses on a frequently-used concept of “like product” in the WTO-covered 
agreements, pointing out the inconsistency in understanding and using the concept within the 
WTO legal framework. 
 WTO Trade in Services Division, HANDBOOK ON THE GATS AGREEMENT (2005). 
The publication aims to provide a better understanding of the GATS as well as the 
challenges and opportunities of the ongoing negotiati ns relating to it. 
 Joseph McMahon, WTO AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE: A COMMENTARY (2006). 
It provides a comprehensive legal analysis of the obligations imposed by the Agreement on 
Agriculture and the complex history of the Agreement’s egotiation, its revision, and its effect 
on international development. The book’s commentary is structured around three areas of reform 
initiated by the Agreement: market access, domestic support, and export competition. 
 Alan Sykes, WTO AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS: A COMMENTARY (2006). 
The author reviews the literature in the economic field bearing on the soundness of 
safeguard policies. It also addresses the complex legal issues relating to the constraints on 
safeguard measures under WTO law, and it offers a thorough discussion and critical analysis of 
pertinent WTO disputes. 
 Kyle Bagwell, George Berman & Petros Mavroidis ed., LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
CONTINGENT PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (2010). 
The essays review the regulatory framework of contingent protection in the WTO regime – 
antidumping, countervailing duties, and safeguard measures. 
 Tania Voon, CULTURAL PRODUCTS AND THE WTO TRADE ORGANIZATION (2007). 
The book examines how WTO rules apply to “cultural products” such as film, radio, music, 
and books. This book explains the current legal regim  before proposing reforms aiming to 
better balance different objectives among the Members in respect of cultural products. 
 Tracey Epps, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HEALTH PROTECTION: A CRITICAL 
ASSESSMENT OF THE WTO’S SPS AGREEMENT (2008). 
The author provides a comprehensive analysis of the in ersection between international 
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trade law and domestic policy from the prospective of health protection. 
 Simon Schropp, TRADE POLICY FLEXIBILITY AND ENFORCEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION (2009). 
The author offers a legal and economic analysis of contractual escape and punishment in 
the WTO. It assesses the interrelation among contractual incompleteness, trade policy flexibility 
mechanisms, contract enforcement, and WTO Members’ willingness to co-operate and to 
commit to trade liberalization. 
7. The position of developing countries in the WTO 
 Peter Gallagher, GUIDE TO THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2000). 
The book addresses how developing countries can benefit from special WTO articles 
relating to such issues such as market access to develop d country markets with respect to all 
major commodities and services, the dispute settlement process, trade policy review, foreign 
direct investment, environmental and labor standards, and technical assistance. The book also 
offers the readers case studies on how some developing-country members of the WTO (Uganda, 
India, and Côte d’Ivoire) are making progress in working with the obligations and the benefits 
provided by the WTO agreements. 
 Chantal Thomas & Joel Trachtman ed., DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL 
SYSTEM (2009). 
Various essays evaluate the general situation of developing countries within the WTO, 
examine market access policies and competition law within these countries, and discuss their 
arrangements with international financial institutions, capacity to litigate, and level of 
participation in WTO dispute settlements mechanism. 
8. Domestic context 
 Fiona Smith, AGRICULTURE AND THE WTO (2009). 
The author challenges the orthodoxy of international agricultural trade regulations and 
presents a conceptual method for understanding the Agreement on Agriculture in a context of 
“cultural divergence.” 
 
53 
 Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods ed., POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION (2009). 
The book examines systematically how and why the hijacking of governments by special 
interests or small groups of powerful firms or “regulatory capture” happens, and how it can be 
averted. 
 Rafael Leal-Arcas, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW (2010). 
The author examines international trade and investmn  law at various levels of governance, 
including unilateral, bilateral, regional, and multilateral arrangements and gives special attention 
to the foreign relations of the European Union. 
B. International Negotiation and Rule Making 
1. Current multilateral negotiations 
 Terence P. Stewart, AFTER DOHA: THE CHANGING ATTITUDE AND IDEAS OF THE NEW 
WTO ROUND (2002). 
The author identifies major elements of the upcoming negotiations and reviews the major 
decisions taken in Doha. This book describes the changing context of the world trading system 
and the evolving attitude of the WTO members. 
 Ross Buckley ed., WTO AND THE DOHA ROUND: THE CHANGING FACE OF WORLD 
TRADE (2003). 
This book examines various ways that the WTO might be reformed or improved and the 
chances of success in the Doha Round thus enhanced. Th  challenge brought by a changing 
world must be met to avoid sliding backwards into a less interdependent, and far poorer, world. 
The specific issues researched and analyzed here include: the U.S.-led return to a unilateralist 
and interventionist approach to global problems; the importance of the rules-based WTO system 
to developing nations as a crucial alternative to power politics; the failure to achieve enhanced 
access to developed world markets for agricultural p oducts, textiles, clothing, and footwear; the 
relevance of the GATS and the TRIPs to the developing world; internal WTO governance issues, 
including the important role of the Secretariat as negotiator and mediator; the implementation 
phase of the dispute settlement understanding; the continuing resistance to linking trade and 
environment; the place of human rights in the interational trading system; and the likely impact 
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of the double scourge of AIDS and terrorism on flows of trade, capital, people, and knowledge. 
 Sam Laird, David Vanzetti & Santiago Fernadez de Cordoba, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: 
MAKING SENSE OF THE WTO INDUSTRIAL TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS (2006). 
The book also addresses the issue of concluding the Do a Round negotiations. This book 
demonstrates the academic focus on the strategies rather the techniques to concluding current 
trade negotiations. 
2. Power of rule-making 
 Ronald Wolf, TRADE, AID, AND ARBITRATE: THE GLOBALIZATION OF WESTERN LAW 
(2004). 
The work examines the relationship between trade globalization and globalization of 
western law, admitting the fact that western law plays a dominant role in shaping international 
trade law. 
 Charan Deveraux, Robert Lawrence & Michael Watkins, CASE STUDIES IN US TRADE 
NEGOTIATION (vol. 1, 2006). 
The book reviews how the United States makes interna io al trade rules according to its 
own preferences during trade negotiations. 
 Douglas Irwin, Petros Mavroidis & Alan Sykes, GENESIS OF THE GATT (2008). 
The contributors examine the motivations and contribu ions of the United States and the 
United Kingdom as well as the relatively small role that other countries played in creating the 
GATT. 
 Soo Yeon Kim, POWER AND THE GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL TRADE (2010). 
Soo Yeon Kim evaluates the accountability of the WTO from the perspective of 
power-based bargaining led by the United States and the EU in Power and the Governance of 
Global Trade (Soo Yeon Kim, 2010). 
3. Strategies or priorities 
 Giovanni Anania ed., AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORM AND THE WTO: WHERE ARE WE 
HEADING? (2004). 
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The contributors deal with a broad range of topics regarding the strategies and priorities of 
the WTO Members with respect to their participation in the multilateral trade regime, including 
the evolution of domestic trade policies in the previous ten years across developed and 
developing countries. It also explores: (1) the proposals made in agricultural trade negotiations 
regarding market access, export subsidies, and domestic support; and (2) new issues emergent in 
agricultural trade negotiations (including the interaction between national regulatory systems and 
the international trade regime, intellectual property rights protection, food safety, and 
antidumping trade protection). Finally, the book discusses the future of international trade 
relations – in particular, the implications of enforcing domestic regulations to ensure compliance 
with international rules. 
 Peter Gallagher, Patrick Low & Andrew Stole ed., MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF 
WTO PARTICIPATION: 45 CASES STUDIES (2005). 
The reports in this publication document disparate experiences among a large number of 
economies to address the challenges of participating in the WTO. 
 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., REFORMING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LEGITIMACY, 
EFFICIENCY, AND DOMESTIC GOVERNANCE (2005). 
The book provides discussion and policy recommendations submitted by leading WTO 
negotiators and policy-makers, as well as the analyses submitted by economists, political 
scientists, and trade lawyers on the Doha Round negotiations. Over 30 contributors explore the 
complexity of the world trading system and of the WTO negotiations from a multidisciplinary 
(political, economic, and legal) perspective. 
 Roman Grynberg ed., WTO AT THE MARGINS: SMALL STATES AND THE MULTILATERAL 
TRADING SYSTEM (2006). 
The book aims to document and explain almost ten years of experiences of small states with 
the WTO. It takes an evidential approach to explain the features of trade and economic 
development in small states. It then highlights the issues of concern to these states in relation to 
negotiations at the WTO. The experience of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries 
with the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is discused, and the book ends with a discussion 
of key negotiating issues for the small states as well as means of facilitating trade reform. 
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 George Bermann & Petros Mavroidis ed., WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
(2007). 
The purpose of this work is to examine different aspects of WTO law and how developing 
countries are reacting to the Doha Development Round since 2001. This book also examines the 
differences between what developing countries requi and what they can expect from the WTO. 
 Dominique Njinkeu & Philip English ed., AFRICAN COUNTRIES IN THE NEW TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS (2008). 
In this publication, scholars discuss the African priorities in WTO negotiations. 
 John Odell ed., NEGOTIATION TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO AND 
NAFTA (2006). 
The book sheds light on three aspects of trade negotiations: the strategies developing 
countries use, how they form coalitions, and how they learn from and influence other 
participants’ beliefs. 
 Donna Lee & Rorden Wilkinson ed., WTO AFTER HONG KONG (2007). 
In this work, the contributors address different impacts of the various participants – such as 
developing countries, the United States, the EU, and the G20 (the Group of Twenty Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors) – in the DDA negotiations. 
C. Domestic Legislation and Policy Making 
1. Legislation 
 Carlos Correa, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO, AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS (2000). 
The book sheds light on domestic trade law and policy regarding IPR in developing 
countries. 
 Michael Cardwell, Margaret Grossman & Christopher Rodgers ed., AGRICULTURE AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: LAW, POLICY AND THE WTO (2003). 
The essays address the interface between domestic law, agricultural policy reform, and the 
WTO mechanism, and the book brings together some scholarship in the areas of international 
trade law, agricultural law and policy, and environmental law. 
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 Federico Ortino, BASIC LEGAL INSTRUMENTS FOR THE LIBERALISATION OF TRADE: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EC AND WTO LAW (2004). 
The author provides an in-depth analysis of core legal concepts characterizing the two most 
prominent efforts in the regulation of international tr de – that is, trade liberalization in the WTO 
and the EU. From a comparative perspective, this study offers a fresh look at the principles 
underlying the basic rules of international trade law, such as the prohibition of border measures, 
the principle of nondiscrimination on grounds of nationality, and the principle of reasonableness. 
 Konstantinos Adamantopoulos & Maria Pereyra, EU ANTISUBSIDY LAW AND PRACTICE 
(2007). 
The book provides clear guidance on legal and practical considerations surrounding the 
European Commission’s handling of anti-subsidy proceedings as well as pertinent WTO rules. 
 Luca Rubini, DEFINITION OF SUBSIDY AND STATE AID (2009). 
The book presents a conceptual analysis of the definitions of state aid and subsidy within 
EC and WTO trade regimes. It provides a comparative nalysis of the regulations on subsidy in 
both systems, examining the coherence of the conceptual understanding of subsidy and the 
grounds for legitimate state intervention. 
 Wolfgang Muller, Nicholas Khan & Tibor Scharf, EC AND WTO ANTI-DUMPING LAW 
(2009). 
The authors address overall aspects of the EC anti-dumping regulation and makes extensive 
comparison with the WTO Agreement on Antidumping (formally the Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994). 
 Jan Hoogmartens, EC TRADE LAW FOLLOWING CHINA’S ACCESSION TO THE WTO 
(2004). 
The book clearly points the way to an equitable resolution of complex problems raised from 
the friction between China’s economic regime and the EC trade policy instruments, such as 
China’s unfinished legal and economic reforms, the danger that the EC may develop an abusive 
protectionist stance, the challenge posed to the EC by increased Chinese competition, the 
persistence of Chinese state-owned enterprises, the absence of a satisfactory methodology to 
deal with the Chinese variant of a nonmarket economy, the possible adjustment of EC 
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antidumping regulations vis-à-vis China, emergency safeguards, the role of the rule of law in 
trade regulation, and the translatability of Western social and political institutions. 
 Edwin Vermulst, WTO ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT: A COMMENTARY (2005). 
The aim of this book is to provide an analytical overview of the WTO Anti-Dumping 
Agreement, which is often perceived as the most technical and controversial WTO agreement. 
The book brings together both basic concepts and advanced interpretations provided by leading 
WTO members in a relatively non-technical manner. 
 George Bermann & Petros Mavroidis ed., TRADE AND HUMAN HEALTH AND SAFETY 
(2006). 
The book discusses how health issues arising from tade restrictive measures have fared in 
WTO case law. With an analysis of primary applicable law (i.e. the GATT, the TBT, and the SPS) 
and all case law relating to trade and health, this book offers a comprehensive discussion of the 
standards established for domestic regulations of public health and safety issues. It aims to 
demonstrate how the world trading regime has come of age and has acknowledged that trade 
liberalization cannot take place at the expense of nationally-defined social values. 
 Koen Byttebier & Kim Van der Bourght ed., WTO BLIGATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES: 
CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTATION (2007). 
The book explores the theme of legal implications of WTO rulemaking to its Members and 
the challenges it represents for both the WTO itself and regional trading blocs, governments, 
companies, and citizens. 
 Edward Luck & Michael Doyle ed., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION: 
CLOSING THE COMPLIANCE GAP (2004). 
The contributors examine the experiences of South Korea regarding its compliance with 
WTO obligations. 
 Anwarul Hoda & Ashok Gulati, WTO NEGOTIATIONS ON AGRICULTURE AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2007). 
The book offers a detailed analysis of the Agreement on Agriculture, assesses the 
implementation experience in key members, outlines th  developments in the negotiations 
during the Doha Round up to the breakdown of talks in mid-July 2006, and offers suggestions 
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for developing countries’ participation in future ngotiations. 
 Marc Froese, CANADA AT THE WTO (2010). 
The author analyzes how the WTO, especially its dispute settlement mechanism, affects 
Canadian public policy and how the Canadian governmnt should respond accordingly. 
2. FTAs 
 Yoshi Kodama, Asia Pacific Economic Integration and the GATT-WTO Regime 
(2000). 
The book presents a detailed analysis of applying the WTO rules to regional trade 
arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 Mitsuo Matsushita & Dukgeun Ahn ed., WTO AND EAST ASIA: NEW PERSPECTIVES 
(2004). 
The essays explore how the countries or regional groups in East Asia participate in the 
WTO. 
 J.H.H. Weiler ed., EU, THE WTO, AND THE NAFTA: TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE (2000). 
The book addresses the overlaps of the trade regimes established by the WTO, the EU, and 
the NAFTA. 
 David Gantz, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS (2009). 
The author analyses different uses of RTA mechanisms within several WTO members. 
 Francis Snyder, REGIONAL AND GLOBAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
(2002). 
The book argues the pros and cons of regional and global trade regulations. 
 Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino ed., REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO 
LEGAL SYSTEM (2006). 
The publication investigates the facets of regional trade agreements that go beyond the 
WTO rules, regarding intellectual property, investment, competition, services, sustainable 
development, and mutual recognition. It also examines the dispute settlement mechanisms RTAs 
and includes illuminating case studies. 
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 Gary Horlick, WTO AND NAFTA RULES AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION: SELECTED ESSAYS 
ON ANTI-DUMPING, SUBSIDIES AND OTHER MEASURES (2003). 
The contributors explore how the United States and Canada participate in the WTO and the 
NAFTA from a comparative perspective. 
3. Domestic (and regional) influence on the international regime 
 Tom Ginsburg, Eastphalia as the Perfection of Westphaia, 17 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 
27 (2010); Chang-fa Lo, Values to be Added to an “Eastphalia Order” by the Emerging 
China, 17 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 13 (2010); and David P. Fidler, Eastphalia 
Emerging?: Asia, International Law, and Global Governance, 17 Ind. J. Global Legal 
Stud. 1 (2010). 
They provide some leading research on this strand of thought, focusing on defining the core 
concept and analyzing attitudes held by certain Asian countries and this region as well as their 
implications for the international regime. 
D. Participation of Members in Multilateral Disputes Settlement 
 Gregory Shaffer, Victor Mosoti & Asif Qureshi, TOWARDS A 
DEVELOPMENT-SUPPORTIVE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM AT THE WTO (2003). 
The authors advise developing countries on how to participate in the WTO dispute 
settlement system. 
 Yasuhei Taniguichi, Alan Yanovich & Jan Bohanes ed., WTO IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, NEGOTIATIONS, AND REGIONALISM IN ASIA (2007). 
The essays address the Asia-Pacific countries’ participa ion in the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism. 
 Nicholas Perdikis & Robert Read, WTO AND THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE: RECENT TRADE DISPUTES BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED 
STATES (2005). 
The book provides a critical overview and assessment of the WTO’s dispute settlement 
procedures in the context of several trade disputes between the EU and the United States. Topics 
covered include: a critique of dispute settlement mechanisms in the GATT, the WTO and the 
NAFTA mechanisms agriculture, the Doha Round and the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), 
beef hormones and the banana dispute, the steel dispute, and foreign trade corporations’ process 
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and production method (PPM) issues and cases. 
 Charan Deveraux, Robert Lawrence & Michael Watkins, CASE STUDIES IN US TRADE 
NEGOTIATION (vol.2, 2006). 
The book focuses on how the United States disposes of its international trade disputes 
through negotiations. 
 Chad Bown & Joost Pauwelyn ed., LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RETALIATION IN 
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (2010). 
Various experts analyze the WTO rules on permissible retaliation and assess the economic 
rationale and calculations involved in the mechanism. In addition, the book reports first-hand 
experiences of those countries that have obtained WTO authorisation to retaliate, ranging from 
the United States and the EC to Mexico and Antigua. 
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CHAPTER 2.  THE CONCEPT OF LEGAL INDIGENIZATION  
 
This chapter is a two-part exercise. Both parts of the exercise involve definitions. Section I 
of this chapter defines a “problematic” world in whic  international trade relations have 
developed over the past three quarters of a century. Section II of this chapter defines 
“indigenization” as it applies to the efforts various countries have made to address some of the 
problems involved in participating in a globalized r gime of international trade rules. 
I. Reponses to a “Problematic” World  
We are living in a world never lacking of “problems:” military conflicts, nuclear threats, 
financial crisis, climate change, and other problems seem to surround us. This is not, of course, a 
new phenomenon. The main problem of international trade in the interwar era – that is, between 
World War I and World War II – that is, “legal fragmentation,” served as the fuse for a strong 
enthusiasm for globalization in the post-war era. Indeed, the burst of trade globalization that 
began just after World War II emerged from the trade problems of the preceding years. 
Now, however, the trade globalization from that earli r era has presented our world with 
new problems as well as benefits. New actions have been taken or called for to respond to the 
new problems. This section reviews briefly the problem of fragmentation before World War II 
and the consequences of that fragmentation. Then it explores problems arising over the past 
several decades from trade globalization, especially those of a legal character, and raises a 
question on appropriate responses to those problems. The review of problematic fragmentation 
and globalization provides us the background of the em rgence of legal indigenization, 
considering that history from fragmentation to globalization can help us understand the history 
from globalization to indigenization. 
A. Legal Fragmentation in Trade before World War II 
World trade legislation before World War II can be summarized as “legal fragmentation,” 
which was characterized by “protectionism” or “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies. “The 1930s saw 
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great fragmentation of the world trading system as governments struggled with the global 
depression. ‘Solutions’ to deal with unilateral protectionism included regional preference 
schemes and currency blocs.”77 Generally, the term “fragmentation” is used to describe a legal 
consequence of trade policy of protectionism. It mainly emphasizes unilateral legal measures 
and a lack of multilateral rules. The fragmentation was mainly among the western powers having 
economies and international influence that were roughly equivalent or similar in scale. This 
fragmentation has also been regarded as an underlying cause of the outbreak of World War II.78 
Protectionism, which “had a long tradition in American trade policy,”79 characterized 
various domestic trade laws before World War II. In the United States, “[h]igh tariffs protected 
the large American domestic market from foreign products from the early 19th century on until 
World War II. The taxation of trade was also one of the most important sources of wealth.”80 In 
the rest of the world, “shortly after the Great Depression many countries tried to weaken the 
consequences of this economic crash by raising their tariffs.”81  
Protectionist policies were challenged before World War II (WWII) in the United States. A 
change of trade policy was led by President Roosevelt partially based on Cordell Hull’s opinion 
that “unhampered trade dovetailed with peace,” partially on the high American export surplus, 
and partly on the country’s inability to finance this surplus through gold imports in the long 
run.82  
This U.S. campaign for free trade was, however, hurt by the trade relations that the United 
States had with some of its trade partners, as describ d below:  
Of top concern [about trade relations] were America’s major trade partners: the British 
Commonwealth of Nations. Britain, its dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, 
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and a number of colonies had turned to protectionism to retaliate against Smoot-Hawley [Act],[83] 
which denied them access into the large American market, and to combat the Great Depression.”[84] 
Canada and the United States signed a trade agreement in 1935, yet an Anglo-Canadian accord in 
1937 maintained imperial tariff preferences under th  Ottawa Agreement of 1932.[85] Tariff 
preferences lowered or eliminated duties within the empire but raised them against nonmembers. 
This discriminatory network placed U.S. traders at an unfair disadvantage in empire markets. As 
Britain’s top export market, America responded by refusing to lower tariffs until the pernicious 
Ottawa system was abolished. A circle of retaliation characterized Anglo-American trade relations 
in the 1930s.86                  
Negotiation of a trade agreement between the United S ates and Britain in 1938 
demonstrated the difficulties in achieving international cooperation in that period. The imbalance 
between the gains of the two countries – that is, Britain acquired more concessions from the 
United States than it gave to the latter – is summarized below. 
Over a year in the making, the accord was consummated because of Hitler’s march through Austria 
and Czechoslovakia. Winning more concessions than it gave, Britain, under the watchful eyes of the 
southern dominions (Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa), barely lowered preferential Ottawa 
tariff rates.87 
As shown in the above summary, although the United States tried to make a freer trade 
network, “the groundwork had yet to be laid for a multilateral trade system, under which nations 
would reduce barriers in a fair and simultaneous fashion.”88  
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One scholar reproaches the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930, which “finally increased U.S. 
tariff rates to the highest levels in history.”89 In his view, “[i]nstead of weakening the economic 
crisis it increased the crisis on the stock market, [it] led to a depression of American exports and 
international trade in general and [it] thereby contributed to the coming of World War II.”90 
Another observer draws a similar conclusion as follows: 
Prior to World War II, international trade was conducted primarily through trading blocs – among 
countries with similar economic systems and complementary needs. There was no true ‘global’ trade. 
In their zeal to compete, these blocs eventually became military blocs, and World War II began.91  
The 1930 Act triggered revenges from the United States’ trade partners. The main leverage 
of their revenges was to adopt trade laws or construct ade blocs to implement the trade policy 
of protectionism. Consequently, various domestic trade laws emerged, without any multilateral 
discipline. In short, we might characterize the intr ational trading regime in the early portion of 
the twentieth century as being one of “fragmentation.” 
B. Legal Globalization as a Response to Fragmentation 
Attempts to fight against legal fragmentation can be traced back into the era before WWII. 
The efforts at the international level took center stage, however, at the conclusion of WWII. 
Trade globalization, embracing legal issues, is a direct outcome of these international efforts. It 
has succeeded, to some extent, in helping overcome the disadvantages of legal fragmentation.  
Three features – the ideology of free trade, recipro al trade agreements signed by the 
United States, and the desire for recovery in post-war era – constituted the context from which 
the GATT emerged. First, the ideology of free trade laid the foundation of the fight against legal 
fragmentation and protectionism, as briefly reviewed b low: 
[That ideology] gained ground in the United States in the early thirties; and following this thinking 
on free trade, the United States began to sign bilateral agreements with 29 countries with the prime 
objective of mutual tariff reduction. This paved the way towards the development of an idea of [a] 
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liberalized trade regime in the world, particularly after the end of [] World War II.92  
Second, enthusiasm for – or we might even say worship of – the ideology of free trade led 
to the conclusion of several reciprocal trade agreements by the U.S. in the 1930s. The following 
excerpt gives a brief review of the efforts to conclude trade agreements during that period: 
Through the 1930s [Cordell] Hull[93] laid the foundation of the negotiations of the GATT by 
reaching several trade agreements with Belgium, Brazil [and] Switzerland. His Reciprocal Trade 
Agreement Program (RTAP) also remained one of the main pillars of the GATT. Benefits of one 
country’s lower trade barriers should always be recipro ated by an equivalent extent so that all 
benefits of freer trade are mutually and equally profitable for both attending countries. In the course 
of World War II Hull and his aides continued to employ the RTAP to strengthen America’s position 
in the world by signing agreements with several other states, such as Turkey, Argentina [and] 
Iceland.94  
Third, the longing for recovery of Europe’s economies was strong enough for the 
international powers to abandon the pre-war trade policies. The following excerpt gives a 
summary on the historical process in which the desire for European recovery as well as other 
factors have contributed to bring about a different world from the one prior to WWII: 
After World War II the recovery and economic viability of the Western European Allies as well as 
the integration of former enemies were one of the focal points of American economic foreign policy 
to repress the expanding influence of the Soviet Union. A major step towards this goal should have 
been the International Trade Organization (ITO) – a parallel organization to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) – for international commercial relations. The GATT created in the Geneva 
Round of multilateral tariff negotiations 1947 was to be absorbed into this international organization. 
The Republican congress elected in 1946 turned down the ITO as highly imprudent and idealistic 
immediately after the World War and refused its approval to the ITO. So the GATT intended as a 
temporary agreement was transformed into a normative-institutional framework and persisted until 
it passed into the World Trade Organization in 1995.95 
The contemporary world – a world much different from the one prior to World War II as 
described in the preceding paragraph – has been frequently described by the term “globalization” 
in the past decades. Although globalization, as a widely acknowledged phenomenon as well as a 
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commonly accepted concept, did not emerge until late 1980s,96 the Bretton Woods Conference 
of 1944, which created the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, had lifted 
the curtain in front of international steps towards globalization.97 The following excerpt 
sketches the history of the emergence of the three pillars of international economic mechanism 
in the post-WWII era– that is, the IMF, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs (GATT). The three organizations contribute to globalization mainly by facilitating 
and improving currency policy, capital flows, and free trade in the world. 
The 1944 Bretton Woods conference in the United States established the charters for the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, two pillars of the post-World War II international 
economic institutional system. Because the Bretton W ods conference was directed and organized 
by the financial ministers of the governments concer ed, it was not there felt appropriate to address 
the trade questions which generally belonged to other ministries. Yet the Bretton Woods conference 
explicitly recognized the necessity of an international trade organization to complement the 
responsibilities of the financial organizations. Indeed, in some ways the WTO, after many decades, 
has become the ‘missing leg’ of the Bretton Woods system.98  
The GATT, which had operated for nearly 50 years as a transitional arrangement for the 
ITO before the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, has led the 
process of trade globalization since 1947. The principles announced in the GATT regarding 
international trade, as enumerated in the following excerpt, illustrate mirrors the fact that the 
GATT relied on liberalized and multilateral leverages to unite the fragmentary world that had 
existed in the pre-WWII era:  
GATT is based on three principles. First, only a liberalized world trade could foster worldwide 
welfare and second, GATT should serve on a long term basis to cut down all trade barriers. Third, 
rules for a liberal trading system are best developed in multilateral forums.99  
Both the context of the GATT’s advent and the principles of trade globalization established 
by the GATT indicated the determination of the inter ational community to put an end to a 
fragmented world. Generally speaking, the GATT has contributed to this end in at least two ways. 
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On the one hand, it guided the international community to reach a consensus on primary 
principles in trade rule-making. On the other hand, it provided multilateral forums for 
rule-making and dispute settlement. In other words, it i  the GATT that dominated the process of 
trade globalization and addressed, at least in part, the problems of legal fragmentation. 
C. Legal Globalization – Inherent Problems 
Despite the historical contribution the GATT has made s indicated above, the 
GATT/WTO-led globalization efforts have eventually found themselves faced with two types of 
problems: “birth defects” (that is, inherent problems) and “acquired problems.” The deeper the 
globalization is, the more obvious these problems have become. This subsection and the next 
subsection portray the defects and problems in question, beginning with so called “birth 
defects.”  
“Birth defects” refer to inherent flaws of the GATT mechanism . Several causes can be 
identified to explain their existence. First, the rules binding all participants were designed by 
forces that could not represent the majority. Second, the rules were made as compromises 
between the leading forces acing as a minority. Third, non-legal dispositions were turned to by 
the rule-makers when no compromises could be achieved regarding legal leverages. These flaws 
forced (1) the countries which constitute a majority but less powerful group, (2) the countries 
who have not gained their ideal negotiating results, and (3) the countries who are powerful 
enough to impose their preferences on other countries to rely on their own discretion regarding  
domestic implementation of multilateral rules to achieve their own goals. 
First, as indicated in the preceding subsection, “the major initiatives leading to the 
establishment of GATT were taken by the United States during World War II, in cooperation 
with its allies, particularly the United Kingdom.”100 The fact that the multilateral rules were 
developed by a small group of participants in the world trading system has implied the potential 
incompetence of the rules to serve multilateral trading relationships that have come to involve a 
large number of countries. The following excerpt briefly reviews such leadership of the United 
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States and Great Britain: 
Britain had provided the original blueprint for the charter during the war, but the Americans had 
seized the initiative by 1943. Since then, the United States had directed the show in two meetings in 
Washington, two nuclear club preparatory conferences, and the world gathering in Havana. A 
commercial code – a dream for years, if not decades – was now a reality. Considering that the ITO 
code had been negotiated in a chaotic era, its completion was a remarkable feat.101 
Second, the outcome of the trade negotiations which resulted in the GATT 1947 was largely 
regarded as a compromise between the two leading forces, rather a fully reasoned system, 
although the outcome itself was impressive. One authority gives this positive evaluation of the 
early trade negotiations:  
The arduous planning process had resulted in a weighty document that addressed all aspects of 
commercial relations. The Havana Charter [which would have created and governed the ITO] was 
complex. It reflected the difficult circumstances of the times and accounted for the diverse 
economic systems of its signatories. Multilateralism was still the goal, albeit in a far-off future. And 
the United States had shown leadership befitting its stature as a powerhouse and defender of the 
West.102 
Behind the remarkable achievements of the GATT negotiati ns, however, were deep 
discrepancies between the two leading countries. As one of the critical discrepancies, different 
opinions between the USA and the UK regarding the aim of multilateral discipline resulted 
inevitably in compromises on some issues between thm. The following excerpt provides some 
elaboration on this point:  
Whereas the Americans endorsed multilateralism as an end in itself to promote private enterprises 
and prosperity, the British cared only that trade volume increased. For the British, regulation of 
commerce was the safe route to growth. …Free trade frightened the British. Their economy was in 
shambles and the sun was setting over the empire. …The Commonwealth put the United States on 
notice that a regime of free trade was unacceptable, but regardless, American officials forged ahead. 
They sought to assuage British concerns while pursuing their multilateral dreams. Their 
determination was strong, but so was the resistance t home and abroad to their vision. …The 
Washington meeting had not given Britain all that it wanted. …Yet Prime Minister Attllee also had 
good reason to be satisfied. British trade interests had been upheld and America’s doctrinaire free 
trade ideas stymied.103  
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In addition to the aim of multilateralism, the form of multilateralism also invited debates 
among trading partners. As early as the wartime, two different strands of thought on the form of 
global trading system emerged. One of them cast doubt on the path of concluding trade 
agreements. The other criticized the trade policies adopted by main trading partners during the 
interwar period. Both of them regarded regionalism, bilateralism, or unilateralism insufficient to 
achieve an ideal order of world trade. The blending of the two strands then inevitability pointed 
to multilateralism, which founded the creation of the GATT.104 One authority examines the 
blending of the two strands of thought regarding creating an organization of trade, as excerpted 
below: 
The two strands of thinking about creating an organization for international trade began to merge in 
1945. In the United States, Congress enacted the 1945 renewal of the reciprocal trade agreements 
legislation for a three-year period. In December of that year, the US government invited a number of 
nations to enter into negotiations to conclude a multilateral agreement for the mutual reduction of 
tariffs. Also in 1945, the United Nations was formed; and in 1946 its subordinate body ECOSOC 
(the Economic and Social Council) began work to develop a draft charter for what was to be 
designated the International Trade Organization (ITO). The major work was undertaken at Geneva 
in 1947.  
The basic idea at Geneva in 1947 was that the ITO would be the organization and that GATT would 
be a specialized agreement as a part of the ITO and would depend on the ITO for institutional 
support such as decisions, dispute settlement, membership obligations, and so on.105 
Besides ideological discrepancies among the negotiators, their differing political concerns 
also undermined the perfection of the global trading system. In the shadow of the Cold War, 
which since roughly 1946 brought about political conflict, military tension, proxy wars and 
economic competition between the Communist world (primarily the Soviet Union and its 
satellite states and allies) and the powers of the Western world (primarily the United States and 
its allies), the trade negotiations proceeded arduously due to a lack of necessary trust and 
cooperation among the negotiators. As Thomas W. Zeiler remarks, “the Cold War had an 
overriding impact on the outcome of the Havana conference. On the grounds of national security, 
free-traders retreated in the Geneva and Havana Charter discussions, just as they had in the 
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GATT negotiations.”106 
Despite the discrepancies in views between the USA and Great Britain, they were still both 
intent on establishing a multilateral trading mechanism as soon as possible. Therefore, 
compromise arose inevitably between the two countries on many issues: 
For instance, the United States sought precise limits on state traders and cartels, which enjoyed price 
advantages over merchants left unsheltered from government aid or global combines. Britain 
welcomed large-scale organizations as long as they did not discriminate. Besides, the Soviet Union 
would insist on government monopolies. The experts l f  the extent of freedom allowed for cartels 
and state trading undetermined, but clearly, America would have to give way.107 
Third, difficulties encountered by the founders of the GATT in trying to balance the 
soundness and attractiveness of the global trade syst m further weakened the GATT’s perfection. 
As one expert points out as follows: 
Regimes always face the dilemma of granting a certain order and security on the one hand but 
leaving states the feeling that they are not locked in rigid compliance with the respective regime’s 
rules on the other hand. So called ‘safeguard clauses’ in international agreements vouch for 
exceptions of non-compliance with certain rules if compliance would seriously undermine the 
well-being of part or all of the population.108 
Furthermore, the fact that the multilateral regulations did not cover every issue relating to 
international trade – a necessity in order to reduc criticisms from some participants in the 
negotiations –also undermined the accountability of the global trading system.  
Taking into account the above factors, it should come as no surprise that the global trading 
system had some inherent defects. A mountain of literature on this point has emerged, involving 
nearly every aspect of the system. The illustrations that address the inherent problems of this 
multilateral system include article drafting,109 the WTO legal structure,110 limited coverage of 
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trade agreements,111 and the power-orienting nature of trade negotiations.112   
To summarize some key themes emerging from those obrvations: many aspects of the 
multilateral system bear inherent problems due to various causes. The contributions made by the 
United States and the United Kingdom in establishing the global trade system were undoubted – 
indeed, perhaps little short of magnificent. It was, however, this unshakable leadership that 
caused problems in the first place since the rules made by the minority had binding force on the 
majority. Furthermore, issues that could not be compro ised between the two countries were 
excluded from multilateral rules. Consequently, trade globalization has been led by a defective 
mechanism with birth defects or inherent flaws.       
D. Legal Globalization – Acquired Problems  
The following paragraphs enumerate several main problems confronted by the GATT/WTO, 
including mainly (1) surge of sovereign countries; (2) self-evolution of the global trading system; 
and (3) development of international law. A direct result of the surge of sovereign countries is the 
increasing number of domestic legal systems, which will invite more processes of indigenization. 
The self-evolution of the global trading system, which has brought new challenges and tasks to 
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the WTO, provides further space for the process of legal indigenization. The development of 
international law in the past decades, particularly in the areas of global governance, human rights, 
and multiple international actors, has not been sufficiently addressed by the multilateral trading 
rules, and then has provided ample space for the individual members to take advantage of their 
discretion to act according to their own preferences. 
1. Surge of sovereign countries 
Many sovereign countries emerged in the movement of decolonization between the 1940s 
and the 1960s, and this development presented one of th main challenges to the global trading 
system. To date, the WTO has 153 members, which means th t the global legal system has to be 
accepted by and implemented in 153 “domestic” legal systems. This number is roughly three 
times the number of states that even existed as of the 1940s.  
Complexity stemming from the surge of sovereign countries has been further demonstrated 
by the trend of the overlapping groups of the members within the WTO. To date, there are 24 
negotiating groups in the WTO, such as the African Group, the Recent New Members, the 
Cairns Group, the G-20, and the Friends of Fish. Some groups were formed based on geographic 
location – for instance, the African Group. Some were composed on the basis of similar trade 
interests, such as the Cotton-4. Some others were grouped according to economic development 
levels – for instance, least-developed countries. Individual WTO members may participate in 
multiple groups. For example, the United States is member of the Friends of Ambition (NAMA), 
the Friends of Fish, the Joint Proposal, and the APEC. China possesses membership in the G-20, 
the G-33, the Paragraph 6 Countries, the Friends of A-D Negotiations (FANs), the “W52” 
Sponsors, the APEC, and the Recent New Members (RNMs). 
In a broader context, the surge of sovereign countries has also brought challenges to the 
legal foundations of general international law. One of the challenges, as identified by the 
following excerpt, might be a changing role of these newly established countries – that is, a role 
changing from ensuring the peaceful coexistence of states to ensuring comprehensive 
cooperation on international issues: 
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With more entities being recognized as full subjects of international law, the differences in the leves 
of economic development amongst the members of the in ernational community became much more 
obvious than they had been in colonial times. These changes came to test the legal foundations of 
international law. It became, for instance, more and more evident that a strict reliance on the concept 
of legal equality could not be upheld in all circumstances within a growing community whose 
members had different economic, political and military capacities. These changes and the ensuring 
developments reflected to a certain extent the broader forces influencing international law whose 
function slowly changed from that of ensuring the peaceful coexistence of states to ensuring 
broad-ranging cooperation on a number of socio-economic issues.113  
2. Self-evolution of the global trading system 
In 1995, the GATT mechanism evolved into the WTO mechanism, which implied further 
legalization of the global trading system. As Pitou van dijck summarizes, “[f]rom an institutional 
point of view, the establishment of the WTO is a major breakthrough and strengthens the rule of 
law in international trade.”114 In short, there has been a remarkable process of evolution in the 
global trading system. 
However, the institutional evolution cannot overcome all the insufficiencies of the former 
GATT mechanism. The new WTO mechanism still faces with new challenges. In the coming 
excerpt, Pitou van dijck and G. J. Faber enumerate three principal callings encountered by the 
WTO after its establishment. These three callings iclude: (1) a large number of yet-unfulfilled 
tasks resulting from the Marrakesh Agreement; (2) inconsistencies the WTO has to deal with 
between multilateral rules and regional rules; and (3) the WTO’s responsibility to pursue “the 
new trade agenda.”115 Although 16 years has passed since van dijick and Faber raised these 
concerns, it seems that the WTO has not addressed them efficiently till now, on the grounds that: 
(1) since the establishment of the WTO, there are no substantive agreements have been passed 
within the multilateral trading system; (2) although more and more FTAs emerged in these years, 
the multilateral trading system has done little to address substantial consistence between FTAs 
and multilateral rules; and (3) the first round of multilateral trade negotiations since the 
establishment of the WTO – the DDA – has not been concluded. However, although these 
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concerns have not been completely relaxed, they have deeply affected the focus and approaches 
of the WTO’s operations.  
In addition to these issues, another challenge to the WTO is that it operates within a 
proliferation of multilaterally binding agreements, understandings, and other legal documents. 
This has resulted in imbalanced legal context. The phenomenon of such a proliferation of legal 
documents is characterized as “legalization” in the WTO. One observer offers this definition:   
Legalization is a particular form of institutionalization characterized along three dimensions: 
obligation, precision and delegation. In the context of the GATT/WTO system, obligation refers to 
norms set out in all WTO agreements, Understandings a d other binding documents. Precision 
measures not only the clarity of the wording of relat d WTO agreements, but also the extent to 
which these substantive WTO obligations require (or pr hibit) specific action by WTO members. 
Delegation reflects the willingness of the WTO membrs to relinquish their sovereignty in terms of 
both the DSM and the other activities of WTO institutions.116  
Based on that three-pronged definition of legalization, the author evaluates the dynamic 
process of legalization in the GATT/WTO by further breaking down the system into three 
different parts – a decision-making mechanism, a surveillance mechanism, and a Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism – and draws this conclusion: 
By reviewing both the current status of legalization in each part and the historical developments, 
this [analysis] concludes that as a general pattern, all three parts of the GATT/WTO have been 
significantly legalized and there are certain degres of correlation between the processes.117 
To sum up, the above analysis shows that the internal volution of the multilateral trading 
system, such as the mechanical advancement and a proliferation of legal instruments, has 
brought about new challenges to the WTO, or at least h  not completely resolved the problems 
faced by the organization. 
3. Development of international law 
General international law has witnessed impressive developments since the conclusion of 
World War II. Not surprisingly, globalization has contributed to such developments. The Hague 
Academy of International Law offers the following observations regarding the way in which 
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globalization influences international law, which can be summarized as that globalization has 
constituted a new factor to test the adequacy and effectiveness of international law:  
It would appear that no general answers may be provided concerning [the] debate [on pros and cons 
of globalization]. In any event, what can be said is that globalization constitutes essentially a factu l 
phenomenon which may, on the one hand, prove beneficial to humankind but which, on the other, 
may raise a challenge to the public interest mandate of governmental institutions. In any event, the 
concept captures in a nutshell the current state of increased transnationalism which constitutes the 
background against which the adequacy and effectiveness of international law and its institutions 
must be carefully tested.118  
Two particularly noteworthy aspects of international law have emerged from globalization: 
rules on global governance and the law of human rights. On the one hand, global governance 
provides new legal foundations for the global trading system with regard to its missions. On the 
other hand, since one of the main characteristics of global governance is to regulate originally 
“domestic” affairs, the operation of global governance will directly confront legal culture and 
tradition at the domestic level.  
a. From law of nations to global governance 
It is probably not too much of a generalization to say that before 20th century most issues 
were local – that is, internal to the states or provinces or municipalities to which most people 
saw themselves as owing loyalty and from which they drew benefit. This began to change 
following World War I. The concept of international l w in the early days of the 20th century 
was different from that of today. A text from a century ago asserted that “[i]nternational law, 
otherwise called the Law of Nations, is the law of the society of states or nations.”119 The 
change emerged as early as the pre-WWII era. As Chri topher C. Joyner points out, “[t]he 
League [of Nations] attempted to realize the ideal th t national might should be subordinated to 
collective international right, codified in the rule of law. But it was not to be, as the onslaught of 
the Second World War destroyed that international order and created the need for a new 
international system governed by new legal rules.”120 
                                                 
118 Hague Academy of International Law, RECUEIL DES COURS 42-43 (2001). 
119 John Westlake, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1910). 
120 Christopher C. Joyner, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 20 (2005). 
 
77 
To a large extent, that need was met. As a main trait of international governance, many 
issues which used to be “internal” affairs now fallwithin the coverage of international law: 
Looking backward, the scope and substance of interna ional law expanded tremendously during the 
20th century. …It is wrong to assert that national policies with significant international impacts are 
not regulated by international prescriptions and are remanded exclusively to policymakers as 
national decisions…The process of taking effective decisions to govern transnational events 
describes the essence of international law. By the early 21st century, this process has already been 
subjected to effective restraints that limit the fredom of national decision makers and promote 
policy choices compatible with an international political system comprising associated states who 
share a common set of fundamental rights and duties.121  
Obviously, it is the ideology of “global governance” that has accompanied the expansion of 
the concept of international law. A fundamental question revolves, however, over what global 
governance is. So far, there is little agreement on a u iform definition of global governance 
among scholars. One observer offers this summary of the various strategies that have been 
adopted by scholars to explain this concept:   
In the literature, three strategies to categorize global governance have emerged. The first offers a 
non-definition consisting of the denial that something like global governance exists at all…; the 
second is to offer a positive definition that often very idealistically assumes that a new form of 
managing global affairs has developed that can be chara terized through specific actors, instruments, 
or practices. The third is by juxtaposing global governance to a term with which we feel more 
comfortable.122  
Despite disagreements on the definition of global governance, James Muldoon finds out 
and summarizes four important aspects of the concept of global governance – (1) 
non-governmental mechanisms, (2) diverse actors, (3) three dimensions (i.e., political, economic, 
and social cultural), and (4) operations at multiple levels: 
First, global governance recognizes non-governmental mechanisms as having as much influence on 
how the global system is governed as do governmental mechanisms. Second, the actors involved in 
creating or forming instruments of global governance include “individuals, voluntary groups, 
localities, regions, ethnic groups, nation-states and all kinds of transnational actors.” Third, global 
governance infers the gradual integration of the thr e domains of governance – political, economic, 
and socio-cultural – and the fragmentation of world er due to transitory and contested spheres of 
authority which are disaggregative or anti-systemic. And fourth, global governance architecture is 
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projected to be predominantly non-hierarchical in structure and to operate at multiple levels.123  
Among various ways to understand the concept of global governance as contained in the 
preceding paragraphs, one is to understand the concept from the perspective of the core public 
goods it should provide. The following list enumerat s several essential purposes of global 
governance with regard to providing public goods at the international level: 
• International stability and security, for which the greatest powers carry the main responsibility; 
• An international legal order which should ensure the effective equality of all; 
• An open and inclusive economic world system that meets the needs of all, especially the poorest, 
so as to enable all to participate fully in decision-making; 
• Global welfare as the global equivalent of national human security systems; and 
• The shared commitment to combat pockets of lawlessness and settle regional conflicts.124  
The ideology of global governance provides new legal foundations for the global trading 
system with regard to its mission. Sol Picciotto points out that, “[t]he creation of the WTO has 
established a focus for global renegotiation of a virtually unlimited range of global governance 
issues, by linking them to the bargaining of market access.”125 Another authority has, on the 
other hand, highlighted the challenges presented to the WTO by the proposition of global 
governance, especially the challenge to identify the WTO’s role in such a context: 
[T]here are very different perceptions of the responsibilities of the WTO in the realm of global 
governance and what they should be in the future. Current criticisms of the WTO are in large 
measure linked to these different perceptions. Some say it is not living up to its responsibilities, 
while other say it is meddling in their affairs. Achieving a common understanding of the role of the 
WTO is an absolute priority for the international community if the enormous contribution that the 
multilateral rules-based trading system has made to world economic growth and stability over the 
past 50 years is to continue for the next half-century and beyond.126  
b. Human rights law and international trade 
The development of a global law of human rights in the past decades has also proven to be 
a key feature of the evolution of international law. Human rights law has experienced a rapid 
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development since the conclusion of WWII.127 The emphasis given to human rights by 
international trade law has not provided a sufficient discipline for the WTO Members to address 
the relationship between human rights and internatio l trade law at the domestic level. In other 
words, to what degree an individual member can deviat  from multilateral trading rules due to 
human rights concerns are not yet much clear. It is a wide discretion for individual members to 
address this issue by their own approaches.   
In short, the past several decades have witnessed dramatic changes in the identification, 
observation, and documentation of international human rights. How does this story bear on the 
international trade system? Article XX of the GATT 1994 gives a typical illustration of how the 
global trade system has been influenced by the ideology of human rights. With the expansion of 
human rights laws at the international level, the frequency of the citation of Article XX has 
largely increased among trading partners. Article XX actually establishes the linkage between 
the trade laws and human rights. However, in addition to an exceptional clause, it also serves as 
an embedded human rights clause, within the GATT, by investing discretion to individual 
members to address human rights concerns.128  
To sum up, human rights concerns have been accepted by both the organization and its 
Members as not only an exception to existing trade rules, but also an integral part of the 
elements that influence trade measures. The lagging responses to these requirements from 
multilateral rules has provided the opportunity for the individual countries to dispose pertinent 
issues with their own leverages or methodologies. 
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c. International actors – beyond states 
Accompanying the emergence of global governance has been an expansion of the range of 
actors regarded as members of the international community, so that it includes not just sovereign 
states but also international organization, nonstate ac ors, terrorist groups, regimes, and 
individuals. Joyner offers these observations:  
Different types of actors, operating at different levels, participate in the international community. 
National, transnational, and certain nonstate actors exert notable influence within the international 
system. To varying degrees, all have been made persons or subjects with legal status, personality, 
rights, and duties under international law.129  
Generally speaking, the emergence of new actors in the international community has 
challenged WTO operations in various aspects. The following paragraphs provide a collection of 
analyses from several authorities that illustrate how these new actors have interacted with the 
WTO.  
 Global civil society130 and the WTO 
The dynamic set into motion by global civil society’s claim to occupy the space of international 
community in the current juncture can be illustrated by reference to the efforts of “global civil 
society” in relation to one international institution, the World Trade Organization. … The critique 
[from the global civil society] of external transparency argues that the WTO should become more 
open and accessible to the civil society representatives of the world community directly, and not 
only via the representatives of member-states. Implicitly, the argument is that the laws that are 
negotiated at the WTO lack a legitimate “ground” because the institution is not representative of the 
“global community”... if that community is no longer understood to be authentic, so must law’s 
claim to authority and legitimacy fail.131  
 Terrorist groups and the WTO 
Terrorist organizations also engage in what on the surface appears to be legitimate businesses.… 
Indeed, the business network of terrorist organizations is truly multinational. Al-Qaeda and other 
radical Islamic groups are suspected of receiving fu ding from Al Taqwa, a group of companies in 
Switzerland, Liechtenstein, the Bahamas, and Italy, with shares of business throughout Europe, the 
Middle East, and Africa. Al Taqwa has cement plants, drydocks, textile and brick factories, a 
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division that trades factories, and a division thattr des steel, wheat, oil, and other commodities. The 
business networks that fund al-Qaeda and similar terrorist groups certainly rely on globalized trade 
facilitated by the WTO. Thus, the sanctions available in the WTO regime, amongst them notably 
Article XXI, have the ability to minimize the terrorist funding.132  
 Individuals and the WTO 
WTO law does not prescribe that domestic courts should set aside domestic laws found to be 
incompatible with WTO rules. ..[I]ndividuals depend upon their own national legal and political 
system to enforce the benefits of trade liberalization commitments. In some WTO Members, they 
can ask their government to take action against another WTO Member when their trading rights are 
impaired.133  
[In addition, the] universal recognition of human rights as part of modern general international law 
requires a human rights approach also to WTO law. If the value of governments derives from 
maximizing human rights as a legal precondition for enabling individuals fully to develop their 
personalities and participate in democratic governance, then also international organizations derive 
their value for enhancing human rights.134  
The general picture that emerges from the above details can be summarized in this way: 
with the emergence of new actors in the internationl community as the new subjects of 
international law, the WTO has to face new challenges regarding issues such as legitimacy, 
judicial procedure, anti-terrorism and domestic implementation of international rules. 
E. Legal Indigenization as a Response to Problematic Globalization 
The significance of the above analysis lies in clarifying that trade globalization being thrust 
upon or led by the GATT/WTO mechanism presents serious challenges. How should the WTO 
react to these challenges? Two competing strands of thought regarding the direction of the 
reactions have invited intense attention from academia. The two competing strands of thought 
are not sufficient to address the realistic needs of the participators of the international community, 
however. One of the strands – reversibility of globalization – is unrealistic, considering the fact 
that so many aspects of a country’s economic life have been involved in the process of 
globalization. The other strand – focusing on furthe  globalization – confronts the difficulties to 
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conclude the current multilateral negotiations. Furthermore, these two strands focus on the 
international level only, and incline to ignore the corresponding responses at the domestic level. 
In practices, the individual countries do have a third option – that is, legal indigenization. 
One the one hand, the belief that globalization is beneficial and irreversible has offered firm 
support for the promotion of further globalization. Advocates for this belief come from both 
political and legal fields. The following two excerpts recall the assertion made by some 
politicians who have asserted the irreversibility of gl balization: 
Our political leaders take pleasure in constantly repeating that globalization is a force of nature as 
irresistible and inevitable as the tides. On 18 May 1998, before the representatives of 132 countries 
meeting in Geneva to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the GATT-WTO, Bill Clinton proclaimed 
that ‘Globalization is not a policy choice, it is a fact.’ And Tony Blair added: ‘Globalization is 
irreversible and irresistible.135  
In a speech on U.S. foreign policy, President Clinton told his audience: ‘Today we must embrace the 
inexorable logic of globalization – that everything from our economy to the safety of our cities, to 
the health of our people, depends on events not only within our borders, but half a world away.’ On 
another occasion he emphasized that ‘globalization is irreversible. Protectionism will only make 
things worse.’136  
Many sources from academia also assert the irreversibility of globalization: 
In Globalization from Below, Jeremy Brecher, Tim Costello, and Brendan Smith (2000) argue that 
the economic, political, and cultural interconnectedn ss signified by globalization is irreversible and 
possibly a good thing: this interconnection, they assert, could potentially serve the interests of 
people and the earth, not just the elites.137  
On the other hand, some scholars have cast doubt on the irreversibility of globalization. 
According to Robert Went, political forces, if mastered in support of anti-globalization sentiment, 
would be strong enough to reverse the trend of globalization, as discussed in the paragraph cited 
below:  
Although nobody denies that technological developments play an important enabling role in 
processes of globalization, very few contemporary analysts or observers claim that globalization is 
brought about by ‘some natural or technologically driven phenomena’. To talk about a ‘backlash 
against globalization’ would be senseless if globalization was to be understood as the automatic 
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outcome of exogenous technological processes, sincethat would imply that globalization is 
irrevocable. As Frankel argues: ‘(T)here is a tendency to see globalization as irreversible. But the 
political forces that fragmented the world for 30 years (1914-1944) were evidently far more 
powerful than the accretion of technological progress in transport that went on during that period. 
The lesson is that there is nothing inevitable about the process of globalization.’138  
Jude C. Hays also underscores the significance of political change in seeking alternatives to 
economic openness. As he observes, 
[t]hose who argue that globalization is irreversible ecause there are currently no alternatives to the 
policies of economic openness – at least not ones supported by major parties – underestimate the 
potential for political change.139  
Similarly, John Madeley rebuts the irreversibility of globalization by asserting the existence 
of “alternatives,” as demonstrated by the excerpt below: 
It has been said that the only certain things in life are taxes and death. But there’s something else. 
When politicians tell us ‘there is no alternative’ to this or that, one thing is certain – there is an 
alternative. So when Tony Blair says that globalization is ‘irreversible and irresistible’ and Bill 
Clinton describes it as ‘not a policy choice, but a fact’, we can be sure that globalization is 
reversible and that it is quite obviously a policy choice. Otherwise humanity has lost control to an 
impersonal force.140  
I agree with Madeley’s argument that countries do have choices in the process of 
globalization. However, I do not agree with him that the existence of choices equals to the 
reversibility of globalization. Contrary to what Madeley posits regarding the reversibility of 
globalization, these choices are not inevitably opposite to the principles established by 
globalization. The motive for countries to weigh among and choose from these choices with 
extreme carefulness is to gain a better position in the context of globalization. The process to 
weigh among these choices and to make a final decision can be conceptualized as 
“indigenization” which serves as the theme of this dissertation.     
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II.  The Concept of Indigenization in the Context of 
International Law 
Despite the pros and cons of the two strands of thoug t – for further globalization and for 
anti-globalization – we should bear in mind that the context of the contemporary international 
community is quite different from that of the world immediately after WWII in which the 
ideology of globalization was first conceived. At tha  time, the legal and policy context in which 
to conceive globalization was fragmentation. However, in today’s world, the context is 
globalization itself. Whether or not we believe that process is irreversible, we cannot deny that it 
is a reality of the contemporary world. In other words, ours is a globalized world, not a 
fragmentary world, and this constitutes the context for how the WTO member states participate 
in the WTO regime in response to a problematic legal globalization. The approach many states 
take in response to such a problematic legal globalization is described in this dissertation as 
“legal indigenization.”  
A. Meaning  
In a nutshell, “indigenization” refers to the process or ideology in which domestic 
authorities, when behaving as international actors, make and implement international or 
domestic rules in a way appealing to their native features (especially legal traditions), as 
responses to globalization led by a defective global legal system, for the purpose of getting an 
advantageous position in the context of globalization. The following paragraphs explore this 
definition in detail. 
The concept of indigenization invited wide attentio f r the first time from developing 
countries during the 1970s. The following excerpt recalls how this concept was employed at that 
time: 
The concept of indigenization gained currency during the 1970s when scholars from developing 
countries reacted to neocolonialist domination of social science by Western disciplines, calling for 
the development of independent, locally meaningful theoretical frameworks and methodologies for 
guiding research and scientific discourse. Interest grew during the 1980s, with much attention to 
disciplinary adaptation, including the epistemologies and practices of psychology, social work, and 
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sociology.141  
The meaning of the term “indigenization” varies in d fferent contexts. In the following 
bullet-point paragraphs, some illustrations are offred of how it is defined in different fields. 
• In the Oxford English Dictionary 
Indigenization The act or process of rendering indigenous or making predominantly native; 
adaptation or subjection to the influence or dominance of the indigenous inhabitants of a country; 
spec. the increased use of indigenous people in government, employment, etc. 
• In the movement of decolonization 
Indigenization, a concept identified with the movement among many African countries to re-assess 
the impact of Western elements on traditional cultura  and social institutions, denotes systematic 
actions of sub-Saharan countries to re-establish traditional elements or to introduce functional 
alternatives to conditions that were imposed upon them under the hegemony of colonial powers. … 
Indigenization refers to the conscious effort of a nce subjugated group either to reestablish 
traditional elements or to introduce functional alternatives to conditions imposed under the 
hegemony of an alien group.142  
• From an anthropological perspective 
The word ‘indigenization’ simply understood [in the context of anthropology in East and South 
Asia] … means the process of deciding which native ideas, concepts, or institutions are valid or 
appropriate in the present state of research in a gven country. As a concept, it can serve as an 
analytical tool to explain a phenomenon occurring or taking place in a country. The word 
‘indigenous’ … therefore, means ‘native to a place’ while ‘indigenize’ means ‘to make something 
originate from a place’ (Bennagen 1998).143  
• From a cultural perspective 
The concept of indigenization helps explain how transculturation and hybridization occur. 
Indigenization means that imported cultural elements take on local features as the cultural hybrids 
develop.144  
Although there is no uniform concept of the term, we can still observe at least two 
overlapping aspects of these various definitions. One is that “indigenization” involves a process 
of transformation. The other is that the aim of such transformation is to imbue the targets with 
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“native features,” including native ideas, methods, in titutions, etc. 
In order to get a better understanding of the above definition of “indigenization” in the 
context of international law, we can dissect it into several elements as listed below:  
• Nature: an ideology, a process, and a consequence; 
• Actors: domestic authorities when behaving as international actors; 
• Backgrounds: unsatisfactory international regime of trade globalization; 
• Leverages: making and implementing international and domestic rules by boosting legal 
traditions and cultures of individual participants; 
• Purpose: to gain an advantageous position in the context of globalization; and  
• Consequence: undermining or rendering uncertain the exp cted efficacy of uniform 
multilateral rules. 
For the purpose of this dissertation, “legal indigenization” serves as a tool:  
• to analyze the process in which the WTO Members inject their own legal traditions into 
international and domestic rule making and implementation; 
• to provide a perspective from which to observe domestic authorities’ participation in the 
global trading system; 
• to account for reactions of the member states to a growing GATT/WTO-led 
globalization; 
• to deepen the understanding among the WTO member stat s of each other; and 
• to explain the elements that might undermine or render uncertain the efficacy of 
international trade regulations. 
B. Comparisons with Other Relevant Terms 
In order to further understand the meaning of legal indigenization, the following paragraphs 
offer comparisons between this term and two other rel vant terms: globalization and localization. 
There is no consistency, of course, in the concept of globalization. Many scholarships have 
provided descriptions of the concept, as enumerated below:   
• Globalization – the ever-increasing integration of national economies into the global economy 
through trade and investment rules and privatization, aided by technological advances.145 
• For protestors in Seattle, Gothenburg, or Genoa, globalization represents a state of the world 
wherein international organizations implement the wishes of transnational corporations, ensuring 
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that free trade rules will combine with global market pressures to eliminate the ability of local 
and national governments to implement policies.146 
• Within corporations and business groups, globalization usually refers to a global market reach 
and to an imperative that firms must ‘globalize or die.’147 
• Among economists, globalization refers to a situation in which the so-called ‘law of one price’ 
applies on a global basis. This assumes that goods an  ervices will be freely and costlessly 
traded over space and borders.148 
• Globalization can be defined as a compression of the world by flows of interaction that are 
broadening as well as deepening around the world. These flows have brought about a greater 
degree of interdependence and economic homogenization;  more powerful burgeoning global 
market, financial institutions, and computer technologies have overwhelmed traditional economic 
practices.149 
• [There are] five key propositions about globalisation: 
1. Globalisation is the economic integration of regional and national economies. 
2. It is caused by falling cost of distance. 
3. It has exceptionally powerful effects when the reduced costs of distance combine with 
economies of scale. 
4. It first became important in the early nineteenth century. 
5. It is not solely an economic phenomenon in a historical and geographical context. It has 
political and social consequences. In particular, it impacts on, but does not eliminate, 
cultural differences, and it reduces, but does not eliminate, the policy discretion of 
nation-state.150 
• Globalization addresses the business issues associated with taking a product global. In the 
globalization of high-tech products this involves integrating localization throughout a company, 
after proper internationalization and product design, as well as marketing, sales, and support in 
the world market.’151 
A scrutiny of the above various concepts of globalization from a legal perspective shows 
that the process of globalization calls for legal homology, which means that international 
agreements and rules should serve as the common and eve  sole ancestors of domestic laws of 
the Member States. Legal homology helps to realize the economic, political and social 
                                                 
146 John F. Helliwell, GLOBALIZATION AND WELL-BEING 15 (2002). 
147 Id.  
148 Id. at 17. 
149 Richard Grant & John Rennie Short, Globalization: An Introduction, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE MARGINS 
(Richard Grant & John Rennie Short ed.) 1, 8 (2002). 
150 Brian Easton, GLOBALISATION 2 (2007). 
151 Bert Esselink, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LOCALIZATION 4 (2000). 
 
88 
expectations of the process of unification. 
 In short, “globalization” stands in obvious contrast to “indigenization.” Another concept, 
that of “localization,” appears at first glance to be much closer in meaning to “indigenization.” 
Indeed, “localization” may be confused with “indigenization.” The concept of “localization”, 
which also lacks consistency, is different from the concept of “indigenization”.   
• Localization – a process which reverses the trend of globalization by discriminating in favour of 
the local. Depending on the context, the ‘local’ is predominantly defined as part of the nation 
state, although it can on occasions be the nation sate itself or even occasionally a regional 
grouping of nation states. The policies bringing about localization are ones which increase 
control of the economy by communities and nation state . The result should be an increase in 
community cohesion, a reduction in poverty and inequality and an improvement in livelihoods, 
social infrastructure and environmental protection, and hence an increase in the all-important 
sense of security.152 
• Localization is not about restricting the flow of in ormation, technology, trade and investment, 
management and legal structures …, indeed these are encouraged by the new localist emphasis in 
global aid and trade rules. Such transfers also play a crucial role in the successful transition from 
globalization to localization. It is not a return to overpowering state control, merely governments’ 
provision of a policy and economic framework which allows people, community groups and 
businesses to rediversify their own local economies.153 
• Localization involves taking a product and making it linguistically and culturally appropriate to 
the target locale (country/region and language) where it will be used and sold.154 
Despite the diversity of the definitions of localiztion, we could ascertain that the process it 
brings about is more a kind of business behavior than a legal one in most cases. The aim of 
localization is to maximize the local influence of economic globalization, rather to alter or resist 
it.  
Based on the above concepts, Table 2.1 gives some cparisons of the three terms – 
globalization, localization and indigenization – regarding several critical aspects. Some 
explanations of the entries in Table 2.1 appear in the paragraphs that follow. 
Table 2.1 Comparisons of Globalization, Localization, and Indigenization 
                                                 
152 Hines, supra note 145, at 4-5. 
153 Id. at 5.  
154 Esselink, supra note 151, at 3.  
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 Globalization Localization Indigenization 
Nature  
Process/ideology 
/consequence 
Process/ideology 
/consequence 
Process/ideology 
/consequence 
Actors  International organizations 
Transnational corporations 
and local entities 
Domestic authorities 
Backgrounds Problematic Fragmentation  Influential globalization Problematic globalization 
Leverages  International rule making  Business behaviors 
International and domestic 
rule making and 
implementing 
Foundations  Legal homology 
Local physical factors 
(language mainly) 
Native cultural factors 
(ideas, traditions, 
institutions, etc.) 
Purposes  To benefit all participants  
To acquire benefits of 
similar amount as other 
participants of 
globalization 
To acquire more benefit 
than other participants of 
globalization 
Affected 
scope  
International and domestic 
communities 
Local communities 
International and domestic 
communities 
Legal 
consequences  
Characterizing domestic 
rule making and 
implementing with 
international features 
Local rules receive more 
attention and emphasis 
from transnational 
corporations.  
Characterizing 
international and domestic 
rule making and 
implementing with native 
features 
In most cases, it is international economic institutions that lead the process of globalization, 
considering the fact that one of the indispensable prerequisites for globalization is the 
development of uniform international rules by the international economic institutions such as the 
WTO. The leading forces of localization, by contras, u ually comprise transnational 
corporations and local entities that represent certain types of interests of local people. The 
propellers of indigenization are domestic authorities (i.e., the individual states), because only 
domestic authorities enjoy the power or legitimacy to participate in negotiations of international 
rules, to decide the approaches to implement the international rules domestically, to enact 
relevant domestic laws, and to supervise the enforcement of pertinent domestic laws. 
As indicated in the preceding sections, globalization was introduced to the contemporary 
world as a means of overcoming a fragmentary world before WWII. With the expansion of the 
influence of globalization, local entities and transnational corporations in local areas began to 
adopt localization to make globalization more acceptable in a way that appeals to local physical 
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factors such as language and slogans. However, globalization does not bring about only benefits. 
With more and more disadvantages of globalization being highlighted due to its defects, 
individual states, as traditional and significant participants of globalization, start to employ 
indigenization as a means of counterbalancing the disadvantages of globalization and to get an 
advantageous position therein. It is worth underscoring that globalization serves as a practical 
prerequisite for both localization and indigenization. 
The main leverage employed by globalization is international rule making which targets at 
establishing uniform standards of international conducts among individual countries. The 
leverages of localization mainly include business behaviors, such as adapting a product’s shape, 
color, packing and weight to local taste or preference, translating manuals of imported goods 
into local languages, putting forward business slogans that appeals to local custom, and adjusting 
terms of foreign investment contracts to meet the requirements of local regulations or policies. 
The leverages of indigenization are different from those of either globalization or localization. 
Individual states engaging in indigenization mainly rely on domestic legal traditions and cultures 
to influence the making and implementation of interational rule as well as the enactment and 
enforcement of domestic law. 
The foundation of globalization is legal homology, which refers to the fact that international 
law has served as the uniform source or origin of pertinent domestic law. The grounds of 
localization and indigenization are similar – that is, local or native features. The difference 
between the grounds of localization and indigenization is that in the case of localization, local 
features mainly refer to physical factors such as language, while in the case of indigenization, 
native features mainly refer to ideological or cultural factors, such as legal traditions. 
The asserted purpose of globalization is to benefit all participants of the process. The aim of 
localization is to magnify the influence of globalization to improve the welfare of both 
transnational corporations and local communities. Indigenization attempts to balance the 
conflicting aspects of globalization with native features, so as to weaken or avoid disadvantages 
that an individual participant (usually a sovereign state) might encounter in an imperfect system 
of globalization. 
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The influential scope of globalization covers both international and domestic communities. 
At the international level, more and more issues that used to be “internal” (domestic) ones have 
fallen within the scope now of international regulations. At the domestic level, national laws 
have to adapt to pertinent international rules. The influential scope of localization is usually 
limited to local areas (sometimes a part of a country), since the measures regarding localization 
aim to magnify the influence of globalization in local areas. Similar to that of globalization, the 
influential scope of indigenization covers both inter ational and domestic communities. At the 
international level, an individual state avails itself of the opportunities of international 
negotiations to persuade the international community to adopt principles or rules the state itself 
advocates. At the domestic level, the state both (i) manipulates the approaches to implement 
international rules in a way appealing to its own legal tradition and culture and (ii) controls the 
enactment and enforcement of national laws pertinent to its international rights and obligations 
in the same way. 
The essential legal consequence of globalization lies in the fact that domestic legal regimes 
have been imbued with international features. In most cases that involve foreign elements, 
international principles and rules have become the principles and rules of domestic law. In the 
process of localization, local rules usually are barely impacted by business behaviors that 
involve foreign elements. On the contrary, local rules will receive more attention and emphasis 
from transnational corporations, considering the fact that these corporations try to make the 
influence of globalization more acceptable among local communities. As to indigenization, its 
legal consequence is contrary to that of globalization. Principles or rules backed by domestic 
legal traditions or cultures are employed by indiviual states to influence international 
rule-making and implementation as well as domestic law enactment and enforcement. 
Summary  
The international trading regime was marked in the early portion of the twentieth century 
by fragmentation – that is, every participant involved in international trade adopted its own 
principles and rules of conduct regarding trade issue . The destructive consequences of such 
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legal fragmentation triggered the emergence of multilateral rules which largely contributed to 
globalization. However, scrutinizing the legal aspects of globalization reveals that the 
multilateral trading system – which serves as one of the most important pillars of globalization – 
suffers from both inherent and acquired problems. As a response to the shortcomings of 
globalization, individual states rely on their own legal traditions and cultures to influence the 
development and implementation of international rules as well as their own enactment and 
enforcement of domestic laws. Such a response is define  in this dissertation as legal 
indigenization, which means the process or ideology in which domestic authorities, when 
behaving as international actors, make and implement international or domestic rules in a way 
appealing to their native features (especially legal traditions), as responses to globalization led 
by a defective global legal system, for the purpose of getting an advantageous position in the 
context of globalization.  
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CHAPTER 3.  LEGAL INDIGENIZATION OF WTO  LAW IN CHINA  
 
From the conceptual account of legal indigenization offered above in Chapter 2, we turn 
now to a substantive account – highlighting how China has indigenized WTO law in certain 
aspects. In this chapter, as well as the succeeding chapters, we need to be quite selective, 
identifying just some of the aspects of legal indigenization in China that seem especially 
fundamental in character. Consistent with “legal indigenization,” the aspects of legal 
indigenization in China discussed in this chapter reflect deeply rooted attitudes taken in China 
towards WTO law. Among the most prominent topics emphasized in the pages that follow are 
four aspects of the process of legal indigenization taking place in China: international trade 
negotiations, international trade disputes, domestic legislation, and domestic adjudication.  
I. International Trade Rule-making  
Since its WTO accession in 2001, China has participated actively in WTO-sponsored 
multilateral trade negotiations, submitting proposals and transmitting various documents to the 
WTO. The proposals submitted by China reflect what kind of organization China expects the 
WTO to become and what effects China will take to help it do so. 
As of now, China has concluded FTAs with ASEAN, Pakistan, Chile, New Zealand, 
Singapore, Peru, and Costa Rica.155 Pertinent FTAs cover trade in goods, trade in servic s, and 
investment.156 The contents of FTAs relating to trade in goods usually comprise the rules of 
classification, the formula of tariff reduction, rules of origin, safeguards measures, quantitative 
restrictions and other non-tariff barriers, acknowledgement of China’s status as a market 
economy, and other issues.157 The FTAs on trade in services comprise provisions regarding 
market access, national treatment, and specific commit ents.158 The FTAs on investment 
include provisions regarding national treatment, MFN treatment, transparency of the legal 
                                                 
155 The Ministry of Commerce, available at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/list/ftanews/1/catlist.html, last visited on 
Feb. 27, 2012. 
156 For example, China-ASEAN FTA and China-New Zealand FTA, available at 
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/list/ftanews/1/catlist.html, last visited Feb. 27, 2012. 
157 For example, China-ASEAN FTA (Trade in Goods) and China-Chile FTA, available at 
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/list/ftanews/1/catlist.html, last visited Feb. 27, 2012. 
158 For example, China-ASEAN FTA (Trade in Services) and China-Costa Rica FTA, available at 
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/list/ftanews/1/catlist.html, last visited Feb. 27, 2012. 
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system governing foreign investment, construction of a favorable investment environment, and 
legal protections provided for foreign investors.159 
For the purpose of this section, proposals submitted by the negotiating groups of which 
China is a member are excluded – an approach that is also adopted in Chapters 4 and 5 – since it 
would be difficult to differentiate precisely the specific proposals made by China from those 
made by other members. Instead, we shall focus on the proposals and propositions offered 
independently by, or directly attributable to, China.  
A. Review of the Chinese Proposals  
The Chinese proposals can be grouped into three types – those on S&D treatment, 
substantive provisions, and procedural provisions. As shown in the coming examination, China 
gives particular attention in its proposals to the improvement of Special and Differential 
Treatment (S&D treatment). This principle – the benefit of which is afforded to developing and 
least-developed countries under Part IV of GATT160 and in several Uruguay Round agreements 
– constitutes a fundamental principle in the WTO regime. 
1. Special and Differential (S&D) treatment in China’s proposals 
The term “S&D” appears frequently in the documents China submits to the WTO regarding 
various issues of international trade. For instance, China has argued that “S&D treatment should 
be accorded to developing countries while participants im to clarify and improve the disciplines 
on fisheries subsidies.”161 Likewise, for market access for non-agricultural products, China has 
called for safeguarding “the benefits of developing country Members through implementing the 
principle of ‘less than full reciprocity’.”162 
                                                 
159 For example, China-ASEAN FTA (Investment) and China-Peru FTA, available at 
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/list/ftanews/1/catlist.html, last visited Feb. 27, 2012. 
160 Part IV is entitled “Trade and Development.”  
161 China, Proposal on Fisheries Subsidies, TN/RL/W/9, June 20, 2002 [hereinafter China-TN/RLW/9].  
162 China, Market Access for Non-agricultural Products, TN/MA/W/20, ¶2, December 24, 2002 [hereinafter 
China-TN/MA/W/20].  
Less than full reciprocity is usually taken to mean that the developing countries would undertake less tariff 
reduction commitments, in percentage terms, compared to developed countries.  
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Furthermore, the granting of S&D treatment to developing and least-developed participants 
regarding antidumping issues should, according to China, be demonstrated by implementing the 
principles of “lesser duty rule,” “increasing of negligible import volume and e minimis 
dumping margin,” preferring “price undertakings,” and enforcing “automatic sunset of 
anti-dumping measures.”163 
The attention China has given to S&D treatment alsoppears in other trade areas as well. 
For example, as for risk management in importing and exporting procedures, China suggests that 
“developing and least-developed Members, including low-income economies in transition shall 
not be obligated to introduce the risk management techniques without the acquisition of such 
capability.”164 Similarly, with respect to environmental goods, China recommends creating a 
development list for developing members – that is, a list of S&D-eligible items drawn from the 
common list that comprises specific product lines on which there is consensus that they 
constitute environmental goods.165 China also suggests establishing in the Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB) explicit S&D-related provisions applicable to all developing-country members,166 
accompanied with a draft of “proposed text.”167  
2. Substantive provisions in China’s proposal 
In addition to increasing adherence to the principle of S&D treatment, China has also 
suggested the improvement of some substantive provisions covered by the WTO agreements. 
Overall , China has identified the following substantive issues as needing improvement: the 
scope of fisheries subsidies; “non-actionable” subsidie  as to the fisheries industry;168 base rates 
                                                 
163 China, On the Negotiation on Anti-dumping, TN/RL/W/66, ¶2.1-2.4, March 6, 2003 [hereinafter 
China-TN/RL/W/66].  
164 China, Communication, TN/TF/W/148, July 18, 2007 [hereinafter China-TN/F W/148].  
165 China, Statement on Environmental Goods at the Committee on Trade and Environment Special Session 
(CTESS) Meeting, TN/TE/W/42, July 6, 2004 [hereinafter China-TN/TEW/42].  
166 China, Improving the Special and Differential Provisions i the Dispute Settlement Understanding, 
TN/DS/W/29, ¶1-4, January 22, 2003 [hereinafter China-TN/DS/W/29].  
167 China, Specific Amendments to the Dispute Settlement Understanding – Drafting Inputs from China, 
TN/DS/W/51, March 5, 2003 [hereinafter China-TN/DS/W/51].  
168 China-TN/RL/W/9, supra note 161. 
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and reduction formula of market access for non-agricultural products;169 antidumping-related 
provisions and terms such as “product under investigation,” “major proportion,” “back to back 
investigations,” “particular market situation,” “constructed normal value,” “constructed export 
price,” “cumulative assessment of injury,” “causality between dumping and injury,” “threat of 
material injury,” “prohibition of zeroing,” “treatment to affiliated parties and their transactions,” 
“all others rate,” “reviews” and “‘non market economy’ clause;”170 criteria for identifying 
trade-related MEAs (multilateral environmental agreem nts);171 and risk management 
techniques applied for the purpose of reducing physical inspections on goods.172 
3. Procedural matters in the Chinese proposals 
Beyond substantive issues, overall, proposals made by China on procedural issues 
concentrate on three areas: (i) institutional and operational aspects of the Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB); (ii) transparency of information relating to member governments’ trade-related 
laws, regulations, and other measures; (iii) and the procedures to be followed in handling trade 
remedy issues. 
As for the DSB mechanism, China’s advice mainly rega ds three issues: (1) shortening the 
consultation period and the time-frame of working procedures, (2) time requirements for 
notification to be a third party, and (3) the improvement of rights of third parties during the 
working procedure.173 
B. Characteristics  
As introduced in the Introduction, there would be various ways to characterize pertin n  
practices of each member. Consequently, there would be more “characteristics” of those 
practices than those identified in this work. For the purpose of this dissertation, the approach I 
                                                 
169 China-TN/MA/W/20, supra note 162.  
170 China-TN/RL/W/66, supra note 163. 
171 China, Identification of Multilateral Environmental Agreemnts (MEAs) and Specific Trade Obligations 
(STOS), TN/TE/W/35/Rev.1, July 3, 2003 [hereinafter China-TN/TE/W/35/Rev.1].  
172 China-TN/TF/W/148, supra note 164.  
173 China, Specific Amendments to the Dispute Settlement Understanding – Drafting Inputs from China, 
TN/DS/W/51, March 5, 2003 [hereinafter China-TN/DS/W/51]. 
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have adopted is to underscore the aspects that could distinguish one member’s behavior from 
those of the others on the ground of its own legal tradition and culture. In other words, in this 
dissertation, these listed characteristics warrant special attention and further analysis. 
1. S&D treatment  
To sum up the proposals cited above, the design of nearly any WTO mechanism, from 
China’s point of view, should embrace S&D treatment. China has attributed its enthusiasm about 
S&D treatment to its admiration for WTO mandates and the Doha Ministerial Declaration, on 
grounds that (1) “[providing] special and different treatment to developing countries, particularly 
to the least developed countries, is an important pri ci le in the WTO and has been consistently 
emphasized in previous rounds of negotiations,”174 and (2) the Doha Declaration takes 
“balancing the interests of the WTO Members at different levels of development” as a 
mandate.175 
 For China, incorporating S&D treatment into all future WTO agreements has become a 
priority for its participation in international trade rule-making. The motive for China to attach 
particular emphasis to S&D treatment might be multi-faceted. Basically, China itself is a large 
developing country that wishes to see the S&D principle working to its own specific national 
interests. In addition, like other developing countries, China might take the position that the 
S&D provisions need improvement more badly than do some other aspects of the WTO rules 
and mandates, considering the expected benefits that might be brought about by this treatment. 
Furthermore, from China’s point of view, perhaps only the practice of “differentiated treatment” 
among different countries can achieve real equality among them in the long run. This last 
account, in turn, directs our attention to the Chinese legal tradition and culture, which we shall 
examine in subsection C1, below. 
2. An inclination for vagueness 
A closer examination of the Chinese proposals revolving around substantive issues shows 
                                                 
174 China-TN/RL/W/9, supra note 161.  
175 China-TN/MA/W/20, supra note 162.  
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that the Chinese suggestions, in most cases, stay on the level of identifying the issues that should 
be improved or further negotiated, but without actully proposing specific text or advice that 
would bring or facilitate such improvements or negotiations.  
For example, in a proposal regarding fisheries subsidies, China enumerates, in the first 
place, several kinds of such subsidies – for example fish breeding agriculture, fishing at high 
seas, and fishing in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) – aiming to prove the wide scope of 
this kind of subsidies. Then it calls for “early determination on the scope of subsidies.”176 In 
similar fashion, it mentioned subsidies on infrastruc ure construction, on prevention and control 
of disease, on scientific research and training, and on fishermen’s switching to other businesses 
to illustrate what can be incorporated into the scope f “non-actionable” subsidies in a context of 
the fisheries industry177 – all without further suggesting what, from China’s perspective, should 
be the complete scope of them. 
Another example appears in a proposal submitted by China regarding anti-dumping issues. 
In it, China challenges many terms and provisions in the Antidumping Agreement (ADA), by 
calling for pertinent terms and standards in the ADA to be “further elaborated,” “further defined,” 
“clarified,” “clarified and improved,” “established,” “improved,” and “formulated.”178 Similarly, 
with regard to risk management in the importing andexporting procedures, China stays again on 
the level of urging that “appropriate criteria to select traders to be eligible for different 
treatments shall be established accordingly.”179   
3. Procedural matters  
As for the transparency issue, China offers several suggestions, relating to: (1) scope of 
trade regulations that are subject to publication; (2) designating the appropriate methods of 
publication; (3) identifying an enquiry point where, upon request of any individual, enterprise or 
WTO member, all information relating to the relevant laws, regulations and measures may be 
                                                 
176 China-TN/RL/W/9, supra note 161. 
177 Id. 
178 China-TN/RL/W/66, supra note 163. 
179 China-TN/TF/W/148, supra note 164. 
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obtained; and (4) prescribing a comment period which allows reasonable time for other members 
to make comments in writing, and take these written comments into consideration after such 
laws, regulations and measures are publicized while before implemented or enforced.180 
In respect of trade remedy procedures, China’s suggestions largely center on supplementing 
existing provisions pertinent to the issues of (1) the establishment of response and comment 
procedures after initiation,181 (2) sunset review,182 (3) standing of the application,183 (4) 
pre-initiation consultations in countervailing duty investigations,184 (5) treatment of new subsidy 
allegations in the course of an on-going investigation,185 and (6) the use of the facts available 
under Article 12.7 of the ASCM.186  
In raising concerns about these procedural matters, China offers specific suggestions for 
improvement. For example, on the issue of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), China 
has made the following suggestions, with regard to procedures relating to consultation, 
establishment of panel, participation of third party, easonable period of time, and working 
procedures. For example, China proposed in this proposal to shorten the consultation period 
from 60 days to 30 days. In addition, for China, if a developing-country Member as respondent 
requests, this consultation period should be extended by up to 30 days.187 The reader may refer 
to Appendix 3.1 for other suggestions from China rel ting to the DSB procedures. 
                                                 
180 China, Communication, TN/TF/W/26, March 21, 2005 [hereinafter China-TN/F W/26].  
181 China, Proposal on Establishment of Responding and Comment Procedure after Initiation, TN/RL/GEN/55, 
July 4, 2005 [hereinafter China-TN/RL/GEN/55].  
182 China, Proposal on Sunset Review, TN/RL/GEN/149, June 29, 2007 [hereinafter China-TN/RL/GEN/149].  
183 China-TN/RL/GEN/148, supra note 164.  
184 China, Pre-initiation Consultations in Countervailing Duty Investigations, TN/RL/GEN/161, December 4, 
2009 [hereinafter China-TN/RL/GEN/161].  
185 China, Treatment of New Subsidy Allegations in the Course of An On-going Investigation, TN/RL/GEN/160, 
December 4, 2009 [hereinafter China-TN/RL/GEN/160].  
186 China, Proposal on the Use of the Facts Available under Article 12.7 of ASCM, TN/RL/GEN/169, October 
14, 2010 [hereinafter China-TN/RL/GEN/169].  
187 China-TN/DS/W/51, supra note 173. 
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C. Legal Tradition and Culture 
1. Sovereign equality  
Equality has always been a higher priority principle in China’s international relations, both 
political and economic. It serves as both the prerequisite and the purpose for China to participate 
in the international community.188 China’s sensitivity to equality has roots in its atitude toward 
international law. 
a. In dynastic China 
Ann Kent, who offers a detailed, objective, and complete analysis of China’s changing 
attitude toward international law from the beginning of the 19th century to the present, divides 
that long period into four stages – 1800-1949 (from powerless to empowerment), 1949-1978 
(asymmetry or power and clash of political cultures), 1978-2000 (modernization phase reflecting 
the fruits of globalization, power, and cultural change), and 2000-present (a defender of 
international law).189 
The first phase of this history may provide us with some historical insight as to why China 
takes equality so seriously in its international relations. Kent offers the following accounts of the 
phase of 1800-1949, in which China’s dominant attitude toward international law, especially 
before the conclusion of WWII, can be featured by the terms “dismissiveness” and 
“instrumentalism.” By using of the term “dismissiveness,” Kent means China’s resistance to 
being considered a subject to international law, a concept brought by the Western powers. By 
using the term “instrumentalism,” she means that, to Chinese scholars, international law was 
only an excuse or a leverage adopted by the Western powers to justify their “incursions into 
                                                 
188 For example, the Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China, Yang Jiechi, stated at a G-20 meeting 
on September 26, 2009 that: “Mutual respect and equality are the basic norms governing international relations and 
constitute the important guarantee for common development. In the current context, it is of particular and practical 
importance to adhere to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, to uphold the authority and 
role of the United Nations, to observe in good faith nd the principle of non-interference in each other’s internal 
affairs, and to promote democracy in international relations.” Available at the UN website: 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39793&Cr=global+economic&Cr1, last visited on January 7, 
2012.  
189 See Ann Kent, China’s Changing Attitude to the Norms of International Law and Its Global Impact, in 
CHINA’S “NEW”  DIPLOMACY: TACTICAL OR FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE? (Pauline Kerr, Stuart Harris, Yaqing Qin ed.) 
55 (2008). 
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China and the imposition of unequal treaties upon the country.”190 “China saw international law 
as designed to consolidate power in the hands of the militarily powerful and to undermine states 
that were militarily, if not culturally, weak.”191 
This attitude of dismissiveness and instrumentalism was gradually displaced (at least 
temporarily) by one of increasing confidence, largely due to China’s status as a victorious nation 
in WWII. “China began to be treated as an emerging power and was invited to participate, for 
the first time on an equal basis, with the great powers.”192 
However, this transition only existed for a short period between the conclusion of WWII 
and the establishment of the PRC. In other words, the age-old attitude of “dismissiveness” and 
“instrumentalism” had not been shaken much by this temporary transition. 
b. In contemporary China 
In the first 30 years of the PRC, its attitude toward international law – which would also be 
described as one of instrumentalism – was greatly strengthened by both Marxism and the 
frustration China encountered in the international community. In Marxist thought, “international 
law was conceived as an instrument of a state’s foreign policy[.]”193 
In addition to having influenced by Marxist thought, China’s attitude of instrumentalism 
reflected the country’s frustrations in effectively participating in the international community. 
“The shock of rebuff by the United Nations shaped China’s view of international law and 
                                                 
190 Id. at 56.  
191 Id. For elaborations: Until the early twentieth century … China conceived its power as that of a “Middle 
Kingdom” at the apex of a hierarchically based system of tributary states. This was far from the principle that 
developed in international law of the sovereign equality of states. On the other hand, to China’s rulers, European 
public international law, as a mechanism used to justify foreign incursions into China and the imposition of unequal 
treaties upon the country, appeared precisely as the West then conceived it – as an instrument available only to 
so-called “civilized” Western states. China saw inter ational law as designed to consolidate power in the hands of 
the militarily powerful and to undermine states that were militarily, if not culturally, weak. In the short term, this 
hard power of the West, together with the moral force of international law, assumed ascendancy over China’s 
relational power. It was therefore not surprising that China’s early attitude to international law was, t worst, 
dismissive and, at best, instrumental… (Id. at 56-57). 
192 Id. at 57. “Its increasing dependence on international law reflected its closer integration into the 
international system. At Yalta, in February 1945, it was decided that China, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
the Soviet Union, and France should be foundation members of the new body. China thereupon accepted an 
invitation to become a sponsor of the San Francisco Conference, which drew up the UN Charter.” Id. at 57. 
193 Id. at 58-59. 
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international organizations for the next twenty-one years[,]”194 because, for China, international 
law was employed by western powers as an instrument to isolate it from the international 
community.  
On the other hand, China perceived that the rights and obligations prescribed by an 
international treaty were associated with the power a party possessed, rather than with equality. 
“[T]he contents of an international treaty are decid by the ratio of the relative strength of the 
contracting states and the prevailing general international situation at the time of concluding the 
treaty.”195 
To sum up the above observations given by Kent, China’s attitude toward international law 
between 1949 and 1979 had two elements: on the one hand, it reflected the Marxist theory of 
international law as an instrument of a state’s foreign policy; and on the other hand, China 
reinforced this opinion by viewing international law s a set of rules employed by the Western 
world to exclude or isolate it from the international community.  
According to Kent, China’s attitude, since 1978, toward international law has shifted, from 
instrumentalism alone to instrumentalism and international rule of law, due to both domestic 
reform and globalization. At the same time, the notions of sovereignty, equality, and 
non-interference, as the main principles of traditional international law, are still firmly adhered 
to by the Chinese government.196 Kent characterizes this period as bringing “the fruits of 
globalization, power and cultural change,” and elabor tes on the two causes of this shift: (1) 
China’s “four modernizations” agenda since 1978 in the domestic context, and (2) the beginning 
of globalization in the international context. 
… China’s new “four modernizations” agenda entailed a variety of new international and domestic 
goals.[197] … These changes in China’s political priorities had a critical impact on its attitude toward 
international law and international organizations, as well as toward the domestic rules of law. …  
                                                 
194 Id. at 58.  
195 Id. at 59. 
196 For example, see China-TN/RL/GEN/161, supra note 184. 
197 These new goals mainly include: the preservation of a peaceful international environment; an enhanced 
position in the international community, particularly in international organizations; modernization of the Chinese 
economy; and the maintenance of a credible nuclear d terrent. Kent, supra note 189, at 60. 
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… The convergence between China’s new goals and … globalization … strengthened Chinese 
power, while Chinese culture acted both as a barrier p otecting the society and … as a carrier of the 
norms and structures of globalization into domestic so iety...198 
A partial shift of China’s attitude towards international law – from instrumentalism to 
international rule of law – as shown in the above excerpt, however, has not affected its adherence 
to traditional principles of international law, such as equality.199 In Kent’s view, the most recent 
period – 2000 to the present – has seen China become a defender of international law. For Kent, 
the reason for this shift in attitude is that China has perceived the United States’ behavior as 
displaying a disregard of international law after the errorist attacks on the United States, which 
promoted President Hu’s call for respect for international law in various occasions.200  
Kent summarizes her observations of this long history regarding China’s attitude toward 
international law as “from the use of international law as an instrument of ‘civilized states’ to 
exploit China’s lack of hard power, to its role empowering China’s rise, to its current threatened 
status where the sole superpower has declared itself above the international rule of law, and 
China has challenged its right to do so.”201 
                                                 
198 Id. at 60-63 (italics added). 
199 See id. at 63-64. China’s attitude toward international law was still characterized by strong support for 
traditional principles of international law, in particular, state sovereignty, the sovereign equality of states, and the 
principle of noninterference. Such continuity was consistent with China’s political culture and its continuing 
concern to ensure the more equal redistribution of i ternational power. Just as China adhered to a market economy 
with Chinese characteristics and to a rule of law with Chinese characteristics, so its approach to the international 
rule of law exhibited some unique features. For insta ce, while Russia as a postrevolutionary state had modified its 
traditional interpretation of sovereignty, China’s transition to a socialist market economy status did not affect its 
formal, theoretical position. Id.  
200 “In May 2003, President Hu Jintao called for equal st tus for every country, a new security perspectiv  and 
respect for international law. On October 14, 2004, Russia and China stated in their joint declaration that they 
believed it “necessary to settle international disputes and crisis situations under the auspices of the UN and on the 
basis of universal principles of international law.” At the forty-fourth session of the Asian-African Legal 
Consultative Organization, Liu Zhenmin of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs insisted that “UN reform should 
contribute to the promotion of multilateralism, maintenance of the authority of international law and e hancement 
of unity among its member states.” On July 1, 2005, China and Russia again called for the promotion of 
multilateralism in world affairs and respect for international law. In the same year, China argued that UN reforms 
should be “in the interests of multilateralism and enhance the UN’s authority and efficiency”; they “should 
safeguard the purposes and principles enshrined in the UN Charter”; they should “aim at reversing the rend of the 
UN giving priority to security over development”; and they should “accommodate the propositions and cocerns of 
all UN members, especially those of the developing countries.” Premier Wen Jiabao even observed that “e abiding 
resilience of the Five Principles [of Peaceful Coexistence] lies, in the last analysis, in their consistency with the 
purposes and principles of the UN Charter.” Id  at 64-65. 
201 Id. at 66. For more comments on reasons for China’s renewed int rest in international law, see Hungdah 
Chiu, Chinese Attitudes toward International law in the Post-Mao Era: 1978-1987, in FOREIGNERS IN CHINESE LAW 
1,1 (1997). 
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 Whether or not Kent’s assertion that China is now a “defender of international law” is 
persuasive or not (a matter on which I would prefer to reserve judgment for now), Kent’s 
description of China’s continuous adherence to traditional principles of the international law – 
and in particular the principle of sovereign equality – seems beyond any question. Indeed, that 
point is confirmed by the following excerpts in whic  Chinese scholars focus on the issue of 
China’s attitude toward the relationship between S&D treatment and sovereign equality. 
According to one of the scholars, Guan’en Xiao, S&D treatment safeguards the substantial 
equality in economic and social fields between developed and developing countries, and, thus, 
achieves justice and fairness.202 For the other scholar, Lianzeng Cai, S&D treatment ca  achieve 
stable and durable development in both developed and developing countries. Therefore, it does 
not constitute discrimination against developed countries.203  
To sum up, for most Chinese legal scholars, S&D treatm nt represents a pursuit of 
substantial equality, considering the realities of different levels of economic development.  
2. Attitude toward international law  
As shown in the above analysis, the Chinese model of making proposals (especially on 
substantive issues) seems to be simple in many cases – that is, to throw out a topic for 
multilateral discussion or negotiation without giving specific recommendations. Why would 
China behave so cautiously as this in presenting its own opinions and suggestions to an 
                                                 
202 “[I]n economic and social fields, the pro forma equality did not certainly bring about substantial equality. 
The Most-Favored-Nation treatment and the principle of reciprocity can operate effectively only in international 
trade between two countries with similar levels of economic development. In other words, substantial inequality and 
injustice will appear if these principles are applied n trade between two countries that differ greatly regarding their 
levels of economic development. Although S&D treatment – which confers on developing countries certain 
privileges and extra benefits – seemingly goes against the principles of equality and reciprocity, it rectifies 
substantial inequality and, thus, achieves justice and fairness.” Guan’en Xiao, Study on the Development and 
Reforms of S&D Treatment in the WTO, in 10 JIAN HAN FORUM 28, 28 (2003) [as translated in pertinent part by 
Lijuan Xing]. 
203 “S&D treatment for developing countries reflects the principle of “fairness and mutual benefit” in 
international economic law. It calls for the pursuance of substantial equality. … The pursuance of substantial 
equality requires formal distinction between develop d and developing countries, between economic relations 
among countries with similar levels of development (North-North relation) and economic relations among countries 
with different levels of development (South-North relation). … [In addition,] promotion of fairness in the relations 
between developed and developing countries will bring about stable and durable development in both of em. Such 
development will, in turn, contribute to further national economic progress in developed countries. Therefore, S&D 
treatment does not represent discrimination against developed countries.” Lianzeng Cai, S&D Treatment in the WTO 
Agreements, in 2 JOURNAL OF X IAMEN UNIVERSITY (ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCE) 81, 83 (2001) [as translated in 
pertinent party by Lijuan Xing]. 
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international organization it belongs to? We may find answers by resorting to China’s legal 
tradition and culture, as we have already done withthe issue of S&D treatment.  
On the one hand, the powerlessness of China in international negotiations for most of the 
period since the 19th century, even after its accession to the United Nations in 1970s, makes the 
country less confident in placing its suggestions in front of the Western members. The logic 
behind this cautiousness might be summarized in this way: fewer words coming out, fewer 
skeptics coming in. To some extent, the Chinese philosophy on this mirrors its distrust in, as well 
as alertness to, international organizations. 
On the other hand, its attitude toward international law – reflecting more instrumentalism 
than international rule of law – also contributes to China’s rather faint enthusiasm for giving 
attention to specific rules as opposed to general princi les.  
As one scholar points out, one key motive of China for entering the WTO was in fact 
sovereign equality itself, as explained below. In other words, substantial involvement in 
international rule-making is only a subsidiary goal for China’s WTO accession: 
China’s ‘WTO entry’ … signifies that China no longer has to stand on the sidelines while other 
countries draw up regulations to which it has to adapt. On the contrary, it can totally participate in 
and draw up rules of competition for the new century in negotiations through a multilateral trading 
system and become the beneficiary of certain relevant regulations to ensure China’s equal entry into 
the world market.204 
In addition, the same observer points out that China’s progressive “open door” approach to 
“economic globalization” remains rooted in domestic policy rather than in multilateral rules. The 
heavy reliance on domestic policy rather than on international rules can, in turn, account for the 
Chinese indifference to specific international rules in some cases of trade negotiations.205 
                                                 
204 Ronald C. Keith, China as a Rising World Power and Its Response to ‘Gl balization’, in CHINA AS A RISING 
WORLD POWER AND ITS RESPONSE TO ‘GLOBALIZATION ’ (Ronald C. Keith ed.) 1, 9 (2005). 
205 “In effect China’s progressive ‘open door’ approach to ‘economic globalization’ remains rooted in domestic 
policy designed to support China’s domestic economic development. [It] requires that China not be marginalized in 
multilateral rules of play, and it requires that the PRC, in its own national interest, campaign with alacrity against 
the new dangers of protectionism.” Id. at 9-10. 
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3. Procedural issues in the legal tradition and culture 
The fact that China does propose specific text withregard to procedural reform, which 
contrasts with its vague proposals on substantive provisions, may come as a surprise to those 
who are accustomed to criticizing China for ignoring procedural justice.  
 However, if we look back again into the Chinese history,206 the emphasis we see there on 
(legal) procedure may offer an explanation. In dynastic China, trial organs emerged from the Xia 
Dynasty – that is, well over three thousand years ago.207 In the Shang Dynasty (following the 
Xia Dynasty), legal provisions were developed relating o evidence and litigation procedure.208 
Procedural aspects of the legal system acquired maturity in the succeeding centuries. Although 
procedural provisions were substantive ones in dynastic China,209 the existence of and the 
emphasis on these procedural provisions should not be ignored.  
Some efforts on drafting separate procedural laws could be observed in the late Qing 
Dynasty, as influenced by Western legal theories.210 However, that Western influence was not 
strong enough to overcome the tradition. No separate law on procedure had been promulgated in 
dynastic China. Consequently, despite the long exist nce of procedural provisions, the ideology 
of due process had not taken root in dynastic China. Procedural provisions constituted general 
guidelines for government officials to employ in exercising their duties, rather a set of rules to 
safeguard fairness and efficiency of substantive legal rules. This tradition can be observed also in 
the proposals made by China regarding the procedural issues in the WTO. Its proposals reflect 
rather narrowly on how to organize a trial.  
The foregoing discussion has focused on internationl trade rule-making. A review of 
                                                 
206 A timeline of dynasties in the Chinese history is provided by Appendix 3.2 of this chapter.  
207 Jian Pu, A COMPLETE HISTORY OF CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: X IA, SHANG, AND ZHOU 117 (1999) [as 
translated in pertinent part by Lijuan Xing]. 
208 Id. at 170. 
209 Shihong Xu, A COMPLETE HISTORY OF CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: QIN AND HAN 174 (1999) [as translated in 
pertinent party by Lijuan Xing]. 
210 Yong Zhu, CHINESE LEGAL HISTORY: THE LATE QING AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 291 (1999) [as translated 
in pertinent part by Lijuan Xing]. For example, Shen Jiaben, an official and famous jurist in the late Qing Dynasty, 
used to submit memorials to the throne regarding the plan of drafting procedural laws in 1906. He also hosted the 
drafting of the Law on Criminal and Civil Litigations. On January 24, 1911, a Draft of Criminal Litigaon Lu and a 
Draft of Civil Litigation Lu were completed. (See id. at 292-295.)  
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China’s suggestions on such rule-making shows us how China has approached the matter in a 
way that reflects its own legal tradition and culture. Its proposals on substantive issues and 
procedural matters have reflected China’s long-held attitude of dismissiveness and 
instrumentalism toward international trade, its adherence to traditional principles of international 
law, and its recognition of procedural law. 
II.  International Trade Disputes 
In addition to international trade rule-making, international trade disputes constitute another 
setting in which we can see legal indigenization of WTO law in China. WTO trade disputes 
usually arise from conflicting attitudes towards one or more specific trade practices involving a 
WTO member and its trading partners. Therefore, these disputes constitute a mirror of how one 
member fulfills its relevant WTO obligations within the context of its own legal tradition and 
culture. 
Overall, China was involved in 8 cases as complainant and 21 cases as respondent as of the 
end of 2011. For the purpose of this section, only the cases in which China has found itself in the 
position of respondent are studied, since these cass involve specific practices conducted by 
China grounded on its own initiative and within its own territory. Among the 21 cases involving 
China as the respondent, 5 cases have resulted in DSB reports as of May 2011. These are 
designated in the DSB system as the DS 339/340/342, DS 362, and DS 363 cases. Among them, 
the DS 362 and DS 363 cases have much to do with Chnese legal tradition and culture. The 
following paragraphs give a brief review of the challenged Chinese measures in these two cases. 
A. Review of Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) Cases Involing China 
The DS 362 case is referred to as the Case of “China – Measures Affecting the Protection 
and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights” (or “China – Intellectual Property Rights”). 
The United States complained about: (i) China’s Criminal Law and related Supreme People’s 
Court Interpretations which establish thresholds for criminal procedures and penalties for 
infringements of intellectual property rights; (ii) China’s Regulations for Customs Protection of 
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Intellectual Property Rights and related Implementing Measures that govern the disposal of 
infringing goods confiscated by customs authorities; and (iii) Article 4 of China’s Copyright Law 
of 2001 which was alleged to have denied protection and enforcement to works that had not been 
authorized for publication or distribution within China.211 This case relates to such aspects of 
Chinese legal tradition and culture as: (1) cautiousness in employing criminal penalties to protect 
individual rights; and (2) legal protection of subjects involving illegality. 
The DS 363 case is referred to as the Case of “China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights 
and Distribution Services for Certain Publications a d Audiovisual Entertainment Products” (or 
“China – Publications and Audiovisual Products”). The United States complained about a series 
of Chinese measures regulating activities relating to the importation and distribution of certain 
publications and audiovisual entertainment products.212 This case relates to such aspects of 
Chinese legal tradition and culture as: (1) the relationship between publications and public 
morality, and (2) the relationship between trading rights and state control. 
B. Conflicting Ideologies behind the Disputes 
The disputes between China and its trading partners reflected not only their disagreement 
on the specific provisions or practices that China adopted, but also deep discrepancies between 
those countries with regard to certain Chinese ideologies deeply rooted in its legal traditional and 
culture. The succeeding paragraphs try to identify these conflicting ideologies behind the above 
disputes, especially the DS 362 case and the DS 363 case. 
1. Protection of subjects involving illegality 
In the DS 362 case, the United States claimed that “Article 4(1) of China’s Copyright Law 
denies to the authors of works ‘the publication or distribution of which is prohibited by law’ the 
broad set of rights enumerated in Article 10 of the Copyright Law, which largely encompasses 
the rights contemplated by the provisions of the Berne Convention (1971).” Furthermore, it 
argued that the “authors of works denied protection of the Copyright Law [cannot] benefit from 
                                                 
211 WTO, One-page Summary of Key Findings of DS 362.  
212 WTO, One-page Summary of Key Findings of DS 363.  
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the remedies specified in Articles 46 and 47 of the Copyright Law. Consequently, the authors of 
such works do not enjoy the minimum rights that are “specially granted” by the Berne 
Convention, inconsistently with Article 5(1) of tha Convention.”213 
Before tuning to China’s defence, it is worth reviewing the disputed article – that is, Article 
4 of China’s Copyright Law:  
Works the publication and dissemination of which are prohibited by law shall not be protected by 
this law. 
In exercising their copyright, no copyright owners may violate the Constitution or laws, nor may 
they impair their public interests. 
In response to the United States’ accusation, China offered some arguments that the panel 
handling the dispute summarized as follows. In essence, China argued that “copyright” and 
“copyright protection” was distinguishable in the Chinese system. Therefore, for China, denial 
of copyright protection did not equal to denial of c pyright:  
Article 4(1) simply provides that such a work shall not be protected by the Copyright Law. … 
Article 4(1) was not dependent on content review or any other regulatory regime related to 
publication and that the only result of a finding of prohibited content in that process was a denial of 
authority to publish, not a denial of copyright.214… 
China asked the Panel to note that under the Chinese system of copyright, ‘copyright’ and 
‘copyright protection’ are distinguishable. To the extent that Article 4(1) of the Copyright Law 
would come into play with respect to a work, it would operate not to remove copyright, but to deny 
the particularized rights of private copyright enforcement.215 
The Panel dismissed China’s argument that Article 4(1) of the Copyright Law does not 
remove copyright but only “the particularized rights of private copyright enforcement.” In other 
words, the term “works the publication and dissemination of which are prohibited by law” in 
Article 4 was originally used to mean the term “works the contents of which are illegal.” That is 
to say, the meaning that Article 4 intended to convey is actually that: “works the contents of 
which are illegal shall not be protected by law.” The ideology being challenged was actually that 
of whether a subject involving illegal elements canbe provided legal protection. 
                                                 
213 WTO, Panel Report, WT/DS362/R, ¶7.16, January 26, 2009 [hereinafter WTO-WT/DS362/R].  
214 Id. ¶7.17. 
215 Id. ¶7.21. 
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2. Publications and public morality  
In the DS 363 case, China tried to invoke GATT XX (a) (“public morality” exception) to 
justify its monopoly of importation of reading materials (for example, books, newspapers, 
periodicals, electronic publications), audiovisual home entertainment (“AVHE”) products (for 
example, videocassettes, video compact discs, digital video discs), sound recordings (for 
example, recorded audio tapes), and films for theatrical release. However, the Panel rejected its 
argument on the ground that “China had not demonstrated that the relevant provisions were 
‘necessary’ to protect public morals.”216  
It is worth observing that in invoking GATT XX (a), China gave attention only to its 
opinion that the disputable practices were relevant to the country’s public morality. It did not 
give much further deduction as to why it is “necessary” for the state to monopolize the 
importation and distribution of these products in order to protect its public morality. This 
weakness in China’s arguments partially reflects a traditional ideology in China: monopoly of 
the above products is certainly a first choice for a country to protect its public morality. It is 
obvious, however, that this traditional ideology cannot be agreed to by the Panel its trading 
partners. 
3. Trading rights and state control 
In the DS 363 case, China was accused of violating its WTO obligations regarding granting 
trading rights. China argued that the trading rights for importing or distributing films and other 
products at issue did not fall within its WTO obligations with regard to trading rights in “goods,” 
because importation or distribution of films and other products at issue should be classified as 
trade in services. Again, this argument was rejected by the Panel. Both the accession document 
and the Foreign Trade Law have provided clear provisi ns regarding trading rights and state 
trading. The fact that this dispute still arose reflects one of the most sensitive issues in the 
Chinese trade regime and China’s tough process in carrying out pertinent reform in this area – 
that is, the liberalization of state-controlled trading rights.  
                                                 
216 WTO, One-page Summary of Key Findings of DS 363.  
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4. Criminal thresholds and protection of IPR as civil rights 
In the DS 362 case, the United States attacked China’s practice of establishing thresholds in 
criminal provisions with respect to Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection. Under those 
provisions, IPR offences which do not involve “relatively large” amount of sales (or illegal gains) 
or serious circumstance would not be subject to criminal sanction. The United States claimed 
that such a “minimum threshold” was unjustified. (The Panel disagreed.) The discrepancies 
between the two countries on this issue reflected both: (1) the United Sates’ skepticism over 
China’s determination to provide effective IPR protection, and (2) the Chinese traditional 
reluctance to protect civil rights (including economic rights) by means of criminal punishments.   
C. Legal Tradition and Culture 
The preceding discussion highlighted ideologically different perspectives bearing on several 
types of international trade disputes involving China. The sources of those ideologically 
different perspectives can be found partly in the Cinese legal history or contemporary China’s 
legal system.  
1. Protection of subjects involving illegality  
For the United States, since Article 4 of the Copyright Law states that “works the 
publication and dissemination of which are prohibited by law shall not be protected by this law,” 
the works that possess copyright but are not permitted to publicize or disseminate within China 
cannot receive the protection prescribed in Article 10 of the Copyright Law, which identifies 17 
types of copyrights.  
At the same time, such works will also be denied the rights specified in Articles 46 and 47 
of the Copyright Law, which prescribe s civil, administrative, and criminal liabilities on the 
copyright offenders. 
According to the USA, the denial of legal protection provided by Articles 10, 46, and 47 
had violated the Berne Convention which guarantees minimum standards of protection.  On the 
opposite side, China presented a different logic before the panel: Article 4 of the Copyright Law 
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did not deny the copyright of the relevant works; only “the particularized rights of private 
copyright enforcement” were denied. In other words, there existed a distinction between 
“copyright” and “copyright protection” within the Chinese legal system. Did this argument stand 
up to scrutiny? My answer is “no.” The following paragraphs dissect this question into several 
sub-questions. 
First of all, is it possible to, acknowledge a right on the one hand, and, deny its protection 
by law on the other hand? According to China, “copyright” and “copyright protection” is 
distinguishable in the Chinese system. Were this argument sounds, it could be inferred from it 
that copyright does not inevitably invoke copyright protection. What kinds of rights could be 
denied legal protection, then? China’s answer was: “the particularized rights of private copyright 
enforcement.”217 Of course this raises the issue of what is the “particularized rights of private 
copyright enforcement”?  
An examination of Chinese argument summarized by the Panel demonstrates that China did 
not given a definite meaning or scope of so-called “the particularized rights of private copyright 
enforcement.” Neither did it specify which facets of c pyright had not been denied according to 
the Copyright Law. In other words, it did not specify what “particularized rights of private 
copyright enforcement” were. 
Second, we may turn to the question of whether or not there exists a kind of right that is not 
protected by law within the general context of the Chinese legal regime. Despite the fact that the 
prevailing Chinese laws have not given a clear definition of “right,” we can resort to the wording 
of them to get a sense of the understanding of the concept of “right” contained therein: 
Article 4 of the Constitution: All nationalities in the People’s Republic of China are equal. The 
State protects the lawful rights and interests of the minority nationalities and upholds and develops a 
relationship of equality, unity and mutual assistance among all of China’s nationalities. 
Discrimination against and oppression of any nationlity are prohibited; any act which undermines 
the unity of the nationalities or instigates division is prohibited. (emphasis added) 
Article 5 of the General Principles of the Civil Law: The lawful civil rights and interests of 
citizens and legal persons shall be protected by law; no organization or individual may infringe 
                                                 
217 WTO-WT/DS362/R, supra note 213, ¶7.21. 
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upon them. (emphasis added) 
Article 1 of the Administrative Procedure Law: Pursuant to the Constitution, this Law is enacted 
for the purpose of ensuring the correct and prompt handling of administrative cases by the people’s 
courts, protecting the lawful rights and interests of citizens, legal persons and other organizations, 
and safeguarding and supervising the exercise of administrative powers by administrative organs in 
accordance with the law. (emphasis added) 
Article 1 of the Contract Law: This Law is enacted for the purpose of protecting he legitimate 
rights and interests of the parties to contracts, maintaining the socio-economic order and promoting 
the socialist modernization. (emphasis added) 
A first glance of these articles of some fundamental laws in China – the Constitution, the 
General Principles of the Civil Law, the Administrative Procedural Law, and the Contract Law – 
shows that there is always an adjective such as “lawfu ” and “legitimate” placed in front of the 
term “right.” It seems that there exists an antonym of lawful right or legitimate right – which 
might be possibly “unlawful right” or “illegal right.” However, the fact is that there is no such 
antonym existing in the Chinese legal system at all. The use of terms of “lawful right” or 
“legitimate right” only reflects an accustomed expression in the Chinese legal system.  
The following paragraphs examine the connotations of the works the content of which are 
illegal. Article 25 of the Regulations on Publication Administration, Article 25 of the 
Regulations on Administration of Films, and Article 3 of the Regulations on Administration on 
Audio-Visual Products  include provisions similar to Article 4 of the Copyright Law. That is, 
they deny legal protection of ten types of works that contain illegal contents and, consequently, 
are prohibited from publication and dissemination:  
(1) anything that goes against the basic principles determined by the Constitution; 
(2) anything that endangers the unification, sovereignty a d territorial integrity of the country; 
(3) anything that divulges secrets of state, or endangers state security, reputation and interests; 
(4) anything that instigates national separatism, infringes on the customs and habits of minority 
nationalities and disrupts solidarity of nationalities; 
(5) anything that publicizes heresy or superstition; 
(6) anything that impairs social order and stability; 
(7) anything that publicizes pornography and gambling or plays up violence; 
(8) anything that insults or slanders others, or infringes on the legitimate rights of others;  
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(9) anything that endangers social ethics and the fine traditions of national culture; and 
(10) any other contents prohibited by the provisions of laws and regulations. 
According to the legislative interpretation of the Copyright Law submitted by the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress, the original purpose of Article 4 is to deny any 
legal protection to the works containing illegal contents:  
It is widely disputed within China that whether or not works prohibited from dissemination enjoy 
copyright. One of the strands holds that although works containing reactionary or pornographic 
contents are prohibited from circulation, the right of authorship, the right of revision, and the right 
to protect a work against distortion and mutilation do exist and should be protected from 
infringement. … The other strand argues that rights are invested by law. Works containing 
reactionary contents should not enjoy rights. Therefore, works prohibited from dissemination do not 
enjoy copyright and should not be protected by law….Chinese law has always been prohibiting 
works containing reactionary or pornographic contents.218 
Obviously, the latter strand of opinion was adopted by the final articles of the Copyright 
Law. However, the wording of Article 4(1) has intentio ally avoided clearly answering the 
central question of whether such works enjoy copyright. 
Article 4 of the Copyright Law reflects the age-old Chinese proposition that subjects 
involving illegal aspect receive little protection from law. This proposition has been rooted in 
China for thousands of years. One of the features of the Chinese legal tradition is summarized as 
“addressing obligations and ignoring rights.” The following excerpt offers some elaborations on 
this feature:  
The legal system in dynastic China addressed obligations and ignored rights. Laws were enacted to 
establish common people’s obligations and punishments o  violators. Therefore, in dynastic China, 
penalties constituted the main contents of laws. It was rarely that laws would establish rights for the 
people. The concept of right had not existed in China until a late time. If a person violated law, he 
should be punished by law. There was a definite causation here. More importantly, protection from 
law and punishment imposed by law could not be imple ented at the same time. Laws provided 
protection to those who did not violate them at all. In other words, when a person did not violate law,
he could be protected by law fully and completely. Once he violated law and triggered legal 
punishments, all other aspects of his rights that had nothing to do with his violation could not be 
                                                 
218 Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, Interpretation of the Copyright Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (in Chinese), available at 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/flsyywd/minshang/2002-07/15/content_297588.htm, last visited on July 21, 2011 [as 
translated in pertinent part by Lijuan Xing] [hereinafter NPC-Copyright]. 
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protected by law. This was an extreme strategy to safeguard the authority of laws.219 
2. Publications and public morality  
A second topic of international trade disputes involving China revolves around publications 
and governmental control over them on grounds of public morality. China’s approach to this 
issue also reflects ideological values rooted in Chinese legal history and China’s contemporary 
legal regime.  
a. In dynastic China 
In the Qin Dynasty, with the aim of using law to unify the thoughts of common people, the 
first Qin emperor – Qinshi Huangdi – prohibited thekeeping of books that set forth views that 
deviated from or contradicted the views of Legalism220, and be imposed severe punishment on 
violators.221 
Since its establishment in the Qin Dynasty, the crime of unlawful keeping of prohibited 
books had been classified as one of the crimes threatening the supremacy and ruling authority of 
emperors; consequently the most severe punishments would be imposed on offenders in dynastic 
China, from the Han Dynasty to the Qing Dynasty. The prohibited books were defined as those 
that contained contents questioning or subverting the s atus of emperors. The crime of keeping 
prohibited books would trigger the most severe punishments, such as capital penalties extending 
to the whole clan (i.e., extended family) of the person who kept such books.222 The efforts of the 
governing elite within China to control the thoughts and expressions of common people lasted 
                                                 
219 Zhang-Transition, supra note 6, at 62. 
220 In Chinese history, Legalism (Chinese: 法家; literally “School of Law”) was one of the main philosophic 
currents during the Warring States Period, although the term itself was invented in the Han Dynasty and thus does 
not refer to an organized ‘school’ of thought. Legalism was a utilitarian political philosophy that did not address 
higher questions such as the nature and purpose of lif . 
221 Xu, supra note 209, at 60. 
222 For elaborations on the crime of unlawful keeping of books in dynastic China, see Xu, s pra note 209, at 
497; Pengsheng Chen, A COMPLETE HISTORY OF CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: SUI AND TANG 246 (1999) [as translated 
in pertinent part by Lijuan Xing] [hereinafter Chen-History]; Jianfan Zhang & Chengwei Guo, A COMPLETE 
HISTORY OF CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: SONG 495 (1999) [as translated in pertinent part by Lijuan Xing]; Yulin Han, 
A COMPLETE HISTORY OF CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: YUAN 249 (1999) [as translated in pertinent part by Lijuan 
Xing]; Jinfan Zhang & Xiaofeng Huai, A COMPLETE HISTORY OF CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: M ING 441 (1999) [as 
translated in pertinent part by Lijuan Xing]; Jinfa Zhang, A COMPLETE HISTORY OF CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: QING 
at 197 (1999) [as translated in pertinent part by Lijuan Xing] [hereinafter Zhang-Qing]. 
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for thousands of years. Such control on publications was justified in dynastic China as being an 
indispensable and primary means of acquiring spiritual control. 
This effort to exercise cultural or spiritual control in dynastic China has been analyzed by 
one authority as follows: 
More than one thousand years [ago,] … China had begun to enact rules to control the dissemination 
of ideas. Emperors, beginning with the Wenzong Emperor in A.D. 835, prohibited the unauthorized 
reproduction of items that could be used for prognostication. Subsequent emperors expanded the 
ban to include heterodox items and materials under the exclusive control of the state, such as the 
Classics and official government documents. After th  invention of the printing press, production of 
printed materials increased, and Chinese emperors odered private printers to submit works to 
government officials for prepublication review.223 
b. In contemporary China 
In contemporary China’s legal regime, the freedom of speech and of the press is guaranteed 
by Article 35 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, which states that: 
Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of 
association, of procession and of demonstration. 
According to the method of classification provided by the Ministry of Culture of the PRC, 
film, book publication, television programs, broadcsting, press, and newspapers all fall within 
the concept of “culture” and are subject to administrative supervision.224 Moreover, the 
mechanism of pre-publication review by competent authorities, such as the Ministry of Culture, 
the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, and the General Administration of Press 
and Publication, is regarded as an indispensable constituent of the administrative functions of the 
state. This mechanism of pre-publication review may e sily invite criticisms on grounds that it 
has violated or nullified Article 35 of the Constitu on. An authority notes that “pre-publication 
review by the state was part of a larger framework f  controlling the dissemination of ideas, 
rather than as the building blocks of a system of intellectual property rights, whether for printers, 
                                                 
223 Connie Neigel, PIRACY IN RUSSIA AND CHINA: A DIFFERENT U.S. REACTION, 63 AUT Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 179, 189-190 (2000). 
224 Ministry of Culture of the PRC, CHINESE CULTURE, available at http://www.ccnt.gov.cn/xxzy/zgwh/, last 
visited on July 17, 2011. 
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booksellers, authors, or anyone else.”225 
An examination of the ten types of works that are prohibited from publication and 
dissemination enumerated above, shows us that the scope of prohibited works is relatively wide. 
It includes anything that goes against the basic principles determined by the Constitution, that 
endangers the unification, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, that endangers state 
security or reputation, that instigates national separatism, that impairs social order and stability, 
that endangers social ethics and the fine traditions of national culture, and that is prohibited by 
the provisions of laws and regulations.  
Moreover, it is the competent administrative authori ies that have discretion to determine 
whether or not a work contains the above contents, considering that the above scope lacks clear 
or definite criteria. 
The purpose of this dissertation, however, is not to comment on how the Chinese authorities 
should balance between safeguarding the freedom of speech and press (e.g., relaxing the 
standards of pre-publication review of publications a d motives) and exercising state governance. 
Indeed, my reference to the Constitution and the mechanism of pre-publication review aims to 
explain the emphasis attached by the Chinese authorities to protecting “public morality” through 
contemporary China’s legal system. 
3. Trading rights and state control 
Being one of the essential legal leverages of stategov rnance, the centralization of trading 
rights had been practiced for centuries in dynastic China. Even in the post-1949 era, it served as 
a most important mechanism regarding foreign trade. Th  situation did not change until 2004, 
when the new Foreign Trade Law was enacted. It is no wonder, then, that the right to trade used 
to be one of the most sensitive issues that had impeded China’s implementation of its WTO 
obligations. It is a painful process for China to completely release control over trading rights, 
even though corresponding legal reforms have taken place in legislation.  
                                                 
225 Marc H. Greenberg, The Sly Rabbit and the Three C’s: China, Copyright and Calligraphy, 7 Loy. U. Chi. 
Int’l L. Rev. 163, 175 (2010). 
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a. In dynastic China 
 For thousands of years in dynastic China, trading rights – that is, the authorization to 
engage in commercial trade across borders with foreign persons or entities – were centralized in 
the hands of the rulers, considering the significance that such trade had for national security.  
In the Qin Dynasty, based on the regime of centralized powers, the government authority adopted 
strict policy on foreign trade. Traders could take up foreign transactions on the conditions of holding 
trespassing licenses which were subject to officials’ examination.226 
Since the Han Dynasty, roads to western region wereopened. Foreign trade received great 
development compared with that in the Qin Dynasty. Trade legislation was adjusted accordingly. 
Traders must hold trespassing licenses…. At the same time, horses and weapons were prohibited 
from selling to alien tribes. Prohibited items originating from alien tribes were not allowed to be 
purchased also. These regulations aimed to control foreign trade and maintain national security.227 
Before the Tang Dynasty, in fact, cross-border trade (i.e., trade by land) was the major 
object of trade legislation, eclipsing in importance all other kinds of (internal) trade regulations. 
The tradable items at that time were strictly limited by the authorities. In addition, merchants 
involved in border trade were required to acquire official licenses or permissions ex ante.228 One 
characteristic of trade legislation of that period is that foreign trade and internal trade were not 
separated from each other with regard to the form of regulations. In other words, there did not 
exist an independent code on foreign trade. 
With gradual expansion of overseas trade (i.e., trade by sea), it developed into a separate 
object of trade legislation in the Sui and Tang times. However, even in the Tang Dynasty – the 
most open era in Chinese history – trading rights of both domestic people and foreign merchants 
within China were subject to the authorization from the emperors.229 
Even worse, trading rights of common people were completely removed by the Ming and 
Qing emperors. Indeed, throughout the Chinese history, trading rights were never granted to 
common people completely and thoroughly. Instead, the rights were regarded as an 
                                                 
226 Zhang Jinfan, DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL CIVILIZATION IN CHINA 165 (2010) [as translated in pertinent part 
by Lijuan Xing] [hereinafter Zhang-Civilization]. 
227 Id. at 254-255. 
228 Chen-History, supra note 222, at 416. 
229 See id. at 416-438. 
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indispensable constituent of the rulers’ emperorship, and a primary leverage the rulers could 
exercise to maintain social control.  
b. In contemporary China 
 In the post-1949 era, development of legal system on foreign trade has undergone three 
stages. In the first stage, from 1949 to 1978, the for ign trade system was established under a 
planned economy and the state monopolized foreign trade. It had these key features: (1) both the 
rights for operation of and the rights for administration of foreign trade were centralized in the 
hands of the state; (2) operative enterprises were not separated from the administrative organs; 
and (3) the national finances bore the benefits and debts arising from foreign trade.  
There were two reasons for the PRC to adopt such a foreign trade system in its first 30 
years: one is that the state was deeply influenced by the highly centralized planned economy 
adopted by the former Soviet Union and its foreign model which advocated state-controlled 
foreign trade; the other is China’s consciousness of it  wn independence following many 
decades of existing in essence as a semi-colony. 
Laws and regulations pertinent to foreign trade mainly comprised (i) the Temporary Rules 
of Management of Foreign Trade of 1950 and (ii) the Implementing Rules on the System of 
Licenses in Importing and Exporting Trade of 1951, which were enacted based on the Common 
Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference of 1949 and the Constitution 
of 1954. These regulations only constructed basic legal foundations to maintain and manage the 
tiny volume of foreign trade at that time. This situation remained in place until the end of the 
Cultural Revolution in 1976. 
The second stage of the development of Chinese tradsystem lasted from 1978 through 
2001. In this period, some reforms occurred regarding a modest relaxation of trading rights.  
Since the Reforms and the Opening up in 1979, the foreign trade system underwent a 
transition also. Between 1979 and 2001, reforms in the foreign trade system generally went 
through four stages – (1) transferring the trading r ghts to a lower level of administration, (2) 
implementing a contract system in foreign trade, (3) removing national subsidies on foreign 
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trade, and (4) reforming the system of currency exchange rates as well as abolishing the contract 
system in foreign trade.  
During this entire period, some problems still existed within the foreign trade system. For 
example, rights to foreign trade were not completely liberalized. The thresholds for private 
entities to acquire trading rights were extremely high. State-owned enterprises still monopolized 
importation and exportation in effect. However, a system of “review and approval” was still 
enforced with regard to the acquisition of trading rights. 
The third stage of the development of foreign trade system started in 2001, in the context of 
globalization. The period immediately before China’s WTO accession was important because it 
saw the legal construction of China’s foreign trade system. In order to implement its promises 
relating to its WTO accession, China modified and sorted out a large number of trade 
regulations.  
The enactment of the Foreign Trade Law of 2004 is a milestone both of the trade system 
and generally in the legal history of Chinese trade. The central tenet of the 2004 legislation is 
that trading rights can be exercised by private sector persons and entities. This release of trading 
rights, however, is still “limited.” According to Articles 8, 9, 10, and 11 of the Foreign Trade 
Law, trading rights in goods are exempted from governmental authorization in general; but if 
laws or administrative regulations prescribe otherwise, such laws and administrative regulations 
will prevail over this presumed freedom. Furthermore, the trading rights in services are not 
clearly released, according to the wording of Article 10:  
The units and individuals engaged in international trade in services shall observe the provisions of 
this Law, and of the relevant laws and administrative regulations. 
The units engaged in contracted construction of foreign projects or service cooperation with other 
countries shall have the necessary eligibility or qualification. The specific measures in this regard 
shall be formulated by the State Council. 
Based on his many years of experience, former Minister of Foreign Trade Li Qiang 
elaborated on China’s view of foreign trade. In short, f r China, international trade should be 
based on equality and mutual benefit, and respect for each other’s sovereignty. “China’s foreign 
trade policy consists of two basic objectives: development of the national economy and 
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promotion of international relations.”230 
4. Protection of civil rights through the criminal law 
The determination of China to protect intellectual property was questioned by the USA in 
the DS 362 case. The contested issue revolved around whether or not China should establish a 
minimum threshold to impose criminal sanctions on infringement of intellectual property rights. 
An examination of China’s historical attitude toward employing criminal law to protect civil 
rights can help us further understand such legislation. 
a. In dynastic China 
The thoughts of “matching Heaven with morality” and “encourage morality and punish 
with prudence”231 emerged in the Western Zhou times.232 Since that era, emperors of every 
dynasty adopted the principle of “prudence” in imposing criminal penalties in a general sense, 
except for the Qin emperors who advocated the doctrine of severe punishment as urged by the 
Legalists.233 
With regard to protecting civil rights, the employment of criminal-law instruments in 
dynastic China was limited. Crimes and penalties relating to civil rights were restricted to the 
issues of marriage and family, property rights (mainly theft and robbery), and bodily injuries. 
Moreover, when criminal provisions were applied to pr tect a person’s civil rights, the main 
purpose of such application was to maintain the social rder rather to protect individual rights.234 
b. In contemporary China 
Chinese criminal provisions that were challenged in the DS 362 case235 were Articles 213, 
                                                 
230 Gene T. Hsiao, THE FOREIGN TRADE OF CHINA : POLICY, LAW AND PRACTICE 8-10 (1977). 
231 The Duke of Zhou argued that the Heaven only advocated those of virtues, and that rulers should boost 
morality and impose penalties with prudence. See Zhang-Civilization, supra note 226, at 59-60.  
232 Pu, supra note 207, at 334. 
233 Xu, supra note 209, at 63. In the Qing Dynasty, the emperors advocated Legalism, and relied on laws in 
unifying the thoughts of common people. 
234 For elaborations on criminal penalties in Dynastic China, see Xu, supra note 209, at 128-140, 485-499; 
Chen-History, supra note 222, at 239-270; Zhang & Guo, supra note 222, at 494-508; Han, supra note 222, at 
249-379; Zhang & Huai, supra note 222, at 441-459; Zhang-Qing, supra note 222, at 196-197, 497-551. 
235 Article 213. Whoever, without permission from the owner of a registered trademark, uses a trademark 
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214, 215, 217, and 218 of the Criminal Law. These provisions constitute a part of Section 7 
(“Crimes of Infringing on Intellectual Property Rights”), which is located in Chapter III 
(“Crimes of Disrupting the Order of the Socialist Market Economy”), Part Two (“Specific 
Provisions”) of the Criminal Law of the PRC. Of particular interest – and under scrutiny in the 
DS 362 case – were the so-called “thresholds” prescribed in those provisions. These “thresholds” 
refer to the requirement of “commercial scale” that c n invoke criminal penalties: the higher the 
degree or extent of commercial scale, the more onerous the punishment. 
In order to find out whether these thresholds are designed by China as a block to providing 
appropriate protection for IPR, we must put these di putable provisions into their context – 
Chapter III of the Criminal Law (since this chapter prescribes crimes of the same nature, namely 
economic crimes) – to see whether the penalties imposed on the infringement of IPR are 
obviously and inappropriately lower than those applicable to other economic crimes. 
                                                                                                                                                
which is identical with the registered trademark on the same kind of commodities shall, if the circumstances are 
serious, be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of ot more than three years or criminal detention and shall also, 
or shall only, be fined; if the circumstances are especially serious, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment 
of not less than three years but not more than seven years and shall also be fined . 
Article 214. Whoever knowingly sells commodities bearing counterfeit registered trademarks shall, if the 
amount of sales is relatively large, be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal 
detention and shall also, or shall only, be fined; if the amount of sales is huge, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term 
imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than seven years and shall also be fined. 
Article 215. Whoever forges or without authorization f another makes representations of the person's 
registered trademarks or sells such representations shall, if the circumstances are serious, be sentenced to fixed-term 
imprisonment of not more than three years, criminal detention or public surveillance and shall also, or shall only, be 
fined; if the circumstances are especially serious, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of ot less than 
three years but not more than seven years and shall also be fined . 
Article 217. Whoever, for the purpose of making profits, commits any of the following acts of infringem nt on 
copyright shall, if the amount of illegal gains is relatively large, or if there are other serious circumstances, be 
sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention and shall also, or shall only, 
be fined; if the amount of illegal gains is huge or if there are other especially serious circumstances, h  shall be 
sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than seven years and shll also be 
fined: (1) reproducing and distributing a written work, musical work, motion picture, television programme or other 
visual works, computer software or other works without permission of the copyright owner; (2) publishing a book of 
which the exclusive right of publication is enjoyed by another person; (3) reproducing and distributing a  audio or 
video recording produced by another person without permission of the producer; or (4) producing or selling a work 
of fine art with forged signature of another painter. 
Article 218. Whoever, for the purpose of making profits, knowingly sells works reproduced by infringin on the 
copyright of the owners as mentioned in Article 217 of this Law shall, if the amount of illegal gains is huge, be 
sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention and shall also, or shall only, 
be fined. 
Article 220. Where a unit commits any of the crimes mentioned in the Articles from 213 through 219 of this 
Section, it shall be fined, and the persons who are directly in charge and the other persons who are directly 
responsible for the crime shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Articles respectively. 
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Before turning to Chapter III of the Criminal Law, e should review the specific thresholds 
at issue established by the disputed provisions. Generally speaking, in cases of committing 
infringement of an IPR, if the circumstances are serious or the amount of sales is relatively large, 
an offender shall (according to these criminal law provisions) be sentenced to fixed-term 
imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention. If the circumstances are 
especially serious or the amount of sales is huge, an offender shall be sentenced to fixed term 
imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than seven years. An exception is 
stipulated in which selling works reproduced by infringing on the copyright of the owners, if the 
amount of illegal gains is huge, result in an offender being sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment 
of not more than three years or criminal detention. 
Now we can turn to Chapter III of the Criminal Law to study the justification of these 
provisions. In Chapter III, economic crimes are classified into eight types: (1) crimes of 
producing and marketing fake or substandard commodities, (2) crimes of smuggling, (3) crimes 
of disrupting the order of administration of companies and enterprises, (4) crimes of disrupting 
the order of financial administration, (5) crimes of financial fraud, (6) crimes of jeopardizing the 
administration of tax collection, (7) crimes of infri ging on intellectual property rights, and (8) 
crimes of disrupting the market order. 
Imposing thresholds to trigger penalties on economic crimes is very common in Chapter III. 
For example, an offender shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment if he alters currencies 
and the amount involved is relatively large (Art. 173 of the Criminal Law). The reader may refer 
to Appendix 3.3 for a complete list for the penalties requiring thresholds prescribed in Chapter 
III of the Criminal Law.  
Some provisions impose no thresholds before triggern  criminal penalties. For example, an 
offender shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonme t if he produces or sells fake medicines 
(Article 141 of the Criminal Law). The reader may refer to Appendix 3.4 for a complete list of 
the penalties not requiring thresholds prescribed in Chapter III of the Criminal Law.  
Now let us examine what kinds of economic crimes would trigger a sentence of fixed-term 
imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention, as prescribed in Chapter III. 
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Under those prescriptions, an offender shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not 
more than three years or criminal detention if he sells or buys counterfeit currencies or 
knowingly transports such currencies, and the amount involved is relatively large (Article 171 of 
the Criminal Law). The reader may refer to Appendix 3.5 for a complete list of the penalties of 
fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention prescribed in 
Chapter III of the Criminal Law.   
Offences similar to several of those enumerated above will invite heavier punishment if 
they produce more serious or extensive repercussions. For example, Chapter III provides that an 
offender shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonme t of not less than three years but not more 
than seven years if he (1) smuggles weapons, ammunition, nuclear materials or counterfeit 
currency, and (2) the circumstances are minor (Article 151 of the Criminal Law). The reader may 
refer to Appendix 3.6 for a complete list of penalties of fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 
three years but not more than seven years prescribed in Chapter III of the Criminal Law. 
The crimes referred to above have been grouped into two separate lists – one list for those 
whose effects are relatively serious and that therefore trigger imprisonment of up to three years, 
and one list for those whose effects are more serious and that therefore trigger imprisonment of 
three to seven years. As noted earlier, those are the two degrees of punishment applicable to IPR 
infringement. After examining the corresponding crimes that receive the same punishments as 
IPR infringement, it is fair to conclude that the crimes of IPR infringement are not obviously 
more hazardous to the society than those crimes are. Therefore, the treatment of IPR 
infringement is not obviously inappropriate taking to account the general context of the 
punishments on economic crimes. In other words, the thresholds imposed on the invocation of 
criminal penalties do not constitute an intentionally designed block to IPR protection. 
On May 1, 2011, the Eighth Amendment to the Criminal law came into force. It revoked 
capital punishment on 13 kinds of economic crimes. This is also the first time for the Chinese 
legislature to reduce the kinds of crimes for capital punishment since 1979. This amendment 
reflects a willingness on the part of the state to relieve or relax criminal punishments in response 
to economic crimes. In this process, however, penalti s on the infringement of IPR received no 
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relaxation. This demonstrates, in yet another way, the significance attached to IPR protection by 
the Chinese legislature through the operation of China’s criminal law. 
5. Protection of IPR – more fundamental issues 
The last one of the categories of international trade disputes mentioned above in subsection 
IIB involves the protection of IPR. As noted there (s e specifically subsection IIB4), the DS 362 
case challenged China’s use of “thresholds” in its relevant criminal law provisions. That issue 
was discussed in the proceeding paragraphs. However, the DS362 case also reflects more 
fundamental ideological issue. These go right to the heart of the reasons underlying IPR 
protection.  
a. In dynastic China 
One expert analyses the contemporary protection of IPR in China from a historical 
perspective, starting by addressing the objectives of the traditional legal system of China. Not 
surprisingly, those objectives were to maintain social order and moral goodness and to maintain 
the power of the state over the people.236 
The hostility from Confucianism toward the use of law to protect individual rights and the 
age-old ideology of “the power of the past” had an adverse impact on IPR protection: 
[A] significant traditional force that shaped the P.R.C. Copyright Law is the “power of the past.” 
Chinese intellectuals rely on historical developments i  literature, fine arts, and calligraphy to a 
greater degree than Westerners. This appreciation of the past is also reflected in the Chinese view of 
copying as “the greatest compliment that authors can receive.” Essentially, Chinese intellectuals feel
that the works of prior authors and artists should be available for scholars and artists to build upon. 
An intellectual property system is seen as selfish because it restricts the rights of artists and authors 
by forcing them to “reinvent the wheel.”237 
The first copyright law in China was put into effect under the Qing Dynasty in 1910.238 
However, a commentator points out that the so-called “protection” of IPR in the 1910 law or in 
                                                 
236 June Cohan Lazar, Protecting Ideas and Ideals: Copyright Law in the P ople’s Republic of China, 27 Law 
& Pol’y Int’l Bus. 1185, 1201 (1996). 
237 Id. at 1203-4.  
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the preceding centuries was not aimed at protecting the creators of the works at issue but rather 
on protecting the interests of the state: 
Professor Alford notes that historically, focus on control, via registration, of published works was 
motivated not by a desire to secure property rights for authors, but rather by the state’s need to 
control the content of published works to ensure that works did not challenge the social order or 
improperly reveal “the inner workings of government, politics and military affairs.” A further reason 
for granting protection to certain works was to ensure that the designs embodied in those works, if 
used by the Imperial family, would not be available for use by common people.239 
b. In contemporary China 
Since 1949, Marxism has played an influential role (waxing and waning in different periods, 
of course) in China’s legal development. The influence of Marxism on IPR protection in 
contemporary China is generally negative – that is, Marxism considered the renunciation of 
private property (including IPR) essential to both economic growth and group interests:  
Mao … believed that “literature and art are for the masses of the people, and in the first place for the 
workers, peasants and soldiers; they are created for the workers, peasants and soldiers and are for 
their use.” … Traditional Marxism considered the renunciation of private property essential to 
economic growth, and so the acquisition of private property was largely forbidden in China. 
Copyright, being essentially a private property right, was consequently forbidden because it 
conflicted with the basic tenets of Marxism.240  
Another commentator also points out the negative role of Marxism in IPR protection on the 
grounds that both Marxism and Confucianism convey a disdain for the rule of law.241  
These accounts explain to some extent the ideological indifference to IPR protection in 
contemporary China, especially before its WTO accession. Such ideological indifference has 
been overcome, at least in form, by domestic legislation. However, the ideological transition 
needs more time and efforts than legislation does. Even if the corresponding reform has taken 
place, the traditional indifference might bring about ther problems in law enforcement. 
Therefore, the concerns on IPR protection within China from its trading partners cannot be 
relieved largely by the changes in legislation only. 
                                                 
239 Greenberg, supra note 225, at 175. 
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Before we turn to another form of “legal indigenizat on,” let us summarize the foregoing 
discussion. The international trade disputes involving China as respondent have revealed how 
China has implemented its WTO obligations in a way that reflects values deeply rooted in its 
legal tradition and culture. For example, the contemporary Chinese authorities still take trading 
rights as a central leverage to exercise state governance. Another illustration revolves around the 
state control of publication, which is certainly regarded as a first choice to exert influence on 
social morality. One more example appears in the dispute of IPR protection which reflects the 
Chinese strategy to employ criminal sanctions to protect civil rights.  
III.  Domestic Legislation on Trade 
Having examined trade negotiations and trade dispute  in sections I and II of this chapter, 
let us look now at domestic Chinese legislation on trade, to see how China adapts trade 
legislation to both WTO obligations and its own legal tradition and culture. 
A. Legal Regime of Trade  
The Foreign Trade Law of 2004 serves as the fundamental law of China in the area of trade. 
It provides general principles and overall guidance for foreign trade practice. The State Council 
enacted in 2001 the Regulations on Anti-dumping, the Regulations on Anti-subsidies, and the 
Regulations on Safeguards, all of which, as amended in 2004, lay the foundation of the trade 
remedy system in China. These regulations clarify some basic concepts and mechanisms as to 
trade remedies, such as dumping, subsidies, damages, causality, investigation and measures. 
In addition to the fundamental law and administrative regulations, trade authorities such as 
the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) of the PRC have enacted a large number of departmental 
rules. For example, the MOC and its predecessors have formulated the Temporary Rules on 
Hearings of Antidumping Investigation (2002), the Temporary Rules on Filing of Anti-subsidies 
Investigation (2002), and the Rules on Investigation of Foreign Barriers to Trade (2005). 
According to Announcement No. 2 of the MOC in 2011– publicizing a list of effective 
departmental rules enacted by the ministry and its predecessors – 183 rules are currently 
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effective, most of which relate to foreign trade. 
B. WTO Law in Domestic Context and Characteristics of Domestic 
Legislation  
1. WTO law in domestic context 
After the WTO accession, China modified dramatically some important trade legislations 
according to the multilateral rules. The Foreign Trade Law of 2004 and three laws pertinent to 
IPR protection – the Copyright Law, the Trademark Law, and the Patent Law – represent 
typically this significant legal reform. This subsection takes the Foreign Trade Law as an 
example. The following comparison between the protoc l f China’s WTO accession and the 
Foreign Trade Law demonstrates China’s effort to inc rporate its multilateral obligations into 
domestic law.  
The following excerpt from China’s accession protocl contains its obligations relating to 
the issue of trading rights of trade in goods: 
Right to Trade 
1. … China shall progressively liberalize the availability and scope of the right to trade, so that, 
within three years after accession, all enterprises in China shall have the right to trade in all goods 
throughout the customs territory of China, except for those goods listed in Annex 2A which 
continue to be subject to state trading in accordance with this Protocol. …China shall complete all 
necessary legislative procedures to implement these provisions during the transition period. 
2. Except as otherwise provided for in this Protocol, all foreign individuals and enterprises, 
including those not invested or registered in China, sh ll be accorded treatment no less favourable 
than that accorded to enterprises in China with respect to the right to trade. 
According to Article 10 the Foreign Trade Law of 2004, trading rights in trade in services 
have not been liberalized within Chinese legal system. This article states that: 
The units and individuals engaged in international trade in services shall observe the provisions of 
this Law, and of the relevant laws and administrative regulations. 
The units engaged in contracted construction of foreign projects or service cooperation with other 
countries shall have the necessary eligibility or qualification. The specific measures in this regard 
shall be formulated by the State Council. 
Another pertinent aspect of China’s WTO obligations involves state trading, as expressed in 
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its accession document:  
State Trading 
1. China shall ensure that import purchasing procedures of state trading enterprises are fully 
transparent, and in compliance with the WTO Agreement, and shall refrain from taking any measure 
to influence or direct state trading enterprises as to the quantity, value, or country of origin of goods 
purchased or sold, except in accordance with the WTO Agreement. 
2. As part of China’s notification under the GATT 1994 and the Understanding on the Interpretation 
of Article XVII of the GATT 1994, China shall also provide full information on the pricing 
mechanisms of its state trading enterprises for exported goods.242 
The issue of state trading is prescribed in Article 11 of the Foreign Trade Law, which states 
that:  
The State may put the import and export of certain goods under the control of State- operated 
trading. Such goods shall only be imported and exported by the authorized enterprises, expect the 
import and export of certain quantities of the goods under State- operated trading which the State 
permits to be operated by unauthorized enterprises. 
The catalogues of the goods under the control of State- operated trading and the authorized 
enterprises shall be determined, adjusted and published by the department for foreign trade under 
the State Council in conjunction with the relevant department under the State Council. 
Where, in violation of the provisions in the first paragraph of this Article, the goods under State- 
operated trading are imported or exported without authorization, the Customs shall not grant to them 
clearance. 
2. Characteristics 
Despite the fact that the wording of the domestic provisions are consistent with pertinent 
WTO rules, the legal system of China relating to trade issues still exhibits some Chinese features. 
These characteristics include mainly (1) a contrast between principled law and specific 
regulations, (2) a focus on trade “management,” and (3) a dominance of “temporary” rules.  
a. Principled law and specific regulations 
The Foreign Trade Law of 2004 comprises 11 chapters and 70 articles. In other words, That 
is to say, on average, there are less than 7 articles in each chapter that deals with a huge topic. 
These huge topics include “Foreign Trade Dealers,” “Import and Export of Goods and 
                                                 
242 China’s Protocol of Accession to the WTO, WT/L/432. 
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Technologies,” “International Trade in Service,” “Protection of Trade-related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights,” “Foreign Trade Order,” “Foreign Trade Investigation,” and 
“Foreign Trade Remedies.” Therefore, it is no wonder that most of the articles can only aim at 
setting forth general principles instead of specific rules with regard to trade practice. 
By contrast, the administrative authorities such as the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) have 
enacted a great many rules and regulations on tradeissu s with specific topics and detailed 
provisions. Take anti-dumping as an example. The MOC has enacted at least 16 departmental 
rules to address this issue, as enumerated in Appendix 3.7.  
b. Temporary rules 
As indicated by the titles of the above rules, many of them were enacted as “temporary” 
rules. Similarly, if examining the 183 departmental rules enacted by the MOC that are currently 
effective, we will find 53 “temporary” rules. Some of these have proven to be long-term as a 
practical matter. The oldest “temporary” one – the Temporary Measures of Managing 
Cooperation with Foreign Countries in Labor Services – was enacted in November 1993; so it 
has been in force for eighteen years.  
c. Focus on “management” 
Among the 183 departmental rules enacted by the MOC and its predecessors, 106 of them 
are titled with the term “management,” and most of these 106 rules relate to foreign trade, which 
has evidence the main purpose for the MOC to enact these rules – that is, to “manage” foreign 
trade. 
C. Legal Tradition and Culture 
Here again, we can gain insights into the characteristics of China’s legislation on 
international trade by exploring its legal history and culture. 
1. Forms of law in dynastic China 
The multiple levels of trade legal regime in contemporary China reflects not only the 
contemporary Chinese legal regime, but also some legislative custom in dynastic China – which 
 
131 
provided significant flexibility of legislation. In an overall sense, the source of Chinese law in 
dynastic society was simple – domestic law (that is, no territorially-external influence) as 
promulgated by the imperial bureaucracy (that is, no democratically-created rules). An 
examination into the law in dynastic China will reveal its various forms. Lü243 was the basic and 
fundamental form of domestic law in dynastic China. Compared with other forms, Lü was 
relatively stable over time, both in contents and structure. In addition to Lü, the emperors’ orders 
(usually free-standing and uncodified) constituted another significant from of law, and typically 
had the same, or even superior, effect as compared with Lü. Administrative agencies could also 
enact regulations with the purpose to supplement the provisions in Lü or to provide detailed 
guidance for applying Lü as well as other forms of law. In some dynasties such as the Qin and 
Ming Empires, judgments of cases as well as jurist interpretations also constituted sources of law 
in certain occasions.244 In short, in dynastic China, it was an age-old practice to adopt various 
forms of law. 
2. Contemporary China’s legal regime 
a. General Structure of the legal regime 
The general practice of trade legislation aims to keep the stability and provide flexibility of 
trade rules, considering the different procedures to amend laws, administrative regulations, and 
departmental rules within China’s legal system. Such flexibility is grounded on the Legislation 
law and results in a contrast between principled law and specific regulations. 
The issue of foreign trade is regulated by laws and regulations at different levels – laws (in 
a narrow sense), administrative regulations, departmen al rules, and local regulations.245 Their 
                                                 
243 Lü was the fundamental form of law in dynastic China since the Qing Dynasty. It literally meant general 
binding or discipline. Zhang-Civilization, supra note 226, at 140. 
244 The names of sources of domestic law varied in Dynastic China. For example, After China’s unification n 
the Qin Dynasty, the orders of the emperors were named as “Zhi” or “Zhao.” (Xu, supra note 209, at 64) While in 
the Sui Dynasty, the emperors’ orders were called “Ling.” (Chen-History, supra note 222, at 11) With regard to 
administrative regulations, they were named as “Ge” or “Shi” in the Sui Dynasty, and as “Cheng” in the Qin 
Dynasty (Xu, supra note 209, at 65). With respect to compilation of cases, it was clled as “Ting Xing Shi” in the 
Qin Dynasty (Id. at 66), and as “Da Gao” in the Ming Dynasty (Zhang & Huai, supra note 222, at 13). 
245 According to the Legislation Law of 2000, Chinese law (in a broad sense) comprises mainly: (1) laws (in a 
narrow sense, which are enacted by the National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee) [Article 7]; (2) 
administrative regulations (which are formulated by the State Council) [Article 56]; (3) rules (which are developed 
by the ministries and commissions of the State Council, the People’s Bank of China, the State Audit Administration 
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legal effect descends in the order of law (in a narrow sense), administrative regulations, 
departmental rules and local regulations. However, th ir degree of specification ascends in this 
same order. That is, administrative regulations are enacted to implement laws (in a narrow sense). 
Departmental rules are developed to implement administrative regulations. Such practices of 
legislation aim mainly to keep the stability of law nd to guarantee the “flexibility” of specific 
rules, considering that the procedure to modify administrative regulations or departmental rules 
is much simpler than that relating to laws (in a narrow sense).  
This “flexibility” has its legal foundation in the Legislation Law. In general, the authority to 
enact and amend law (in a narrow sense) is exercised by the NPC and its Standing Committee. 
The State Council enjoys the right to amend administrat ve regulations. Various ministries and 
departments are entitled to enact and amend departmental rules. In the latter two cases, the 
amendment does not require voting among representatives of the NPC and adopts a relatively 
simple procedure.  
Therefore, it is no surprise that the fundamental Foreign Trade Law will give just principles 
and general rules. The administrative regulations and departmental rules regarding international 
trade provide more detailed and specific provisions. 
b. Trade remedy as a new area 
To China, the concept of trade remedy is new. The For ign Trade Law of 1994 did not 
include any chapter or provision on this concept. Indeed, China did not have any law, regulation 
or rule on it until the State Council enacted the Regulations on Anti-dumping and Anti-subsidies 
in 1999. The late entry of Chinese law into this area makes China feel an urgent need to catch up 
with its trade partners. This helps explain why there are so many administrative regulations and 
departmental rules focusing on trade remedies. 
Moreover, the fact of late entry by China into the realm of trade remedy can also account 
                                                                                                                                                
as well as other organs endowed with administrative functions directly under the State Council) [Article 71]; and (4) 
local regulations, autonomous regulations and separate regulations (which are formulated by local Peopl ’s 
Congresses or their standing committees of the provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the 
Central Government, and the comparatively larger cities) [Article 63]. 
 
133 
for the reasons the rules enacted by the MOC are often entitled as “temporary” rules. Trade 
authorities might still try to figure out the most appropriate provisions and approaches to 
regulate pertinent issues. The aim of most of the trade regulations to “manage” trade, which has 
been reflected in their titles, again, demonstrates its deeply-rooted ideology of state control of 
foreign trade.   
IV.  Domestic Adjudication of Trade Issues 
Generally speaking, domestic adjudication of trade issues – that is, the trade-related 
operations of the judicial branch of government or the administrative agencies that carry out the 
function to enforce trade laws and regulations – is another facet that can illustrate how domestic 
legal tradition and culture has influenced a WTO memb r to implement its WTO obligations. 
The ways a country’s judicial bodies treat trade-related cases, carry out judicial review, apply 
WTO law domestically, and exercise the jurisdiction over trade cases can all influence the extent 
to which WTO law has been implemented domestically.  
A. Administrative and Judicial Regimes relating to Trade 
This subsection will briefly review the administrative and judicial authorities and practices 
relating to trade, in order to provide a background for further exploration into the characteristics 
of pertinent issues. The MOC of the PRC is the main administrative authority that takes charge 
of foreign trade issues, as authorized by the State Council.246 It takes the responsibility to (1) 
enact and implement foreign trade policies, (2) participate in multilateral, regional, and bilateral 
trade negotiations, (3) investigate trade barriers, and (4) determine the imposition of AD and 
CVD duties. As indicated in Section III, the MOC also carries the function of enacting 
departmental rules on trade. In addition, the General Administration of Customs, the Tariffs 
Commission of the State Council, and the National Commission of Economy and Trade of the 
State Council also exercise certain administrative authority over foreign trade issues, such as 
imposing tariffs or AD duties and investigates industry injury caused by dumped or subsidized 
                                                 
246 Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, Missions of the Minister of the Commerce, 
available at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/column/mission2010.shtml, last visited on July 29, 2011.  
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goods. 
Article 53 of the Regulations on Anti-dumping enacted by the State Council provides two 
options for interested parties to appeal if they are dissatisfied with the administrative 
determinations emerging from the government’s handling of anti-dumping (AD) complaints. The 
interested parties can choose to initiate procedure of either administrative reconsideration r 
administrative litigation. 
According to Article 53 of the Regulation on Antidumping, the following decisions are 
subject to either administrative reconsideration or judicial review: 
(1) The final determination of an AD investigation provided in Article 25 of the AD 
Regulation.247 
(2) The decision to impose an AD duty, or to collect duty retroactively or a refund, or to 
impose a duty on new shippers pursuant to Chapter 4 of the AD Regulation.248 
(3) A decision provided for in Chapter 5 of the AD regulation.249 
Article 52 of the Regulations on Anti-subsidies prescribes similar provisions regarding the 
types of appeal available in a countervailing duty case.  
Within the MOC, the Bureau of Fair Trade for Imports and Export takes the responsibility 
to carry out investigations relating to foreign trade and to make determinations on trade remedy 
measures. According to the Applicable Measures of Administrative Reconsideration within the 
Ministry of Commerce of 2004, applications for administrative reconsideration of administrative 
determinations on trade issues should be delivered to the Ministry itself.  
As for judicial review of administrative determinations, the intermediate or higher people’s 
courts have jurisdiction over complaints about the MOC’s administrative decisions or activities, 
according to Article 5 of the Rules of the Supreme People’s Court on Trials on Administrative 
Cases of International Trade of 2002 (hereinafter, “ he Rules of the SPC on International Trade 
Cases”). The exercise of the right to initiate administrative litigation does not require the 
                                                 
247 Article 25 of the Regulation on Antidumping authorizes the Ministry of Commerce to make and publicize a 
final determination of an antidumping investigation. 
248 Chapter 4 of the Regulation on Antidumping is entitled Antidumping Measures. 
249 Chapter 5 of the Regulation on Antidumping is entitled Period and Review of Antidumping Duties and Price 
Undertaking. 
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exhaustion of administrative remedies. In other words, if a party who dissatisfies with a final 
determination made by the Bureau of Fair Trade for Imports and Exports, he can file an 
administrative litigation directly, without turning to the procedure of administrative 
reconsideration. It is the party’s choice to initiate the procedure of administrative reconsideration 
or the procedure of administrative litigation. Morev r, if a party who had initiated the 
procedure of administrative reconsideration and were not satisfied with the second determination, 
he is still entitled to file an administrative litigation. These provisions explain how China 
formally puts its WTO obligations into its own administrative and adjudicative system. 
B. WTO Law in Domestic Context and Characteristics of Domestic 
Adjudication 
1. WTO law in domestic context  
Judicial review has constituted a most important WTO obligation for its Members to protect 
the trade interests of other members within one member. Article X(3)(b) of the GATT prescribes 
that the tribunals or procedures of judicial review shall be independent of the agencies entrusted 
with administrative enforcement. Article X(3)(c), however, provides a loophole to the 
requirements of the independence. According to this art cle, arrangements that precede a 
country’s membership in the World Trade Organization may continue if they “provide for an 
objective and impartial review of administrative action even though such procedures are not 
fully or formally independent of the agencies entrus ed with administrative enforcement.” 
However, China’s obligation relating to judicial revi w contained in its protocol of accession is 
more demanding. In its protocol of accession, China was required to establish tribunals that 
“shall be impartial and independent of the agency entrusted with administrative enforcement and 
shall not have any substantial interest in the outcome of the matter,” without having the 
opportunity of relying on its administrative reconsideration system that had been established 
before the WTO accession. Furthermore, “the administrat ve actions subject to review by these 
independent tribunals go far beyond the trade and customs issues specified in the General 
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.”250 
In order to implement the above WTO obligations, China has initiated corresponding 
reforms in the area of adjudication in trade cases, including clearly acknowledging the right to 
file administrative case on trade, as elaborated by one observer below: 
Previously under Chinese law, administrative decision  on certain trade-related matters were 
excluded from judicial review, including decisions concerning the validity of patents and trademarks, 
and determinations in antidumping and countervailing cases. To implement its WTO commitments, 
China has amended relevant legislation so as to provide the right to appeal to courts in all such 
WTO-related matters. In 2002, the Supreme people’s Court issued three judicial interpretations to 
clarify the scope of and standards for judicial review of WTO-related administrative decisions. It 
also designated courts at the intermediate or higher lev l as the first-instance trial courts for 
international trade cases – a move aimed to ensure impartiality and quality of judgment in the 
adjudication of WTO-related cases, given that judges in upper level courts tend to be less vulnerable 
to external interference and are generally better qualified than judges in the basic courts. It is, 
however, still too early to assess the situation of judicial review in WTO-related cases since few 
such cases have been reported.251 
2. Characteristics 
In fulfilling its WTO obligations, China’s domestic adjudication of trade issues still takes 
on some characteristics that have roots in Chinese legal tradition and culture, as analyzed in the 
following paragraphs. The classification of trade cases, the application of WTO law in Chinese 
courts, the distribution of jurisdiction over trade cases, as well as the types of judgments a 
Chinese court can make on trade disputes, directly de ermine the extent to which a pertinent 
WTO obligation has been fulfilled on the ground of Chinese legal tradition and culture.  
a. Trade cases as a kind of administrative cases 
As prescribed in Article 2 of the APL, administrative litigation means that, if a citizen, a 
legal person or any other organization considers that his or its lawful rights and interests have 
been infringed upon by a specific administrative act of an administrative organ or its personnel, 
                                                 
250 “The coverage includes any administrative measure within the scope of the World Trade Organization 
including, but not limited to, China’s commitments on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, services, 
balance-of-payments measures, and so forth. The scope of review seems unprecedentedly broad.” Nicholas R. Lardy, 
INTEGRATING CHINA INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 98-99 (2002). 
251 Donald C. Clarke, CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM: NEW DEVELOPMENTS, NEW CHALLENGES 181-182 (2008). 
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he or it shall have the right to bring a suit befor a people’s court in accordance with this Law. 
Article 1 of the Rules of the SPC on International Trade Cases specifies the scope of trade 
cases that can be accepted by the people’s courts as administrative cases: (1) administrative cases 
involving international trade in goods; (2) administrative cases involving international trade in 
services; (3) administrative cases involving trade-related IPR; and (4) other administrative cases 
involving international trade. Article 3 of the adju icative interpretation clarifies that only 
specific (or concrete) administrative activities can be the subject of a legal challenge.  
What are specific (or concrete) administrative activities regarding international trade? The 
answer appears in the Supreme People’s Court on Applicable Laws of Administrative Cases 
involving Anti-Subsidies of 2002 (hereinafter, “the Rule of the SPC on Administrative AS 
Cases). Article 1 of this adjudicative interpretation defines the specific (or concrete) 
administrative activities as including:  
(1) Final determinations relating to subsidies, amount of subsidies, damages, and extent of 
damages; 
(2) Decisions relating to imposing countervailing duties or nor and retroactive collection; 
(3) Decisions of review relating to maintaining, modifying, or withdrawing countervailing 
duties; and  
(4) Other administrative activities relating to anti-sub idies according to laws and 
administrative regulations. 
Article 1 of the Rules of the Supreme People’s Court n Applicable Laws of Administrative 
Cases involving Anti-dumping of 2002 (“the Rule of the SPC on Administrative AD Cases”) 
prescribes similar provisions to those summarized above for countervailing duty cases. 
b. Applicable law in trade cases 
Generally, the Supreme Court has not acknowledged th  irect application of WTO law in 
Chinese courts. Articles 7 and 8 of the Rules of the SPC on International Trade Cases specify the 
applicable laws in handling such administrative cases. These two articles provided that: (1) the 
laws, administrative regulations, and local regulations that relate to or have an influence on 
international trade and are enacted by local legislatures within their power of legislation shall be 
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used as applicable law; and (2) local administrative rules that are relevant shall be used as 
references. In addition, the departmental rules can be used as references, according to Article 6 
of the Rules of the SPC on Administrative AD Cases and Article 6 of the Rules of the SPC on 
Administrative AS Cases. 
One noteworthy aspect of the provisions enumerated bove is that they make no reference 
to the WTO agreements or any other pertinent interna io al agreement that China has concluded 
or acceded. Hence, the WTO agreements seem to have been excluded from the direct application 
in Chinese courts with regard to these administrative cases on trade. 
c. Jurisdiction 
According to Article 2 of the Rules of the SPC on International Trade Cases, the 
intermediate and higher courts have the jurisdiction over administrative cases on international 
trade for first instance trial. Article 5 of the Rules of the SPC on Administrative AD Cases and 
Article 5 of the Rules of the SPC on Administrative AS Cases further specify that administrative 
cases on anti-dumping and anti-subsidies shall be tried by the higher people’s courts of the 
domicile of the defendant or the intermediate peopl’s courts appointed by such higher courts. 
d. Types of judgments 
Article 10 of the Rules of the SPC on Administrative AD Cases and Article 10 of the Rules 
of the SPC on Administrative AS Cases clarify the types of judgments that a competent court can 
make – judgments that uphold, quash or partially quash the disputed administrative activities. 
A further question may arise that whether a party can laim for compensation caused by 
overruled administrative determinations or activities. Theoretically, such compensation is 
supported by Chinese legal system, as illustrated by the following provisions. Article 67 of the 
Administrative Procedural Law of the PRC states that: 
A citizen, a legal person or any other organization who suffers damage because of the infringement 
upon his or its lawful rights and interests by a specific administrative act of an administrative organ 
or the personnel of an administrative organ, shall have the right to claim compensation. 
If a citizen, a legal person or any other organization makes an independent claim for damages, the 
case shall first be dealt with by an administrative organ. Anyone who refuses to accept the 
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disposition by the administrative organ may file a suit in a people’s court. 
Conciliation may be applied in handling a suit for damages. 
Furthermore, Article 4 of the Law on State Compensation states that: 
The victim shall have the right to compensation if an administrative organ or its functionaries, in 
exercising their functions and powers, commit any of the following acts infringing upon property 
right: 
(1) Illegally inflicting administrative sanctions such as imposition of fines, revocation of certificates 
and licences, ordering suspension of production and business, or confiscation of property; 
(2) Illegally implementing compulsory administrative measures such as sealing up, distraining or 
freezing property; 
(3) Expropriating property or apportioning expenses in violation of the provisions of the State; or 
(4) Other illegal acts causing damage to property 
e. Model of trade law enforcement by administrative agncies 
As for the administration of trade laws and regulations, there is a perceived trend relating to 
the application of pertinent trade law. One example is that, as of today, all the periods for 
collecting anti-dumping duties designated by the MOC’s final determinations are 5 years, the 
maximum period allowed by the WTO rules252 and pertinent domestic provisions, despite the 
differences that may exist in dumping margins and the injuries the dumped goods may cause to 
domestic industries. 
The other example is that, in analyzing elements other than dumping practice that might 
cause injury to the relevant industries, the MOC has taken the same model and arrived at the 
same conclusions in most cases. The elements in theAD cases, as analyzed by the MOC, include: 
(1) importation from other countries or regions; (2) changes in market demands; (3) consuming 
models and substitutable products; (4) commercial ch nnels of circulation and trade policies; (5) 
quality and techniques of domestic products; (6) statu  of operations and management of the 
                                                 
252 Article 11.3 of the Antidumping Agreement states that: Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 
2, any definitive anti-dumping duty shall be terminated on a date not later than five years from its imposition (or 
from the date of the most recent review under paragr ph 2 if that review has covered both dumping and injury, or 
under this paragraph), unless the authorities determin , in a review initiated before that date on their own initiative 
or upon a duly substantiated request made by or on behalf of the domestic industry within a reasonable period of 
time prior to that date, that the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping 
and injury. The duty may remain in force pending the outcome of such a review. 
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domestic enterprises and industry; (7) exportation of domestic products of similar kinds; and (8) 
impact of force majeure. 
In examining the analysis of these elements, especially in the cases that dumping margin is 
found to be positive, the findings relating to these lements always appear stiff. Almost all the 
investigations state the following findings:  
(1) No evidence shows that importation from other countries or regions have impaired 
relevant domestic industries (despite of the fact tha he imported products under 
investigation may or may not constitute a considerabl  portion of the total 
importation); 
(2) The domestic demands of the products at issue keep going upward; 
(3) The consuming model of the products at issue did not change during the period of 
investigation, and there are no substitutable products; 
(4) The domestic products at issue are circulated in a completely competitive market, and 
no trade policies aimed at constraining the products or industries during the period of 
investigation; 
(5) The domestic products are of good quality, and the techniques possessed by the 
industries are at least as good as those of the products under investigation; 
(6) All the domestic enterprises and industries at issue are in good status with regard to 
operations and management, and all the institutions of these enterprises and industries 
are stable, strict, and advanced; 
(7) Exportation of similar products from China does notimpair the domestic industries 
(either considerable exportation or small exportation can lead to this conclusion); and 
(8) No force majeure that may impair the industries happened. 
In other words, as long as dumping practices, injuries to domestic industries, and the 
causation between them are established, there is little likelihood that the MOC will exclude any 
influence that might be attributable to factors other than the dumped goods. The above practice 
demonstrates, to some extent, the insufficient proficiency of Chinese administrative agencies in 
applying pertinent trade rules. Such insufficient proficiency can be easily misunderstood as a 
manifestation of arbitrary. 
At the end of this subsection, it is safe to summarize that, China has undertaken 
corresponding reforms to implement its commitments to the WTO. At the same time both 
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administrative enforcement and judicial procedures have exhibit some Chinese characteristics, 
such as classifying trade disputes as administrative cases, narrowing the scope of applicable laws, 
entrusting jurisdiction to general (not specialized) courts, limiting types of judgments the courts 
can make, and modeling the administration of trade regulations. The following paragraphs try to 
find some roots of these features in the Chinese legal tradition and culture.   
C.  Legal Tradition and Culture  
As in our earlier examinations, we can trace some accounts for Chinese approaches to 
domestic adjudication of trade issues on the grounds of the country’s legal history and 
contemporary legal system. 
1. Judicial review on administrative activities 
a. In dynastic China 
In the thousands of years of dynastic China, there was one fact that never changed – that is, 
the adjudicative system was never separated completely from the administrative system, despite 
the fact that some efforts in this regard were taken in the very late Qing Dynasty but did not 
succeed. In other words, in dynastic China, judicial bodies were administrative agencies at the 
same time, and judges were administrative officials at ame time, especially at the local level. An 
administrative system emerged in the Xia Dynasty. The supreme ruler of the Xia Dynasty was 
called “king.”253 There were two layers of adjudication within the Xia Dynasty – local and 
central. Adjudicative officials in the Xia Dynasty were titled “shi” or “ li ,” who was a local 
adjudicative official that took charge of criminal and civil trials. Da li was a adjudicative official 
at the central level that took charge of trials having nationally-wide influence. The kings 
functioned as supreme judges within the country.254 
When it entered the Western Zhou era, a relatively complete system on administration was 
established. In the Western Zhou era, the clan system and administrative power integrated 
closely. The Zhou kings, based on kindred relationships, infeudated lands to his relatives. A 
                                                 
253 Pu, supra note 207, at 96-98. 
254 Id. at 117. 
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system of administration took shape in both central and local regions. The central administrative 
regime set three official positions – Tai Fu, Tai Bao, and Tai Shi – to assist the Zhou kings to 
manage significant military and political affairs. In local areas, the persons who were infeudated 
lands by the kings carried the administrative functions in effect.255 In the Western Zhou era, 
judicial bodies were set in the central region to charge adjudication within the country. In local 
regions or kingdoms, disputes were handled by administrative officials.256  
Before the Han Dynasty, administrative law regulated mainly (1) the organization of 
administrative agencies, (2) official positions, and (3) the selection, appointment, evaluation, and 
welfare of governmental officials. In the Han Dynasty, a mature system of administrative 
supervision, which is similar to today’s administrative reconsideration, took shape:  
Generally speaking, every level of administrative organs enjoyed legitimate authorization of 
administrative supervision – the authorization to supervise the legitimacy and credibility of all 
officials within their administrative functions. At central level, the position of Yu Shi Da Fu 
exercised specialized function of administrative function. The position of Cheng Xiang Si Zhi was 
set within the administrative regime and supposed to exercise the function of supervision within the 
administrative regime. At local level, the position f Ci Shi exercised vertical supervision over loca 
administration. In addition, the position of Du You exercised horizontal supervision over local 
administration, since this position was established within the local administrative regime.257  
Since the Han Dynasty, the contents of administrative law were inherited from one dynasty 
to another, which mainly consisted of two parts: general administrative provisions and 
administrative supervision.258 In addition, despite the fact that judicial authorities were 
established at the central level, local administrative authorities still functioned as judicial 
bodies.259 
                                                 
255 For elaborations, see id. at 198-210. 
256 For elaborations, see id. at 329-331. 
257 For elaborations, see Xu, supra note 209, at 328-337. 
258 For elaborations on administrative law in dynastic China, see Pu, supra note 207, at 90-100, 137-146, 
198-217; Xu, supra note 209, at 67-92, 302-409; Chen-History, supra note 222, at 270-330; Zhang & Guo, supra 
note 222, at 84-118; Han, supra note 222, at 43-199; Zhang & Huai, supra note 222, at 43-161; and Zhang-Qing, 
supra note 222, at 83-127, 345-387, 685-704. 
259 For elaborations on judiciary mechanisms in dynastic China, see Pu, supra note 207, at 117-118, 170-173, 
329-342; Xu, supra note 209, at 172-186, 512-658; Chen-History, supra note 222, at 64-82, 615-682; Zhang & Guo, 
supra note 222, at 547-714; Han, supra note 222, at 719-786; Zhang & Huai, supra note 222, at 500-546; and 
Zhang-Qing, supra note 222, at 317-345, 637-685, 802-819. 
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b. In contemporary China 
In contemporary China, significant progress with regard to judicial review of administrative 
activities came with the promulgation of the Administrative Procedure Law (APL) in 1989. 
However, this law is criticized as a product with many controversial and compromised solutions 
that have hounded the implementation of the law.260 
One of the main flaws in the system created by the 1989 law relates to the narrow scope of 
court jurisdiction over administrative activities. Jianfu Chen offers these observations: 
In principle, a court is only empowered to inquire into the legality (not the merits or appropriateness) 
of specific (concrete) administrative acts, which include the examination of the following: (1) 
sufficiency of evidence in decision-making; (2) proer application of laws and regulations; (3) 
proper observance of statutory procedures; (4) acting within power; and (5) proper use of official 
power. … 
Four categories of administrative actions are specifically excluded from court jurisdiction [by 
Article 12 of the Administrative Procedural Law], namely, state acts involving national defence and 
foreign affairs, decisions concerning rewards, punishments, appointments, and removals concerning 
their working staff, the legality of administrative laws and regulations or decisions and orders 
having universal binding force, and all decisions for which the law provides that final adjudication 
is to be conducted by administrative authorities. Further, it is doubtful whether specific 
administrative activities infringing upon the political rights of citizens, legal entities, or other 
organisations, such as freedom of the press, are revi wable when the court is not specifically 
empowered to do so by clear legal provisions.261 
For some scholars, both administrative procedure and administrative litigation are even 
regarded as constituting a mechanism for political control in contemporary China.262 Another 
flaw of the pertinent system of judicial review lies in the limited jurisdiction enjoyed by the 
courts with regard to the types of judgments they can make. According to Article 54 of the APL, 
a court can only uphold, quash or partially quash an administrative decision. There is, however, 
an exception. Under Article 54(4), a court may alter an administrative decision on administrative 
                                                 
260 Jianfu Chen, CHINESE LAW: CONTEXT AND TRANSFORMATION 247 (2008) [hereinafter 
Chen-Transformation]. 
261 Id. at 248-249. 
262 For example, see Xin He, Administrative Law as a Mechanism for Political Contr l in Contemporary China, 
in BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA (Stéphanie Balme, Michael W. Dowdle ed.) 143 (2009). (In this essay, 
He argues that the recent development of administrative law in China has much to do with the changing 
socioeconomic conditions of the late 1990s. These changing conditions have caused administrative law to become 
an effective mechanism of political control.)  
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penalty if such a penalty is manifestly unfair.  
Chinese legal culture reflected in the field of administrative law has inevitable influence on 
trade cases. Especially, all the restrictions imposed on judicial review of administrative actions 
will be applied to trade issues. Specifically, on the one hand, the courts are only empowered to 
review specific administrative activities regarding (1) whether the major evidence is true and 
adequate; (2) whether the application of law is correct; (3) whether there is any violation of legal 
procedures; (4) whether there is any ultra virus; (5) whether there is any misuse of authority; (6) 
whether the administrative punishment is obviously njust; and (7) whether there is any failure 
to perform or delay in performing the legal duties. On the other hand, the courts can only make 
judgments to uphold, quash, or partially quash an administrative determination on antidumping 
or countervailing cases. These restrictions will impair the rights of a complainant in trade cases 
to receive full protection from the mechanism of judicial review.  
2. The direct application of WTO law 
The direct application of WTO law has invited heated discussion among Chinese 
scholars.263 Although the Rules of the SPC on International Trade Cases has in effect excluded 
the application of foreign law and international law in administrative cases of international trade, 
it is still too early to deny the hope of direct application of the WTO agreements in the Chinese 
courts, at least taking into account civil cases involving international trade.  
After all, some Chinese legal provisions do acknowledge the legal significance of 
                                                 
263 For example, Quan Yuan, Certain Legal Problems on Internal Application of the Rules of the WTO, 7 HEBEI 
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international rules for domestic application. For instance, Article 142 of the General Principles 
of the Civil Law, Article 126 of the Contract Law, and Article 238 of the Civil Procedural 
Law,264 all give prevailing effect of international treaties concluded or acceded to by China over 
domestic law. These provisions do offer grounds for the possibility of direct application of the 
WTO agreements in Chinese courts, especially with regard to civil litigations.  
As for administrative litigation, Article 72 of the Administrative Procedural Law states that: 
If an international treaty concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of China contains 
provisions different from those found in this Law, the provisions of the international treaty shall 
apply, unless the provisions are ones on which the People’s Republic of China has announced 
reservations. 
At first glance, it seems that international treatis also have prevailing effect over domestic 
law in administrative litigations. A scrutiny of this article, however, shows that only if the 
provisions in the APL are inconsistent with WTO agreements, WTO agreements can prevail over 
the APL. The reality is that, there is no such inconsistency has been found so far. Therefore, 
Article 72 of the Administrative Procedural Law still cannot resolve the issue of the direct 
application of WTO law in administrative litigations. 
                                                 
264 Article 142 of the General Principles of the Civil Law states that: 
The application of law in civil relations with foreigners shall be determined by the provisions in this
chapter. 
If any international treaty concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of China contains provisin  
differing from those in the civil laws of the People's Republic of China, the provisions of the international 
treaty shall apply, unless the provisions are ones  which the People's Republic of China has announced 
reservations. 
International practice may be applied on matters fo which neither the law of the People's Republic of 
China nor any international treaty concluded or acceded to by the People's Republic of China has any 
provisions. 
Article 126 of the Contract Law state that:  
The parties to a foreign-related contract may choose those laws applicable to the settlement of contract 
disputes, unless stipulated otherwise by law. If the parties to a foreign-related contract fail to make such choice, 
the State laws most closely related to the contract shall apply. 
For the contracts to be fulfilled in the territory of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-foreign 
equity joint ventures, on Chinese-foreign contractul joint ventures and on Chinese-foreign cooperation in 
exploring and exploiting natural resources, the laws of the People’s Republic of China shall apply. 
Article 238 of the Civil Procedure Law states that:  
If an international treaty concluded or acceded to by the People's Republic of China contains provision  
that differ from provisions of this Law, the provisions of the international treaty shall apply, except those on 
which China has made reservations. 
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Furthermore, the direct application of WTO agreements is subject to one general 
prerequisite of applying international treaties in Chinese courts – that is, the involvement of 
foreign elements. In other words, the WTO agreements will by no means be directly applied to 
cases that do not involve foreign elements. 
3. Administrative litigation as a legal remedy  
a. In dynastic China 
As indicated above, administrative litigation did not formally exist in dynastic China. 
Instead, administrative supervision – which was similar to administrative reconsideration of 
today’s regime – can be of some significance for our analysis. As mentioned above, in dynastic 
China, administrative organs functioned as judicial bodies at the same time; and judicial 
judgments were in effect administrative determinations. Moreover, in dynastic China, there was 
no clear distinction between civil and administrative litigations. The following excerpt explains 
the difficulties for common people to initiate administrative reconsideration at that time: 
In the Sui Dynasty, cases must be tried by competent authorizes having jurisdiction. Parties could 
not appeal freely. Based on the levels of jurisdiction, a case should be tried for the first time the 
Xian administration. If the Xian administration refused to try it, the Zhou or Jun administrations 
(i.e., higher level of administrations) should try it. In turn, if Zhou or Jun administrations refused to 
try it, the Ministry of Penalty should do it; otherwise, the case would be allowed to be submitted to 
the emperors. Therefore, the prerequisite of appeal was ignorance of cases not refusals from 
competent authorities rather inappropriate decisions made by them.  It could be imagined how hard 
for a party to appeal a case.265  
In the Tang Dynasty, the system of appeal developed to some extent. A party who did not 
satisfy with the judgment he received could bring a appeal, up until to emperors. A system of 
“direct appeal” also emerged in the Tang Dynasty, which meant that a complaining party could 
appeal to the emperor directly. However, the party must strictly comply with certain 
requirements of this system; otherwise, he would be severely punished. For example, what the 
party narrated must be the truth; otherwise, he would be imposed 80 flogs with a stick. The party 
must strictly comply with the procedure pertinent to “direct appeal”; otherwise, he would be 
                                                 
265 Chen-History, supra note 222, at 78-79. 
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imposed 60 flogs with a stick. In addition, if an adjudicative official was found by the emperor 
that he did not notify the direct appeal, which constituted violation of his duties, he, the official, 
would be imposed 60 to 100 flogs with a stick.266 The similar system of review was inherited 
for thousands of years until the end of the Qing Dynasty.  
b. In contemporary China 
The statistics released by the Supreme People’s Court shows that, in China, administrative 
litigation is resorted to much less by the people than is civil litigation or criminal prosecution. 
For example, in 2008, all Chinese courts received 6,288,831 cases in total for first-instance trial, 
among which 108,398 were administrative cases, 767,842 were criminal cases, and 5,412,591 
were civil cases.267 For second-instance trial, the courts received 654,044 cases in total, of 
which only 32,920 were administrative cases.268 
The same trend is evident in other recent years as well. In 2009, the courts received 
6,688,963 cases in total for first-instance trial, of which only 120,312 were administrative 
cases.269 For second-instance trial, there were a mere 32,64 administrative cases among (fewer 
than in 2008) 731,950 cases in total.270 In 2010, the courts received 6,999,350 cases in total f r 
first-instance trial, of which only 129,133 were administrative cases. For second-instance trial, 
there were 720,976 in total, and 4.90% of them (just over 35,000) were administrative cases.271 
Furthermore, administrative cases relating directly to international trade, if any, do not 
constitute a considerable portion of the total administrative cases. According to the classification 
of the Supreme People’s Court in 2008 and 2009, the administrative cases are categorized into 
                                                 
266 Id. at 560-562. 
267 Available at http://www.court.gov.cn/qwfb/sfsj/20102/t20100221_1403.htm, last visited on September 7, 
2011.  
268 Available at http://www.court.gov.cn/qwfb/sfsj/20102/t20100221_1402.htm, last visited on September 7, 
2011.  
269 Available at http://www.court.gov.cn/qwfb/sfsj/20104/t20100408_3856.htm, last visited on September 7, 
2011.  
270 Available at http://www.court.gov.cn/qwfb/sfsj/20104/t20100408_3847.htm, last visited on September 7, 
2011.  
271 Available at http://www.court.gov.cn/qwfb/sfsj/201103/t20110324_19084.htm, last visited on September 3, 
2011.  
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ten groups: public security (police), recourses, urban construction, business and commercial, 
technical supervision, environmental protection, traffic, labor and social security, county (xiang) 
government, and others.272 Obviously, trade cases can not constitute a major group compared 
with other cases included in that classification. 
Because we are limited to publicly-disclosed information, we have no idea of the specific 
number of cases regarding international trade that are heard involving administrative 
reconsideration and litigation. However, according to the information released by the MOC, the 
fact that no trade remedy measures were revoked based on an administrative-reconsideration 
decision or an administrative-litigation judgment so far strongly suggests that the protection 
offered by this kind of legal remedy is insufficient. 
Moreover, the reasons that administrative litigation as a legal remedy in China is less 
resorted to by Chinese people than civil or criminal litigation probably can be found in the 
inherent flaws of the institutions and the operations relating to judicial review, as identified 
above.  
4. Competence of intermediate courts to exercise jurisdiction over trade cases 
As indicated above, the intermediate or higher people’s courts have the jurisdiction over 
trade cases. Some scholars have expressed concerns on the competence of intermediate courts in 
trying trade cases, considering both the complexity of trade cases and the unlikeliness for an 
intermediate court to overrule determinations made by administrative agencies at 
central-government level. One expert offers some comments on this issue: 
The Supreme People’s Court designates Beijing Municipal City Superior People’s Court or its 
designated Beijing Municipal City Interim People’s Court to hear AD judicial review cases. Many 
people are concerned as to whether the local district court [(i.e., intermediate people’s courts)] is 
capable of hearing such complicated cases. For example, to hear AD administrative case, judges 
must understand complicated calculations of export rices, normal value and other values.  
Furthermore, many people are also concerned about whether the level of local district courts is 
sufficient to hear AD administrative cases. The AD determinations are made by the 
                                                 
272 Available at http://www.court.gov.cn/qwfb/sfsj/20102/t20100221_1412.htm and 
http://www.court.gov.cn/qwfb/sfsj/201004/t20100408_3 51.htm, last visited on September 3, 2011. 
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central-government ministry-level MOFCOM [(i.e., the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC)] or the 
Tariff Commission under the State Council, but the Beijing Local Court is just a local district court. 
It is doubtful whether a local court can make a judgment overruling a central-government 
decision.273 
Actually, the jurisdiction of intermediate people’s courts over administrative cases of 
international trade has its foundation in the APL of 1989. Article 14 of the APL prescribes that:  
The intermediate people’s courts shall have jurisdiction as courts of first instance over the following 
administrative cases:  
(1) cases of confirming patent rights of invention and cases handled by the Customs;  
(2) suits against specific administrative acts undertak n by departments under the State Council or 
by the people’s governments of provinces, autonomous regions or municipalities directly under the 
Central Government; and  
(3) grave and complicated cases in areas under their jurisdiction.  
In most administrative cases relating to international trade, the specific administrative 
activities are conducted by the MOC. Therefore, according to the above article, it is legitimate 
and appropriate for intermediate people’s courts to try these cases, since the MOC is one of the 
departments under the State Council as specified in Article 14 (2). 
To sum up, four features of domestic adjudication of trade issues have been examined in 
this dissertation. They are judicial review of administrative activities, direct application of WTO 
law, administrative litigation as a legal remedy, and competence of intermediate courts to 
exercise jurisdiction over trade cases. Each featur has, in turn, been explained in the context of 
the Chinese legal tradition and culture.  
Summary  
The process of legal indigenization of WTO law in China can be explored in four aspects – 
the conduct of international trade negotiations, the handling of international trade disputes, 
domestic legislation on trade, and domestic adjudication of cases involving trade.  
In international trade negotiations, the proposals ubmitted by China to the WTO have 
                                                 
273 Xiaochen Wu, ANTI-DUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE OF CHINA 287 (2009). 
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exhibited some common characteristics. First of all, China expresses extreme enthusiasm about 
the principle of S&D treatment, as shown by the fact that most proposals it submits contain 
relevant S&D recommendations. Second, China also identifies some substantive provisions as 
needing further negotiations, concerning issues such as subsidies, anti-dumping, market access, 
and environmental obligations. The suggestions made on substantive provisions are vague, in 
that they just point out the terms or provisions that need improvement, without providing further 
specific proposals on how to improve the formulation of those provisions. As for procedural 
matters, China calls for advancing (1) the WTO institutions relating to dispute settlement, (2) 
transparency mechanisms relating to distribution of domestic laws, policies, and practices, and 
(3) procedural issues relating to trade remedies. In doing so, China has proposed specific textual 
changes in some cases. 
The characteristics exhibited in China’s trade negotiati ns have their roots in the legal 
tradition and culture of the country. Since late dynastic China, its attitude towards international 
law has not deviated much from one of “dismissal” and “instrumentalism,” which makes China, 
on the one hand, take sovereign equality very seriously in the international community, and on 
the other hand, give more emphasis to general princi les of international mechanisms than to 
specific rules. This fact can partially explain why China attaches particular importance attention 
to the S&D treatment principle but makes only vague recommendations as to substantive 
provisions. Its lack of confidence in the international community also contributes to China’s 
cautious approach in proposing suggestions in front of the WTO’s western members. On the 
other hand, the long history of addressing the management facet of legal procedure in dynastic 
China explains the Chinese proposals with specific recommendations regarding the management 
facet of certain procedural issues. 
International trade disputes in which China is respondent, especially the DS 362 and DS 
363 cases, challenged the country’s approach and attitude toward IPR protection and monopoly 
over the importing and distributing of publications and audiovisual products in China. These 
disputes reflect the discrepancies between China and its trading partners with regard to certain 
ideologies rooted in their legal traditions and cultures. The conflicting ideologies behind these 
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disputes relate mainly to the legal status of subjects involving illegality, the role of publications 
in protecting public morals, state control of trading rights, and cautiousness in employing 
criminal penalties to IPR and other kinds of indiviual rights. 
The Chinese legal tradition and culture serve as one of the determinants of the challenged 
ideologies. First of all, subjects involving illegal aspects were totally deprived of legal protection 
in dynastic China, considering that they were regarded as threats to the supremacy of rulers and 
social order. Second, both in dynastic and contemporary China, the control of the contents of 
publications and other similar products have been rgarded for certain as a first choice of the 
state to protect public morals. Third, trading rights ad been concentrated in the hands of the 
Chinese government from the earliest dynasty through 2004. Therefore, it is a painful process for 
China to completely release control over trading rights, although legal reforms have taken place 
in the trade legal regime in order to implement China’s promises regarding trading rights as it 
entered the WTO. Fourth, in addition to the principle of “prudence” in imposing criminal 
penalties in dynastic China, it was rare for the rul rs to employ criminal penalties to protect 
individual civil rights unless the offences severely threatened their reign or social order. Despite 
that historical approach, the Chinese government has in recent years given emphasis to IPR 
infringement by using criminal punishments – and, significantly, it seems clear that this 
emphasis is fully appropriate in weight and effect, if we evaluate the relevant provisions within 
the general context of criminal punishments imposed on economic crimes. 
Laws (in a narrow sense), administrative regulations a d departmental rules constitute the 
main body of China’s domestic legal regime governing trade. The higher the legal status is, the 
more general and non-specific its contents are. The For ign Trade Law of 2004 only offers 
general principles and overall guidance as to trade practice. Several administrative regulations 
enacted by the State Council lay the foundation of the trade remedy system. The most detailed 
provisions and specific topics appear in the departmen al rules formulated mainly by the 
Ministry of Commerce and its predecessors. Among these administrative regulations and 
departmental rules, many of them are characterized as “temporary” ones, and focus on 
“management.”  
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Similar legal regimes can be observed in both dynastic nd contemporary China. China’s 
dynastic empires publicized various forms of legal documents with differential legal effects. 
China’s contemporary legal regime, including its set of rules on foreign trade, provides a similar 
model of legal structure. Furthermore, the concept of trade remedies is new to China. This 
newness has counterbalancing effects: on one hand, it urges China to enact a large number of 
rules for the purpose of keeping pace with its trading partners regarding legislation on trade 
remedies; on the other hand, China has to enact temporary rules which may subject to frequent 
adjustments easily, considering that the procedure to enact or amend administrative regulations 
or departmental rules is simpler than that of laws (in a narrow sense). In addition, the traditional 
ideology of state control in trade makes China still place heavy emphasis on the power of the 
management function of trade regulations. 
 Domestic adjudication provides China some discretion with regard to applying the WTO 
obligations and domestic law. The legal system provides the interested parties who are not 
satisfied with administrative determinations two kinds of remedies: administrative 
reconsideration and judicial review. However, to some scholars, inherent flaws exist in both 
remedies, such as the limited coverage of administrat ve cases, the exclusion of direct 
application of the WTO agreements, incompetence of the courts exercising jurisdiction over 
trade cases, and constraints in the types of judgments the courts can make.  
Putting these concerns in the context of China’s legal tradition and culture, we might find 
that they have both their historical roots and their contemporary causes. First, there did not exist 
judicial review of administrative activities in dynastic China. A mechanism similar to 
administrative reconsideration in dynastic China also placed some difficulties for common 
people to get their complaints appealed. In contemporary China, the flaws of the mechanisms of 
administrative reconsideration and judicial review with respect to trade cases result from the 
inherent flaws of the fundamental regime governing these two areas. Although direct application 
of WTO law is not totally denied in the Chinese courts theoretically, especially with respect to 
civil litigation, the actual possibility of such application is still slim in administrative 
proceedings. Third, the fact should be taken into account that administrative litigation as a legal 
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remedy is resorted to by Chinese people much less than civil or criminal litigation. Lastly, the 
competence of intermediate and higher people’s courts in trying trade cases can be traced in the 
Administrative Procedural Law enacted more than twen y years ago. In other words, it is 
legitimate and appropriate within the Chinese judicial system for these courts to exercise 
jurisdiction over trade cases.  
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Appendix 3.1 
(Pertinent passages in main text are found largely in subsection IB3 of Chapter 3) 
China-TN/DS/W/51 
Specific Amendments to the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
– Drafting inputs from China 
Communication from China 
 The following communication, dated 3 March 2003, has been received from the 
Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China. 
_______________ 
Further to its communication, dated 6 January 2003, China would like to propose the 
following amendments to the DSU: 
1. Consultation 
1. In paragraph 7 of Article 4, the numeral "60  shall be replaced by the numeral "30  
wherever it appears. 
2. The following footnote shall be inserted at the endof this paragraph: 
 Where one or more of the parties is a developing-country Member, the time period 
established in paragraph 7 of Article 4 shall, if the developing-country Member request, 
be extended by up to 30 days. 
2. Panel 
1. Paragraph 1 of Article 6 shall be amended as follows: 
 If the complaining party so requests, the DSB shall establish a panel at the meeting 
at which the request first appears as an item on the DSB's agenda, unless the DSB 
decides by consensus not to establish a panel. 
 The existing footnote to Article 6.1 shall be retained at the end of paragraph 1. 
2. The following new footnote shall be added to Article 6.1 after the word “requests”: 
 
155 
 In a case involving a complaint against a developing-country Member, if the 
developing-country Member request, the establishment of a panel shall be postponed at 
the DSB meeting following that at which the request fir t appears as an item on the 
DSB's agenda. 
3. Third party 
1. In paragraph 2 of Article 10, the sentence "within 10 days after the date of 
establishment of the panel" shall be inserted after "to the DSB". 
2. Paragraph 6 of Appendix 3 “Working Procedures” shall be amended as follows: 
 All third parties which have notified their interest in the dispute to the DSB shall be 
invited in writing to be present of all substantive m etings of the panel.  The third 
parties shall be invited by the panel to present their views and may response to the 
questions raised by the panel and parties to the dispute during the first substantive 
meeting. 
3. Paragraph 7 of Appendix 3 “Working Procedures” shall be amended as follows: 
 Formal rebuttals shall be made at a second substantive meeting of the panel.  The 
party complained against shall have the right to take the floor first to be followed by the 
complaining party.  The parties shall submit, prior t  that meeting, written rebuttals to 
the panel.  The third party shall have the right to observe the meeting without 
opportunities to take the floor at the second substantive meeting of the panel. 
4. S&D Treatment 
1. The following provision on horizontal S&D treatment to developing-country Members, 
including LDCs, shall be added in an appropriate place in the DSU. 
Article xx 
Special and Differential Treatments to Developing Countries 
 1. Developed-country Members shall exercise due restraint in cases against 
developing-country Members.  Developed-country Members shall not bring more than 
two cases to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body against a particular developing-country 
Member in one calendar year. 
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 2. Where a developed-country Member brings a case against a 
developing-country Member, if the final rulings of a panel or the Appellate Body show 
that the developing-country Member does not violate its obligations under the WTO 
Agreements, the legal costs of the developing-country Member shall be borne by the 
developed-country Member initiating the dispute settlement proceedings. 
2. The following provision on shortened timeframe for safeguard and anti-dumping cases 
in the DSU shall be added in an appropriate place in the DSU. 
Article xx 
Shortened Time-Frame for Disputes Involving Safeguard and Anti-Dumping Measures 
 1. Time-periods applicable under the DSU for the conduct of disputes involving 
safeguard and anti-dumping measures shall be half of the normal time-frame. 
 2. If the defending party is a developing-country Member, the shortened 
time-frame shall not apply to the defending party. 
 Relevant provisions in the Agreement on Safeguards n  Agreement on Anti-Dumping 
should be revised accordingly. 
5. Reasonable period of Time 
1. The following paragraphs shall be inserted at the end of paragraph 6 of Article 21: 
 Upon compliance with the recommendations or rulings of the DSB, the Member 
concerned shall submit to the DSB a written notification on compliance. 
 If the Member concerned has not submitted the above-mentioned notification by the 
date that is 20 days before the date of expiry of the reasonable period of time, then not 
later than that date the Member concerned shall submit to the DSB a written notification 
on compliance including the measures that it has taken, or the measures that it expects to 
have taken by the expiry of the reasonable period of time 
6. Amendment to Working Procedures 
1. Subparagraph 12(a) shall be revised as follows: 
 (a) Receipt of first written submissions of the parties: 
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  (1) Complaining Party:  ____ 3-4 weeks 
  (2) Party complained against: ____ 4-5 weeks 
 Such revision is to balance the current time-period for parties to a dispute to prepare 
written submissions. 
2. In order to address special situations of developing-country Members, the following 
sentence shall be added to subparagraph 12(a): 
 For developing-country Members to a dispute, the following time-frame shall apply: 
 (1) Complaining Party:  ____  4-6 weeks 
 (2) Party complained against: ____  6-7 weeks 
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Appendix 3.2 
(Pertinent passages in main text are found largely in subsection IC3 of Chapter 3) 
Dynasties in Chinese History 
 
Xia Dynasty 2070-1600 BCE 
Shang Dynasty 1600-1029 BCE 
Western Zhou Dynasty 1029-771 BCE 
Eastern Zhou Dynasty 
Spring and Autumn Period 
Warring States Period 
770-256 BCE 
722-476 BCE 
475-221 BCE 
Qin Dynasty 221-206 BCE 
Western Han Dynasty 206 BCE-9 CE 
Xin Dynasty 9-23 
Eastern Han Dynasty 25-220 
Three Kingdoms 220-265 
Western Jin Dynasty 265-317 
Eastern Jin Dynasty 317-420 
Southern and Northern Dynasties 420-589 
Sui Dynasty 581-618 
Tang Dynasty 618-907 
Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms 907-960 
Northern Song Dynasty 960-1127 
Southern Song Dynasty 1127-1279 
Liao Dynasty 916-1125 
Jin Dynasty 1115-1234 
Yuan Dynasty 1271-1368 
Ming Dynasty 1368-1644 
Qing Dynasty 1644-1911 
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Appendix 3.3  
(Pertinent passages in main text are found largely in subsection IIC4 of Chapter 3) 
Sentences Requiring Thresholds Prescribed in Chapter III of the Criminal 
Law of the PRC 
A person will be imposed penalties if he: 
(1) mixes impurities into or adulterates the products, or passes a fake product off as a 
genuine one, a defective product as a high-quality one, or a substandard product as a 
standard one, if the amount of earnings from sales is more than 50,000 yuan (Art. 140);  
(2) in violation of the provisions of the Company Law, makes a false capital contribution by 
failing to pay the promised cash or tangible assets or o transfer property rights, or 
surreptitiously withdraws the contributed capital after the incorporation of the company, if 
the amount involved is huge, and the consequences are serious, or if there are other serious 
circumstances (Art. 159);  
(3) alters currencies if the amount involved is relatively large (Art. 173);  
(4) for the purpose of illegal possession, unlawfully raises funds by means of fraud if the 
amount involved is relatively large (Art. 192);  
(5) does not pay the taxes due and adopts means of trans erring or concealing his property 
so that the tax authorities cannot pursue the amount of taxes in arrears if the amount 
involved is over 10,000 yuan (Art. 203); or  
(6) fabricates stories and spreads them to damage another person’s business credit or 
commodity reputation, if heavy losses are caused to the person, or if there are other serious 
circumstances (Art. 221). 
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Appendix 3.4  
(Pertinent passages in main text are found largely in subsection IIC4 of Chapter 3) 
Sentences not Requiring Thresholds Prescribed in Chapter III of the Criminal 
Law of the PRC 
A person will be imposed penalties if he: 
(1) produces or sells fake medicines (Art. 141);  
(2) smuggles weapons, ammunition, nuclear materials or counterfeit currency (Art. 151);  
(3) for the purpose of making profits or dissemination, smuggles pornographic movies, 
videotapes, magnetic tapes, pictures, books or periodicals or other pornographic materials 
(Art. 152);  
(4) counterfeits currencies (Art. 170);  
(5) refuses to pay taxes by means of violence or threa  (Art. 202); and  
(6) illegally sells special invoices for value-adde tax (Art. 207). According to these 
provisions, criminal penalties without thresholds are imposed on the crimes that severely 
threaten the social stability and the people’s healt . 
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Appendix 3.5  
(Pertinent passages in main text are found largely in subsection IIC4 of Chapter 3) 
Sentences of Fixed-term Imprisonment of Not More than Three Years or 
Criminal Detention Prescribed in Chapter III of the Criminal Law of the 
PRC 
A person will be imposed penalties of fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years 
or criminal detention if he: 
(1) produces or sells fake medicines (Art. 140);  
(2) produces or sells food that is not up to hygiene standards, thus causing an accident of 
serious food poisoning or resulting in any serious disease caused by food-borne 
bacteria (Art. 143); 
(3) produces fake pesticides, fake animal pharmaceuticals or fake chemical fertilizers or 
sells pesticides, animal pharmaceuticals, chemical fertilizers or seeds while clearly 
knowing that they are fake or no longer effective, or any producer or seller who passes 
substandard pesticides, animal phamarceuticals, chemi al fertilizers or seeds off as 
up-to-standard ones, thus causing relatively heavy losses to production (Art. 147); 
(4) produces cosmetics that are not up to hygiene standards or knowingly sells such 
cosmetics, thus causing serious consequences (Art. 148);
(5) for the purpose of making profits or dissemination, smuggles pornographic movies, 
videotapes, magnetic tapes, pictures, books or periodicals or other pornographic 
materials, if the circumstances are minor (Art. 152); 
(6) smuggles goods or articles and evades or dodges payable duties if the amount of gains 
is relatively large or receives administrative penalties twice within one year for 
smuggling (Art. 153);  
(7) when applying for company registration, obtains the registration by deceiving the 
competent company registration authority through falsely declaring the capital to be 
registered with falsified certificates or by other d ceptive means, if the amount of the 
falsely registered capital is huge, and the consequences are serious or if there are other 
serious circumstances (Art. 158); 
(8) is directly in charge and the other persons who are directly responsible for the crime 
where a company submits to shareholders and the general public false financial and 
accounting reports, or reports concealing important f cts, thus causing serious harm to 
the interests of shareholders or others (Art. 161); 
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(9) for the purpose of seeking illegitimate benefits, gives money or property to any 
employee of a company, enterprise or entity, if the amount involved is relatively large 
(Art. 164); 
(10) is a director or manager of a State-owned company or enterprise who, taking 
advantage of his office, operates for himself or for another the same business as that of 
the company or enterprise in which he holds the office and obtains illegal interests, if 
the amount involved is huge (Art. 165); 
(11) is an employee of a State-owned company, enterprise o  institution who, taking 
advantage of his office, commits any of the following acts and thus causes heavy 
losses to the interests of the State: (1) turning management of the profitable business 
of his unit over to his relatives or friends; (2) purchasing commodities from the unit 
managed by his relatives or friends at a price obviously higher than the market price, 
or selling commodities to such unit at a price obviusly lower than the market price; 
or (3) purchasing from the unit managed by his relatives or friends commodities that 
are not up to standards (Art. 166); 
(12) is directly in charge of a State-owned company, enterprise or institution, when signing 
or fulfilling a contract, is defrauded due to serious neglect of responsibility and thus 
causes heavy losses to the interests of the State (Art. 167); 
(13) is directly in charge of a State-owned company or enterprise, practises irregularities 
for selfish ends and causes bankruptcy or heavy losses to the said company or 
enterprise, thus resulting in heavy losses of the interests of the State (Art. 168); 
(14) is directly in charge of a State-owned company or enterprise or the competent 
department at a higher level and practises irregularities for selfish ends by converting 
State-owned assets to shares at a low price or selling them at a low price and thus 
causes heavy losses to the interests of the State (Art. 169); 
(15) sells or buys counterfeit currencies or knowingly transports such currencies, if the 
amount involved is relatively large (Art. 171); 
(16) is an employee of a bank or of any other banking institution who buys counterfeit 
currencies or, taking advantage of his position, exchanges such currencies for genuine 
ones,  if the circumstances are minor (Art. 171); 
(17) knowingly holds or uses counterfeit currencies shall, if the amount involved is 
relatively large (Art. 172); 
(18) alters currencies shall, if the amount involved is relatively large (Art. 173); 
(19) establishes a commercial bank or any other banking institution without the approval of 
the People’s Bank of China (Art. 174); 
(20) for the purpose of making profits through transferring loans, fraudulently obtains 
credit funds from a banking institution and transfer  the funds to another at usury, if 
the amount of illegal gains is relatively large (Art. 175); 
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(21) illegally takes in deposits from the general public or does so in disguised form, thus 
disrupting the financial order (Art. 176); 
(22) forges or alters treasury certificates or any other negotiable securities issued by the 
State, if the amount involved is relatively large (Art. 178); 
(23) forges or alters stocks or corporate or enterprise bonds, if the amount involved is 
relatively large (Art. 178); 
(24) fails to pay or underpays the amount of taxes payable by means of forging, altering, 
concealing or destroying without authorization account books or vouchers for the 
accounts, or overstating expenses or omitting or understating incomes in account 
books, or refusing to file his tax returns after the ax authorities have notified him to 
do so or filing false tax returns, if the amount of ax evaded accounts for over 10 
percent but under 30 percent of the total of taxes payable and over 10,000 yuan but 
under 100,000 yuan, or if he commits tax evasion again after having been twice 
subjected to administrative sanctions by the tax authorities for tax evasion (Art. 201); 
(25) refuses to pay taxes by means of violence or threat (Art. 202); 
(26) does not pay the taxes due and adopts the means of transferring or concealing his 
property so that the tax authorities cannot pursue the amount of taxes in arrears, if the 
amount involved is over 10,000 yuan but under 100,0 yuan (Art. 203); 
(27) falsely makes out special invoices for value-added tax or any other invoices to defraud 
a tax refund for exports or to offset tax money (Art. 205); 
(28) forges or sells forged special invoices for value-added tax (Art. 206); 
(29) illegally sells special invoices for value-added tax (Art. 207); 
(30) forges or makes without authorization any other invo ces, which can be used to 
defraud a tax refund for exports or to offset tax money, or sells such invoices (Art. 
209); 
(31) is a bidder who acts in collusion with each other in offering bidding prices and thus 
jeopardize the interests of bid-inviters or of other bidders, if the circumstances are 
serious (Art. 223); 
(32) during the course of signing or fulfilling a contract, commits any of the following acts 
to defraud money or property of the other party for the purpose of illegal possession, if 
the amount involved is relatively large: (1) signing a contract in the name of a 
fictitious unit or in the name of another person;  (2) offering as guaranty forged, 
altered or invalidated negotiable instruments or any other false property right 
certificates; (3) while having no ability to fulfil a contract, cajoling the other party into 
continuing to sign and fulfil a contract by way of fulfilling a contract that involves a 
small amount of money or fulfilling part of the contract; (4) going into hiding after 
receiving the other party's goods, payment for goods, cash paid in advance or property 
for guaranty; or (5) any other acts (Art. 224); 
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(33) commits any of the following acts by violence or intimidation, if the circumstances are 
serious: (1) buying or selling commodities by violenc  or intimidation, (2) compelling 
another person to provide or receive a service, (3) compelling another person to 
participate in or withdraw from bidding or auction, (4) compelling another person to 
transfer or purchase shares, bonds, or other assets of a company or enterprise, or (5) 
compelling another person to participate in or withdraw from particular operating 
activities (Art. 226); 
(34) scalps train or ship tickets, if the circumstances are serious (Art. 227); 
(35) in violation of the rules and regulations on land administration, illegally transfers or 
scalps land-use right to make profits, if the circumstances are serious (Art. 228); or  
(36) in violation of the provisions in the Law on Import and Export Commodity Inspection, 
evades commodity inspection and markets or uses import commodities that are subject 
to inspection by the commodity inspection authorities but are not declared for such 
inspection, or exports commodities that are subject to inspection by the commodity 
inspection authorities but are not proved up to standard through declaration for such 
inspection, if the circumstances are serious (Art. 230). 
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Appendix 3.6  
(Pertinent passages in main text are found largely in subsection IIC4 of Chapter 3) 
Sentences of Fixed-term Imprisonment of Not Less than Three Years but Not 
More than Seven Years 
 
A person will be imposed penalties of fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years 
but not more than seven years if he: 
(1) produces or sells food that is not up to hygiene standards,  if serious harm is done to 
human health (Art. 143); 
(2) produces fake pesticides, fake animal pharmaceuticals or fake chemical fertilizers or 
sells pesticides, animal pharmaceuticals, chemical fertilizers or seeds while clearly 
knowing that they are fake or no longer effective, or any producer or seller who 
passes substandard pesticides, animal phamarceuticals, chemical fertilizers or seeds 
off as up-to-standard ones, if heavy losses are caused to production (Art. 147);  
(3) smuggles weapons, ammunition, nuclear materials or counterfeit currency, if the 
circumstances are minor (Art. 151);  
(4) is a director or manager of a State-owned company or enterprise who, taking 
advantage of his office, operates for himself or for another the same business as that 
of the company or enterprise in which he holds the office and obtains illegal interests, 
if the amount is especially huge (Art. 165);  
(5) is an employee of a State-owned company, enterprise o  institution who, taking 
advantage of his office, commits any of the following acts,  if especially heavy 
losses are caused to the interests of the State: (1) turning management of the 
profitable business of his unit over to his relatives or friends; (2) purchasing 
commodities from the unit managed by his relatives or friends at a price obviously 
higher than the market price, or selling commodities o such unit at a price obviously 
lower than the market price; or (3) purchasing from the unit managed by his relatives 
or friends commodities that are not up to standards (Art. 166); 
(6) is directly in charge of a State-owned company, enterprise or institution, when signing 
or fulfilling a contract, is defrauded due to serious neglect of responsibility, if 
especially heavy losses are caused to the interests of the State (Art. 167);  
(7) is directly in charge of a State-owned company or enterprise or the competent 
department at a higher level practises irregularities for selfish ends by converting 
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State-owned assets to shares at a low price or selling them at a low price, if especially 
heavy losses are caused to the interests of the Stat  (Art. 169);  
(8) for the purpose of making profits through transferring loans, fraudulently obtains 
credit funds from a banking institution and transfer  the funds to another at usury, if 
the amount involved is huge (Art. 175);  
(9) fails to pay or underpays the amount of taxes payable by means of forging, altering, 
concealing or destroying without authorization account books or vouchers for the 
accounts, or overstating expenses or omitting or understating incomes in account 
books, or refusing to file his tax returns after the ax authorities have notified him to 
do so or filing false tax returns, if the amount of ax evaded accounts for over 30 
percent of the total of taxes payable or is over 100,0 0 yuan (Art. 201);  
(10) refuses to pay taxes by means of violence or threat, if the circumstances are serious 
(Art. 202);  
(11) does not pay the taxes due and adopts the means of transferring or concealing his 
property so that the tax authorities cannot pursue the amount of taxes in arrears, if the 
amount involved is over 100,000 yuan (Art. 203); 
(12) forges or makes without authorization any other invo ces, which can be used to 
defraud a tax refund for exports or to offset tax money, or sells such invoice, if the 
number involved is large (Art. 209);  
(13) commits any of the following acts by violence or intimidation, if the circumstances 
are especially serious: (1) buying or selling commodities by violence or intimidation, 
(2) compelling another person to provide or receive a s rvice, (3) compelling another 
person to participate in or withdraw from bidding or auction, (4) compelling another 
person to transfer or purchase shares, bonds, or othe assets of a company or 
enterprise, or (5) compelling another person to participate in or withdraw from 
particular operating activities (Art. 226); or 
(14) in violation of the rules and regulations on land administration, illegally transfers or 
scalps land-use right to make profits, if the circumstances are especially serious (Art. 
228). 
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Appendix 3.7  
(Pertinent passages in main text are found largely in subsection IIIB2 of Chapter 3) 
A list of MOC departmental rules on Antidumping Issues 
 
(1) the Temporary Rules on Hearings of Anti-dumping I vestigation;  
(2) the Temporary Rules on Filing of Antidumping Investigation;  
(3) the Temporary Rules on Field Investigation on Anti-dumping;  
(4) the Temporary Rules on Questionnaire Survey in Anti-dumping Investigation; 
(5) the Temporary Rules on Sampling in Anti-dumping I vestigation;  
(6) the Temporary Rules on Information Disclosure in Anti-dumping Investigation;  
(7) the Temporary Rules on Consulting Public Information in Anti-dumping Investigation; 
(8) the Temporary Rules on Prince Undertaking in Anti-dumping;  
(9) the Temporary Rules on Review of New Exporters in Anti-dumping;  
(10) the Temporary Rules on Duty Reimbursement in Anti-dumping;  
(11) the Temporary Rules on Interim Review of Dumping and Dumping Margin;  
(12) the Temporary Rules on Procedures of Adjusting the Scope of Dumped Goods;  
(13) the Rules on Hearings of Industrial Damages Investigation;  
(14) the Rules on Investigation on Industrial Damages in Anti-Dumping; 
(15) the Rules on Appearance in Foreign Anti-dumping Cases involving Exported Goods; 
and  
(16) the Rules on Consulting and Disclosing Information in Investigation of Industrial 
Damages. 
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CHAPTER 4.  LEGAL INDIGENIZATION OF WTO  LAW IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
 
No one can study the WTO without considering the rol of the United States. Being one of 
the WTO’s sponsors and most important members, the Unit d States has provided us with 
abundant materials to study in respect of legal indigenization of WTO law. In this chapter, I 
explore the process of legal indigenization in the United States from the same four perspectives 
as were at issue in Chapter 3: international trade negotiations, international trade disputes, 
domestic legislation on trade, and domestic adjudication of trade issues. Based on a brief review 
of U.S. documents and practices in the four areas, I characterize how the United States 
indigenizes these documents or practices with its own legal tradition and culture.  
I. International Trade Rule-making  
Both global and regional systems give the United States a wide playing field on which to 
exercise its trade negotiating power, skill, and policy. The United States actively participates in 
multilateral trade negotiations and also initiates r gional (and bilateral) trade negotiations. The 
following paragraphs explore the characteristics of U.S. trade negotiations, both substantive and 
procedural, and how they reflect U.S. legal tradition and culture. 
A. Overview  
On the one hand, to examine the participation of the United States in multilateral trade 
negotiations after the establishment of the WTO, we may look into the proposals submitted by 
that country to the WTO. On the other hand, to explore U.S. practices in regional and bilateral 
trade negotiations, we can look into the contents of various U.S. Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).  
1. Multilateral trade negotiations 
Like other members, the main path for the United States to convey its views and 
preferences in multilateral trade negations is to submit proposals to the WTO. Generally 
speaking, the American proposals can be categorized into two groups – those on substantive 
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provisions and those on procedural issues. Following the analysis of those two groups of 
proposals, particular attention is given below to the American attitude towards the S&D 
treatment principle. 
a. On substantive provisions 
A wide range of substantive provisions in the WTO agreements, including those on trade 
remedies, market access, environmental goods, and customs and border measures, have received 
suggestions for improvement and further negotiations from the United States.  
Take the proposals on trade remedies as an example. The USA has made recommendations 
on the topics of circumvention,274 fisheries subsidies,275 antidumping and countervailing 
issues,276 exchange rates issues in the ADA,277 allocation of subsidy benefits over time,278 new 
shipper reviews in the ADA,279 all other rates,280 accrual of interest,281 expanding the 
prohibited “red light” subsidy category,282 definition of domestic industry for perishable, 
seasonal agricultural products in the ADA and ASCM,283 and causation in the ADA and 
                                                 
274 The United States, Circumvention, TN/RL/W/50, February 4, 2003 [hereinafter USA-TN/RL W/50]; 
Circumvention, TN/RL/GEN/29, February 8, 2005 [hereinafter USA-TN/RL/GEN/29]; and, Circumvention, 
TN/RL/GEN/106, March 6, 2006 [hereinafter USA-TN/RL/GEN/106].  
275 The United States, Possible Approaches to Improved Disciplines on Fisheries Subsidies, TN/RL/W/77, 
March 19, 2003[ hereinafter USA-TN/RL/W/77].   
276 The United States, Identification of Additional Issues under The Anti-Dumping and Subsidies Agreements, 
TN/RL/W/98, May 6, 2003 [hereinafter USA-TN/RL/W/98].  
277 The United States, Exchange Rates (Anti-Dumping Agreement Article 2.4.1), TN/RL/W/149, April 22, 2004 
[hereinafter USA-TN/RL/W/149]; Exchange Rates (Anti-Dumping Agreement Article 2.4.1), TN/RL/GEN/5, July 
14, 2004 [hereinafter USA-TN/RL/GEN/5]. 
278 The United States, Allocation of Subsidy Benefits over Time, TN/RL/W/148, April 22, 2004 [hereinafter 
USA-TN/RL/W/148]; Allocation Periods for Subsidy Benefits, TN/RL/W/157, June 4, 2004 [hereinafter 
USA-TN/RL/W/157]; and, Expensing versus Allocating Subsidy Benefits, TN/RL/GEN/17, September 15, 2004 
[hereinafter USA-TN/RL/GEN/17]. 
279 The United States, New Shipper Reviews (ADA Article 9.5), TN/RL/W/156, June 4, 2004 [hereinafter 
USA-TN/RL/W/156]; and, New Shipper Reviews (ADA Article 9.5), TN/RL/GEN/11, TN/RL/W/156/Rev.1, July 14, 
2004 [hereinafter USA-TN/RL/GEN/11].  
280 The United States, All-others Rate (Article 94.4 ADA), TN/RL/GEN/16, September 17, 2004 [hereinafter 
USA-TN/RL/GEN/16]. 
281 The United States, Accrual of Interest (ADA Articles 9.3.1 & 9.3.2), TN/RL/W/168, December 10, 2004 
[hereinafter USA-TN/RL/W/168]. 
282 The United States, Expanding the Prohibited “Red Light” Subsidy Category, TN/RL/GEN/94, January 16, 
2006 [hereinafter USA-TN/RL/GEN/94]; and, Expanding the Prohibited “Red Light” Subsidy Category: Draft Text, 
TN/RL/GEN/146, June 5, 2007 [hereinafter USA-TN/RL/GEN/146].  
283 The United States, Definition of Domestic Industry for Perishable, Seasonal Agricultural Products, 
TN/RL/GEN/129, April 24, 2006 [hereinafter USA-TN/RL/GEN/129]. 
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ASCM.284 Another example of recommendations on a comprehensive issue can be found in the 
proposals on environmental goods, in which the United States expresses its opinion on paragraph 
31 of the Doha Declaration285 and an initial list of environmental goods.286 Details on these 
proposals, and the general characteristics they reveal, will be discussed below in subsection IB 
of this chapter. 
b. On procedural provisions 
In addition to substantive provisions, the United States has given much attention to 
procedural issues such as transparency of DSB operations, the DSB procedures, and those on 
trade remedies. As to the DSB procedures in particular, the United States suggests addressing 
transparency issues287 and practices for open meetings.288 As to the procedures in trade 
remedies, the USA recommends changes in regard to prompt access to non-confidential 
information in the ADA,289 conduct of verifications,290 preliminary determinations in the 
Antidumping Agreement (ADA),291 disclosure of calculations in preliminary and final 
determinations,292 and collection of domestic antidumping (AD) duties under the ADA Article 
                                                 
284 The United States, Causation (ADA Article 3.5; ASCM Article 15.5), TN/RL/GEN/128, April 24, 2006 
[hereinafter USA-TN/RL/GEN/128]. 
285 The United States, Sub-paragraph 31(I) of The Doha Declaration, TN/TE/W/40, June 21, 2004 [hereinafter 
USA-TN/TE/W/40]; and Continued Work under Paragraph 31(II) of The Doha Ministerial Declaration, 
TN/TE/W/70, February 20, 2007 [hereinafter USA-TN/TE W/70]. 
286 The United States, Initial List of Environmental Goods, TN/TE/W/52, TN/MA/W/18/Add.7, July 4, 2005 
[hereinafter USA-TN/TE/W/52]. 
287 The United States, Further Contribution of the United States to the Improvement of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding of the WTO related to Transparency, TN/DS/W/46, February 11, 2003 [hereinafter 
USA-TN/DS/W/46]. 
288 The United States, Contribution of the United States on Some Practical Considerations in Improving the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO related to Transparency and Open Meetings, TN/DS/W/79, July 13, 
2005 [hereinafter USA-TN/DS/W/79]. 
289 The United States, Prompt Access to Non-Confidential Information (Articles 6.4 Agreement on 
Anti-Dumping Practices and 12.3 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures), TN/RL/W/162, June 29, 
2004 [hereinafter USA-TN/RL/W/162]. 
290 The United States, Conduct of Verifications (ADA Article 6.7 & Annex I and ASCM Article 12.6 & Annex 
VI), TN/RL/GEN/15, September 15, 2004 [hereinafter USA-TN/RL/GEN/15].  
291 The United States, Preliminary Determinations (Article 6 ADA & Article 12 ASCM), TN/RL/GEN/25, 
October 20, 2004 [hereinafter USA-TN/RL/GEN/25]. 
292 The United States, Disclosure of Calculations in Preliminary and Final Determinations, TN/RL/GEN/133, 
April 24, 2006 [hereinafter USA-TN/RL/GEN/133]. 
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9.3.293 The USA also suggests changes on procedural issues of express shipment,294 
transparency and publication,295 and internet publication.296 
c. On S&D treatment 
The United States has also given attention to the WTO S&D treatment principle.  It 
submitted elaborations on whether the current S&D provisions need improvement in the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM).297 In some other proposals 
such as those on market access for non-agricultural products,298 express shipment,299 fees 
charged,300 advanced binding rules,301 and internet publication,302 the United States has 
recommended considering the possibility and the necssity of incorporating the S&D treatment 
principle into relevant provisions. 
2. FTA negotiations 
The United States has initiated and concluded regional r bilateral free trade agreements 
with Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Columbia, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Canada, Mexico, Oman, 
Panama, Peru, Singapore, the Dominican Republic and five Central American countries (Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua).The coverage of these FTAs varies in 
each case. Generally speaking, the FTAs have a wide range of coverage – trade in goods, 
operations in the services sector, liberalized investm nt policy, IP protection, environmental 
                                                 
293 The United States, Collection of Anti-Dumping Duties under Article 9.3, TN/RL/GEN/131, April 24, 2006 
[hereinafter USA-TN/RL/GEN/131]. 
294 The United States, Express Shipments, TN/TF/W/15, February 4, 2005 [hereinafter USA-TN/F W/15]; and, 
Draft Text on Expedited Shipments, TN/TF/W/144, May 21, 2007 [hereinafter USA-TN/TF/W/144].  
295 The United States, Proposal on Transparency and Publication, TN/TF/W/13, February 4, 2005 [hereinafter 
USA-TN/TF/W/13]. 
296 The United States, Draft Text on Internet Publication, TN/TF/W/145, May 21, 2007 [hereinafter 
USA-TN/TF/W/145]. 
297 The United States, Special and Differential Treatment and the Subsidie Agreement, TN/RL/W/33, 
December 2, 2002 [hereinafter USA-TN/RL/W/33]. 
298 The United States, Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products, TN/MA/W/18, December 5, 2002 
[hereinafter USA-TN/MA/W/18]. 
299 USA-TN/TF/W/15, supra note 294. 
300 Id. 
301 Id. 
302 USA-TN/TF/W/145, supra note 296. 
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protection, and governmental procurement. A trend of the U.S. FTAs to go far beyond the 
traditional FTA coverage prompts us to explore the roots in U.S. legal tradition and culture. 
B. Characteristics 
The U.S. proposals to the WTO, as well as the terms of various FTAs, have exhibited some 
noteworthy characteristics. The following paragraphs examine several main characteristics. 
1. Series of proposals 
Generally, compared to the proposals made by China, there is one impression the U.S. 
proposals – that it, its proposals are well planned an  organized in series. This different attitude 
and approaches promote me to explore whether it is one of the manifestations of U.S. legal 
culture, especially those aspects relates to the WTO. In this subsection, I will explore this 
perceived characteristic.  
For an issue that the United States has conveyed concerns about – whether substantive or 
procedural – the country typically takes a series of steps to formulate its specific proposals. In 
some cases, the process can be observed to follow these steps: in the first place, it identifies the 
issue that needs improvement or further negotiations; in the second place, it further elaborates on 
the significance of the issue and particular challenges involved in addressing it; and eventually, it 
puts forward drafts as the basis of multilateral discussion. 
Let us look at examples that are found in U.S. proposals on allocation of subsidy benefits, 
circumvention, DSB transparency, and fisheries subsidies.  
The first example is a set of proposals on the alloc ti n of subsidy benefits. The United 
States identified the issue of how to allocate subsidy benefits and provided a formula it adopted 
in a proposal dated April 22, 2004.303 In a proposal of June 4, 2004, the USA elaborated th  
allocation periods for subsidy benefits by introducing its own practices.304 In a proposal dated 
July 14, 2004, it discussed how to determine appropriate allocation period.305 In the paper of 
                                                 
303 USA-TN/RL/W/148, supra note 278. 
304 USA-TN/RL/W/157, supra note 278. 
305 The United States, Allocation Periods for Subsidy Benefits, TN/RL/GEN/12, TN/RL/W/157/Rev.1, July 14, 
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September 15, 2004, it addressed the threshold matter of when such a methodology of allocating 
subsidy benefits should be invoked.306 
The second example is about circumvention – a measur  taken by exporters to evade an 
antidumping or countervailing duty.307 On February 4, 2003, the United States submitted a 
proposal which suggested discussing further the uniform procedures as to circumvention.308 In a 
proposal of February 8, 2005, it elaborated the forms of circumvention and procedures for 
circumvention enquiries and suggested making specific rules.309 On March 6, 2006, it submitted 
the proposed text.310 
The third example relates to the DSB transparency. I  a proposal dated February 11, 2003, 
the United States identified some issues concerning DSB transparency that it said needed 
improvement – public attendance, access to submission  (written versions of oral statement are 
public), access to final panel report, and amicus curiae submission.311 On July 13, 2005, it 
submitted a proposal, underscoring some U.S. proposals regarding conceptual issues and raising 
practical considerations.312 On April 21, 2006, it submitted a legal draft.313 
The fourth example has to do with fisheries subsidie . On March 19, 2003, the United 
States, in its proposal, pointed out distinctive feature of how fisheries subsidies are handled.314 
In a proposal of December 13, 2004, it provided additional views on the structure of the fisheries 
subsidies negotiations.315 On May 13, 2005, it put forward a piece of specific suggestion on 
                                                                                                                                                
2004 [hereinafter USA-TN/RL/GEN/12]. 
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relevant definition.316 On April 24, 2006, it proposed actual text on fisheries subsidies in three 
areas – (1) appropriate conditions to attach to vessel capacity reduction (buyback) programs, 
which have been proposed as a potential exception to a broad prohibition;  (2) provisions for 
the Committee’s periodic review of the effectiveness of new disciplines on fisheries subsidies, 
including a role for intergovernmental organizations with fisheries expertise;  and (3) 
provisions for appropriate involvement of fisheries experts in addressing technical and scientific 
questions that may arise in dispute settlement proceedings under new fisheries subsidies 
disciplines.317 
Examples containing similar three-step sequences can also be found in the proposals on 
on-the-spot investigation318, preliminary legal and factual considerations319, and the “red light” 
subsidy category320. 
2. Cautiousness toward S&D treatment 
Generally, the attitude of the United States toward st engthening S&D treatment can be 
characterized as cautiousness. The United States regards the system of S&D treatment as a 
transitional mechanism as well as an exception to general rules instead of a fundamental 
principle of the WTO, as verified by its following arguments in the proposals.  
In asserting that the provision of S&D treatment in the context of the ASCM is only a 
temporary or transitional measure, the United States emphasizes that the aim of the mechanism 
is not to establish a permanent group of second-class members. Besides, the current S&D 
provisions in the ASCM are, in the U.S. view, good enough.321 In some other proposals, the 
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United States has emphasized repeatedly that further negotiations on the pertinent S&D 
provisions are needed only if there is a necessity to design such a transitional mechanism. In 
some proposals, the method of multilateral negotiati ns recommended by the USA is to work out 
a general set of rules in the first place, and thenur  to the exceptional S&D treatment if 
necessary.322 On December 15, 2009, the USA proposed a draft titled “Transition Provisions for 
Developing and Least-Developed Country Members,” which reflected American opinion on the 
transitional nature of S&D treatment.323 
3. Institutional reform 
The American proposals to the WTO are not limited to “repairing” current minor 
shortcomings in its operational or institutional aspects. They also focus on some important 
reforms of the institution. For instance, the United States calls for expanding the scope of “red 
light” subsidies, permitting public attendance, and dmitting amicus curiae submissions in the 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). 
On June 5, 2007, the USA proposed a draft on expanding the prohibited “red light” subsidy 
category, as well as on some conforming changes in pertinent provisions. The scope of the 
“prohibited” (“red light”) subsidies is recommended to include several other types.324 A 
complete proposed draft of a new Article 3 of the ASCM appears in Appendix 4.1. Compared to 
the current provision, cited as follows, the U.S. proposal would greatly expand the scope of the 
“prohibited” subsidies, which would in turn impose more obligations on the WTO Members if 
adopted.  
On April 21, 2006, the USA proposed some recommendations as to the transparency of 
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DSB operations – specifically, open meetings, access to ubmissions, access to final reports, and 
amicus curiae submissions. In addition to modifying Article 18 of the DSU, the USA proposal 
has tried to reform the existing DSU (i.e., the Dispute Settlement Understanding) regime, in the 
aspects of opening meetings, timely access to submissions, timely access to final reports, and 
amicus curiae submissions. Appendix 4.2 contains the full content of that proposal.325 
For the United States, the recommendations regarding the improvement of the operational 
or institutional aspects of the WTO mechanisms are not restricted to clarifying certain terms or 
provisions, or to resolving some problems arising from practice. Instead, the United States is 
working on further disciplining the multilateral mechanism through institutional reform.  
4. International rule of law 
Emphasis on procedural justice and international rule of law has been reflected in some 
proposals submitted by the USA. As noted by Peter-Tobias Stoll, “[i]n the negotiations [of the 
Uruguay Round], the United States and developing States, albeit for different reasons, came 
together to push for a strong multilateral rule of law to govern the new WTO, including an 
effective dispute settlement mechanism.”326 In a proposal of December 2, 2002, the United 
States, when examining the relationship between S&D treatment and subsidies, emphasized that 
the rule of law is more effective than subsidies in boosting productivity and performance.327 
Moreover, in a proposal on investigatory procedures nder the ADA and the ASCM, the United 
States explained that the significance of procedural fairness lies in that it is “central to the rule of 
law.”328 
5. Procedural justice 
As indicated in the preceding paragraphs, in pursuing international rule of law, the United 
States has put the procedural justice center stage. On the grounds of the significance of 
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procedural justice to international rule of law, the United States has in particular specified the 
importance of improving the ADA procedures, as appering in the following excerpt:  
To better ensure transparency and procedural fairness i  such reviews, Members also should 
incorporate by reference in Article 9.3 [of the ADA] the rules on evidence and procedure in Article 
6 and the public notice and explanation requirements in Article 12.329 
Furthermore, the issues of procedural fairness in trade remedies have also been given 
special emphasis in the American proposals. By analyzing the significance of preliminary 
decisions, the United States has pointed out that preliminary decisions in trade remedy 
investigations “provide a vital contribution to procedural fairness:” 
By informing parties of how the authorities weigh the facts on the record at a particular time and 
apply the law to those facts [in preliminary decisions], interested parties may assess where, in their 
view, the authority requires additional facts, may h ve misinterpreted the facts, or possibly 
misapplied the law.  The interested parties may also deduce which issues had the greatest impact 
on their interests.  In this way, interested parties are presented with a framework that can be the 
basis for the defence of their interests in the phase of the investigation prior to the final 
determination. 
This procedural fairness function of preliminary determinations is implicitly recognized by Article 
12.2 of the ADA and Article 22.3 of the ASCM. Both Agreements require a public notice providing 
an explanation of the findings in sufficient detail, which set forth all relevant facts and analysis, that
may inform the interested parties’ future participation in the investigation.330 
In short, the United States has taken the procedural justice as one of the breakthrough points 
to improve the multilateral trade regulations.  
6. U.S. practices and experiences 
In making this proposal, the United States is generous in sharing its own practices and 
experiences in trade areas to support its arguments. For example, the USA gives the formula it 
uses to allocate the benefit from a grant (i.e., a subsidy), which is known as the declining balance 
formula because the allocated benefits are highest in the first year and decline over the allocation 
period.331 Moreover, it shares its own experiences with other m mbers regarding fisheries 
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subsidies, especially some federal buyback programs pertinent to fishery. 332 
The reason for the United States to share these practices and experiences is, as expressed in 
a document it submitted, that “the United States has a well-developed practice … which …can 
serve as a good basis for [multilateral] discussion.”333 
7. Selective FTA partners 
The USA has trade interests all over the world. However, the list of its FTA partners is 
relatively short and highly selective, based on political and security interests more than 
economic interests. To date, the United States’ FTApartners are located mainly in Latin America, 
Middle East, Asia, and Oceania. The excerpt below denotes the general strategy adopted by the 
USA to select FTA partners: 
[P]icking FTA partners primarily involves US relations with developing countries and is affected by 
the myriad US political, economic, and security interests with those countries. On the economic 
front, this means advancing US trade and investment interests abroad by improving access to 
growing markets and “leveling the playing field” for US firms, workers, farmers in competition 
with foreign suppliers, as well as by building allinces in support of US objectives in WTO talks. 
On the foreign policy front, this means using free trade to promote economic growth and the rule of 
law, to strengthen the foundations of democratic governance, and to secure support for global efforts 
against terrorism.334 
To sum up, it is more political and security interests than economic interests that drive U.S. 
FTA strategy. More uniquely, the possibility as well as necessity to promote the rule of law in 
another country has been used as a criteria by the Unit d States to select its FTA partners. Any of 
the U.S. FTAs can illustrate this strategy. In the U.S.-Australia FTA, what the USA was 
concerned about was the trade relationship between Australia and the Asian countries. The 
document prepared by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) described 
the significance of the U.S.-Australia FTA in tightening the strategic relationship between the 
United States and Australia in both bilateral and regional contexts:  
The FTA will strengthen links between the U.S. and Australian economies at a time when Australia 
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is increasing its economic ties to Asian markets. The United States-Australia FTA will also serve as 
a catalyst for expanded regional trade, as both the U.S. and Australia have completed FTAs with 
Singapore, and the United States is also about to begin negotiations with Thailand. Australia has 
recently completed an FTA with Thailand and entered into preliminary discussions with China and 
Japan. 
Finally, the FTA supports the economy of a steadfast ally, further cementing the longstanding 
U.S.-Australia strategic relationship, while simultaneously benefiting U.S. commerce.335 
In some FTAs with Latin American countries, the United States expressed its intent to 
improve democracy in these countries. For instance, on  aspect of the significance of the 
U.S.-Colombia FTA is to “strengthen peace, democracy, freedom and reform,” as appearing in a 
USTR report. 336 
Through the FTAs with Middle-East countries, the United States wants to strengthen 
democracy in its trading partners and to balance the power in the Gulf area. For example, the 
U.S.-Oman FTA serves to “support economic reform, regional integration, and democracy” in 
Oman, as evaluated by the USTR as follows: 
Oman is a regional leader in economic reform. …Oman’s emphasis on economic diversification has 
opened the country to foreign participation in the economy, particularly in the form of joint ventures. 
This FTA is the most recent and important step in Oman’s efforts to reform its economy, create jobs, 
and move away from dependence on revenues generated from oil exports. 
This Agreement also helps the advancement of economic and political freedom in the region. For 
decades, Oman and the United States have shared a desire for peace, stability and economic 
opportunity in the Middle East. Free trade agreements in the Middle East carry out the 
recommendation in the “The 9/11 Commission Report” urging the United States to “encourage 
development, more open societies and opportunities for people to improve the lives of their 
families,” by strengthening trade relations with the region.337 
It is even evident that, to the U.S. decision-makers, conomic benefit brought about by 
concluding FTAs does not prevail over other considerations such as political or security interests. 
Article XXIV of GATT 1994 provides the possibility for the United States to accomplish the 
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tasks of its FTAs.  
As an exception to the MFN principle, Article XXIV permits the formation of free trade areas 
(FTAs) and customs unions (CUs), whereby two or more WTO members eliminate trade barriers 
among themselves in a preferential way, with respect to other WTO members. Under an FTAs, such 
as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), each member retains its own external 
tariffs, while under a customs union, such as the European Union (EU), the members adopt a 
common external tariff on each product. These arrangements naturally introduce WTO-allowed 
discrimination between union members and outside countries.338 
8. Out-reform 
One more feature of regional trade negotiations participated in by the United States is U.S. 
efforts on “out-reform” – reforms taking place in its trading partners. As analyzed by Jeffrey J. 
Schott, “FTAs offer opportunities not just to bolster exports but also to reinforce and secure 
domestic reforms crucial for economic development [in its trading partners].”339 
In addition to general reforms in economic and political areas, the United States targets 
environmental, labor, and IPR issues as well. The U.S.-Jordan trade agreement was the first to 
include specific provisions on labor and the environment.340 Howard Rosen applauds the 
significance of this FTA regarding its contribution to environmental and labor concerns as 
follows: 
The great precedent in the US-Jordan FTA was the inclusion, in the text of the agreement itself, of 
specific (and parallel) provisions concerning environmental and labor issues. 
At the core of the environmental provision is the recognition that “it is inappropriate to encourage 
trade by relaxing domestic environmental laws.” At the same time, the U.S.-Jordan FTA 
acknowledges the right of each country to establish its own environmental laws and policies. It goes 
on to state that “a Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its environmental laws, through a 
sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the 
Parties” ….341 
The progress made by the U.S.-Jordan FTA, compared to the side agreement on 
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environment of the North American Free Trade Agreemnt (NAFTA), is further pointed out by 
Rosen as follows: 
The substance of the environmental provision in the US-Jordan FTA is almost identical to that 
included in NAFTA. The primary difference is that the US-Jordan FTA places it in the actual body 
of the agreement, thereby making it subject to the general dispute settlement mechanism set out in 
the agreement. By contrast, under NAFTA, the enviroment provision is relegated to a side 
agreement, where it must rely on its own dispute setlement mechanism.342 
As for labor issues, the U.S.-Jordan FTA sets out three requirements, as summarized below: 
• Each country must enforce its own labor laws in manners that affect trade, and those labor laws 
must reflect both “internationally recognized labor rights” as defined by the Trade Act of 1974, as 
amended, and core labor standards as defined by the International Labor Organization. 
• The parties agree not to relax their own labor laws in order to encourage trade with the other 
party. 
• What counts as effective enforcement of labor laws llows for a “reasonable exercise of … 
discretion” and “bona fide decision[s] regarding the allocation of resources” …343 
Rosen then concludes that “[t]he provision … is very similar to that dealing with the 
environment. It, too, is included in the text of the U.S.-Jordan FTA and is subject to the dispute 
settlement procedures set forth in the agreement.”344 
IPR protection is another weighty issue that has been addressed by the U.S. FTAs. The 
features of IPR protection in the U.S.-Chile FTA, as identified below, can be described as an 
expansion of NAFTA or TRIPs obligations in general: 
The US-Chile FTA contains several interesting features. It extends IP protection into new areas not 
included in North-South trade agreements currently i  effect, enforced by a strong dispute 
settlement mechanism. The text mandates that the two countries will adhere to certain international 
IP conventions in specified time frames and that they will make efforts to conform to others. The 
text develops further the obligations existing in TRIPs and NAFTA regarding transparency and 
cooperation; it also provides protection in cutting-edge areas such as domain names on the Web and 
limitations on liability for Internet service providers. The US-Chile agreement expands many of the 
obligations existing in NAFTA or TRIPs related to patents, trademarks, well-known marks, 
copyrights and related rights, satellite signals, and border measures. Many of these provisions can 
be found in US law and in World Intellectual Property Organization treaties and recommendations, 
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but not under trade agreements subject to strong dispute settlement provisions. 345 
To sum up, FTAs have also been employed by the United S ates to propel domestic reforms 
in its trading partners, especially regarding the issues of environment, labor standards, and IPR 
protection. 
C. Legal Tradition and Culture 
The characteristics of both international and regional trade negotiations of the USA have 
their roots in the country’s legal tradition and culture. As explained in the following paragraphs, 
some key pertinent elements of that tradition and culture are an emphasis on procedural fairness, 
an expectation of leadership, an insistence on recipro ity, a belief (at least rhetorical) in the rule 
of law, and a division of governmental powers. 
1. Procedural fairness in the common law tradition 
The pursuance of and emphasis on procedural fairness find their roots, with little doubt, in 
the common law tradition that so heavily influences U.S. law. Indeed, “[t]he procedure was, and 
is, unique in the world and today may be the most distinctive feature of the common law.”346 An 
expert explains the emphasis on procedure as one of th  most important features of the common 
law tradition describes the roots of procedural fairness in the common law as follows: 
In the long period in which the common law was developing, and indeed up to the 19th century, 
when dramatic legislative reforms were undertaken, the principal focus of English lawyers and 
commentators … was on procedure, not on substance or principle. …A lawyer’s attention was 
focused on issues of procedure because the overall aim was to formulate question of fact in a way to 
ensure getting them before a jury. In that setting, the substance of the law, “… appears to be have 
been ‘secreted in the interstices of procedure’…”347 
In the United States, in addition to specific procedural doctrines, such as the right to jury trial and 
the right to counsel, procedural due process even has a constitutional basis. The Fifth and Fourteenth 
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Amendments provide a general principle of due process of law.348 
The principle of “due process” that derives from the ideology of procedural fairness leads 
the USA to focus not only on court procedures – on the DSB procedures in the case of the WTO 
– but also on procedural fairness contained in substantive issues, such as trade remedies 
available in the WTO regime. 
2. Leadership in the WTO 
The leadership of the USA in the organization can also ccount for some U.S. practices in 
making international trade rules. It is open to little dispute that “the United States and the 
European Union had dominated GATT.”349 “American-led Western leadership championed trade 
liberalization (particularly in tariff reductions) as a way of guaranteeing that economic collapse 
would not recur in the post-war era. Because economic prosperity was produced in the period of 
American dominance after the war, the assumption persist d that trade liberalization linked to 
American hegemony was the foundation of this prosperity.” 350 In this leadership, American 
events and initiatives played an essential role.351 
Although the leadership of the USA as well as European countries has been challenged by 
some developing countries,352 the consistent and active Western participation in the multilateral 
trade negotiations shows that U.S. determination to lead this organization has not been shaken 
much. Consequently, the influence of U.S. legal tradi ion and culture on international 
rule-making (i.e., the outward indigenization) has not been impaired much. The continuous 
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leadership possessed by the United States and its consequential confidence in directing 
international rule-making has resulted in its overwhelming enthusiasm in submitting series 
proposals and providing its own practices as the basis of multilateral discussion. 
Byers and Nolte address the sources of the U.S. sense of responsibility in international 
affairs as a superpower in the world – mainly, (1) the expectations from the rest of the 
international community, (2) the expectations within the United States, and (3) a feeling of 
insecurity on extreme sensitivity to external context.353 These three sources of the U.S. sense of 
responsibility in international affairs will consolidate its determination and efforts with regard to 
indigenizing the multilateral rules in a way that appeals to its own interests.  
3. Reciprocity and S&D treatment 
The apparent indifference of the United States to pri ritizing S&D treatment in future 
negotiations partially rests on its firm belief in reciprocity. In the pre-GATT era, the United 
States and European countries “had suffered through the depression and the war that followed 
and were determined not to repeat what they saw as their protectionist roots.”354 Therefore, one 
of the fundamental pillars of the GATT underscored by its founders is to fight against 
protectionism by the leverage of reciprocity, and istead to help the developing countries, 
despite the fact that modern theories may have found co sistency between them.355 It was the 
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expansion of GATT parties (due to the decolonization since the 1950s, as discussed earlier in 
subsection ID1 of Chapter 2 that led to the rise of S&D treatment.  
A brief history of the emergence of the S&D provisions in the multilateral trading system 
may help us understand the American attitude toward S&D treatment. In short, when drafting the 
Charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO), developing countries strongly criticized 
“the U.S. proposals and the suggested draft ITO Charter, as merely fulfilling the interests of 
developed countries and deteriorating the development prospects of developing countries.”356 
Thanks to the insistence from developing countries, “[t]he Havana Charter accommodated 
the development interests in a provision titled, “Government Assistance to Economic 
Development and Reconstruction.”357 
Despite that the development provision contained in the Havana Charter was introduced in 
the GATT 1947, there was no evolution in development issues in the GATT, partially due to the 
indifference from the leading parties. As explained by the following excerpt, on the one hand, for 
most parties, preferential treatment would lead to inefficiency and distortion of multilateral trade 
rules; on the other hand, developing parties believd that their interests would be sufficiently 
safeguarded by the provision mentioned above:  
… The contracting parties entered into the GATT with the common perception that multilateral 
trading system would benefit all participating parties, should they have comparative advantages. It 
was assumed that preferential treatment for particular parties was inappropriate, since it would lead 
to inefficiency and distortion of trade, and, therefo , non-discrimination rules were a necessity. … 
[It appears] that developing countries, becoming ori inal members of the GATT, did not initially 
disfavor of the basic paradigm of the GATT, namely liberalism. They might have believed that their 
development interests would still be maintained, because the provision of the stillborn Havana 
Charter, especially which titled “Government Assistance to Economic Development and 
Reconstruction,” was introduced as Art. XVIII into the GATT by amendment in 1948. …
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356 Nandang Sutrisno, USING WORLD TRADE LAW TO PROMOTE THE INTERESTS OF GLOBAL SOUTH: A STUDY 
ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENTS 43 (2009). 
357 Id. at 43.  
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“Parallel with the increasing membership of several newly-independent developing 
countries of the GATT in 1950s, the demand for the accommodation of the development 
interests of the developing countries in the GATT rules became stronger.”358 Responding to such 
demands from the developing countries, the GATT, with the consent, of course, of the United 
States, started working on a modification of Article XVIII of the GATT, which gradually 
developed into the current S&D mechanism.        
The history of incorporating S&D treatment into themultilateral trading system has showed 
us the resistance or indifference of the United States to addressing such provisions since the 
preparation of the ITO. The inconsistency between th  S&D treatment principle supported by the 
developing countries and the reciprocity principle supported by the developed countries can 
partially account for the American attitude of resistance or indifference toward S&D treatment. 
This explains why the United States accepts the S&D approach as a transitional system and 
gives it less priority than the negotiation of general rules. 
4. International rule of law 
The role of the “rule of law” as a feature of the common law tradition – and more 
specifically the U.S. efforts to promote or impose th “rule of law” outside its own territory – 
has been widely discussed. In short, the United States has tried to promote rule of law in both 
foreign countries and international affairs. It “engaged in strenuous efforts to create an 
international order based on legal principles”, which resulted in “the proliferation of law-based 
international institutions.”359 Furthermore, in supporting the rule of law in inter ational affairs, 
tried to ensure that international law would develop in a way “acceptable to it and that the 
interpretation and application of international law would be compatible with U.S. interests.”360 
As noted by David Gantz, “[b]oth the WTO and the NAFT  mechanisms are at least 
nominally legalistic or ‘rule oriented’ systems[.]”361 It is little surprise, then, that the United 
                                                 
358 For elaborations on the history of the S&D treatment, see id.at 43-7. 
359 John Francis Murphy, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1 (2004). 
360 Id. at 3. 
361 Id. at 56. 
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States urges an adherence to the “rule of law” in the international community, especially, if we 
are acquainted with firm belief of the American peol  in the rule of law.362 To sum up, U.S. 
advocacy within the WTO for the international rule of law largely originated the American belief 
and practice of domestic rule of law. 
5. Segmentation of power and environmental, labor, and IPR issues 
The United States is often described as the pioneer i  promoting environmental protection, 
labor standards, and IPR protection within the trade regime. On the one hand, I acknowledge that 
it is public support rather institutional structure that drives policy-making in many cases. On the 
other hand, however, I have observed the significance of political structure in the U.S. 
policy-making, especially relating to foreign and iternational affairs. The promotion of 
environmental protection, labor standards, and IPR protection in its FTAs is an example of the 
segmentation of power, which finds its roots in the common law tradition.363  
The Administration – that is, the executive branch – takes charge of negotiating trade 
agreements as well as enforcing trade statutes, and yet these powers are exercised under the 
scrutiny of the Congress, the judicial branch of government, and even the public.  
A good example of the influence of segmentation of power on trade relates to 
environmental issues. The failure of the first Bush Administration to incorporate environmental 
and labor provisions into the NAFTA original documents led to the establishment of a 
mechanism of “environmental assessment” of FTAs which could reflect the Congress’ concerns 
about pertinent issues.  
Due to the absence of environmental and labor protecti ns in the NAFTA, the Clinton 
Administration was denied the “fast-track”364 trade negotiating authority by the Congress. This 
                                                 
362 For elaborations on the belief of American people in the rule of law, see Ronald W. Eades, FIGHTS FOR 
RIGHTS 55 (2000) and Gary Althen & Janet Bennett, AMERICAN WAYS: A CULTURAL GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES 
67-8 (2011). Althen and Bennett go on to explain that e “The belief in the rule of law goes beyond the realm of 
politics to other areas of life that are governed by formal rules and procedures,” so that getting a job with a 
government agency, for example, or getting a governm nt grant for a research project entails following published 
procedures and demonstrating that one meets the published requirements. Theoretically, personal connections do not 
matter under the rule of law. Id. at 68. 
363 Head, supra note 6, at 380. 
364 Sean D. Murphy, UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Volume 1: 1999-2001) 220 (2002). For 
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move reflected the Congress’ dissatisfaction with the Administration’s alleged indifference to 
environmental and labor concerns in the NAFTA.365 Pressure from the Congress led ultimately 
to the environmental assessment of FTAs:   
On November 16, 1999, President Clinton signed an executive order committing the United States 
to “a policy of careful assessment and consideration of the environmental impacts of trade 
agreements … through a process of ongoing assessment and evaluation, and, in certain instances, 
written environmental reviews.”366 
The above analysis can provide us with another perspective to understand the FTA 
provisions relating to environmental protection and labor standards. Some scholars have 
criticized these provisions as an arbitrary exercis by the United States of its advantageous status 
in the FTA negotiations, by availing itself of the WTO RTA mechanism.367 The above analysis 
shows that such imposition of pertinent provisions partially resulting from the pressure imposed 
on the Administration by the Congress rather the Administration’s eagerness.   
In sum, the approach taken by the United States to international trade negotiations, whether 
multilateral or regional (or bilateral), reveals certain characteristics such as cautiousness toward 
S&D treatment, emphasis on institutional reform, boosting the international rule of law, 
addressing procedural justice, strategic selection of FTA partners, and promoting out-reform, 
which in turn reflect fundamental American values, including an emphasis on procedural 
                                                                                                                                                
elaborations on the US environmental assessment of trade agreements, see id, at 219-220. “The U.S. Constitution 
grants Congress the exclusive authority to establish tariffs and enact other legislation governing inter ational trade. 
At the same time, the Constitution grants to the president the authority to negotiate international agreements. If the 
president negotiates an agreement that requires changes in U.S. tariffs, implementing legislation must be approved 
by Congress. Beginning in the 1970s, Congress enactd “fast-track” legislation that provided an expedit  
procedure for congressional consideration of trade agr ements. Under fast-track legislation, the president engages in 
extensive consultations and coordination with Congress during the course of the negotiating process and, in 
exchange, Congress votes on the required implementing legislation within a fixed time after the negotiation is 
completed, with a simple “up or down vote” (i.e., without any amendments). The purpose of the fast-track process 
was to provide the president with credibility when negotiating difficult trade agreements by drawing Congress into 
the process and by making it unlikely that the agreem nt, once concluded, would fall victim to legislative haggling.” 
Id.  
365 David L. Markell & John H. Knox, GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 7 (2003). The authors explain that when the NAFTA was negotiated, “the 
environmental community was, on the whole, dissatisfied with the result. Their objections spilled into the broader 
debate over whether to approve NAFTA, which became one of the chief points of contention among the candidates 
in the 1992 U.S. presidential campaign.” Id. 
366 Murphy-Practice, supra note 364, at 220. For elaborations on the US environmental assessment of trade 
agreements, see id, at 220-221. 
367 For example, see Bashar Hikmet Malkawi, JORDAN AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY FOR 
ARAB COUNTRIES 30 (2006). 
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fairness, an expectation of global leadership, the principle of reciprocity, and segmentation of 
power within the political regime.     
II.  International Trade Disputes 
Multilateral trade disputes involving the United States provide us with another valuable 
source of information to figure out how the United States indigenizes its WTO obligations to 
reflect its own ideologies. The method used above in Chapter 3 – that is, analyzing “completed” 
cases in which the country at issue (there, China) is respondent – is used in this section.  
A. Overview of International Trade Disputes Featuring the United 
States as Respondent 
Since the establishment of the WTO, the United States has been involved in 97 cases as 
complainant and 113 cases as respondent. Among the 113 cases, 46 cases have resulted in DSB 
reports. These 46 cases can be classified into three groups according to the issues challenged – 
the cases of “as such,” “as applied,” and “as such and as applied.” “As such” challenges are 
specific U.S. legislation, such as Section 301 of Trade Act of 1974 and the so-called Byrd 
Amendment, that was the subject of complaints by other WTO members.368 “As applied” 
disputes involve the U.S. application or enforcement of trade laws and agreements, such as 
imposition of countervailing duties on certain steel products and safeguard measure on imports 
of lamb, that was challenged.369 “As such and as applied” challenges are a mixture of the former 
                                                 
368 The list of “as such” cases includes these: DS2/4 [the Case of “United States – Standards for Reformulated 
and Conventional Gasoline” (or “US – Gasoline”)], 108 [the Case of “United States – Tax Treatment for ‘F eign 
Sales Corporations’” (or “US – FSC”)], 136/162 [the Case of “United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916” (or “US 
– 1916 Act”)], 152 [the Case of “United States – Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act 1974” (or “US – Section 301 
Trade Act”)], 160 [the Case of “United States – Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act” (or “US – Section 110(5) 
Copyright Act”)], 176 [the Case of “United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998” (or “US – 
Section 211 Appropriations Act”)], 217/234 [the Case of “United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset 
Act of 2000” (or “US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment)”)], 221 [the Case of “United States – Section 129(c)(1) of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act” (or “US –Section 129(c)(1) URAA”)], 243 [the Case of “United States – Rules of 
Origin for Textiles and Apparel Products” (or “US – Textiles Rules of Origin”)], 276 [the Case of “United States – 
Subsidies on Upland Cotton” (or “US – Upland Cotton”)], 285 [the Case of “United States – Measures Affecting the 
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services” (or “US – Gambling”)], 343/345 [the Case of “United 
States – Measures Relating to Shrimp from Thailand” and “United States – Customs Bond Directive for 
Merchandise Subject to Anti-Dumping/Countervailing Duties” (or “US – Shrimp (Thailand), US – Customs Bond 
Directive”)], and 392 [the Case of “United States – Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China”]. 
369 The list of “as applied” cases includes these: DS 24 [the Case of “United States – Restrictions on Imports of 
Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear” (or “US – Underwear”)], 33 [the Case of “United States – Measures 
Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India” (or “US – Wool Shirts and Blouses”)], 58 [the 
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two types, such as the laws, regulations and methodology for calculating dumping margins and 
their application by the United States.370 
B. Ideologies Challenged by the Disputes 
The U.S. ideologies heighted by pertinent WTO disputes mainly refer to the so-called 
“unilateralism” and extra-territorial application of American law.  
                                                                                                                                                
Case of “United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products” (or “US – Shrimp”)], 138 [the 
Case of “United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon 
Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom” (or “US – Lead and Bismuth II”)], 165 [the Case of “United 
States – Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities” (or “US – Certain EC products”). 
EC is the complainant], 166 [the Case of “United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat 
Gluten from the European Communities” (or “US – Wheat Gluten”)], 177/178 [the Case of “United States – 
Safeguard Measure on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Fr zen Lamb from New Zealand” (or “US – Lamb”)], 179 [the 
Case of “United States – Anti-Dumping measures on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils and Stainless Steel Sh et and 
Strip from Korea” (or “US – Stainless Steel”)], 184 [the Case of “United States – Anti-Dumping Measure on 
Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan” (or “US – Hot-rolled Steel”)], 192 [the Case of “United States – 
Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yarfrom Pakistan” (or “US – Cotton Yarn”)], 202 [the Case of 
“United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from 
Korea” (or “US – Line Pipe”)], 206 [the Case of “United States – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measure  on 
Steel Plate from India” (or “US – Steel Plate”)], 236 [the Case of “United States – Preliminary Determinations with 
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada” (or “US – Softwood Lumber III”)], 
248/249/251/252/253/254/258/259 [the Case of “United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of 
Certain Steel Products” (or “US – Steel Safeguards”)], 257 [the Case of “United States – Final Countervailing Duty 
Determination with respect to certain Softwood Lumber from Canada” (or “US – Softwood Lumber IV”)], 264 [the 
Case of “United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada” (or “US – Softwood 
Lumber V”). Canada complained], 277 [the Case of “United States – Investigation of the International Tr de 
Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada” (or “US – oftwood Lumber VI”)], 296 [the Case of “United 
States – Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) from 
Korea” (or “US – Countervailing Duty Investigation  DRAMs”)], 320/321 [the Case of “United States/Canada – 
Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute” (or “US – Continued Suspension; Canad  – 
Continued Suspension”)], 335 [the Case of “United States – Anti-Dumping Measure on Shrimp from Ecuador” ( r 
“US – Shrimp (Ecuador)”)], 379 [the Case of “United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties 
on Certain Products from China”], and 383 [the Case of “United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Polyeth lene 
Retail Carrier Bags from Thailand”]. 
370 The list of “as such and as applied” cases includes th se:  DS99 [the Case of “United States – 
Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above 
from Korea” (or “US – Drams”)], 194 [the Case of “United States – Measures Treating Export Restraints s 
Subsidies” (or “US – Export Restraints”)], 212 [the Case of “United States – Countervailing Measures Concerning 
Certain Products from the European Communities” (or “US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products”)], 
213 [the Case of “United States – Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products 
from Germany” (or “US – Carbon Steel”)], 244 [the Case of “United States – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping 
Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan” (or “US – Corrosion Resistant Steel Sunset 
Review”)], 268 [the Case of “United States – Sunset R views of Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular 
Goods from Argentina” (or “US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews”)], 282 [the Case of “United States – 
Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico” (or “US – Anti -Dumping Measures 
on Oil Country Tubular Goods”)], 294 [the Case of “United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology fr 
Calculating Dumping Margins (Zeroing)” (or “US – Zeroing (EC)”)], 322 [the Case of “United States – Measures 
Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews” (or “US – Zeroing (Japan)”)], 350 [the Case of “United States – 
Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology” (or “US – Continued Zeroing”)], and 402 [the Case 
of “United States – Use of Zeroing in Anti-Dumping Measures Involving Products from Korea”]. 
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1. Sovereignty or unilateralism 
Some disputes – both “as such” (e.g., the DS 152 case [the Case of US – Section 301 Trade 
Act]) and “as applied” (e.g., the DS 248/249/251/252/254/258/259 case [the Caseof US – Steel 
Safeguards]) – were cited by other WTO members as evidence on which they criticized 
“unilateralism” they claim has been adopted by the United States.  
However, to the United States, it is national sovereignty that was challenged in these and 
other complaints over alleged unilateralism. In the DS 152 dispute (the Case of US – Section 
301Trade Act) – which revolved around the U.S. legislat on (i.e., Sections 301-310 of the Trade 
Act of 1974) authorizing certain actions by the Office of the United States Trade Representative 
(“USTR”), including the suspension or withdrawal of c ncessions or the imposition of duties or 
other important restrictions, in response to trade barriers imposed by other countries – the U.S. 
argument turned in part on the distinction between ma datory legislative provisions (requiring 
certain enforcement action) and permissive legislative provisions (allowing the exercise of 
sovereign powers). The U.S. argument was summarized by the Panel as follows. In short, to the 
United States, Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 fall within the category of 
discretionary legislation which results from exercising sovereign powers: 
The United States indicates that to put [it] another way, international agreements are made between 
contracting parties. The actions of those parties towards one another may or may not violate the 
obligations they have undertaken vis-à-vis one another. However, the actions taken towards 
non-parties are not relevant to this analysis. It is one thing to conclude that a contracting party ma
challenge legislation mandating action towards all if that action violates an obligation with respect 
to contracting parties. However, if legislation permitting such action could also be challenged, 
contracting parties would effectively be precluded from exercising sovereign powers with regard to 
non-parties, except by establishing parallel sets of laws applicable to parties and non-parties, or by 
explicitly providing for limits in their domestic laws as to how discretion may be exercised towards 
parties. There is absolutely no indication in the WTO Agreement or its annexes that Members 
agreed to this degree of interference with the exercis  of national sovereignty.371 
The United States argues that the EC’s proposed construction of [GATT] Article XVI:4, even if it 
had so much as an ambiguous textual basis, would run afoul of the in dubio mitius principle,[372] 
                                                 
371 WTO, Panel Report, WT/DS152/R, ¶4.248, December 22, 1999 [hereinafter WTO-WT/DS152/R].  
372 The interpretative principle of in dubio mitius, widely recognized in international law as a ‘supplementary 
means of interpretation,’ “applies in interpreting treaties, in deference to the sovereignty of states. If the meaning of 
a term is ambiguous, that meaning is to be preferred which is less onerous to the party assuming an obligations, or 
which interferes less with the territorial and personal supremacy of a party, or involves less general r strictions upon 
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since that construction would interfere with a Membr’s sovereign right to choose the form by 
which it implements its obligations in domestic law, and require each and every Member to 
re-examine and potentially revise the form of various pieces of legislation they quite correctly 
assumed in 1995 to be consistent with their WTO obligations based on the consistent application of 
the doctrine of the non-actionability of discretionary legislation.373 
In the DS 217/234 dispute (the Case of US – Byrd Amendment) – which revolved around 
the U.S. Continued Dumping and Subsidy Act of 2000 under which anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties assessed on or after October 1, 2000 were to be distributed to the affected 
domestic producers for qualifying expenditures. TheUnited States argued that the Byrd 
Amendment falls within its national sovereignty.  
Under the WTO Agreement, Members retain the right to control their treasury, allocate their 
resources, and disburse funds for a wide range of purposes. A Member’s sovereign right to 
appropriate lawfully assessed and collected duties cannot be restricted by this Panel ex aequo et 
bono.374 
Moreover, the United States recognises that “WTO Memb rs have agreed to exercise their 
sovereignty according to their WTO Agreement commitments”, and “Members are free to pursue 
their own domestic goals through spending so long as they do not do so in a way that violate[s] 
commitments made in the WTO Agreement”. …375 
Also in the DS 217/234 dispute (the Case of US – Byrd amendment), the United States 
argued on the ground of national sovereignty in the appeal (having lost the case at the first 
instance): 
…the Panel should have interpreted Articles 18.1 and 32.1 [of the ADA] in a manner so as to:  (1) 
give meaning to the footnotes’ express permission to take “actions” authorized under other relevant 
provisions of the WTO Agreement; and (2) avoid the creation of any limitations on the sovereign 
power [of states] over fiscal matters not otherwise sp cifically proscribed by the WTO 
agreements.376 
The United States addressed, in addition, the sovereign ight to distribute government 
revenues – the core ground of its argument in the DS 217/234 dispute – in its proposal of April 
                                                                                                                                                
the parties.” WTO, WTO APPELLATE BODY REPERTORY OF REPORTS AND AWARDS: 1995-2006 337 (2007) 
[hereinafter WTO-AB]. 
373 WTO-WT/DS152/R, supra note 371. 
374 This term means in equity and good conscience. 
375 WTO, Panel Report, WT/DS217/R, ¶4.232 & 4.844, September 16, 2002 [hereinafter WTO-WT/DS217/R].  
376 WTO, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R, ¶18, January 16, 2003 [hereinafter 
WTO-WT/DS217/AB/R]. 
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24, 2004 on the issue of distributing monies collected from antidumping duty and countervailing 
duty after the settlement of the DS 217/234 case in front of the Appellate Body.377  
2. Extra-territorial application of American law 
The other U.S. ideology regarding the relationship between domestic law and the 
international community that has been challenged in WTO cases is the extra-territorial 
application of American law, especially environmental law. In the DS 58 case (the Case of US – 
Shrimp), the United States prohibited the importation of certain shrimp and shrimp products on 
the ground of protecting turtles in the exporting countries. In response to the complaints, the 
United States argued on the grounds of its Endangered Species Act of 1973 (“ESA”) and related 
legislation, which aim to protect turtle within both the United States and foreign countries. Some 
may also classify such cases into those involving “unilateralism.”378 In order to differentiate 
these cases from those mainly involving the sovereignty argument, however, it is more 
appropriate to discuss them separately. Here also, U.S. legal tradition and culture (in particular 
the international facet thereof) helps explain the actions being challenged in WTO cases 
involving the United States as respondent. 
C. Legal Tradition and Culture 
Both the ideologies challenged by the United States’ trading partners – namely, 
unilateralism and extra-territorial application of American – and U.S. arguments seem to have 
roots in the county’s legal history and culture. The so-called U.S. “unilateralism” can be 
understood from the perspectives of its emphasis on (1) the capacity to retaliate, (2) the belief in 
reciprocity, and (3) the sensitivity to sovereignty. The characteristic of extra-territorial 
application has its roots in the long-term pertinent practices of American adjudication. 
                                                 
377 The United States, Three Issues Identified for Discussion by the Negotiating Group on Rules, TN/RL/W/153, 
April 24, 2004 [hereinafter USA-TN/RL/W/153].  
378 For example, see Walden Bello, The Shrimp-Turtle Controversy and the Rise of Green Unilateralism, in 
THE FUTURE IN THE BALANCE: ESSAYS ON GLOBALIZATION AND RESISTANCE (Walden Bello & Anuradha Mittal) 170 
(2001); and Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE: A GUIDE TO WTO JURISPRUDENCE 83 
(2006). Of course, some scholars express disagreement on relating this case to “unilateralism.” For example, see 
generally Robert Howse & D Regan, The Product/Process Distinction – An Illusory Basis for Disciplining 
“Unilateralism” in Trade Policy 11 EJIL 249 (2000).  
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1. Origins of “unilateralism” 
The leverage of so-called “unilateralism” has develop d from the history of the United 
States and its trade policies. In U.S. history and foreign trade relations, that history has resulted 
in the erection of three pillars that support the country’s peculiar approach to international trade 
rules – which is usually labeled as “unilateralism” by its trading partners. These pillars are: (a) a 
belief in the capacity to retaliate against a trade blockade, (b) reciprocity in trade activities, and 
(c) supremacy of national sovereignty.   
a. Capacity to retaliate: drawn from U.S. history 
In the early days of American independence, unlike the experience of its European 
counterparts, “the founders [of the United States] r luctantly acquiesced to the elements of 
mercantilism.” 379 Out of national security concerns, “[r]ecognizing, as Adam Smith had, that 
‘defense … is of much more importance than opulence,’ th y experimented with retaliation and 
then adopted a policy of economic nationalism.”380 In response to the suppression and blocking 
from European countries, especially Great Britain, nd in order “to compel respect for 
commercial rights, [the founders] concluded that the U.S. government must demonstrate its 
resolve and capacity to retaliate unilaterally against foreign restrictions.”381  
b. Belief in reciprocity: drawn from the history of U.S. trade policy 
The development of the principle of reciprocity in U.S. trade relations started formally from 
the Reciprocal Trade Program initiated by Cordell Hu l in the years after the enactment of the 
Tariff Act of 1930. This principle of reciprocity was established by the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act of 1934 initiated by the Secretary Cordell Hull, in order to launch a reciprocal 
trade program.382 Hull emphasized that the “entire policy of this bill would rest upon trade 
relationships which would be mutually and equally profitable both to our own and other 
                                                 
379 Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., OPENING AMERICA’S MARKET 2 (1995). 
380 Id. 
381 Id. 
382 See id. at 141-2. 
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countries.”383 President Roosevelt further strengthened Hull’s assertion in his transmittal 
message: “[t]he successful building up of trade without injury to American producers depends 
upon a cautious and gradual evolution of plans … [under which] no sound and important 
American interest will be injuriously disturbed.”384  
“Reciprocity is itself an ambiguous term that finds expression across a range of scholarly 
disciplines. ... In spite of its ambiguity, reciprocity is at its root a principle of exchange.”385A 
writer has accounted for how the criticized “aggressive unilateralism” is consistent with “diffuse 
reciprocity.” Before turning to substantial examinat on of his analysis, we may acquaint 
ourselves with the term “diffuse reciprocity” – expectations that participants in such 
arrangements will yield a rough equivalent of benefits in the aggregate and over time.386 
According to this writer, Section 301 serves as “the principal statue empowering the Executive 
to advance claims for a diffuse reciprocity against [it ] trading partners,”387 considering the 
following facts. First, the first iteration of Section 301 – the Trade Act of 1974 – authorized the 
President a broad authority to eliminate the transgressions of the U.S. interests by its trading 
partners prescribed by the law. Second, the Trade Agr ements Act of 1979 authorizes the 
President to be far more aggressive in rectifying the perceived defaults of its trading partners. 
Third, in addition to authorize the withdrawal or suspension of trade benefits in the case of a 
foreign national whose acts or policies were “unjustifiable” or “unreasonable,” the statue added a 
new provision tying this authority to U.S. trade agreements. The President was expressly 
authorized to withdraw benefits or restrict imports for the purpose of enforcing “the rights of the 
United States under … trade agreement[s]” or for the purpose of responding to any foreign 
                                                 
383 Hull testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, April 26, 1934, SNFN, Hearings on H.R.8687, at 7. 
(emphasis added) 
384 Edgar B. Nixon, Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, 2:1-3. (emphasis added) 
385 Rorden Wilkinson, MULTILATERALISM AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE ARCHITECTURE AND 
EXTENSION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION 41 (2000) [hereinafter Wilkinson-Multilateralism]. 
386 Id. “[There are] two types of reciprocity…: specific and diffuse. Each type of reciprocity relates to a 
particular way in which the action of exchange is ordered. In instances of specific reciprocity, the action of 
exchange takes place between actors in a limited sequence. Here, each partner is known to the other or others; the 
initial part of the transaction is known to all; and the value of that which is returned is gauged accordingly. 
Conversely, diffuse reciprocity is less precise.” Id   
387 Alan C. Swan, “Fairness” and “Reciprocity” in international Trade Section 301 and the Rule of Law, 16 
Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 37, 47 (1999). 
 
196 
country practice or policy “inconsistent with” or a “denial of U.S. benefits under a trade 
agreement.” 
The history of Section 301 from the Trade Act 1974 to the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988388 shows that this section targets at protecting the U.S. interests 
that can be “justifiably” or “unreasonably” expected from its trade relationships with its trading 
partners.  
In this view, the so-called “aggressive unilateralism” as reflected by Section 301 is actually 
the right to “diffuse reciprocity.” With the development and transformation of Section 301, 
diffuse reciprocity has transformed into adherence to rule of law. In short, Section 301 is 
justifiable when viewed in the context of U.S. legal tr dition and culture. 
The history of Section 301in the above excerpt demonstrates, on the one hand, how 
“aggressive unilateralism” derived from “diffusive r ciprocity,” and explains to us, on the other 
hand, how the unilateral actions taken by the U.S. Administration under Section 301 were 
compelled by the Congress.  
c. Sovereignty 
It seems a long way to calm down the debates or confli ts between national sovereignty and 
multilateralism within the United States. According to An Chen, as of 2003, such conflicts 
underwent three big rounds and arrived at their climax in the great 1994 sovereignty debate, the 
section 301 dispute (the DS 152 case ) and the section 201 dispute (the DS 
248/249/251/252/254/258/259 case).  
The first round took place before the establishment of the WTO, regarding whether the 
United States should accept and implement the Uruguay Round Results. The second was 
reflected in the Section 301 Dispute. The third round has been incarnated in the Section 201 
Disputes. An Chen observes that each round has the sam core: defending the United States’ 
sovereignty.389 At the same time, he also regards that the argument of “defending sovereignty” 
                                                 
388 Since the 1988 Act, Section 301 has been changed with only minor technical amendments.  
389 An Chen, The Three Big Rounds of U.S. Unilateralism versus WTO Multilateralism during the Last Decade: 
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is actually a disguise of the U.S. “unilateralism.” In other words, the argument of sovereignty 
originates from its unilateralism. On the grounds that conflicts between national sovereignty and 
multilateralism reflect the frictions between unilateralism and multilateralism, An Chen 
concludes that the United States “has not been ready to concede to the WTO multilateralism 
voluntarily.”390 
However, I would like to interpret this relationship between national sovereignty and 
unilateralism from a reverse direction – that is, the unilateralism originates from sovereignty. In 
other words, it is the sensitivity to sovereignty in the United States that leads to the “unilateral” 
behavior. In the debate, the American scholars haveexpressed genuine concerns out of 
sovereignty.391 
Then, how sensitive the United States is to sovereignty compared with other countries in 
the world? The answer can be found in the concept of “the sovereignty of the people” posited by 
Alexis de Tocqueville.   
In America the principle of the sovereignty of the people is neither barren nor concealed, as it is 
with some other nations; it is recognized by the customs and proclaimed by the laws; it spreads 
freely, and arrives without impediment at its most remote consequences. If there is a country in the 
world where the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people can be fairly appreciated, where it can be 
studied in its application to the affairs of society, and where its dangers and advantages may be 
judged, that country is assuredly America.392 
According to Alexis de Tocqueville, the principle of the sovereignty of the people in the 
United States extended its influence to the people’s habits, religion, and family life, and even had 
a profound impact on their notions of popular governance. “In the United States the sovereignty 
of the people is not an isolated doctrine, bearing no relation to the prevailing habits and ideas of 
the people; it may, on the contrary, be regarded as the last link of a chain of opinions which binds 
                                                                                                                                                
A Combined Analysis of the Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate, Section 301 Disputes (1998-2000), and Section 201 
Disputes (2002-Present), 17 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 409, 464-5 (2003) [hereinafter Chen-Unilateralism]. 
390 Id. at 409. 
391 For example, John H. Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance and 
Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results, 36 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 157 (1997) [hereinafter Jackson-Debate]; 
and Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 Chi. J. Int’l L. 401(2000).  
392 Alexis de Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 57 & 60 (vol.1, 1945). 
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the whole Anglo-American world.”393   
2. Extra-territorial application of American law 
For the purpose of this work, the extra-territorial application of American law basically 
refers to enforcement of American law outside the geographical scope of the United States.394 It 
includes de facto influence of American laws on another country’s legal standards and pertinent 
practices. 
The Constitution does not forbid either Congressional r state enactment of laws which apply 
outside the United States. Nor does it prohibit either the federal government or the states from 
enforcing American law abroad. Several passages sugge t that the Constitution contemplates the 
application of American law beyond the geographical confines of the United States.395 
The extra-territorial application of domestic law has a long history in the United States, 
starting from the application of U.S. law to Americans outside the United States. As articulated 
below, anti-corruption, anti-discrimination, and anti-trust constituted the main areas that firstly 
involved the extra-territorial application of domestic U.S. law: 
[T]he Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, which was enacted after several highly publicized 
incidents involving bribery of foreign officials in the airplane manufacturing industry, imposes 
criminal and civil penalties on US corporate officers and employees working or travelling abroad if 
they make payments or offer anything of value to a f reign official in an attempt to influence the 
official to act, decide or use his influence with his government in a way that helps the US company 
to obtain or retain business in the foreign country. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 also has a specific 
extraterritorial reach; it extends the anti-discrimination provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to 
US corporations that employ US citizens abroad. Another, more striking example of the application 
of US laws to American companies engaged in internaio l business transactions is provided by 
Trasnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v BP North American Petroleum. The defendants were major oil companies 
accused of having violated both the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Commodities Exchange Act 
(CEA) by engaging in forward trades in Brent (North Sea) crude oil. The court refused to dismiss 
the suit even though the plaintiff was a foreign corporation that did not engage in business in the 
United States and whose financial injury was entirely the result of trading in an international 
market.396 
                                                 
393 Id. at 435-436. 
394 For elaborations on different understanding of “extra-territorial” application of American law, see John H. 
Robinson, The Extraterritorial Application of American Law: Preliminary Reflections, 27 J.C. & U.L. 187 (2000). 
395 Charles Doyle, Extraterritorial Application of American Criminal Law 1 (report to the Congress) (2010). 
396 Zhiguo Gao, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF OIL AND GAS 233-234 (1998). 
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The extra-territorial application of environmental laws, consequently, can find its roots in 
this long history of the practices of applying U.S. law extra-territorially. However, the progress 
of extra-territorial application of environmental lw is not easy to make, because the prerequisite 
of such application – that is, the nationality link between the U.S. law and the objects it tries to 
regulate outside the United States – is problematic. In most cases, this nationality link is hard to 
establish in environmental cases. Moreover, the justification of extra-territorial application of 
environmental law depends on the relief of other two concerns from the U.S. domestic judicature. 
One is that “whether [the] Congress has also prescribed environmental standards of conduct for 
U.S. companies operating abroad.”397 The other concern is whether the Congress has prescrib d 
environmental standards of conduct for foreign companies. 
To sum up, we can provide a relatively objective asses ment of the criticized U.S. 
“unilateralism” and extra-application of American law by examining its legal history and culture, 
which explains the United States’ strong belief in capacity to retaliate, the principle of reciprocity, 
and national sovereignty. This examination also shows that the disputed extra-application of U.S. 
environmental law, is, to a large extent, an inheritance or extension of a long-term legal practice 
of its own. 
III.  Domestic Legislation on Trade 
Having explored how the involvement of the United States in international trade 
negotiations and international trade disputes reflect d eply rooted U.S. attitudes and values, we 
turn now to another area: U.S. trade legislation. The trade-oriented aspect of the U.S. legal 
system is one of the most comprehensive and complex on s in the world. The enactment of trade 
laws in the United States also illustrates how WTO law has been indigenized by domestic 
legislation. The U.S. domestic trade law has exhibited some features, including wide coverage 
and codification, embargo policy, and dualism regarding the relationship between international 
law and domestic law. These features have their roots in the U.S. legal tradition and culture, such 
as a merger of the common law and civil law traditions, a reflection of fluctuated trade policy 
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and legislation, and a skeptical attitude toward international law. 
A. WTO Law in Domestic Context and Characteristics of Domestic 
Legislation  
According to the Overview and Compilation of U.S. Trade Statutes398, the U.S. trade 
statutes are classified into seven groups: (1) tariff and customs laws; (2) trade remedy laws; (3) 
other laws regulating imports; (4) laws regulating export activities; (5) authorities relating to 
political or economic security; (6) reciprocal trade agreements; and (7) organization of trade 
policy functions. In addition, the trade statutes can be classified into two groups – trade-focused 
and trade-related laws; the first group regulates trade issues such as antidumping, tariff, export 
administration, and trade sanctions, while the second group handles such issues as merchant 
marine, defense production, foreign assistance, food security, and tax reform. 
Three types of characteristics can be identified to escribe U.S. trade legislation: (1) it 
forms a remarkably comprehensive and complex regime, which has largely been codified; (2) it 
includes numerous country-specific elements designed to serve national security interests; and (3) 
it reflects to some degree the treaty commitments of he United States. 
1. WTO law in domestic context 
The Uruguay Round Agreement Act serves to incorporate WTO law into the U.S. legal 
system. The following excerpt from the Overview and Compilation of U.S. Trade Statutes of 
2010 elaborates on this point: 
The Uruguay Round Agreement Act approves the trade agr ements resulting from the Uruguay 
Round of multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) entered into by the President on April 15, 1994. The legislation and the Statement of 
Administrative Action (SAA) proposed to implement the Agreements were submitted to the 
Congress on September 27, 1994. 
The legislation contained general provisions on: (1) approval and entry into force of the Uruguay 
Round Agreements, and the relationship of the Agreements to U.S. laws (section 101 of the Act); (2) 
authorities to implement the results of tariff negotiations (section 111 of the Act); (3) procedures 
regarding implementation of dispute settlement proceedings affecting the United States and 
                                                 
398 This resource, prepared and published by Committee on Ways and Means U.S. House of Representatives in 
2010, offers a summary of international trade-related rules and regimes for the United States. 
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oversight of activities of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (sections 121-130 of the Act); and (4) 
objectives regarding extended Uruguay Round negotiations and other related provisions (sections 
131, 135 and 315 of the Act).399 
2. Characteristics 
a. Comprehensive contents, complicated constituents, ad codification 
The contents of U.S. trade law have a very wide range of coverage, and they comprise 
almost every aspect of trade and every topic in each aspect. Moreover, they are complicated. As 
indicated by the Overview and Compilation of the US Trade Statutes, there are at least 28 
trade-focused statutes400 and 38 trade-related statutes401 at the federal level. Despite their 
volume and complexity, all the trade statutes have been codified into the U.S. Code. Most of 
them are codified in Title 19 of the U.S. Code. 
                                                 
399 Committee on Ways and Means U.S. House of Representatives , THE OVERVIEW AND COMPILATION OF US 
TRADE STATUTES 306-307 (2010) [hereinafter USHR-Compilation]. 
400 Trade-focused laws include: Antidumping Act of 1916; Tariff Act of 1930, as amended; Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962, as amended; Trade Act of 1974, as amended; Trade Agreement Act of 1979; Export Administration Act 
of 1979, as amended; Trade and Tariff Act of 1984; Omnibus Trade and Competitive Act of 1988; 
Telecommunications Trade Act of 1988; Export Enhancement Act of 1988, as amended; Caribbean Basin Economic 
Recovery Expansion Act of 1990; Customs and Trade Act of 1990; Trade and Development Act of 2000; Tariff 
Suspension and Trade Act of 2000; Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000; Foreign 
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2002; Trade Act of 2002; Softwood 
Lumber Act of 2008; Customs Modernization Act ; U.S.-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act; Andean Trade 
Preference Act, as amended; Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act; African Growth and Opportuni y 
Act, as amended; AGOA Acceleration Act; Uruguay  Round Agreement Act; Trading with the Enemy Act, as 
amended; Narcotics Control Trade Act; Arms Export Control Act; and Clean Diamond Trade Act. 
401 Trade-related laws include: Merchant Marine Act of 1920; Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933; Buy 
American Act of 1933, as amended; Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended; Agricultural Adjustment Act of 
1956, as amended; Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended; Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; 
Fishermen’s Protective Act of 1967, as amended; Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, as amended; Endangered 
Species Act of 1973, as amended; International Air Transportation Fair Competitiveness Act of 1974; Atlantic Tunas 
Convention Act of 1975; Consolidated Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985; Food Security Act of 1985; International 
Security and Development cooperation Act of 1985;  Tax Reform Act of 1986; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1987; Foreign Shipping Practices Act of 1988; Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990; Chemical and Biological 
Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991; Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992; Wild Bird 
Conservation Act of 1992; Cuban Democracy Act of 1992; United States – Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992; 
Rhinoceros and Tiger Conservation Act of 1994, as amended; Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity 
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996; Iran Sanctions Act of 1996; Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2003; Burmese 
Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003; Syria Accountabili y and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003; 
Belarus Democracy Act of 2004; American Jobs Creation Act of 2004; Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004; 
Emergency protection for Iraqi cultural antiquities Act of 2004; Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006; 
Federal Meat Inspection Act; Animal Health Protection Act; African Elephant Conservation Act; High Seas Driftnet 
Fisheries Enforcement Act; National Emergencies Act; International Emergency Economic Powers Act, as amended; 
and Sudan Peace Act. 
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b. Country specification and trade sanctions  
Some trade provisions or statutes – such as section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974 (market 
disruption by imports from Communist countries) and section 421-423 of the Trade Act of 1974, 
as amended (market disruption by imports from the People’s Republic of China.) – are targeted 
at certain countries explicitly, such as China and other communist or “terrorist” countries.  
The main motives of the United States for retaining the policy of embargo are (1) to address 
concerns about national security, (2) to serve natio l economic interests, and (3) to promote 
domestic politics.402 The countries that are the subject of an embargo policy or trade sanctions 
include Cuba, Libya, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Burma, and Belarus.403 
The United States differentiates embargo measures against different countries. For example, 
according to the 2012 Report on Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls e eased by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security, the Department of Commerce 
requires a license for export or reexport to Cuba of virtually all commodities, technology, and 
software subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), with a few narrow exceptions 
for items generally authorized by a License Exception.404 On July 1, 2010, the President signed 
into law the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 
(CISADA). CISADA Title I expands sanctions on Iran predominantly through amendments to 
the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA).405 The Department of Commerce requires a license for the 
export or reexport to Iraq, or transfer within Iraq, of certain types of goods.406 North Korea is subject 
to sanctions based on its nuclear and ballistic missile tests, engagement in proliferation and other 
illicit activities and human rights violations.407 The U.S. Government requires a license for the 
                                                 
402 Helen Osieja, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: THE CASE OF THE U.S. 
EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA 5 (2006). According to this observer, “[w]ehn one or more of these interests is at stake, 
the US intervenes in the affairs of other countries.” Id. 
403 This embargo list is summarized by Lijuan Xing based on USHR-Compilation, supra note 399. 
404The U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security, 2012 Report on Foreign Policy-Based 
Export Controls 44, available at the website of the Department of Commerce http://www.commerce.gov/. last 
visited January 7, 2012 [hereinafter 2012 Report on Export Control] 
405 Id. at 46. 
406 Id. at 47. 
407 Id. at 48. 
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export and reexport of nearly all items on the Commerce Control List (CCL) to Sudan. Many items 
controlled on the CCL to Sudan may require a license from both the Departments of Commerce and 
the Treasury. License applications may be submitted to both agencies concurrently.408  
In order to implement the embargo policy against a country, the United States would enact 
various regulations covering every aspect of bilateral trade relationship. For example, the Export 
Control Act of 1949 establishes a general authority “to establish and maintain a total embargo 
upon all trade between the United States and Cuba.” Specific authority for a total trade embargo 
on Cuba was contained in Section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The Cuban 
Import Regulations added an additional ban on imports from Cuba, placing all transactions under 
the authority of the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA), based on the specific addition of 
TWEA to the statutory authority for the regulations. The embargo on transactions with Cuba is 
implemented at present for exports by the Export Administration Regulations (15 U.S.C. 
768-799.2), particularly sections 770, 785.1, and 799.1, and for imports and other transactions by 
the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (15 CFR 515).409 
c. Incorporation of international agreements 
The regional and multilateral agreements in which the United States participates have been 
incorporated into U.S. domestic law by way of secondary (that is, implementing) legislation. For 
example, the United States has promulgated the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), the 
North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, the United States-Israel Free Trade 
Area Implementation Act, the United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 
the United States-Jordan Free Trade Area Implementatio  Act, and other implementation acts 
based on U.S. FTAs. As indicated in this explanatio, c mmon mode of acts incorporating FTAs 
into the U.S. legal regime provides that U.S. law will prevail over the FTA in the case of 
conflict.410 
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B. Legal Tradition and Culture 
1. Civil law and common law traditions 
The U.S. trade legislation reflects a blending of the common law and civil law traditions 
within its legal system. The large volume, comprehensiveness, and thoroughness of U.S. 
legislation relating to international trade issues, as well as the codification of such legislation, are
reflections of some key features of the civil law tradition, especially the typical one that this 
legal tradition “regard[s] legislation as the principal and paradigm form of law[.]”411 which has 
been partially incorporated into the common law of the country. The U.S. preference has been 
“given to more affirmative ideas clearly derived from civil law.”412 For example, the practice of 
codification – which is an obvious feature of the civil law tradition – is common in the U.S. legal 
system.413 
Indeed, one authority has cast doubt on the purity and completeness with regard to the 
purported “inheritance” of common law culture from Great Britain by the United States, dating 
back to its colonial era. According to him, “the central theme of the colonial period has been to 
emphasize the transfer and transformation of common law in its American setting.”414 Because 
that American setting differed in so many ways from the English setting, however, big changes 
were necessary. Consequently, the common law in this new continent was often whatever the 
early lawyers said it to be. In effect, what they said the common law was had been adapted 
intentionally to the new needs of settlement in this continent.415 
Generally, however, “[d]uring the nineteenth century, the American legal system was almost 
wholly dominated by the judicially administered common law”416 – that is, caselaw as opposed 
to legislation. When the legal system entered the period between 1908 and 1940 that Jackson 
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412 Glenn, supra note 6, at 263. 
413 Id. at 263. 
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415 See id. at 953-954. 
416 Jackson, supra note 6, at10. 
 
205 
explores, judges relied on three approaches of legal interpretation: (1) applying precedents in 
common law or equity (i.e., common law construction), (2) construing the meaning of a statute 
as it affects the case at bar (i.e., statutory construction), and (3) finding guidance in a 
constitutional provision to help decide the case (i.e., constitutional construction).417 Jackson’s 
observation shows that, between 1920s and 1970s, statutes and the Constitution became two 
sources of law that are as important as common law in the American courts.  
In short, U.S. trade law may be seen as reflecting a blend of both common law tradition and 
civil law tradition. While the heavy emphasis on developing rules through sophisticated judicial 
decisions obviously derives from the common law tradi ion, the reliance of U.S. trade law on 
statutory enactments and codification as well as the increasing importance of statutes in 
American judicial system demonstrate the influence of the civil law tradition in this common law 
country. 
2. Fluctuation of trade policies 
Despite the fluctuation in U.S. trade policies; there are some universal principles that, 
according to at least one expert, lie at the foundation of the overall policies adopted by the 
United States in its history. These universal principles include “free trade, equality (either 
national or most-favored-nation treatment), and recip o ity.”418 
The United States regards trade law as an indispensable part of diplomacy rather than 
merely a matter of state administration. This attitude partially finds its roots in the history of the 
early American trade law that was used by the natio’s f unders to fight for its independence. 
The legislative purpose of the first trade legislaton in the United States in 1789 was to provide 
                                                 
417 Id. at 52-53. Jackson explains the development in this way:  
In the late 1920s, common law construction was found to be the principal form of legal interpretation …; in the 
1960s, the frequency of cases decided by full opinin that had a primary common law bent … The decline in the 
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financial support for the newborn state, by collecting duties in “support of government, for the 
discharge of the debts of the United States, and the encouragement and protection of 
manufactures.”419 
The fluctuation of U.S. trade policies has been summarized by an expert as following this 
progression: (1) free trade and economic security from 1776 to 1860,420 (2) the argument 
between Republicans and Democrats as to protectionism and liberalism between the time of the 
Civil War and the Great Depression,421 (3) the fluctuation from then until about 1960 betw en 
unreciprocal and reciprocal trade,422 (4) the opening of America’s market between 1960 
and1974,423 (5) illusive safeguards,424 and (6) the curbing of executive discretion in unfair trade 
cases.425 
The retention of Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 after the Congress passed the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) – which would, on its face, seem inconsistent with the 
unilateralism of Section 301 – is an example of the compromise between advocates of hegemony 
and multilateralism, as pointed out by An Chen: 
In fact and in essence, what WTO opponents and proponents argue over is not the economic 
                                                 
419 Bryan A. Edens, Substantial Evidence in the Law of International Trade: Meaningful Judicial Review of 
Antidumping Actions or Perpetuation of the Yo-Yo Effect, 6 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J. 431, 438 (2008). 
“Though it enumerated specific tariff provisions on goods ranging from Madeira wine to teas imported from China 
and India, pickled fish, and snuff, the rates were low enough that fiscal considerations were satisfied, but there was 
little discouragement of imports. The stage was set for a debate revolving around trade.” Id.  
420 Until after the Civil War, the United States sought equal access to the markets of major European 
competitors, and strove for a more aggressive policy, seeking special privileges and offering special oncessions for 
raw materials from Asia and agricultural products in the U.S. market. For more elaborations on this pont, see Eckes, 
supra note 379, at 27. 
421 “In the great tariff debates between the time of the Civil War and the Great Depression, Republicans 
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423 “The Kennedy Round of multilateral tariff negotiations thus marked a milestone in American economic 
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Market.” Id. at 218. 
424 “Since the mid-1960s, the forces of global competition have restructured the domestic market America’s 
leaders identified the broad national interests” and relied heavily on safeguard measures to protect th se interests. 
For more elaborations on this point, see id. at 255-256. 
425 “The 1979 Trade Agreements Act initiated a dramatic change in U.S. unfair trade enforcement. Establishing 
a quasi-judicial procedure for resolving trade disputes outside the policy process, it sharply reduced th  opportunity 
for the executive branch to subordinate trade enforcement to other policy considerations or ideological caprice.” Id. 
at 277. 
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sovereignty of the United States, but the economic hegemony of the United States. An obvious 
example of this aspect is the implementing practice of Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act and the 
decision made by the U.S. Congress after the Great D bate that Section 301 should continue to be 
implemented.426 
3. Subordination of international law to domestic law 
The dualism adopted by the United States –that is, enacting domestic implementing statutes 
in order to enforce international agreements – reflects a general attitude of the United States 
towards the relationship between international law and domestic law, which gives a subordinate 
effect to international law. For example, “when theUS congress enacted domestic legislation to 
implement the Uruguay Round Final Act setting up the World Trade Organization, it made sure 
to provide that no provision of the WTO agreements, or the application of any such provision to 
any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any United States law shall have effect.”427 
There are … instances in which the United States has been actively involved in international law 
making, but subsequently sought, in applying that law, to subordinate it to domestic US law. To cite 
only one example,  
Although this observation was made eight years ago,the relevant legislation – the URAA –
has not changed much since its enactment. The attitude of the United States toward international 
law is also elaborated by another scholar, focusing on the negative role of the Congress in 
conferring the full legal effect of international lw: 
Despite the fact that the United States was able to achieve many of its negotiating objectives, 
securing approval by Congress turned out to be difficult. The Senate, in particular, remained 
skeptical and, in the end, lengthy implementing legislation was enacted. It contains, inter alia, 
language regarding the follow-up of dispute settlement procedures that result in findings that the 
United States has violated WTO law. The follow-up provisions, which involve the US Trade 
Representative, the Federal Trade Commission and other parts of the administration, are drafted in a 
way which might cast a shadow on the preparedness of the United States fully to honor its 
membership and resulting obligations under the WTO Agreement. The same holds true for lengthy 
provisions that detail “congressional disapproval” of US participation in the WTO. 428 
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427 Edwardd Kwakwa, The International Community, International Law, and the United States: Three in One, 
Two against One, or One and the Same?, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL 
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the WTO agreements as a basis for challenging any federal, state or local action in a United States court.” Id. For 
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The degree of importance attached to international law by the United States rests, in part, in 
the factors diagnosed below – mainly (1) federalism, (2) separation of powers, and (3) 
relationship between treaty law and domestic law:  
… [N]orm internationalization – the process by which States incorporate or internalize international 
law domestically – is a critical factor in ascertaining why States obey international law. In the case 
of the United States, its unique system of federalism, in particular, … the separation of powers … 
[and the] relationship between treaty law and United States domestic law, arguably introduce certain 
important factors or impediments to multilateral cooperation that do not exist in other countries.429 
In addition to the factors identified above, sovereignty is another influential one 
contributing to the Congress’ attitude toward interational law. As discussed in subsection C1c 
of this chapter, sovereignty is usually the ultimate cause of the unique attitude of the Americans. 
Hence, it is natural for the Congress to subordinate international law to domestic law in order to 
address the country’s sovereignty.  
Another authority points out that the high regard in which domestic law is held by the 
American people derives from their belief that it is because American law is developed by good 
and moral people that this law is superior: 
… [I]f we enlarge this idea somewhat with respect to domestic American culture more generally, 
going beyond professional legal culture, it seems that Americans always spontaneously make an 
implicit distinction between “good” law and “bad” law according to inherent conceptions of justice 
and goodness. We find here the idea, still too often a caricature, according to which all Americans 
think that the American conception of law is necessarily “good” or “just” because it is the product of 
a good and moral people.430 
To sum up, the U.S. domestic trade law has exhibited some features, including wide 
coverage and codification, keeping of embargo policy, and adoption of dualism to give effect to 
international agreements. These features have their roots in the U.S. legal tradition and culture, 
such as a mixture of common law and civil law traditions, a tendency toward fluctuation of trade 
policy and trade law, and the skeptical attitude that e United States takes toward international 
law. 
                                                 
429 Kwakwa, supra note 427, at 48-49.  
430 Emmanuelle Jouannet, French and American Perspectives on International Law: Legal Cultures and 
International Law, 58 Me. L. Rev. 292, 320 (2006). 
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IV.  Domestic Adjudication of Trade Issues 
Lastly, let us turn to a fourth aspect of the indigenization of WTO law in the United States. 
Domestic trade-related adjudication in the United States – like international trade negotiations, 
international trade disputes, and domestic trade legislation – can show us how the United States 
sets its WTO obligations into its own judicial system and culture. 
A. Overview: the Main Agencies, Courts, and Statutory Provisions 
The administrative regime that governs the enforcement of U.S. trade statutes revolves 
mainly around the Customs Border and Protection (CBP) division of the Department of 
Homeland Security, the International Trade Commission (ITC), the Department of Commerce 
(DOC), the Department of Agriculture (DOA), and theOffice of the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR). 
The courts that have jurisdiction over trade cases include the Court of International Trade 
(CIT), the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), and the United States Supreme 
Court. 
According to the Annual Reports released by the ITC since 1997, the main types of trade 
investigations and cases arise from the enforcement of four key provisions: Section 731 of the 
Tariff Act of 1930 (antidumping), Section 701 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (anti-subsidy), Section 
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (IP protection), and Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 
(safeguards). Antidumping cases are especially important. Such cases dominate all the trade 
investigations in every year from 1997 to 2010. Other provisions that have been frequently 
involved in trade administration and investigation actions include Section 332 of the Tariff Act 
of 1930 (general issues), Section 421 of the Trade Act of 1974 (special safeguards against China), 
and Section 751 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (sunset review of countervailing duty or antidumping 
duty orders).   
 
210 
B. Characteristics 
1. Administrative segmentation 
Consistent with the fundamental ideology of state governance – that is, separation of power, 
within the U.S. system – trade administrative power is vested in five separate agencies: the CBP, 
the ITC, DOC, DOA, and the USTR. Briefly, the CBP handles mainly the function of the former 
US Customs Service.431 Determinations of injury or threat of injury are made by the ITC in 
countervailing duty and antidumping cases and in safeguards cases under Section 201.432 The 
USTR is primarily responsible for developing, implem nting, and coordinating US international 
trade policy.433 The DOC regulates non-agricultural trade activities, ncluding implementation 
of the Multinational Trade Negotiations (MTN) and the administration of import regulating 
statutes. The DOA plays an important role in implementing most major agricultural legislation 
and regulations.434 
The significance of such segmentation of power among different administrative organs may 
lie in the fact that nearly every aspect of foreign trade has been taken care of by administrative 
agencies specializing in certain aspects. In addition, he different facets or purposes of trade can 
be addressed by different organs. For example, trade preferences arrangement given to important 
trading partners – through FTA negotiations – are handled by the Administrative branch which is 
good at targeting the countries that need domestic reforms – either political or economic. The 
agriculture trade is administered by the DOA, which is competent in addressing domestic 
subsidies and sustainable development.  
                                                 
431 The CBP also assumes the duties of the former US Border Patrol and the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) of the US Department of Justice as well as the import/export inspection duties of the Animal Plant 
Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the US Department of Agriculture (USDA).  
432 The ITC is also responsible for the preparation and publication of the harmonized tariff schedules of the US. 
433 The US Trade Representative is also the chief negotiator for the US on bi-lateral and multilateral tariff and 
non-tariff barriers and on issues relating to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). He or she administers the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
program as well. 
434 For elaborations on the functions of these five agncies, see Leslie Alan Glick, GUIDE TO UNITED STATES 
CUSTOMS AND TRADE LAWS AFTER THE CUSTOMS MODERNIZATION ACT 9-18 (2008). 
 
211 
2. Judicial review 
The United States provides judicial review to administrative determinations on antidumping 
and countervailing duty issues (and many other trade issues), but with some limitation on the 
types of cases. On the one hand, only “final” decision – which have exhausted administrative 
remedies regarding antidumping and countervailing duties – are subject to judicial review; on 
the other hand, the U.S. law does not explicitly provide for judicial review of safeguard cases.435   
In addition to the limited types of trade cases that can receive judicial review, judgments 
that can be made by the courts also have limitations. The courts can affirm, remand, or partially 
remand the determinations made by administrative agencies. On the grounds of this narrow 
authority of the judicature, a scholar has urged expanding the power of the courts to “remand 
agency decisions with specific instructions to reach  judicially determined result.”436 
Some concerns arising from judicial review relate to the efficacy of certain judicial 
procedures in protecting the interest of petitioners, such as the preliminary injunction issued by 
the courts: 
In an appeal of an antidumping (AD) or countervailing duty (CVD) determination, the issuance 
of a preliminary injunction is essential to ensure that the plaintiff is not deprived of a remedy with 
respect to the particular entries of foreign merchandise affected by its appeal and, more generally, its 
right to judicial review….437 
The credibility of a preliminary injunction is especially important in appeals of AD and 
CVD determinations:  
Parties to an AD/CVD proceeding have a statutory right to appeal a determination issued by the 
DOC or the ITC to the CIT. If the CIT finds on appeal that the determination is not supported by 
substantial evidence or is not in accordance with law, it may remand the matter to the agency for 
disposition consistent with its findings. In turn, this could result in a change to the AD/CVDs that 
are ultimately applied to the entries of foreign merchandise at issue in the appeal when such entries 
are liquidated. To prevent the entries of foreign merchandise from being prematurely liquidated 
while the appeal is still pending before the CIT, the statute authorizes the CIT to enjoin liquidation 
                                                 
435 Gregory W. Bowman, Nick Covelli, David A. Gantz & Ihn Ho Uhm, TRADE REMEDIES IN NORTH AMERICA 
169, 395-396 (2010). 
436 Edens, supra note 419, at 432. 
437 Jeffrey D. Gerrish & Luke A. Meisner, Protecting the Right to Judicial Reviews in Trade Remedy Cases: 
Preliminary Injunctions and the Impact of Recent Court Decisions, 19 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 469, 469-470 (2011). 
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of the entries.  
The CIT rules specifically provide for parties to an appeal of an AD/CVD determination to file a 
motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin liquidation of the entries subject to the appeal.438 
However, it has been emphasized that the role of preliminary injunctions is very limited in 
protecting the interest of petitioners because the protection of their interest can only be realized 
if such injunctions have been issued before the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
actually imposes certain measures based on administrative determinations on the products at 
issue. Explaining that “if a party aggrieved by an erroneous AD/CVD determination wants to 
receive the benefit of a favorable court decision in its appeal, it is essential that the party obtain a 
preliminary injunction before liquidation takes place,”439 one authority urges that “a carefully 
crafted legislative fix [of the rules on preliminary injunctions] may be necessary.”440 
3. Specialized courts and judicial segmentation 
The judicial structure that exercises jurisdiction over trade cases comprises the CIT, the 
CAFC, and the Supreme Court, as summarized in this way:
The court of first instance in US trade law cases i the CIT, which is headquartered in New York 
City. The CIT is an ‘Article III’ court, meaning that it is a fully independent court pursuant to Article 
III of the US Constitution. … This sort of judicial independence goes to the heart of US 
constitutional separation of powers. Unlike other US federal district courts, the CIT’s jurisdiction is 
based on subject matter and extends nation-wide (as opposed to jurisdiction over federal law matters 
in a specific geographic region). … Upon appeal from the CIT, trade law cases are heard by the 
CAFC. Like the CIT, the CAFC is an Article III court, and its jurisdiction is also nation-wide. 
Requests for review of CAFC decisions may be accepted by the US Supreme Court, but there is no 
appeal as of right. Rather, a party to a CAFC judgment may seek discretionary US Supreme Court 
review by filing a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, although typically, the Supreme Court 
denies such petitions in trade-law cases.441 
Among the three courts, the CIT is a specialized court f cusing on trade cases. Despite the 
fact that the CAFC does not exclusively try trade cases, its competence in dealing with these 
complex cases is highly regarded. Although, as indicated in the above excerpt, the CIT is usually 
                                                 
438 Id. at 471. 
439 Id. at 471-472. 
440 Id. at 469. 
441 Bowman, Covelli, Gantz & Uhm, supra note 435, at 170. 
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the court of first instance, this is not always the case. Complaints arising from administrative 
determinations based on Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (IPR protection) fall within the 
jurisdiction of the CAFA with regard to first instance.442 In other words, the jurisdiction over 
trade cases of first instance is shared by the CIT and the CAFC. 
C. Legal Tradition and Culture 
The U.S. approach to the domestic adjudication of disputes over international trade law 
issues – including the alleged violating or distorting of WTO obligations through domestic 
adjudication - finds its roots in several aspects of the American legal tradition and culture. These 
include the subordination of international law to domestic law and the competition between 
unilateralism and multilateralism, as elaborated in the above section. Therefore, the remainder of 
this chapter focuses mainly on the aspects that have not already been discussed.               
1. “Expertise” deference 
In subsection IC4, I elaborated on the belief of the American people in rule of law that 
supports the United States’ pursuance of internatiol rule of law. The U.S. reputation as a 
country emphasizing the “rule of law” rests partly on the assumption that the independence of 
courts will guarantee the full protection of the interests of complainants, whether domestic or 
international. The rights of the complainants might be impaired by two kinds of deference within 
the judicial system. One is the deference given to specialized courts by the Supreme Court 
(“expertise” deference); the other is the administrative deference given to administrative organs 
by the specialized courts (administrative deference). As pointed out in the preceding excerpt, 
although complainants may seek Supreme Court review if they are not satisfied with a CAFA 
judgment, the Supreme Court enjoys the discretion to deny such petition, as it usually does. The 
following excerpt offers two primary reasons for the Supreme Court’s denial: 
There are likely two primary reasons for denial: first, trade-law decisions tend to be quite 
technical and typically do not raise the sort of constitutional issues that are often addressed by the 
Supreme Court; and second, because of the CIT’s and the CAFC’s exclusive jurisdiction over 
                                                 
442 ITC, UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION: YEAR IN REVIEW – FISCAL YEAR OF 2005 15, 
available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/year_in_review/pub3869.pdf, last visited on September 27, 
2011[hereinafter ITC-Review].  
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trade-law matters, there is typically no need for the Supreme Court to reconcile differing judicial 
interpretations of federal law among different federal courts.443 
2. Administrative deference 
Juridical review is “an integrative solution for concerns about delegation and its negative 
pressures on both constitutional structures and on private rights.”444 In other words, the 
fundamental assignment of judicial review is to avoid abuse of administrative powers. Bearing 
this background in mind, we can now turn to the doctrine of administrative deference in the 
judicial review of trade cases.  
In the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court established the octrine of administrative deference in 
the leading Chevron case, as well as the steps to apply this doctrine. U der “Chevron doctrine,” 
there is a two-step analysis: step 1 is to explore the intent of the Congress regarding pertinent 
statute (if such intent is clear, then no deference is given to administrative interpretation); if such 
intent is not clear, step 2 is for the court to examine whether the agency’s interpretation is based 
on a permissible construction of the statue.445 Generally speaking, the efficiency of judicial 
review regarding trade administration is likely to be undermined by the doctrine of 
administrative deference, consequently. In the cases involving the Commerce and the USITC, a 
determinations made by them at issue will be upheld by the courts as long as it is “based on a 
permissible construction of the pertinent statute.”446  
In the trade context in 2006, “[i]n general, the courts continued to reinforce the strong rule 
of deference to the agency’s determinations.”447 Another pair of scholars drew the same 
                                                 
443 Bowman, Covelli, Gantz & Uhm, supra note 435, at 170-171. 
444 Edens, supra note 419, at 445-446. 
445 Bowman, Covelli, Gantz & Uhm, supra note 435, at 174-175. “In 1984, in the leading case of Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court stated as follows: 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two 
questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question a  issue. If the 
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed 
the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be 
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect 
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction 
of the statute.” Id. 
446 Id. at 174-175. 
447 Valerie A. Slater & Lisa W. Ross, Judicial Review of the International Trade Commission’  Determinations 
 
215 
conclusion about trade determinations in 2005.448 The likelihood of the courts remanding 
administrative determinations has decreased due to their respect for the doctrine of 
administrative deference. 
The influence of the doctrine of administrative defer nce in judicial review is reflected not 
only in the unlikelihood that courts will remand administrative determinations, but also in the 
narrow scope of review in these cases. This narrow scope of review originates partially from the 
specialized courts’ views that (1) agencies and courts are collaborative instrumentalities of 
justice, and (2) therefore, a specialized court would not be allowed to displace agency 
responsibility. Furthermore, the unique position of the law of international trade determines that 
it should not be entirely subject to judicial review. 
The CAFC described the scope of judicial review…, saying that “agencies and courts together 
constitute a ‘partnership’ in furtherance of the public interest, and are ‘collaborative 
instrumentalities of justice.”’ In such a partnership, division of responsibility is opaque in practice. 
A court’s function in exercising judicial review is often described as “control[ling] the lawfulness of 
agency action” and “permitting the court to control he lawfulness of agency action without 
allowing it to displace agency responsibility.”…  
The law of international trade … is necessarily colored by its unique position in the framework of 
the larger administrative system and is not entirely elucidated by traditional administrative law 
concepts.449 
The decisions made by the trade courts to support the adoption of “zeroing” methodology – 
which refers to treating all non-dumped sales as having a dumping margin of zero, and thereby 
preventing non-dumped sales from offsetting dumped sales450 – adopted by the administrative 
organs are perfect examples of the implementation of the doctrine of administrative deference by 
the trade courts, considering that most of the zeroing cases brought in front of the DSB involving 
the United States had exhausted judicial remedies within the United States.  
                                                                                                                                                
in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Proceedings: An Overview of Decision in 2006, 39 Geo. J. Int’l L. 69, 69 
(2007). 
448 Andrea C. Casson & Neal J. Reynolds, Judicial Review of the International Trade Commission’  Injury 
Determinations in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Proceedings: An Overview and Analysis of Federal Court 
Decisions in 2005, 38 Geo. J. Int’l L. 89, 121 (2006).  
449 Edens, supra note 419, at 436.  
450 Bhala-Dictionary, supra note 15, at 529.  
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3. Extra-territorial application 
As noted above in subsection IIB2 of this chapter, the U.S. practice of extraterritorial 
application of domestic laws has triggered complaints from other WTO members. What is the 
attitude of U.S. courts toward such extra-territorial application? According to Zhiguo Gao, in 
determining whether a statute applies extraterritorially, an American court must address at least 
four issues – statutory intent, actual or intended effects within the United States of the conduct at 
issue, conflicts with another state’s domestic law or policy, and other barriers to 
extraterritority.451 
As to the possibility for the U.S. courts to actually rely on these four criteria, Gao offers 
these further observations: 
Even if these issues are resolved favourably to an environmental claimant [seeking extraterritorial 
application of US environmental laws], the court may still conclude that there are statutory, judicial 
or constitutional barriers to the claimant’s suit. Courts do not, of course, necessarily raise all of these 
issues in every case or in the order indicated. A court might well conclude that there is no 
Congressional intent to give a statute extraterritorial scope because such an application would 
conflict with another country’s own policies. Noneth less, the suggested approach provides a 
helpful analytical framework for assessing whether US environmental statutes have extraterritorial 
application. It may also help explain why, although virtually every US environmental statute has 
been alleged to have extraterritorial effect, very f w have been held to do so.452 
Obviously, the four criteria for consideration do nt set a high threshold for extra-territorial 
application. In other words, it is not difficult for a U.S. court to conclude that all four factors are
met in favor of extraterritorial application. Even if the current practices of the courts have not 
demonstrated a trend of positive application, it isst ll not difficult for the courts to make a shift 
in attitude, taking into account that they have been granted sufficient discretion to do so.  
Summary  
The participation and practices of the United States in international trade rule-making, 
international trade disputes, domestic trade legislation and domestic adjudication of trade issues 
                                                 
451 Gao, supra note 396, at 234-247. 
452 Id. at 235. 
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have presented us with another significant example of l gal indigenization of WTO law. 
The United States has submitted various proposals to the WTO with regard to substantive 
and procedural issues. The U.S. enthusiasm for international rule of law and procedural fairness 
is rooted in the country’s common law tradition which places procedure at the center. The wide 
range of the proposals, the series of steps taken to complete a proposal, and the sharing of its 
own practices in trade areas demonstrate the capacity, willingness, and confidence of the United 
States in its leadership in this organization, despit  some challenges it may have encountered in 
the past decades. 
The U.S. attitude of cautiousness toward S&D treatmnt is reflected by American 
reluctance to improve current S&D provisions in certain WTO agreements and to definitely 
incorporate the S&D provisions in future agreements. To be specific, for the United States, 
current S&D provisions in the ASCM are considered good enough as a transitional regime. 
According to the U.S. view, the members should initiate further negotiations for general rules in 
the first place, leaving aside the issue of S&D treatment, and then incorporate it into new rules as 
a transitional or exceptional provision if such necessity is proved. This attitude has its roots in 
the long-term resistance and disregard of S&D provisi ns by the United States at multilateral 
trade negotiations. For the United States, S&D treatm nt is more an exception than a mandate, 
and more a mercy than an obligation. 
In FTA negotiations, the United States has concluded trade agreements with its trading 
partners located in Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, North America, and Oceania. The 
selection of FTA partners is a reflection of the U.S. global, regional, and domestic interests, both 
in politics and in economy. This standard of selection conforms to the ideology of the United 
States to take trade as an important instrument of diplomacy. The approach of the U.S. FTAs in 
addressing environmental, labor, and IPR protection reflects not only the U.S. diplomatic aim of 
“out-reform” in its trading partners, but also the segmentation of power in the U.S. political 
regime – that is, the outcome of the Congress, right to supervise the Administration’s 
authorization to negotiate trade agreements. 
Since the establishment of the WTO, the United States has been involved in a number of 
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trade disputes as respondent. In these cases, both domestic legislation and enforcement of trade 
law have been challenged by its trading partners in cases complaining about U.S. laws “as such,” 
“as applied,” and “as such and as applied.” The American ideologies challenged by these trade 
disputes mainly rest on the tension among sovereignty, u ilateralism, and multilateralism and the 
concerns about the extra-territorial application of the U.S. laws. 
The conflict between sovereignty and multilateralism in American culture is often criticized 
by its trading partners as “unilateralism.” This so-called “unilateralism,” on the one hand, may 
have its roots in the American history. First, the need felt by the founders of the country to 
retaliate in response to the alleged suppression from Great Britain and some European countries 
laid the foundation for contemporary “unilateralism” in the United States. Second, the firm 
belief in reciprocal trade also supported the growth of U.S. “unilateralism” aimed at fighting 
against trade practices that prejudice “reciprocity” maliciously. This justification of 
“unilateralism” is characterized by American scholars s “diffusive reciprocity.” Third, 
“unilateralism” also derives from both the opinion f supreme national sovereignty held by the 
Americans and the conditional acceptance by the Congress of a multilateral trading system. 
Extra-territorial application of the U.S. laws in trade – and particularly of trade-related 
environmental law – may also have been cited as a reflection or evidence of the American 
unilateralism, especially taking into account that t e application of such U.S. laws will not be 
restricted to a nationality link. In this chapter, particular attention is given to the tradition of 
extra-territorial application of the U.S. law, whic ontains specific prerequisites to justify such 
extra-territorial application. 
The U.S. regime of domestic trade legislation may be one of the world’s most 
comprehensive and complicated legal systems. The wid coverage and large number of trade 
statutes, as well as the codification of such statutes, show us the merger of civil law influence 
into the common law tradition in this country. The United States still retained the statutes on 
trade sanctions to safeguard its national security and economic interests in the outside world, 
especially the region of Latin America. Furthermore, dualism adopted by the United States – a 
separately-enacted domestic law to incorporate interna ional agreements into the U.S. legal 
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system – gives the country an opportunity to subordinate international law to domestic law. This 
subordination serves as the most fundamental featur of the American attitude towards 
international law.  
Both administrative and judicial regimes for enforcing U.S. trade statutes exhibit the feature 
of segmentation of power. For trade administration, the power is shared by the CBP, DOC, DOA, 
ITC, and USTA. For judicial review, both the CIT and CAFC enjoy jurisdiction over trade cases 
of first instance. The first instance jurisdiction depends on the types of trade cases. The CIT 
presides AD and CVD cases as well as safeguards case , if any. The CAFA presides over the 
cases arising from Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Furthermore, the CIT is a specialized 
court on trade cases within the U.S. judicial system. 
The efficiency of judicial review of administrative determinations might be impaired by the 
following elements: (1) the types of cases that can be reviewed are mainly limited to AD and 
CVD cases; (2) the courts can only affirm or remand the administrative determinations without 
giving specific instruction, modifications, or final determinations, pursuant to the doctrine of 
administrative deference; (3) the Supreme Court is not likely to accept trade appeals on the basis 
of deference to specialized courts, and (4) the specialized trade courts will give their deference to 
administrative determinations. Moreover, the application of the factors that justify 
extra-territorial application of U.S. trade laws and trade-related environmental law fall mainly 
within the discretion of the courts.  
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Appendix 4.1  
(Pertinent passages in main text are found largely in subsection IB3 of Chapter 4) 
Excerpt of USA-TN/DS/W/86 
 
Further Contribution of the United States to the Improvement of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding of the WTO Related to Transparency – Revised Legal Drafting 
 
Communication from the United States 
The following communication, dated 20 April 2006, is being circulated at the request of the 
delegation of the United States. 
_______________ 
(1) Open meetings 
 US proposal: 
  The DSU should provide that the public may observe all substantive panel, Appellate 
Body and arbitration meetings with the parties except those portions dealing with confidential 
information (such as business confidential information or law enforcement methods)… 
To reflect the proposal in the text of the DSU: 
(a) Article 18 of the DSU is amended by inserting the following new paragraph 3: 
“3. Each substantive meeting with the parties of a panel, the Appellate Body, or an arbitrator, 
and each meeting of a panel or arbitrator with an expert, shall be open for the public to observe, 
except for any portion dealing with confidential information.” 
(2) Timely access to submissions 
US proposal: 
 The DSU should provide that parties’ submissions and written versions of oral statements 
in panel, Appellate Body, or arbitration proceedings are public, except those portions dealing with 
confidential information. 
 To help facilitate public access to these documents, the Secretariat should maintain them in 
a central location that would be responsible for making these documents available to the public. 
 
221 
To reflect the proposal: 
(e) Paragraph 2 of Article 18 is amended to read as follows: 
“2. Any document that a Member provides to a panel, th  Appellate Body, or an arbitrator shall 
be public, except for confidential information. Nothing in this Understanding precludes a Member 
from disclosing statements of its own positions to the public. A Member shall not disclose another 
Member’s confidential information. The Member submitting the confidential information shall 
provide within 15 days of the request of another Memb r a non confidential summary of the 
information.” 
… 
(3) Timely access to Final Reports 
US proposal: 
 The WTO should make a final panel report available to WTO Members and the public once 
it is issued to the parties, although only circulation would trigger the relevant DSU deadlines. 
Text to reflect the proposal: 
(h) A decision by the DSB: 
 “A final report issued by a panel to the parties is an unrestricted document, except for any 
confidential information (as defined in Article 18). Any interim report considered final by operation 
of the last sentence of paragraph 2 of Article 15 is unrestricted when considered final.   
 This decision is without prejudice to the practice concerning the date of circulation of the 
report.” 
(4) Amicus curiae submissions 
US proposal: 
 In light of the experience to date with amicus curiae submissions to panels and the 
Appellate Body, Members may wish to consider whether it would be helpful to propose guideline 
procedures for handling amicus curiae submissions t address those procedural concerns that have 
been raised by Members, panels and the Appellate Body. 
 The United States notes with interest the procedures p oposed by the European 
Communities for handling amicus curiae submissions (TN/DS/W/1) and looks forward to 
working with the European Communities and other Memb rs on this issue. The United States 
does not believe that an amendment to the Dispute Set lement Understanding is necessary for 
this purpose.   
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CHAPTER 5.  LEGAL INDIGENIZATION OF WTO  LAW IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION  
 
 
As one of the leading members of the WTO, the European Union (EU, formerly EC453) 
provides us with another valuable example with which to study the process of legal 
indigenization of WTO law. In this chapter, four aspects of EU practice and experience are 
explored – international trade negotiations, international trade disputes, “domestic” trade 
legislation, and “domestic” adjudication of trade issues. Although the EU is not a sovereign 
member of the WTO in the sense of general internatio l law, its Member states, on the one hand, 
have a cohesive voice in the WTO, and on the other hand, adopt and implement a uniform 
Common Commercial Policy (CCP) at the Union level. Furthermore, the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) and the General Court enjoy the authority t  interpret EU trade regulations and 
jurisdiction over trade disputes between EU governme ts, institutions, and individuals. 
Consequently, for the purpose of this chapter, the EU’s own practice and experience in 
negotiation, dispute settlement, legislation and adjudication are characterized as “domestic.” The 
term “regional” is used to denote the relationship between the EU and its trading partners.   
I. International Trade Rule-making 
As one of the GATT/WTO sponsors, the EU has participated actively in trade negotiations 
at both the multilateral level and the regional level. In this section, the proposals submitted to the 
WTO by the EU, along with the terms of regional trade agreements (RTAs) concluded by the EU, 
are studied as the material of EU practice in trade negotiations. After identifying the 
characteristics exhibited by these proposals and pertinent RTAs, I try to find their roots in the 
legal traditions and culture of the EU.    
An examination of the EU proposals has helped us observe their characteristics, such as 
finds that they exhibit some characteristics relating o heavy reliance on overall goal of pertinent 
mechanism, a particular perspective on DSB constituents, the unique style of proposals, the 
pondering on the relationship among development, sus ainability, and S&D treatment, and 
highlights of principles and doctrines. Most of these characteristics consist with the traits of the 
civil law tradition, such as the role of judges, the status of principles, and the dominance of 
                                                 
453 In this chapter, the terms EU and EC are used interchangeable in most cases.  
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jurists.  
A. Overview 
Since the establishment of the WTO, the EU has submitted proposals on comprehensive 
issues covering substantive and procedural provisions in the WTO agreements. These proposals 
have embraced substantive issues concerning the status of multilateral environmental agreements, 
market access for non-agricultural products, antidumping measures, subsidy and countervailing 
measures, regional trade agreements, fisheries subsidies, GATS-related issues, environmental 
goods, freedom of transit, Article VIII of GATT 1994, and geographical indications.  
Procedural issues covered by these proposals have conc ntrated on institutional and 
operational aspects of the DSB, including those regarding panels, third parties, the Appellate 
Body, and surveillance and implementation of recommendations made by the DSB.  
The EU also gives some attention to special and differential treatment (S&D treatment), 
sustainability impact, and technical assistance and c pacity building.  
As for RTA negotiations, as of June 2011, the EU has given notification of 30 RTAs in force. 
The EU’s RTA partners include Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cameroon, 
CARIFORUM States,454 Chile, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Egypt, Faroe Islands, Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, 
Norway, Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT),455 the Palestinian Authority, South Africa, 
Switzerland and Liechtenstein, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, San Marino, and Serbia. Moreover, it is 
currently negotiating trade agreements with four other countries: India, Ukraine, Canada, and the 
Republic of Korea.456 
                                                 
454 The Caribbean Forum of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (CARIFORUM) is a grouping of Caribbean 
States which are signatories to the Lome IV Convention. 
455 The overseas countries and territories (OCT) are twenty one territories that have a special relationship with 
one of the member states of the EU: twelve with the United Kingdom, six with France, two with the Nethrlands 
and one with Denmark. 
456 WTO, The Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-IS), available at 
http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx, last visited on August 7, 2011, last visited on September 16, 
2011.  
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B. Characteristics 
The proposals submitted to the WTO as well as the RTAs concluded by the EU have 
exhibited some common characteristics. As the following paragraphs indicate, those 
characteristics involve a range of topics, from the ov rall goals of the WTO to the operations of 
the DSB and the handling of regional issues. 
1. Overall goal of the mechanisms 
Before proposing specific recommendations, the EU typically will first clarify or set the 
overall goal of the mechanisms at issue. For example, in the proposal of March 13, 2002 on 
contribution to the improvement of the DSU, the EU pointed out that “any improvement of the 
DSU should contribute towards [an] overall goal of facilitating the earliest possible resolution of 
disputes.”457  
Similarly, in the proposal of August 1, 2002 for a special session on Special and Different 
Treatment, the EU argued that the primary aim of the Members’ suggestion should be to aid the 
integration of developing countries into the multilateral trading system based on an analysis of 
the overall objectives of S&D treatment in the WTO rules.458  
2. Constituents of the DSB 
The attention given to the DSB by the EU is not limited to the DSU procedures only. The 
Union has recommended reform in the form and constituents of the DSB (especially the panels). 
In the proposal of March 13, 2002, the EU suggested “moving from ad hoc to more permanent 
panelists.”459 In the proposal of January 23, 2003, the EU further proposed a draft with regard to 
establishing permanent panelists. It also suggested in that proposal a procedure to modify the 
                                                 
457 The European Communities, Contribution of the European Communities and Its Memb r States to the 
Improvement of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/1, March 13, 2002 [hereinafter 
EU-TN/DS/W/1].  
458 The European Communities, Submission for the Committee on Trade and Development - Special Session on 
Special and Differential Treatment, TN/CTD/W/13, August 1, 2002 [hereinafter EU-TN/CTD/W/13]. 
459 EU- TN/DS/W/1, supra note 457. 
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number of Appellate Body members.460 
3. Style of proposals 
The proposals submitted by the EU usually constitute packages of complete, logical and 
systematic legal analysis. A common style of these proposals features an introduction of the 
proposal’s background, a following statement of issues identified, relevant legal framework, 
significance of improvement, normative analysis, conclusions, and proposed texts. Examples of 
such style appear in the proposals of March 13, 2002 on contribution to the improvement of the 
DSB and of March 21, 2002 on multilateral environmetal agreements.461  
4. Development, sustainability, and S&D treatment 
The Union has addressed the issue of “development and sustainability,” a topic whose 
coverage is broader than that of S&D treatment. As shown below, it offered deep and integral 
assessment on the sustainability impact of trade liberalization from an overall perspective, and 
gives much attention to technical assistance and capacity building in developing countries 
through international trade rule making.  
The emphasis that the EU places on the issues of “development and sustainability” can be 
seen in the analysis offered in the EU’s proposals of June 2, 2002 on sustainability impact 
assessment and of July 8, 2002 on the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 
1994.462 
                                                 
460 The European Communities, Contribution of the European Communities and Its Memb r States to the 
Improvement and Clarification of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/38, January 23, 2003 
[hereinafter EU-TN/DS/W/38]. 
461 More examples can be found in the proposals of July 9, 2002 on regional agreements, of July 8, 2002 on the 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994, of March 7, 2003 on a swift control mechanism for 
institutions in AD and CVD, of April 20, 2006 on independent group of experts for the enforcement of initiation 
standards, of November 21, 2002 on subsidies and countervailing measures, of February 10, 2005 on classification 
in the telecom sector under the WTO-GATS framework, f April 29, 2005 on freedom of transit, of August 1, 2002 
on special session on special and differential treatm nt, and of November 20, 2002 on S&D treatment. All the 
proposals mentioned in this paragraph are available t 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_communities_e.htm, last visited on September 14, 
2011. 
462 More examples can be found in the proposals of April 23, 2003 on fisheries subsidies, of April 29, 2005, 
April 6, 2006, and September 27, 2007 on technical assistance and support for capacity building, and of May 12, 
2005 on RTA. All the proposals mentioned in this paragraph are available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_communities_e.htm, last visited on September 14, 
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The EU’s attitude toward S&D treatment is different from that of China or the United States. 
To a large extent, the EU’s attitude falls somewhere the middle of those of the above two 
members. On the one hand, the Union does not take S&D treatment as a mandatory mechanism, 
nor does it overemphasize the importance of S&D treatm nt, as China does. On the other hand, 
the Union does not devalue or denigrate the significance of S&D treatment or take it as an 
exception that exists at some inferior level, as the United States does. Instead, based on the 
proposals identified in the preceding paragraphs, the EU’s attitude toward S&D treatment can be 
summarized as follows: 
(1) It is more effective to incorporate negotiations of S&D treatment in separate sessions 
with regard to specific topics it belongs to than to carry out such negotiations in the 
Committee on Trade and Development. 
(2) The purpose of S&D treatment is not to create a “second class” membership 
permanently in the organization. 
(3) Different needs of developing countries should be addressed. In other words, the 
application of S&D treatment should be differentiated in individual cases. 
(4) Emphasis should be given to full use of the current S&D provisions. 
(5) To make S&D treatment mandatory, as suggested by man  developing members, may 
not be the only way to make them more precise, effectiv  or operational. 
(6) The importance of S&D treatment should be addressed in conjunction with technical 
assistance and capacity building.463 
5. Proposed texts 
Like the United States, the EC has provided, along with legal analysis, proposed texts of the 
provisions at issue. Examples of such proposed texts appear in the proposals on the issues of 
improving the DSU (of March 13, 2002 and January 23, 2003) and subsidies and countervailing 
measures (of November 18, 2005, November 21, 2002, and April 24, 2006).464 These proposed 
                                                                                                                                                
2011. 
463 See EU-TN/CTD/W/13. See also the European Communities, The WTO Work Programme on Special and 
Differential Treatment Some eu Ideas for The Way Ahead, TN/CTD/W/20, November 20, 2002 [hereinafter 
EU-TN/CTD/W/20].  
464 More examples can be found in the proposals on the issues of clarifications and improvements to Article X 
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texts strengthen the various characteristics of the EU proposals summarized in the foregoing 
paragraphs. 
6. Regional issues 
Being a regional organization, the EU has given particular attention to the mechanisms of 
FTA in the WTO. Recognizing the long-standing differences in interpreting the WTO provisions 
in the proposal of July 9, 2002,465 the EU addressed the principle of overall liberalization 
regarding RTAs in its succeeding submission on this topic dated May 12, 2005.466 
7. Principles and guidelines 
In the proposals, the EU has emphasized the significa t role of principles and guidelines in 
improving the multilateral institutions at issue. It has put forward the principles of further 
negotiations or improvement of S&D treatment and enviro mental goods in the proposals of 
November 20, 2002 on S&D treatment, of February 17, 2005 on market access for 
environmental goods, and of July 5, 2005 on environme tal goods.467 Before presenting its own 
specific principles or guidelines, the EU clarified that the purpose of establishing a number of 
guidelines or working assumptions was to enable the members “better to understand the purpose 
of S&D treatment and … to evaluate specific or general proposals made, and take decisions on 
them.”468 The specific guidelines and principles proposed by the EU regarding S&D treatment 
and environmental goods can be found in Appendix 5.1. 
                                                                                                                                                
(publication and administration of trade regulations) (of January 28, 2005), freedom of transit (of April 29, 2005), 
improving GATT Article VIII on formalities and requirements connected with importation and exportation and 
related proposals on S&D and technical assistance (of June 9, 2005), geographical indications (of June 14, 2005), 
transparency of anti-dumping activity (of April 20, 2006), independent group of experts for the enforcement of 
initiation standards (of April 20, 2006), fisheries subsidies (of April 24, 2006), non-agricultural market access (of 
May 20, 2008, September 9, 2009, and March 19, 2010), and WTO facilitation proposals (of May 1, 2009). All the 
proposals mentioned in this paragraph are available t 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_communities_e.htm, last visited on September 14, 
2011.  
465 The European Communities, Submission on Regional Trade Agreements by the European Communities and 
Their Member States, TN/RL/W/14, 9 July 2002 [hereinafter EU-TN/RL/W/14].  
466 The European Communities, Submission on Regional Trade Agreements by the European Communities, 
TN/RL/W/179, May 12, 2005 [hereinafter EU-TN/RL/W/179]. 
467 All the proposals mentioned in this paragraph are available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_communities_e.htm, last visited on September 16, 
2011. 
468 EU- TN/CTD/W/20, supra note 463. 
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8. Status of independent experts in trade disputes settlement 
In a proposal dated March 7, 2003, the EU tried to reflect on a swift control mechanism for 
initiations, especially unjustified initiations, ofAD or CVD investigations. Considering the 
adverse impact of unjustified initiations of AD or CVD investigations within individual members, 
the EU suggested that a swift control mechanism be established within the DSU regime by the 
WTO to reduce the adverse impact of unjustified initiations. In the proposal, the EU further 
suggested three possible models to establish such me anism. One is to establish “fast track 
initiation panels.” Ideally, such panels would issue their recommendations before the actual 
imposition of measures. The second model is to resort to “binding arbitration,” in order to 
immediately solve problems of initiation which result from clearly defined and straightforward 
issues. The third model is to create a “standing advisory body” outside the traditional dispute 
settlement system.  Such a body could be modeled upon the “Permanent Group of Experts” 
provided for in Article 24.3 of the ASCM (for CVD initiations, it could be this existing Group 
which could serve as the advisory body).  Its task would be to give a non-binding advisory 
opinion on the WTO legality of the initiation of an ti-dumping or CVD investigation.  The 
standing advisory body could report to the WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices or the 
WTO Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures where Members could express their 
views on the report.469 
In a proposal dated April 20, 2006, the EU focused on the third model mentioned above – 
that is, establishment of an independent group of experts for the enforcement of initiation 
standards in AD and CVD investigations. In this proposal, the EU mentioned that this model had 
received positive comments from many as a workable opinion. Therefore, the EU proposed 
fundamental solutions and legal text to establish such an independent group of experts. The 
specific proposed solution appears in Appendix 5.2. 
To sum up this subsection, the activities of the EU in participating in international trade 
rule-making reveal several key characteristics: emphasizing the overall goal of pertinent 
                                                 
469 The EU, Negotiations on Anti-Dumping and Subsidies - Reflection Paper of the European Communities on 
a Swift Control Mechanism for Initiations, TN/RL/W/67, March 7, 2003 [hereinafter EU-TN/RL/W67]. 
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mechanisms, urging reforms of the DSB, displaying a solid style of proposals, addressing 
development and sustainability, providing proposed legal texts, sharing EU experiences, 
emphasizing regional issues, focusing on principles and guidelines, and boosting the status of 
independent experts in dispute settlement mechanism.  
C. Legal Tradition and Culture 
Some characteristics exhibited by the EU’s trade-negotiation proposals have their roots in 
the legal tradition and culture of the EU, in particular relating to the role of judges, the status of 
principles, and the dominance of jurist. Geographically speaking, the EU covers multiple legal 
traditions, such as Roman law tradition, German-Austrian legal tradition, common law tradition, 
Scandinavian legal tradition, and the legal tradition of Eastern Europe. However, in this chapter, 
the legal tradition and culture of the EU refers to a uniquely developed legal tradition and culture 
accompanying the growth of the European Union. As pointed out by Cruz as follows, since its 
birth in 1950s,470 EU law has received influence from the French, German and English legal 
systems: 
European Community law has adopted and adapted a number of different legal styles, beginning 
with the French style, then the German approach, in its earlier phase when there were only six in the 
Community; with the enlargement of the Community, it has slowly started to rely on previously 
decided case law in the style of the common law and has even begun to develop its own version of 
stare decisis.471 
Based on the above facts, the EU legal system can be characterized as a “hybrid” one. For 
Cruz, “the EC has given rise to a unique legal system that is at once sui generis, separate from 
either civil or common law parent families, yet ‘supranational’, a regional system and a 
distinctive legal order in its own right.”472 The development of this unique legal system is 
attributable to the development of the Union itself. One expert offers this observation on the 
fundamental constituents of the EU legal tradition: 
The current legal culture of Europe is the consequence of many years of development shaped by 
                                                 
470 For elaborations on the development of the EU, see Gabriël Moens & John Trone, COMMERCIAL LAW OF 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 4-10 (2010). 
471 Peter de Cruz, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD (3d ed.) 160 (2007). 
472 Id. at 140. 
 
230 
similar collective wishes – such as the separation of power and the law, the progressive 
pre-eminence of the latter, and convergent principles of constitutional law all over Europe, 
especially in the fields of human rights and the rul of law. Of particular importance is access to the 
courts, a right that has only recently come to be explicitly recognized in national constitutions. This 
recognition is an example of the emergence over time of the rule-of-law ideal.473 
Although the purpose of this chapter is by no means to classify the EU legal tradition and 
culture, the above observation is helpful for us to find origins of the Union’s legal practices.  
1. Role of judges 
The EU proposals on establishing permanent panelists referred to above may astonish some 
common law scholars, since the role and status of judges in civil law countries have been 
characterized, especially by common law scholars, as “n rrow, mechanical and uncreative.”474 
In other words, in the eyes of some common law scholars, the role of judges in civil law 
countries is much less important than that of judges in common law countries. To them, judges 
in civil law countries are only “civil servants and functionaries,”475 mainly due to their lack of 
lawmaking power.  
Despite the above description of civil law judges, their role is never ignored or debased by 
civil legal systems. The fact that they do not enjoy the power of law making does not impair 
their functions “to find the right legislative provision, couple it with the fact situation, bless the
solution that is more or less automatically produced from the union,”476 and to control judicial 
procedures (mainly investigation).477 These functions of judges are important enough for the EU 
to expect permanent or strong constituents of panels.  
2. Principles and doctrines 
In the proposals, the EU suggested giving much attention to principles or guidelines before 
                                                 
473 S. Galera, European Legal Tradition and the EU Legal System: Understandings and Premises about the 
Rule of Law’s Requirements, in JUDICIAL REVIEW: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS INSIDE THE EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEM 
(S. Galera ed.) 277, 277-279 (2010). 
474 John Henry Merryman & Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 38 (2007). 
475 Id. at 35. 
476 Id. at 36. 
477 Glenn, supra note 6, at 145. 
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the WTO Members make further negotiations. The centrality of principles in EU law can be 
traced back to French and German legal systems and to the central role played by principles in 
the civil law tradition, as contained in the notion f “general principles of law.”  
“The notion of ‘general principles of law’ was itself derived from French administrative 
law.”478 Since the Liberation, the Council of State of France has imported into the 
administrative law something very much like the British concept of “natural justice.”479 The 
change in the attitude of the French tribunal mainly lies in the proposition that, in certain cases, 
“practical rule gives way to a higher principle,” and that general principles of law can be 
applicable “even in the absence of a legal text.”480  
Also, “German law thinks in terms of general principles, rather than in pragmatic terms, 
conceptualizing problems, rather than working from case to case. The legal terminology and 
central method of law making – to codify laws in a comprehensive, authoritative and precise 
manner – distinguish it from the common law approach.”481 In short, general principles of law 
are at the heart of legal thinking in civil law countries. This attitude can help explain the motive 
of the EU for setting principles before negotiating specific rules. 
3. Jurists in the civil law tradition 
The EU proposed to establish, within the DSB regime but outside the traditional dispute 
settlement mechanism, a swift control mechanism of initiation of AD/CVD investigations which 
might be operated by independent experts. The appeal of such an approach to the EU probably 
originates partially in the preeminent status of jurists (or legal scholars, law professors, experts) 
in the civil law tradition. The development of the civil law tradition can in fact be attributed 
largely to the role played over many centuries by jurists. These include the jurisconsults482 of 
                                                 
478 Francis G. Jacobs, Recent Developments in the Principle of Proportionality in European Community Law, 
in THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE (Evelyn Ellis ed.) 1, 2 (1999). 
479 The Black Law Dictionary (9th ed.) defines the term “natural justice” as “justice as defined in a moral, as 
opposed to a legal, sense.” In the common law tradition, procedural fairness (or due process) is one of the most 
manifestations of natural justice.  
480 Bernard Schwartz, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON-LAW WORLD 208-209 (1954). 
481 Cruz, supra note 471, at 94.  
482 A class of scholar-advisors that would provide guidance on legal matters in ancient Rome. Head, supra note 
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the classical period (from roughly 117 to 235 CE.), the jurists who compiled Justinian’s great 
law works of the sixth century, the legal scholars who revived Roman law studies beginning in 
the late eleventh century, and others. The prestige of law professors in the civil law tradition has 
been identified as one of the main features of this tradition.483 Someone even characterizes the 
law thereof as the jurists’ law.484 To entrust independent experts with the authority to influence 
AD/CVD initiations, as suggested by the EU proposals reflect to some extent the high respect, 
trust, and regard given to experts by civil law tradition. In addition, the suggestion to establish 
expert’s authority in judicial bodies is consistent with the EU’s own “domestic” adjudicative 
practices on trade, especially its system of General Advocate, as further elaborated in subsection 
IVC6 of this chapter. 
4. Sustainable development 
The emphasis on “development and sustainability” in the proposals demonstrates EU 
attitudes and methodology toward developmental issue . Sustainable development was added to 
the objectives of the EU by the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997.485 That was followed by several 
steps in the development of the EU’s Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS): (1) the policy of 
sustainable development in the EU between 1997 and 2001, (2) the background of the revision 
of the SDS between 2001 and 2006, (3) establishment of the current SDS of the EU in 2006, and 
(4) an international and integrated approach requird by the 2006 revision.  
First, the policy of sustainable development in the EU between 1997 and 2001 emphasized 
three dimensions – economic, social, and environmental.486 Second, the enlargement of the EU 
and the changing context of the outside world since 2001 presented new challenges to the EU 
                                                                                                                                                
6, at 56. 
483 Glenn, supra note 6, at145. 
484 Paolo Grossi, Damiano Canale & Hasso Hofmann, A HISTORY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN THE CIVIL 
WORLD: 1600-1900 205 (2009). 
485 Moens & Trone, supra note 470, at 7. 
486 The European Commission, available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eussd/, lasted visited September 16, 
2011. Already in 1997 sustainable development becam  fundamental objective of the EU when it was included in 
the Treaty of Amsterdam as an overarching objective of EU policies. At the Gothenburg Summit in June 2001, EU 
leaders launched the first EU sustainable development strategy based on a proposal from the European Commission. 
This 2001 strategy was composed of two main parts: economic and social dimensions. The EU SDS added a third,
environmental dimension to the Lisbon Strategy of economic and social renewal. 
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SDS – including climate change, the aging of society, a widening gap between the rich and the 
poor, terrorist threats, and further globalization. These challenges prompted a shift of the EU’s 
focus “to take account of progress made, tackle shortcomings and take account of new 
challenges” as well as a renewed strategy adopted by Heads of State and Governments at the 
European Council of June 15-16, 2006.487 Third, considering the enlargement of the EU and the 
changing context in the outside world, the SDS underwent a revision in 2006 that focuses on 
gradual change and an integrated approach.488 Fourth, the integrated approach has also taken 
into account into the international dimension and the EU’s external policies.489 
The above elaborations on the EU SDS demonstrate the great importance the EU has 
attached to it, as well as the EU’s commitment to address this issue in an international context – 
which is required by its integrated approach to achieve the goal of sustainable development.  
In sum, the EU’s participation in international trade rule-making has exhibited some 
features that have roots in the EU legal tradition and culture, including respect of roles of judges, 
the importance of general principles, an emphasis on the role of jurists, and a focus on 
sustainable development.  
II.  International trade disputes 
The EU, as a major participant in the WTO, has alsobeen involved in a large number of 
international trade disputes. In this section, based on an overview of the disputes, I identify EU 
                                                 
487 The European Commission, available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eussd/, lasted visited September 16, 
2011. 
488 The European Commission, available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eussd/, lasted visited September 16, 
2011. “The renewed EU SDS sets out a single, coherent strategy on how the EU will more effectively live up to its 
long-standing commitment to meet the challenges of sustainable development. It recognises the need to gradually 
change our current unsustainable consumption and production patterns and move towards a better integrat d 
approach to policy-making. It reaffirms the need for global solidarity and recognises the importance of 
strengthening our work with partners outside the EU, including those rapidly developing countries which will have 
a significant impact on global sustainable development.” Id. 
489 The European Commission, available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eussd/, lasted visited September 16, 
2011. The document goes on to enumerate the aims and priorities for the EU’s SDS in coming years. “To improve 
synergies and reduce trade-offs, a more integrated approach to policy making is proposed, based on better regulation 
(impact assessments) and on the guiding principles for ustainable development (adopted by the European Council 
of June 2005). The external dimension of sustainable development (e.g., global resource use, internatio l 
development concerns) is factored into EU internal policy making and through integration of SD considerations in 
EU’s external policies.” Id. 
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ideologies that have encountered challenges at the multilateral level, which mainly include its 
methods of interpreting WTO rules, priority of FTA preferences over multilateral treatment, and 
the application of legal principles. These characteristics reflect some features of the civil law 
tradition such as those relating to legal interpretation, trade preferences system, and legal 
principles .  
A. Overview 
Since the establishment of the WTO, the EU has beeninvolved in 83 cases as complainant 
and 70 cases as respondent. Among the 70 cases as rpondent, 27 cases have resulted in DSB 
reports. One kind of these cases revolves around complaints about certain EU legislation. These 
are also called cases of alleged “as such” violations f WTO-related obligations.490 Another type 
of cases centers on allegations of “as applied” violati ns.491 Some cases contain both “as applied” 
and “as such” complaints.492  
                                                 
490 For example, in the DS 27 case (the Case of European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, also the Case of EC – Banan s III), the European Communities’ regime for the importation, 
distribution and sale of bananas, introduced on 1 July 1993 and established by EEC Council Reg. 404/93, was 
challenged by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and the United States. In the DS 219 case (the Casof 
European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Mallebl  Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil, also the 
Case of EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings), the EC Regulation imposing anti-dumping duties on certain imports was 
challenged by Brazil. Other cases of “as such” include these: DS 26/48 (the Case of European Communities – 
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones); also the Case of EC – Hormones); DS 69 (the Cas of 
European Communities – Measures Affecting Importation of Certain Poultry Products; also the Case of EC – 
Poultry); DS 174/290 (the Case of European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications 
for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs; also the Case of EC – Trademarks And Geographical Indications); DS 231 
(the Case of European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines; also the Case of EC – Sardines); DS 246 (the 
Case of European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries; also 
the Case of EC – Tariff Preferences); DS 265/266/283 (the Case of European Communities – Export Subsidies on 
Sugar); DS 269/286 (the Case of European Communities – Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken 
Cuts; also the Case of EC – Chicken Cuts); DS 301 (the Case of European Communities – Measures Affecting 
Trade in Commercial Vessels; also the Case of EC – Commercial Vessels); DS 316 (the Case of European 
Communities – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft; also the case of EC and certain member States – 
Large Civil Aircraft) 
491 These involve EU application of trade regulations. For instance, in the DS 62/67/68 case (the Case of 
European Communities – Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, also the Case of EC – Computer 
Equipment), the European Communities’ application of tariffs on local area networks was challenged by the United 
States. In the DS141 case (the Case of European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-type 
Bed Linen from India, also the Case of EC – Bed Linen), definitive anti-dumping duties imposed by the European 
Communities, including the European Communities’ zeroing method used in calculating the dumping margin, was 
complained about by India. Other cases of “as applied:” DS 135 (the Case of European Communities – Measur s 
Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos; also the Case of EC – Asbestos); DS 299 (the Caseof 
European Communities – Countervailing Measures on Dy amic Random Access Memory Chips from Korea; also 
the Case of EC – Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips); DS 315 (the Case of European Communities – 
Selected Customs Matters); DS 337 (the Case of European Communities –Anti-Dumping Measure on Farmed 
Salmon from Norway; also the Case of EC – Salmon (Norway)). 
492 For example, in the DS 291/292/293case (the Case of Eur pean Communities – Measures Affecting the 
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B. Conflicting Ideologies   
Behind these specific practices of the Union with regard to trade legislation or the 
application of trade legislation complained about by other members are EU ideologies relating to 
the international trading system that other countries have challenged at the multilateral level. 
1. Methods of interpreting WTO agreements 
Almost in every appeal, the EU challenged the Panel’s interpretation of pertinent WTO 
agreements or provisions, and further argued that EU legislation or application could stand up to 
its own interpretation of these agreements. Generally speaking, in its arguments, the EU adopted 
the methods of “proper or ordinary meaning,”493 “object and purpose” of the provisions at 
issue494, context of negotiation495, and principles of general international law496 in interpreting 
the provisions at issue. As pointed in the Appellat Body report of the DS 27 case, the EU 
employed “the letter, the context and the negotiating history, and even the Panel’s own 
interpretation” to interpret a WTO article.497  
The following paragraphs, excerpted from pertinent DSB reports, contain some illustrations 
of the EU’s arguments regarding interpretation of the WTO provisions. The Appellate Body 
report of the DS 141 case involves the EU’s approach of “proper meaning.” The Appellate Body 
report of the DS 246 case mentions the EU’s approaches of “ordinary meaning,” “object and 
purpose,” and “context.”  
                                                                                                                                                
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, also the Case of EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products), 
the United States, Canada, and Argentina complained about the alleged general EC moratorium on approvals of 
biotech products, EC measures allegedly affecting the approval of specific biotech products, and EC member State 
safeguard measures prohibiting the import/marketing of specific biotech products within the territories of these 
member States. 
493 WTO, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS141/AB/R, ¶9, 10, 12, 13, 18, 25, 29 &34, March 1, 2001 [hereinafter 
WTO-WT/DS141/AB/R].  
494 WTO, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS27/AB/R, ¶19, 20, 22 &23, September 9, 1997 [hereinafter 
WTO-WT/DS27/AB/R]; Panel Report, WT/DS69/R, ¶18, March 12, 1998 [hereinafter WTO-WT/DS69/R]; 
Appellate Body Report, WT/DS246/AB/R, ¶15, 19 & 30, April 7, 2004 [hereinafter WTO-WT/DS246/AB/R]; and, 
Appellate Body Report, WT/DS315/AB/R, ¶51, November 13, 2006 [hereinafter WTO-WT/DS315/AB/R].  
495 WTO-WT/DS27/AB/R, id.  
496 WTO, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS269/AB/R, ¶41-51, WT/DS286/AB/R, September 12, 2005 
[hereinafter WTO-WT/DS269/AB/R]. 
497 WTO-WT/DS27/AB/R, supra note 494. 
 
236 
In the DS 141 case (EC – Bed linen), “the European Communities submits that the 
interpretation of the Panel fails to give proper meaning to the word ‘comparable’ in Article 2.4.2 
[of AD Agreement].”498 In the DS 246 case (EC – Tariff Preferences), “[t]he European 
Communities suggests that the Panel should have begun its analysis by examining the ordinary 
meaning of the word “notwithstanding” in the Enabling Clause….[I]ts understanding of the 
relationship between Article I:1 and the Enabling Clause is supported by the object and purpose 
of the Enabling Clause…[It also] emphasizes …immediate context for interpreting the term 
“non-discriminatory” in footnote 3 [of the Enabling Clause].”499 
2. Trade Preferences in FTAs and multilateralism 
In two important and famous cases – the DS 27 case (Banana III) about the Lome Waiver500, 
the DS 246 case (Tariff Preference) about the GSP system501 – the EU ideology that was being 
challenged relates to the relationship between regionalism (or regional trade preferences) and 
multilateralism. In the DS 27 case revolving around the European Communities’ regime for the 
importation, distribution and sale of bananas, introduced on 1 July 1993 and established by EEC 
Council Reg. 404/93., the European Communities argues as follows: 
[T]here are, in fact, two separate EU import regimes for bananas: one preferential regime for 
traditional ACP bananas and one erga omnes[502] regime for all other imported bananas. The 
European Communities contends further that the non-discrimination obligations of Article I:1, X:3(a) 
and XIII of the GATT 1994 and Article 1.3 of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures (the 
‘Licensing Agreement’), only apply within each of these two regimes.”503 
In the DS 246 case, the European Communities’ generaliz d tariff preferences (GSP) 
scheme for developing countries and economies in transition was challenged by its trading 
partners. In particular, the complaint centered on special arrangements under the scheme to 
                                                 
498 WTO-WT/DS141/AB/R, supra note 493, ¶10. (emphasis added)  
499 WTO-WT/DS246/AB/R, supra note 494, ¶ 11, 14 & 21. (emphasis added) 
500 The Lome Waiver was a system of trade references granted by the EU to approximately seventy-one African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) developing countries. Bhala-Dictionary, supra note 15, at 284. 
501 The Generalized System of Preferences is a scheme by which one country (namely, developed one) accords 
duty-free, reduced-tariff, and/or quota-free treatment to merchandise imported from and originating in another 
country (typically, a developing or least developed one). Id. at 229. 
502 This term means that rights and obligations are owned toward all. 
503 WTO-WT/DS27/AB/R, supra note 494, ¶23. 
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combat drug production and trafficking (the Drug Arrangements), the benefits of which applied 
only to 12 countries experiencing a certain gravity of drug problems. The EC’s opinion in the 
case regarding the relationship between S&D treatment and Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) 
treatment was summarized by the Appellate Body as follows: 
The European Communities emphasizes that the Enabling C ause is ‘the most concrete, 
comprehensive and important application’ of the principle of special and differential treatment. In 
the view of the European Communities, special and differential treatment is ‘the most basic 
principle of the international law of development’, and it constitutes lex specialis that applies to the 
exclusion of more general WTO rules on the same subject matter.504 
The fundamental ideology reflected by the arguments adopted by the EU in these two cases 
is that regionalism (or regional trade preferences) an be used in parallel with the multilateral 
system and can serve as a fundamental feature of th multilateral system (as long as regionalism 
is a stepping stone, not a stumbling block, in the path toward multilateralism). 
3. Applying principles in arguments 
In order to support its arguments in these trade disputes, the EU applied some general 
principles of law such as legitimate expectations ad good faith. The Appellate Body report 
regarding the DS 62/67/68 case exemplifies the EU’s invocation of the principle of legitimate 
expectations. In this appeal, the EU challenged the Panel’s application of that principle in 
interpreting its tariff schedule, as summarized by the Appellate Body as follows: 
The European Communities submits that the Panel errd in law by not considering the object and 
purpose of the tariff concession in Schedule LXXX with respect to the products concerned but 
rather a supposed and erroneous object and purpose of Article II of the GATT 1994, i.e., the 
protection of “legitimate expectations”. … 
… The European Communities questions how it is possible to determine the content of MFN tariff 
treatment on the basis of the “legitimate expectations” of one Member among all WTO Members. If 
the “legitimate expectations” of that Member diverges from the “legitimate expectations” of other 
Members, the consequence would be that a Member, in o der to know exactly what is the tariff 
treatment to grant a given product, would have to verify the potentially divergent “legitimate 
expectations” of all other WTO Members.505  
                                                 
504 WTO-WT/DS246/AB/R, supra note 494, ¶14.  
505 WTO, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R, ¶13& 16, June 5, 1998 
[hereinafter WTO-WT/DS62/AB/R]. 
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Other examples of applying the principle of legitimate expectations appear in the DS 135 
case (the case of EC – Asbestos, the Panel report), the DS 231 case (the case of EC – Sardines, 
the Panel report), and the DS 269/286 case (the case of EC – Chicken cuts, the Appellate Body 
report). 
In the DS 27 case (the case of EC – Banana III), the EU relied on a general principle – that 
is, a claimant must normally have a legal right or interest in the claim it is pursuing – to cast 
doubts on the United States’ legitimate status as complainant. The EU’s argument is 
demonstrated by the Appellate Body report as follows: 
The European Communities argues that the Panel infringed Article 3.2 of the DSU by finding that 
the United States has a right to advance claims under the GATT 1994. The European Communities 
asserts that, as a general principle, in any system of law, including international law, a claimant 
must normally have a legal right or interest in the claim it is pursuing. … 
According to the European Communities, treaty law is a “method of contracting out of general 
international law.” Therefore, the WTO Agreement must contain a rejection of the requirement of a 
legal interest or an acceptance of the notion of action popularis506 in order to conclude that the 
WTO dispute settlement system set aside the requirement of a legal interest. The absence of such an 
express rule in the DSU or in the other covered agreements indicates that general international law 
must be applied.507 
Moreover, the reference to the principle of good faith ppears in the DS 135 case (the Panel 
report) and the DS 231 case (the Panel report). In both of those cases, the EU relied on the 
principle of good faith in trade relations, including a particular “application of this general 
principle, the application widely known as the doctrine of abus de droit, [which] prohibits the 
abusive exercise of a state’s rights and enjoins that w enever the assertion of a right ‘impinges 
on the field covered by [a] treaty obligation, it must be exercised bona fide, that is to say, 
reasonably.”508  
To sum up, the WTO cases involving the EC as respondent highlight some particular EC 
                                                 
506 “In Roman law, an actio popularis was an action that could be brought by an individual on behalf of the 
public interest. This amounts to objective enforcement of law by an individual action.” Anne van Aaken, Making 
International Human Rights Protection More Effective: A Rational-Choice Approach to the Effectiveness of 
Provisions For Ius Standi, n INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Stefan Voigt, Max Albert, Dieter 
Schmidtchen ed.) 29, 37 (2006). 
507 WTO-WT/DS27/AB/R, supra note 494, ¶15 & 16. 
508 WTO, Principles and Concepts of General Public International Law, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/repertory_e/p3_e.htm, last visited on July 7, 2011.  
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practices or ideologies. These ideologies relate to fundamental methods of interpreting the WTO 
agreements, the understanding of the relationship between trade preferences in the FTAs and 
multilateralism (especially MFN treatment), and thegeneral principles of law applied by the EU 
in implementing its WTO obligations,   
C. Legal Tradition and Culture 
In the following paragraphs, I will look into the EU’s legal tradition and culture for the 
roots of the above practices or ideologies of the EU in implementing its WTO obligations.  
1. Interpretation of international agreements 
The methods adopted by the EU for interpreting WTO agreement are consistent with the 
techniques commonly used in EU legal and judicial pr ctice more generally for the interpretation 
of legal texts. These techniques include, most prominently, literal interpretation, logical 
interpretation, and teleological interpretation. Under the first of these techniques, where an EU 
court (for example, the ECJ) finds that the terms of the text  
are clear and unambiguous, it adopts the literal interpretation … The next interpretative principle is 
the logical interpretation of the text, wherein theCourt will consider the provision within the 
context of the system. In considering previous judicial interpretations on a provision, the Court may 
also consider adopting the teleological interpretation, which, although literal to a certain extent, 
focuses on the intention of the legislature in the light of the conditions prevailing at the time of the 
judgment.509 
The general EU techniques of legal interpretation derive from the methods of legal 
interpretation in its Member States. As pointed out by Cruz, the civil law approaches to legal 
interpretation include grammatical/literal interpretation,510 the logical interpretation,511 the 
legislative history approach,512 and the teleological approach.513 The applicability of this array 
                                                 
509 Cruz, supra note 471, at 171. 
510 Grammatical/literal interpretation refers to the so-called plain meaning. “If the words of the statue ar  
ambiguous, then all legal systems need to consider the permissible methods of determining the ‘proper construction’ 
of the statute in order to give effect to the legislat ve intention.” Id. at 275. 
511 The logical interpretation refers to “constru[ing] the legislative provision not only on its stated trms, but 
within the context of the entire body of rules comprising the legal system, derived from the same statute, in other 
laws or from recognised general principles of law.” Id  at 276. 
512 The legislative history approach refers to “seek[ing] to ascertain the legislative intention by embarking on 
research into the legislative history of the statute…It appears that this is an approach that is pursued very much 
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of techniques for legal interpretation has also been confirmed by René David and Henry P. De 
Vries.514 
Naturally, the civil law approach described above would have little applicability to the UK, 
another EU member. However, similarity in interpretation methods can also be observed 
between continental law and English common law. In the common law tradition, 
[t]he three main traditional aids to interpretation are the literal rule, the golden rule and the mischief 
rule. These have always been subject to a court’s perce tion of ‘the intention of Parliament’, that is, 
what Parliament intended to achieve or address in passing that provision. Another very important 
factor, which is increasingly being taken into account, is the context of a statute.515 
Legal interpretation may be reviewed as part of a larger context of arguments made by (and 
to) courts in support of particular outcomes to disputes. Some common types of such arguments, 
as found in different legal systems, are enumerated by one source as follows: 
Apart from these similarities, no less than 11 basic types of ‘judicial argument’ have been identified 
by Summers and Taruffo (1991) as being frequently used by higher courts in all three major types of 
legal system: (1) ‘ordinary meaning’ arguments; (2) ‘technical meaning’ arguments; (3) contextual 
arguments; (4) arguments based on precedents; (5) statutory interpretation by analogy; (6) legal 
concept arguments; (7) arguments based on general legal principles; (8) historical/evolutionary 
arguments; (9) statutory purpose arguments; (10) substantive reasoning arguments; and (11) 
legislative intention arguments.516 
Many of these types of judicial arguments, such as (1), (3), (4), (6), (7), (8), and (9), have 
been adopted by the EU in its arguments in front of the DSB, as enumerated in the preceding 
paragraphs. 
                                                                                                                                                
more in civil law countries than in common law jurisdictions.” Id. at 277. 
513 The teleological approach refers to “seek[ing] to interpret the legislative text within the context of 
contemporary conditions. In other words, it presupposes the need to extend the application of a legislative provision 
beyond the scope of prior legislative intent, and to adapt it to rapidly changing social or economic conditions.” Id. at 
278.  
514 René David & Henry P. De Vries, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS 
101 (1958). 
515 Cruz, supra note 471, at 279. “English judges tend to emphasise the predominance of the ‘ordinary meaning’ 
of the words and would generally not be prepared to look at the statutory purpose of a statute or any other policies 
or rationales unless there is some ambiguity in the words used. The ‘golden rule approach’ refers to the principle 
that a judge may depart from the clear meaning of a statute if the result would otherwise be absurd or impractical.” 
Id. 
516 Id. at 294. The three major types of legal system referr d to here (dating back to 1991) are civil law, 
common law, and socialist law. 
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In comparison, the Chinese legal system gives much more attention to authorization of 
interpretation than to principles of interpretation. The Legislation Law provides that the 
Standing Committee of the NPC enjoys the power to interpret law.517 It is evident that Chinese 
legal system which lacks definite or solid principles of legal interpretation seems to be incapable 
of relying on various approaches in interpreting inter ational agreements as the EU has done. 
One scholar describes China’s interpretation of international legal system as “a way to shed light 
on surface appearances of textual interpretation.”518 
2. Trade preferences and multilateralism 
The EU expressed its attitude toward the relationship between regionalism (or regional 
trade preferences) and multilateralism in the proposal f July 9, 2002 on regional trade 
agreements. According to the EU, regional trade agrements must be “stepping stones” rather 
than “stumbling blocks” towards multilateral liberaliz tion, and that regionalism and 
multilateralism must be mutually supportive rather than contradictive.519 This ideology has also 
been confirmed by EU arguments in WTO trade disputes, as introduced above. 
Driven by this firm belief in the role of regionalism and the fundamental status of trade 
preferences in the overall context of multilateralism, “[a] key feature of EU commercial policy 
[becomes] the combination of regionalism and multilateralism: on the one hand, the Union has 
been a strong supporter of multilateral trade rules; on the other, it has developed the most 
                                                 
517 Articles 42-47 of the Legislation Law of the PRC. This law further prescribes two circumstances that will 
call for the Committee’s interpretation: (1) the specific meaning of a provision needs to be further defined; and (2) 
after its enactment, new developments make it necessary to define the basis on which to apply the law.Article 42 of 
the Legislation Law of the PRC. 
Chinese jurisprudence commonly divides authoritative interpretation into three categories: legislative, 
administrative, and judicial. Generally speaking, “legislative interpretation means interpretation given by legislative 
authorities on laws and rules issued by themselves; administrative interpretation refers interpretations given by 
administrative authorities on these rules and regulations; and judicial interpretations are those issued by the 
Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procurat rate in their judicial and procuratorial work.” 
Chen-Transformation, supra note 260, at 106-107. 
“[L]egislative interpretation has the greatest weight, while judicial interpretation appears to have th least, and 
administrative interpretation falls somewhere in the middle.” Vai lo Lo & Xiaowen Tian, LAW AND INVESTMENT IN 
CHINA: THE LEGAL AND BUSINESS ENVIRONMENTS AFTER WTO ACCESSION 14 (2005). 
518 Pitman B. Potter, China and the International Law System: Challenges of Participation, in CHINA’S LEGAL 
SYSTEM: NEW DEVELOPMENTS, NEW CHALLENGES (Donald C. Clarke ed.) 145, 161 (2008). 
519 EU-TN/RL/W/14, supra note 465.  
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extensive network of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) of any GATT/WTO member.”520  
Such a complex regime of trade preferences adopted by the EU put one of the most 
important mandates of the WTO – the MFN treatment – at the bottom. The EU “pyramid of trade 
preferences” comprises five tiers: (1) membership to the EU; (2) association agreements, which 
involve the creation of a Customs Union or an FTA between the EU and the trading partner, as 
well as common rules on non-trade issues; (3) free trade areas between the EU and various 
trading partners; (4) non-reciprocal preferences granted by the EU to developing countries under 
the Generalized System of Preference (GSP); and (5) MFN treatment.521 Evidently, MFN 
treatment is at the bottom of this pyramid, which means that all four other types of trade 
preferences prevail over MFN treatment. And only nine countries (Australia, Canada, 
Taiwai,China, Hong Kong, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Singapore and the USA) 
export to the EU under MFN treatment.522 This approach, on the one hand, demonstrates the 
EU’s attitude toward the relationship between regionalism (or regional trade preferences) and 
multilateralism, and on the other hand, increases th  possibility of trade disputes.  
3. Legal principles 
Most principles frequently resorted by the EU in its argument before the DSB have their 
origins in the civil law tradition. For example, the principle of good faith appearing in the DS 
135 and DS 231 cases has its roots in the civil law tr dition. The following excerpt provides an 
account of the origin of this principle: 
Good faith or bona fides is very difficult to define. Most scholars agree, however, that it has three 
constitutive moral elements: (1) honesty, (2) fairness, and (3) reason.... 
The concept of good faith originated in Roman law, where it gave the judge an equitable discretion 
to decide a case brought before him according to what seemed to be reasonable and fair. Thus, bona 
fides associated with trustworthiness and honorable conduct permitted the judge to denounce 
breaches of good faith by taking into consideration he particularities of each case. As such, bona 
fides has affected the entire civil legal family. Despite the fact that modern civil systems vary to 
some extent, the general concept of b na fides constitutes in this legal family one of the most 
                                                 
520 Mario Telò, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 163 (2009). 
521 Id. at 163-165. 
522 Id. at 165. 
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important abstract rules.523 
Legal principles are widely resorted to in “domestic” judicature of the EU, which can 
account for the EU’s frequent invocation of principles in its arguments at the multilateral level. 
Such domestic application of principles – focusing o  those of proportionality, equal treatment, 
and legitimate expectations – is analyzed in detail in section IV of this chapter.  
To sum up this section, we can observe that the practices or ideologies in respect of the 
EU’s implementation of its WTO obligations have their roots in the EU legal tradition and 
culture, especially its own approaches to interpreting international agreements and to prioritizing 
regional trade references in a multilateral context. The practices of the EU to apply general 
principles of law in adjudication will be further elaborated in section IV of this chapter.       
III.  “Domestic” Legislation on Trade 
Having looked at the EU’s practice in the context of international trade negotiations and 
international trade disputes, we turn now to another context for the indigenization of WTO law 
in the EU: “domestic” legislation on trade. 
A. Overview 
According to a report on Trade Policy Review released by the WTO in 2009,524 EU trade 
policy is formulated and implemented by means of two ypes of legislation. One is legislation at 
primary level – that is, treaties and other agreements of similar status. The Common Commercial 
Policy (CCP) the EC enacts and implements belongs to the legislation at primary level. The 
other is legislation at secondary level, which comprises (i) regulations (with general application) 
that are binding and directly applicable in all Member States, (ii) directives (requiring 
transposition into national law and practice), (iii) decisions (binding upon their addressees), and 
(iv) recommendations and opinions which are based on treaties but do not have binding force.525 
                                                 
523 Mitchell & Powell, supra note 6, at 39. 
524 WTO, Trade Policy Review – European Communities, WT/TPR/S/214, ¶8, March 2, 2009 [hereinafter 
WTO-WT/TPR/S/214]. 
525 Id. ¶8. 
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According to Borchardt, the sources of European Union law include: (1) primary legislation 
(Union treaties, general principles of law); (2) the EU’s international agreements; (3) secondary 
legislation (legislative actions [regulations, directives, decisions]; non-legislative acts [delegated 
acts, implementing acts]; other acts [recommendations and opinions, inter-institutional 
agreements, resolutions, declarations and action prgrams]); (4) general principles of law; and (5) 
conventions between the member states (Coreper decisions526 and international agreements).527  
In the EU, trade regulations are a constituent of the CCP.528 The CCP covers trade issues 
relating to exports, imports, commercial defense, and community statistics. Regulations on 
exports can be further classified into regulations  common rules for exports, dual-use items, 
export credit insurance, export of cultural goods, and the ban on trade in instruments of torture. 
Regulations on imports can be further grouped into regulations on common rules for imports, 
common rules for imports from certain non-EU Member countries, the EU procedure for 
administering quantitative quotas, and trade in seal products. In the EU, anti-dumping measures, 
anti-subsidy measures, and protection against foreign trade barriers are featured as “trade 
defence.” A list of EU basic regulation on trade appears in Appendix 5.3.  
Moreover, the CCP covers schemes of preferences, generalized tariff preferences, aid for 
trade in developing countries, fair trade and non-gvernmental trade-related sustainability 
assurance schemes, agricultural commodities, dependnce and poverty, the International Coffee 
Agreement 2007, global partnership for sustainable development, integration of the 
environmental dimension in developing countries, and promoting corporate social responsibility. 
                                                 
526 Article 16 (7) TEU establishes the Coreper, “a committee consisting of the Permanent Representatives of 
the Member States shall be responsible for preparing the work of the Council.” Coreper plays a pivotal role in the 
Community decision-making system, where it is a forum for both dialogue (between the permanent representatives 
and between each of them and their capital) and political control (orientation and supervision of the work of the 
groups of experts). The European Commission, available t 
http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/stepbystep/glossary_en.htm, last visited on October 1, 2011. 
527 Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, THE ABC OF EUROPEAN LAW 80 (2010). 
528 For an introduction of the development of the CCP, see Telò, supra note 520, at 156-159.   
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B. WTO Law in “Domestic” Context and Characteristics of 
“Domestic” Legislation 
1. WTO law in “domestic” context 
The Council regulation (EC) No. 1225/2009 which presc ibes anti-dumping rules expresses 
the EU’s attitude toward the relationship between the EU trade regulations and the WTO 
agreements. In short, as demonstrated by the following excerpt from the prologue, the aim of the 
EU regulations is to ensure a proper and transparent pplication of pertinent WTO rules:  
… 
(3) The agreement on dumping, namely, the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1994 Anti-Dumping 
Agreement”), contains detailed rules… In order to ensure a proper and transparent application of 
those rules, the language of the agreement should be brought into Community legislation as far as 
possible. (emphasis added) 
Similarly, in the prologue of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 579/2009 on countervailing 
measures, the aim of this EU regulation to implement and supplement pertinent WTO 
agreements is identified: 
… 
(4) In order to reach greater transparency and effectiveness in the application by the Community of 
the rules laid down in the 1994 Anti-Dumping Agreement and the Subsidies Agreement respectively, 
the adoption of two separate Regulations which would lay down in sufficient detail the requirements 
for the application of each of these commercial defence instruments has been considered as 
necessary…. (emphasis added) 
(20) Even though the Subsidies Agreement does not contain provisions concerning circumvention of 
countervailing measures, the possibility of such circumvention exists…. It appears therefore 
appropriate to enact an anti-circumvention provision in this Regulation. 
The above excerpts from the prologues of the EU’s trade regulations have conveyed the 
attitude of the EU with regard to the relationship between the WTO agreements and its 
“domestic” trade regulations – that is, “domestic” rade regulations aim largely to implement the 
WTO agreements and serve as the implementation guidance in enforcing the EU’s WTO 
obligations. 
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2. Characteristics of “domestic” legislation 
Some characteristics of EU legislation on external trade can be observed. Two 
characteristics highlighted here are (i) the principle of subsidiarity, and power distribution more 
generally, and (ii) the structure and style of the legislation. 
a. Distribution of legislative power  
Generally speaking, “[t]he EU may act only within the powers that are assigned to it by its 
founding Treaties (Art 5(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)). The Member States retain 
competence over any matter to which jurisdiction has not been assigned to the EU by the 
Treaties (Arts 4(1), 5(2), TEU). The Member States must exercise their retained powers 
consistently with EU law.”529 The exercise of power by the EU is subject to the principle of 
subsidiarity. Subsidiarity is defined as follows: “in areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and 
local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or ffects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved at Union level.” (Art 5(3) TEU) 
The Union has exclusive competence in legislation on the issues covered by the CCP, 
including trade. Furthermore, it “may authorize theM mber States to make laws regarding these 
matters (Art 2(1) TEU).”530 In effect, the Union has exercised this discretion by authorizing the 
Member States to enact trade-related rules. For example, the Member States have been 
authorized to (1) lay down the rules on penalties for infringements of the regulation on trade in 
seal products,531 (2) introduce additional national legislation to pr hibit or impose an 
authorization requirement for dual-use items;532 and (3) establish effective, proportionate and 
                                                 
529 Moens & Trone, supra note 470, at 26. 
530 Id.  
531 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 
2009 on Trade in Seal Products, Art 6. 
532 Council Regulation (EC) No. 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 Setting up A Community Regime for the Control of 
Exports, Transfer, Brokering and Transit of Dual-use Items, Art 4. 
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dissuasive penalties for infringements of the regulation on export of cultural goods.533 
b. Style of legislation 
The basic regulations on trade usually have very strong preambles, which contain a large 
number of recitals relating to legal basis, background, principles, and purposes of the regulations. 
For example, Council Regulation (EC) No. 1225/2009 [on protection against dumped imports 
from countries not members of the European Community], which contains 34 recitals, clarifies 
its legal basis. According to the preamble, the legal basis of the regulation rests on the Treaty 
establishing the European Union (particularly Article 133) and Council Regulation (EC) No. 
1234/2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets, and on specific 
provisions for certain agricultural products. The prologue reviews the background of the need to 
codify Council Regulation (EC) No. 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped 
imports from countries not members of the European Community, and the context of GATT 
1994 and the 1994 Anti-dumping Agreement.534  
To sum up this subsection, the EU’s “domestic” trade regulations aim to establish 
implementation guidance of its WTO obligations. Although China and the United States also 
bring their domestic legislation to the consistency with the WTO agreements largely, neither of 
them has expressed definitely the “subordinate” statu  of their domestic law to the WTO law, 
partially out of the sovereign concern. In “domestic” rade regulations, it is obvious that the 
authority to enact trade regulations is centralized in the Union but can be entrusted to its member 
states. Furthermore, the EU trade regulations are subject to a wide range of principles and 
                                                 
533 Council Regulation (EC) No. 116/2009 of 18 December 2008 on the Export of Cultural Goods, Art 9. 
534 Examples of the multiple purposes of this regulation (i.e., Council Regulation (EC) No. 1234/2007) as 
expressed in the prologue, include: to lay down clear and detailed rules on the calculation of normal value, to define 
the export price and to enumerate the adjustments which are to be made in those cases, to list the factors which may 
affect prices and price comparability and to lay down specific rules as to when and how the adjustments should be 
made, to lay down clear and detailed guidance as tothe factors which may be relevant for the determinatio  of 
whether the dumped imports have caused material injury or are threatening to cause injury, to lay down who may 
lodge an anti-dumping complaint, to lay down the manner in which interested parties should be given notice of the 
information which the authorities require, and should have ample opportunity to present all relevant evid nce and to 
defend their interests, to lay down the conditions u der which provisional duties may be imposed, to specify 
procedures for accepting undertakings which eliminate dumping and injury instead of imposing provisional or 
definitive duties, to provide for retroactive collection of provisional duties if that is deemed appropriate, and to 
define the circumstances which may trigger the retroactive application of duties to avoid the undermining of the 
definitive measures to be applied, and to provide provisions to deal with circumvention. 
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prerequisites set in the prologues.  
C. Legal Tradition and Culture 
The features of the EU’s “domestic” legislation on trade may also find their roots in the 
EU’s legal tradition and culture.  
1. Concept of the legal rule 
As explained in the beginning of this chapter, the EU legal culture is a “hybrid” one, with 
the dominant influence from the civil law tradition. Therefore, some examination of the notion 
of law or of a legal rule in the EU’s Member States can help us understand the style of 
legislation the EU uses in its trade relations. Thebasic notion of law under the French legal 
system is different from which is typical in common law countries, as pointed out by one 
authority on the subject:    
… [A] Frenchman and French lawyers have a much broader view of the meaning of the word ‘law’ 
than the typical English or common law lawyer, who sees it as mainly linked to the possibility of a 
court action. The French conception of law comprises: … all the rules devised to establish the 
structures of society and to regulate people’s conduct, and these include many which cannot give 
rise to an action in the courts but are none the less basic to the organization of the State.535  
The differences in the French and English concepts of law or legal rules are also addressed 
by another scholar: 
[In France,] the law is not essentially judges’ law, but rather a law of jurists and the universities. 
French law has an aversion to case studies and seeks clarity by looking beyond the decisions in 
particular cases to the principles proclaimed by the legislator and legal writers. What the English 
call a legal rule the French regard as the disposition of a dispute. Rules only exist at a higher level of 
abstraction. The very concept of rule implies generality – abstraction.  
For a Frenchmen, the English jurist’s legal rule is nothing but an isolated judicial decision; it is not a 
règle juridique. For an Englishman, the French jurist’s règle juridique is not a legal rule. It does not
have the precision that is the essence of such a rule. Rather, it is a legal principle.536 
The differences in the French and English concepts of the legal rule lead to dissimilar 
legislation techniques in the French and English legal systems. In short, an English statute will 
                                                 
535 Cruz, supra note 471, at 70. 
536 Liebesny, supra note 6, at 49. 
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deal explicitly with particular problems. A French statute will go into less detail. In the French 
system, articles which embody general legal rules ar  referred to as “principles.” 
… [An] English statute will necessarily deal explicit y with particular problems. A French statute 
will go into less detail, will give the judge more discretion, will not try to foresee all problems, and 
may include general formulae that to a Common lawyer se m to negate its effects as law and made 
it more a general principle than a command…. 
If the Common lawyer finds a decision on a particular point that interests him, he feels that he has 
finally found the legal rule…. For the Frenchman, the statutory text has a very different value, for in 
such texts the legal rule to be followed is always found.537 
Apparently, the concept of law or the legal rule in civil law tradition has had a heavier 
influence on EU law than that in common law tradition has had. Principled, abstract, and 
systemic thinking has helped bring EU legislation t its current style, with a strong emphasis on 
legal basis, on background, on principles, and on principles in prologues. 
2. EU law and national law 
Through the study of the preambles of the EU’s basic regulations on trade, we can observe 
that one of their fundamental purposes is to increase clarification and practicability of their 
founding agreements or regulations. This effort makes it sensible to characterize these basic 
regulations more as “domestic” law than as regional accords. The possibility of achieving this 
goal of “clarification and practicability” relies heavily on the supremacy of EU law over the 
national law of on its Member States as well as its nature of direct application. 
As pointed out by Cruz, no matter whether the constitution of a Member State adopts (1) 
monism, which accepts that international law obligations are of the same nature as, or are even 
superior to, national law obligations (such as the French and Dutch constitutions) or (2) dualism, 
under which only limited status is given to rules of international law until or unless it is 
transformed into national law by some method of natio l enactment (such as in the British 
government practices), EU law has supremacy over national law within its jurisdiction.538 
Furthermore, the relationship between EU law and natio l law is based on “a concept that 
                                                 
537 Id. at 49-50. 
538 See Cruz, supra note 471, at 142-143. 
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suggests that, in the appropriate case, Community law is directly applicable to national law and 
can thereby create rights in favor of individuals, which national courts must protect.” The direct 
application of EEC treaty has been confirmed by the ECJ, whose observations are quoted below: 
The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a Common Market, the functioning of which 
is of direct concern to interested parties in the Community, implies that this Treaty is more than an 
agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the contracting States.  
…The Treaty has created in each of the member States, whose constitutional law relating to the 
internal effect of international obligations differs widely, rules of substantive law that were 
enforceable by private individuals. …539 
The significance of the relationship between the EU law and domestic laws of its Member 
States – that is, the EU law can be applied directly by domestic adjudication within individual 
states – lies in that this adoption of monism within t e regional organization can guarantee a 
thorough implementation of the EU law and avoid the second time of absorption of WTO 
obligations into domestic legal systems of Member States, a path of WTO-agreements-the EU 
regulations-domestic trade laws that would complicate the process of absorption of the WTO 
agreements into national law, at the potential risk of bringing out more inconsistencies between 
them .  
IV.   “Domestic” Adjudication of Trade Issues 
The administration and adjudication of EU trade regulations constitutes another source that 
demonstrates how the EU has accommodated its multilateral obligations within its legal tradition 
and culture. After identifying the administrative and judicial organs in which the relevant cases 
arise, I will explain below the key characteristics of such cases and their outcomes, and then 
examine how they are influenced by legal tradition and culture. 
A. Overview 
“Domestic” adjudication of trade issues within the EU has demonstrated a variety of 
                                                 
539 NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratis der 
Belastingen (commonly just referred to as Van Gend en Loos). Judgment of the Court of February 5, 1963. Case 
26-62.  
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features deeply rooted in the EU’s legal tradition and culture. The following paragraphs give an 
overview of the administration and adjudication of trade regulations within the Union. 
1. Administrative organs 
Generally speaking, the Commission and the Council of the EU exercise administrative 
power over trade issues. The following excerpt gives a brief introduction of the administration of 
trade regulations: 
In trade policy, the Commission, mandated by the Council and in consultation with a Council 
committee of high-level trade officials called the ‘Trade Policy Committee’, has responsibility for 
negotiating and managing trade agreements involving tariff amendments, customs and trade 
provisions and protective measures.540 
The functions of the Commission with regard to trade include: (1) defining EU interests, (2) 
negotiating agreements on behalf of EU member states, (3) monitoring implementation of 
international agreements, (4) acting as liaison with other departments within the Commission 
with a trade dimension (environmental, competition, agriculture, etc.), and (5) informing the 
public.541 
2. Courts 
The ECJ and the General Court exercise jurisdiction over trade cases. Neither of them is a 
specialized court on trade. One source explaining the operations of the Court of Justice 
summarizes its overall purpose as follows: 
The Court of Justice (ECJ) interprets EU law to make sure it is applied in the same way in all EU 
countries. It also settles legal disputes between EU governments and EU institutions. Individuals, 
companies or organisations can also bring cases before the Court if they feel their rights have been 
infringed by an EU institution.542 
As explained in another source,543 the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice covers: (1) 
                                                 
540 Council of the European Union, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showpage.aspx?id=1848&lang=en, last visited on July 27, 2011.  
541 Andreas Staab, THE EUROPEAN UNION EXPLAINED: INSTITUTIONS, ACTORS, GLOBAL IMPACT 140 (2008). 
542 The Court of Justice of the European Union, available t 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-jus ice/index_en.htm, last visited on July 27, 2011.  
543 See the Court of Justice, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7024/, last visited on July 27, 
2011. 
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references for preliminary rulings,544 (2) actions for failure to fulfil obligations,545 (3) actions 
for annulment,546 (4) actions for failure to act,547 (5) appeals,548 and (6) reviews.549 
The ECJ gains assistance from another institution – the General Court. “To help the Court 
of Justice cope with the large number of cases brought before it…, a ‘General Court’ deals with 
cases brought forward by private individuals, companies and some organisations, and cases 
relating to competition law.”550 
                                                 
544 The Court of Justice cooperates with all the courts of the Member States, which are the ordinary courts in 
matters of European Union law. To ensure the effectiv  and uniform application of European Union legislation and 
to prevent divergent interpretations, the national courts may, and sometimes must, refer to the Court of Justice and 
ask it to clarify a point concerning the interpretation of EU law, so that they may ascertain, for example, whether 
their national legislation complies with that law. A reference for a preliminary ruling may also seek the review of the 
validity of an act of EU law. See the Court of Justice, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7024/, last 
visited on July 27, 2011. 
545 These actions enable the Court of Justice to determin  whether a Member State has fulfilled its obligations 
under European Union law. See the Court of Justice, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7024/, last 
visited on July 27, 2011. 
546 By an action for annulment, the applicant seeks the annulment of a measure (in particular a regulation, 
directive or decision) adopted by an institution, body, office or agency of the European Union. The Court f Justice 
has exclusive jurisdiction over actions brought by a Member State against the European Parliament and/or against 
the Council (apart from Council measures in respect of State aid, dumping and implementing powers) or br ught by 
one European Union institution against another. The General Court has jurisdiction, at first instance, in all other 
actions of this type and particularly in actions brought by individuals. See the Court of Justice, avail ble at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7024/, last vii ed on July 27, 2011. 
547 These actions enable the lawfulness of the failure of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the 
European Union to act to be reviewed. However, such an action may be brought only after the institution c ncerned 
has been called on to act. Where the failure to act is held to be unlawful, it is for the institution concerned to put an 
end to the failure by appropriate measures. Jurisdict on to hear actions for failure to act is shared b tween the Court 
of Justice and the General Court according to the same criteria as for actions for annulment. See the Court of Justice, 
available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_70 4/, last visited on July 27, 2011. 
548 Appeals on points of law only may be brought befor the Court of Justice against judgments and orders of 
the General Court. If the appeal is admissible and well founded, the Court of Justice sets aside the judgment of the 
General Court. See the Court of Justice, available t http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7024/., last visited on July 
27, 2011. 
549 Decisions of the General Court on appeals against decisions of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal 
may, in exceptional circumstances, be reviewed by the Court of Justice as provided in the Protocol on the Statute of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union. See the Court of Justice, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7024/, last vii ed on July 27, 2011. 
550 THE Court of Justice, available at http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice/index_en.htm, 
last visited on July 27, 2011. The General Court has jurisdiction to hear a wide range of cases. They include: (1) 
direct actions brought by natural or legal persons against acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the 
European Union (which are addressed to them or are of direct and individual concern to them) and against 
regulatory acts (which concern them directly and which do not entail implementing measures) or against a failure to 
act on the part of those institutions, bodies, offices or agencies; for example, a case brought by a company against a 
Commission decision imposing a fine on that company; (2) actions brought by the Member States against the 
Commission; (3) actions brought by the Member States gainst the Council relating to acts adopted in the field of 
State aid, ‘dumping' and acts by which it exercises mplementing powers; (4) actions seeking compensation for 
damage caused by the institutions of the European Union or their staff; (5) actions based on contracts made by the 
European Union which expressly give jurisdiction to the General Court; (6) actions relating to Community 
trademarks; (7) appeals, limited to points of law, gainst the decisions of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal; 
and (8) actions brought against decisions of the Community Plant Variety Office or of the European Chemicals 
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B. Characteristics 
Perhaps one of the most noteworthy characteristics of the operations of administrative and 
judicial organs in the EU system is their level of s phistication and complexity. As detailed 
below, that system has matured into a highly developed regime of rules and procedures – most of 
them having applicability to matters concerning inter ational trade. 
1. Form of determinations on trade defence 
The determinations on matters relating to trade defnce551 made by the EU’s administrative 
agencies (the Commission and the Council) – such as t ose on initiating investigation and 
imposing, amending, or terminating definitive antidumping duties, countervailing duties or 
safeguard guarantee – take the form of regulations which have legally binding effect within the 
EU. Therefore, individuals, companies, associations, r tate governments can bring actions for 
annulment against such regulations in front of the Union courts. We may recall that in both 
China and the United States, the determinations on trade defence take the form of administrative 
rather legal documents.  
2. Judicial protection of individual rights 
The uniqueness of judicial protection of individual rights provided by the EU is reflected in 
the fact that individuals are entitled to challenge th  basic (abstract) regulations enacted by the 
Union. “Article 241 [of the European Community Treaty] includes the ability of an individual to 
challenge a regulation adopted by the institutions j intly or singly.”552 In the European Court of 
Justice and the General Court, the number of cases that were initiated by individuals, companies 
or associations overwhelms the number of cases brought by the governments of Member States. 
Case C-26/00 Kingdom of the Netherlands v Commission [2005] and Case C-284/94 Kingdom of 
Spain v Council [1998] are two examples of the small number of cases initiated by the 
                                                                                                                                                
Agency. The General Court, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7033/, last visited on July 27, 2011. 
551 It will be recalled from the discussion in subsection IIIA, above, that in the EU, anti-dumping measures, 
anti-subsidy measures, and protection against foreign trade barriers are classified as “trade defence.” 
552 Kirk W. Junker, Conference Conclusions “. . . and beyond”: Judicial Review in the European Union, 45 
Duq. L. Rev. 599, 606 (2007). 
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governments of Member States. 
Not only the regulations containing specific decision , such as those imposing definitive 
AD duties, but also basic regulations of the Union ca be challenged in front of the courts. In 
Case T-45/06 Reliance Industries Ltd v Council and Commission [2008], the applicant applied 
for the annulment of Article 11(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 
on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community 
(OJ 1996 L 56, p. 1) and Article 18(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2026/97 of 6 October 
1997 on protection against subsidised imports from c untries not members of the European 
Community (OJ 1997 L 288, p. 1). 
3. Types of actions 
In a more general context, there are five types of actions that can be brought to the ECJ: (1) 
preliminary ruling proceedings, (2) proceedings for failure to fulfill an obligation, (3) actions for 
annulment, (4) actions for failure to act, and (5) direct actions for compensation.553 
As to trade issues, three of these five types of actions have been resorted to frequently: 
actions for annulment, direct actions, and preliminary rulings. Of those three, actions for 
annulment are most frequently brought. Case C-452/98 Nederlandse Antillen v Council [2001] 
and Case T-462/04 HEG Ltd and Graphite India Ltd v Council [2008] are examples. In these 
actions, the applicants urge the courts to annul or partially annul regulations imposing, amending, 
or terminating certain trade measures.  
If the applicants assert that the regulations at issue have caused injury to them, they can 
bring direct actions for compensation, such as in Case T-364/03 Medici Grimm KG v Council 
[2006] and Case T-429/04 Trubowest Handel GmbH and Viktor Makarov v Council [2008]. In 
the former case, action was filed for damage allegedly suffered by the applicant at a result of the 
absence of retroactive effect of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2380/98 of 3 November 1998, 
amending Regulation (EC) No. 1567/97 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
                                                 
553 The Court of Justice, available at http://europa.eu/ bout-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice/index_n.htm, 
last visited on July 27, 2011. 
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leather handbags originating the People’s Republic of China (OJ 1998 L 296, p.1), partly 
annulled by the judgment of the Court of First Instance of 29 June 2000 in Case T-7/99 Medici 
Grimm v Council [2000] ECR II-2671. 
In the latter case, application for compensation was brought in respect of the damage 
allegedly suffered by reason of the adoption of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2320/97 of 17 
November 1997 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain seamless pipes 
and tubes of iron or non-alloy steel originating in Hungary, Poland, Russia, the Czech Republic, 
Romania and the Slovak Republic, repealing Regulation (EEC) No. 1189/93 and terminating the 
proceeding in respect of such imports originating in the Republic of Croatia (OJ 1997 L 322, 
p.1) 
If national tribunals or courts have encountered some difficulties in understanding EU law, 
they can request preliminary rulings for interpreting pertinent regulations. This was done in Case 
C-230/98, submitted by the Tribunale Civile e Penal di Treviso, Italy, on the interpretation of 
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 545/92 of February 3,1992 concerning the arrangements 
applicable to the import into the Community of products originating in the Republics of Croatia 
and Slovenia and the Yugoslav Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro 
(OJ 1992 L 63, p. 1)554 and Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 859/92 of  April 3,1992 laying 
down detailed rules governing imports of 'baby-beef‘ originating in the Republics of Croatia and 
Slovenia and the Yugoslav Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, as 
well as in Case C-93/08, submitted by the Augstākās tiesas Senāta Administratīvo lietu 
departaments (Latvia), on the interpretation of Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No. 1383/2003 of  
July 22, 2003 concerning customs action against goods suspected of infringing certain 
intellectual property rights and the measures to be tak n against goods found to have infringed 
such rights (OJ 2003 L 196, p. 7).  
As indicated by the judgments released by the ECJ, the courts may dismiss the action, may 
uphold or partially uphold the application, or refer the case back to the General Court.  
                                                 
554 The abbreviation “OJ” represents the “Official Journal of the European Communities.” 
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4. Application of legal principles  
The applicants in actions before the EU courts can allege that the regulations at issue breach 
the general principles of EU law. The courts will, in response, give separate analysis as to 
whether such arguments will apply and prevail. On the grounds of the EU courts’ adjudicative 
practices, the general principles relating to cases of commercial policy that have been frequently 
invoked mainly comprise the principle of proportionality, the principle of equal treatment, and 
the principle of legitimate expectations. Specifically, the principle of proportionality is usually 
used in cases challenging the imposition and amount f antidumping or countervailing duties or 
safeguard measures. For example, the principle of proportionality was resorted to by the 
complainants invoked in Case T-97/95 Sinochem National Chemicals Import & Export 
Corporation v Council [1998] in which the applicant sought the annulment of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 95/95 of January 16, 1995 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of furfuraldehyde originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ 1995 L 15, p. 11), 
and argued that the imposition of such duties had breached the principle of proportionality. 
The principle of equal treatment is usually employed in cases complaining about different 
treatment of similar products. The principle of legitimate expectations was resorted to in Case 
T-401/06 Brosmann Footwear (HK) Ltd and others v Council [2010] in which the applicants 
applied for partial annulment of Council Regulation (EC) No 1472/2006 of  October 5, 2006 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitely the provisional duty imposed 
on imports of certain footwear with uppers of leather originating in the People’s Republic of 
China and Vietnam (OJ 2006 L 275, p. 1), and argued that the absence of a reaction from the 
Commission for a significant length of time had breached the principle of legitimate 
expectations.  
The principle of legitimate expectations emerges typically in cases relating to the 
administrative process of investigation or decision making. For example, it was invoked in Case 
C-150/94 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Council [1998] in which the 
applicants (1) urged annulment of Article 1(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 519/94 of 7 
March 1994 on common rules for imports from certain h rd countries and (2) sought the repeal 
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of Regulations (EEC) No.s 1765/82, 1766/82 and 3420/83 (OJ 1994 L 67, p. 89), in so far as the 
applied to toys falling within HS/CN Codes 9503 41,9503 49 and 9503 90. The applicants 
argued that different treatment on two similar types of products had breached the principle of 
equal treatment. 
5. Procedural rights 
The applicants can also complain about the infringement of their procedural rights by the 
Council or the Commission in their decision-making processes. In trade cases, these rights are 
mainly the right to a fair hearing and the right of defence. These rights, and claims of their 
infringements, usually relate to administrative process such as the release of information by the 
administrative organs, as complained about in Case -458/98 P Industrie des Poudres 
Sphériques v Council [2000] and Case T-249/06 Interpipe Niko Tube ZAT and Interpipe NTRP 
VAT v Council [2009]. 
6. Style of judgments 
Although the contents obviously are not identical in all judgments, the judgments do have a 
common style. Generally speaking, the judgments made by the Union courts include these 
features: background of the case (the parties, the facts, and the procedures before the action), 
relevant provisions, orders sought by the parties, arguments of the parties, findings of the Court, 
bearing on cost, and collective judgments. Moreover, th re is no dissenting opinion in such a 
judgment. 
7. Case law 
Typically, the judgments of the courts cite the outc mes of earlier cases that can support the 
findings or arguments of the courts. The intent for the Courts to refer to cases is to reemphasize 
the application of relevant principles or regulations as set forth in settled cases. For example, the 
Court cited cases in Case 180/00 Kingdom of the Netherlands v Commission [2005] to confirm 
the requirements of applying the principle of proportionality and in Case T-462/04 HEG Ltd and 
Graphite India Ltd v Council [2008] to clarify the application of the principle of equal treatment.  
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One authority has offered these observations about the use of case law in this setting: 
Although cases have grown in importance in interpreting the Codes and statutes, they are still 
primarily considered to be illustrations of general principles that are universally acknowledged, or 
illuminations of statutory provisions that embody such principles…. 
 [T]he ECJ appears to be developing a form of stare decisis that is broadly in accordance with 
English common law tradition, but which is not exercised in exactly the same manner as in 
contemporary English common law. Previously decided cases are relied upon in later cases, but the 
scope of their applicability may be extended or restricted in accordance with the particular 
circumstances.555  
8. Opinion of Advocates General 
The function of Advocates General is to give expert opinions to the ECJ, including opinions 
relating to trade cases. Although their opinions are not binding since “[t]he Treaty of Nice 
empowered the ECJ to rule without first hearing the opinion of the Advocate General,”556 the 
Court respects these opinions highly, taking in account the fact that, as of today, the decisions of 
the Court, so far as released, have not made different conclusions from those of the opinions. For 
example, all the judgments of Case C-230/98 (submitted by the Tribunale Civile e Penale di 
Treviso, Italy for a preliminary ruling), Case C-458/98 P Industrie des Poudres Sphériques v 
Council [2000], Case C-76/98 Ajinomoto Co., Inc. and NutraSweet Companyand v Council 
[2001], Case C-239/99 (submitted by the Finanzgericht Düsseldorf (Germany) for a preliminary 
ruling) adopted the opinions submitted by the Advocates General.  
9. Application of WTO agreements 
In the Case T-221/05 Huvis Corp v Council [2008], paragraphs 71 and 72 of the judgments 
clarify the principle regarding the application of WTO agreements in the Union courts. In short, 
the direct application of the WTO agreements is subject to strict conditions – either (1) the 
Community intends to implement a particular obligation assumed in the context of the WTO, or 
(2) the Community measure refers expressly to the precise provisions of the WTO agreements:  
It must be recalled at the outset that, according to se tled case-law, having regard to their nature and 
                                                 
555 Cruz, supra note 471, at 94. 
556 Roy H. Ginsberg, DEMYSTIFYING THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE ENDURING LOGIC OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
132 (2007). 
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structure, the WTO Agreements are not in principle among the rules in the light of which the 
Community Courts are to review the legality of measure  adopted by the Community institutions 
(Case C-76/00 P Petrotub and Republica v Council [2003] ECR I-79, paragraph 53; Case C-93/02 P 
Biret International v Council [2003] ECR I-10497, paragraph 52; and Ikea Wholesale, paragraph 
29). 
It is only where the Community intended to implement a particular obligation assumed in the 
context of the WTO, or where the Community measure ref rs expressly to the precise provisions of 
the WTO Agreements, that it is for the Community Courts to review the legality of the Community 
measure in question in the light of the WTO rules (Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council [1999] ECR 
I-8395, paragraph 49; Petrotub and Republica v Council, paragraph 54; Biret International v 
Council, paragraph 53; and Ikea Wholesale, paragraph 30).557 
To sum up, the direct application of WTO agreements in he Union Courts is very limited 
and subject to certain conditions, such as an explicit reference to definite WTO provisions by the 
Community measures.  
In this subsection, we observe some characteristics of “domestic” adjudication of trade 
issues within the EU, such as the issues of the form of determinations on trade defence, judicial 
protection of individual rights, types of actions, application of general principles of law, 
procedural rights, style of judgments, opinion of Advocates General, and direct application of 
WTO agreements. 
C. Legal Tradition and Culture 
As with our consideration of the other three contexts in which WTO law may be seen as 
having been indigenized into the EU system – trade negotiations, trade disputes, and “domestic” 
legislation – we close this chapter with an examinatio  of how European (and English) legal 
tradition and culture bear on the adjudication of trade matters within the EU system. 
1. Judicial review  
The EU Courts’ authority to inspect administrative determinations on trade defence is 
generally featured as judicial review. The wide coverage of the courts’ power of judicial review 
is conferred by Article 230 of the European Community Treaty, which provides that: 
                                                 
557 Judgment of The Court of First Instance (Third Chamber) on Case T-221/05 Huvis Corp v Council [2008], 
¶71 & 72, July 8, 2008.  
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The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts adopted jointly by the European Parliament and 
the Council, of acts of the Council, of the Commission and of the ECB [European Central Bank], 
other than recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the European Parliament intended to 
produce legal effects vis-a-vis third parties.558 
This scope is regarded because it covers review on any legally binding act as well as 
interpretation of EU law. As one observer explains, Article 234 of the treaty provides that the 
Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give prliminary rulings concerning (a) the 
interpretation of the treaty itself, (2) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of 
the Community and of the European Central Bank, and (3) the interpretation of the statutes of 
bodies established by an act of the Council, where those statutes so provide.559  
Moreover, Art 173 of the EEC Treaty (i.e., Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community560) “permits a natural or legal person to institute proceedings against a decision 
addressed to him or it. Article 173 confers jurisdiction on the Court to review the legality of Acts 
of the Council and the Commission other than ‘recommendations’ or ‘opinions’, and Art 173(1) 
enables parties to attack a Community Act on any one of four grounds: lack of competence, 
infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaty or of any rule of 
law relating to its application, or misuse of powers.”561 As one authority has explained,  
[t]hese four terms are borrowed from French administrative law and the grounds of annulment are 
similar to those developed by the French Conseil d’État as forms of ‘excès de pouvoir’, which leads 
to annulment in French administrative law.562 
The judicial review in the civil law tradition that serves as one of the origins of EU legal 
tradition and culture is described as a “diffuse system of judicial review,” which is explained in 
the following excerpt:  
The civil-law tradition is compatible with a diffuse system of judicial review – legal certainty will 
not be in ruins. Legal certainty can be more or less strongly cherished, however. In this regard, 
                                                 
558 EC Treaty, as amended by the 2003 Treaty of Nice. 
559 Junker, supra note 552, at 608. 
560 The EEC Treaty, signed in Rome in 1957, brings together France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries 
in a community whose aim is to achieve integration via trade with a view to economic expansion. After the Treaty 
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perhaps the civil-law tradition has given special weight to it. If the protection of legal certainty is to 
be maximized, the centralized model may be preferabl . By establishing a constitutional court that 
can be reached as soon as a statute raises constitutional problems, the centralized model safeguards 
legal certainty in a very straightforward manner. The sooner the constitutional court speaks, the 
more quickly any legal doubts will be dispelled.563 
This excerpt provides a clue for us to understand the comprehensive scope of judicial 
review in the EU, which, in turn, guarantees the fulfillment of its WTO obligations. The 
development of judicial review in the EU legal regime started since WWII, with the shift of the 
functions of constitutional courts in Europe. The constitutional courts in European countries 
“stopped being legislative organs and became more judicial institutions.” This fact constituted 
“an authentic ‘revolution’ in European legal tradition.” Furthermore, this transformation brought 
about “the introduction in countries with a continental legal tradition (civil law) of the 
Anglo-Saxon principle of stare decisis into the jurisdictional area. Thus, the new constitutional 
jurisdiction was not limited to comparing abstract norms. It also delved profoundly into matters 
when there were violations of norms, specifically in the case of fundamental rights, by 
examining appeals for legal protection. ”564  
2. Style of judgments 
The style of judgments of the ECJ and the General Court as summarized above reflects a 
combination of the French style and the German style. In other words, the logic applied in case 
judgments by the ECJ and the General Courts has been heavily influenced by that practiced 
within the civil law tradition. 
The typical French law report usually contains: (a) the name of the court that heard the case, 
(b) a concise statement of the precise issue before the court, (c) the judgment, collectively stated 
(that, in the form of ‘… the court holds…’), and nodissenting (or concurring) judgments apart 
from the collective judgment. Similarly in Germany, the form of the law report of a Federal 
Supreme Court judgment will usually contain the following sequence of items: (a) one or more 
opening paragraphs stating the propositions of the law supported by the decision (this part of the 
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report forms no part of the decision but nevertheless provides a useful summary of the issues in 
the case); (b) an identification of the articles of the Civil Code, Criminal Code, or other 
enactments, that are relevant to the case; (c) the division or section of the court , which had to 
decide the case; (d) the date on which the trial was concluded; (e) the initials of the parties to the 
action; (f) a citation of the facts of the case, abbreviated from the appeal court judgment usually 
along with extracts from the judgment containing the legal reasoning; (g) an indication by the 
court as to whether it agrees or disagrees with the previous court’s reasoning and/or its decision; 
(h) a consideration of the appellant’s grounds for appeal; and (i) finally a statement of the court’s 
own reasons for its conclusions.565 
3. Application of principles in EU jurisprudence 
Before we turn to the application of general principles of law in EU jurisprudence, we 
might first examine the unique system relating to stare decisis within the EU adjudication. The 
term “case law” has different meanings in the context of the civil law and common law 
traditions:  
In the broad sense, this refers to a body of non-statutory rules as declared, or developed, by judicial 
decisions. This body of law is called ‘jurisprudenc’ in French law. In the narrow sense, case law 
refers to a method of using the rules, so produced, as a basis for deciding future cases. This … is the 
method that is typical of the growth and evolution of the English common law tradition.566  
Generally speaking, “EU law does not have a doctrine of stare decisis” 567 – a matter that is 
also confirmed by the sources of EU law as introduce  above. From this perspective, the concept 
of case law in the EU is more like the one in French law. 
As to the status of case law in French law, Cruz points out that the judicial decisions, 
although lacking any binding authority de jure, do have de facto authority. And this authority 
varies according to the circumstances.568 The situation is similar in Germany, as explained by 
another authority: 
                                                 
565 Cruz, supra note 471, at 260 & 264. 
566 Id. at 250.  
567 Moens & Trone, supra note 470, at 22.  
568 Cruz, supra note 471, at 70. 
 
263 
… In practice a decision of the French Court of Cassation or of the German Federal Court will be 
followed by the lower courts just as much as the decision of an English or American Appeals Court. 
This is true not only of a chain of identical decisions. Even isolated decisions of the German Federal 
Court are accorded the greatest respect by judicial practice. A judge will deviate from such a 
decision only rarely and such deviation is certainly not typical.569 
Having acquainted ourselves with the case law system within the EU, we now turn our 
focus to the application of general rules of law in EU jurisprudence.  
a. Overview  
In the Union, the ECJ has developed much jurisprudence on the application of general 
principles of law relating to a wide range of topics. Such application is established largely on 
national administrative law doctrine of the EU’s leading member states. In the Union courts, the 
general principles can be used as (1) interpretive guides of legal documents, (2) grounds of 
review, (3) grounds to annul EU acts, (4) grounds to annul national measures, and (5) basis for 
damages actions.  
The ECJ has … developed a rich body of jurisprudence on general principles of law, covering topics 
such as a process rights, fundamental rights, equal treatment and non-discrimination, proportionality, 
and legal certainty and legitimate expectations. In developing these concepts the ECJ drew on 
national administrative law doctrine, German law was perhaps the most influential in this regard, 
providing the inspiration for the introduction of, for example, proportionality and legitimate 
expectations into the Community legal order. 
The general principles are used in a number of different ways. They function as interpretive guides 
in relation to primary Treaty Articles and other Community acts. The general principles also operate 
as grounds of review. The Community Courts cannot ival date primary Treaty Articles. They can 
however annul other Community acts, and breath of a general principle will be a ground for 
annulment. The principles can also be used against national measures that fall within the scope of 
EU law, although the range of measures caught in this manner is not free from doubt. Breach of a 
general principle may also form the basis for a damages action.570 
The practice of applying general principles in the adjudication of disputes has its roots in 
civil law traditions. In the courts of civil law countries, judges refer to general principles in two 
kinds of circumstances mainly: one is that the particular case at issue is not covered by code 
provisions or legislative enactment; the other is that judges want more room for discretion and 
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flexibility. 
In French and German judgments, judges frequently refer to certain general principle of law 
(clausulae generales) as a means of justifying their decision, where the code provisions or legislative 
enactments do not cover precisely the particular case before them. This is necessitated by the rule 
that neither precedent nor doctrine can be cited as the ole ground for decision. On the other hand, 
even where the code provisions or statute do cover the situation, judges may prefer room for 
discretion and flexibility. General principles are, therefore, extremely useful to provide this 
flexibility and room for manoeuvre.571 
b. Principle of proportionality 
Article 5 (ex Article 3b) of the EC Treaty, as inserted under the Maastricht Agreement, 
incorporates the principle of proportionality, providing that “[a]ny action by the Community 
shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.”572 The following 
excerpt explains the German origin of this principle: 
As is well known, the principle of proportionality is of utmost importance in German constitutional 
law, finding its origins in administrative law. … The German Constitutional Court defined 
proportionality as “an expression of the general right of the citizen towards the state that his 
freedom should be limited by the public authorities only to the extent indispensible for the 
protection of the public interest”. It plays the role as a “tool of interpretation” of two conflicting 
fundamental rights in order to ensure the principle of unity of the Constitution.573 
According to German law, three tests must be applied before using the principle of 
proportionality: (1) the measure must be appropriate for attaining the objective; (2) it must be 
necessary, in the sense that no other measure is available which is less restrictive of freedom; 
and (3) the effect or magnitude of the measure must not be disproportionate to its aim 
(proportionality in the narrower sense).574 
The history of the development of the principle of proportionality into a general principle of 
EU law is elaborated below. According to the excerpt, the application of this principle within the 
Union context aims to guarantee that an individual’s freedom of action is not limited to the 
degree necessary for the general public interest: 
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In EC law, the first manifestation of the principle of proportionality occurred with Case 8/55, 
Fédération Charbonnière de Belgique v. High Authoriy, that concerned a challenge of a general 
decision of the High Authority fixing Belgian coal prices. The Court observed that “in application of 
a generally accepted rule of law”, action of the High Authority in response to a wrongful act of an 
enterprise must be proportionate to the gravity of that fact. The principle developed within the 
administrative context, e.g. assessing the proportionality of legislation in the field of CAP [(i.e., 
Common Agricultural Policy)], fines and penalties. It constitutes a general principle of law 
according to which the Community may impose upon Community citizens, for the purpose of the 
public interest, only such obligations, restrictions and penalties that are strictly necessary for the 
purpose of the public interest. It guarantees that the individual’s freedom of action is not limited 
beyond the degree necessary for the general public interest. A “reasonable relationship” must exist 
between the measures taken by the institutions and the aim pursued by the Community.575 
The following excerpt gives us a description of applying this principle in EU case law. In 
short, the application of such principle is typically subject to three sub-principles – that is, 
suitability, necessity, and balance: 
The ECJ has apparently borrowed the proportionality requirement from German administrative law 
and applied it within varying degrees of strictness. Under EC law, the development of case-law and 
academic commentary have carved out a standardised scrutiny process of proportionality consisting 
of three elements or sub-principles. Firstly, the requirement of suitability suggests that an interfering 
action be at least regarded as suitable for attaining its aim. Secondly, the requirement of necessity 
demands that authorities must choose the least restrictive among equally effective means. The third 
elements is the idea of proportionality in the narrow sense, which demands a proper balance 
between the injury to an individual and the desired Community interest, prohibiting those measures 
whose disadvantage to the individual outweighs the purported Community interest. Determinative 
of the standards of judicial control are such variables as the nature of the area concerned, the value
of the purpose to be sought, the intensity of an interference, and the nature of the fundamental rights 
affected.576 
In the cases of commercial policy (including trade cases), the EU courts have reiterated the 
general standard of applying proportionality – the m asures at issue must be appropriate and 
necessary.577 The courts have clarified that the imposition of the measure itself cannot be 
questioned by this principle. Only the amount of the duties can be challenged under this 
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principle.578 The mission of the court in applying the principle to examine the amount of 
assessed duties is not to examine whether other less distortive measures exist, but rather to 
examine whether the measure that was imposed is manifestly inappropriate.579 If the measure is 
not manifestly inappropriate, it cannot create a breach of the principle of proportionality. 
Furthermore, the courts have emphasized that, in trade issues, a wide discretion has been 
conferred on the administrative organs.580 Based on these opinions, we can safely conclude that 
the courts have significantly raised the threshold f r applying this principle in trade cases 
compared with that in other areas. 
c. Principle of legitimate expectations 
As an authority on EU law has explained, “[t]he principle of legitimate expectations is 
particularly prominent in German law and known as ‘Vertrauensschutz’. Like proportionality 
and equality, it corresponds, according to the German doctrine, to a fundamental right, due to its 
possible deduction from the Grundgezetz.”581 
The General Court made the following observations as to applying this principle in the 
Union courts. To be specific, it proposed three conditions of its application: (1) precise, 
unconditional, and consistent assurances are given; (2) those assurances can give rise to a 
legitimate expectation; and (3) those assurances comply with the applicable rules: 
Three conditions must be satisfied in order to claim entitlement to the protection of legitimate 
expectations. First, precise, unconditional and consistent assurances originating from authorized and 
reliable sources must have been given to the person concerned by the Community authorities. 
Second, those assurances must be such as to give rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of the 
person to whom they are addressed. Third, the assurnces given must comply with the applicable 
rules … Even if assurances are made, they must create an expectation on the part of the applicant. 
This is not simply a subjective test. The expectation must be legitimate and [the] Court will look to 
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whether an ordinary, prudent trader would have relied on it on the basis of the institution’s 
representation. Finally, the Union measure in question must not be illegal. If it is, it will not generate 
any protected expectation.582 
As to trade cases such as Case T-401/06 Brosmann Footwear (HK) Ltd and others v 
Council [2010], the court stated that “the principle extends to any person in a situation where a 
Community authority has caused him to entertain expectations which are justified. Moreover, a 
person may not plead infringement of the principle unless he has been given precise assurances 
by the administration.”583 In other words, in trade cases, whether or not the principle can be 
applied depends on whether or not an applicant can prove that the administration has given him 
“precise assurance.”  
d. Principle of equal treatment 
The principle of equal treatment applied by the Union courts derives typically from the 
principle of equality, which is also a principle of German constitutional law.584  
Equality is one of the general principles established in EU law. In the cases concerning 
commercial policy, the court stated in Cases T-407/06 and T-408/06 Zhejiang Aokang Shoes and 
Wenzhou Taima Shoes v Council [2010] that the principle of equal treatment “prohibits treating 
similar situations differently and treating different situations in the same way unless there are 
objective reasons for such treatment[.]”585 In these particular cases, most of the alleged 
infringement of equal treatment was rebutted due to the findings of the courts that the situation at 
issue was in fact different. Outcome in these cases illustrate the fact that establishing a breach of 
the equal treatment principle is not easy for the applicants. The applicants usually complained on 
the grounds of the first half of the interpretation, but the court usually dismissed such complaints 
on the basis of the second half of the interpretation, as explained by the court in the language 
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quoted above. 
4. Centrality of the person and protection of fundamental rights 
The right of individuals to directly appeal EU law and, especially, to challenge the 
soundness of a general EU regulation reflects the ideology of centrality of the person originating 
in the civil law tradition. An ideological reform taking place in Europe (especially in France) 
centuries ago gave rise to the centrality of the person, emphasizing the domain of person over 
things and the power of every person to receive his due.586 Consequently, the ideology of 
centrality of the person led EU legislation to formally emphasize individual’s rights, as 
evidenced by the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000, which guarantees a 
broad range of civil and political rights: 
In 2000 the EU adopted the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Nice, 7 December 2000…, as amended 
at Strasbourg, 12 December 2007… This Charter was based upon the case law of the European 
Court of Justice regarding the protection of fundamental rights as general principles of EU law. 
As well as the usual civil and political rights, the Charter guarantees rights such as the freedom to 
conduct a business (Art 16), the right to strike and to bargain collectively (Art 28), information and 
consultation rights for employees (Art 27), protection against unjustified dismissal (Art 30), paid 
maternity leave and parental leave (Art 23(2)) and the protection of personal data (Art 8).587 
As summarized by one authority, a large number of fundamental rights that have been 
addressed by the Union courts. They include: the right to dignity, the right to property, freedom 
of association, the doctrine of margin of appreciation, freedom of religion, the principle of 
equality and non-discrimination, the right to privacy, freedom to pursue a trade or profession, 
non-retroactivity of penal provisions, nulla poena sine culpa,588 nulla poena sine lege,589 non 
bis in idem,590 effective judicial protection, freedom of expression, right against arbitrary 
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intervention, right to a fair legal process, right to be heard in a reasonable time, transparency, 
right to good administration, right to be heard, right to collective bargaining, right to marry and 
to found a family, right to liberty of movement, right to life, right to a name, and right to liberty 
and security of person.591 
From the above perspective, it seems evident that the protection of procedural rights as well 
as an individual’s right to directly appeal to EU law and, especially, to challenge the soundness 
of a general EU regulation partially originates in c vil law tradition of centrality of the person 
and protection of fundamental rights. 
5. Principle of due process 
The protection of procedural rights by EU trade administration embodies the principle of 
“procedural due process,” which has its roots in the common law tradition, as explained below:  
The influence on general principles is not only limited to the continental law. In 1973, the accession 
of common law countries (United Kingdom and Ireland) permitted the Court and the AGs to rely on 
the general concept of natural justice exemplified by the audi alteram partem principle …[T]he 
influence of the common law was visible in the TMP (1974) and AM&S (1982) [cases], both 
concerning procedural due process. The ECJ elaborated, under the influence of the common law, 
procedural principles like the right to be heard (TMP) and the protection of the legal privilege 
(AM&S).592 
6. Advocates General 
The institution of Advocate General in the Union judicial system can be traced back into the 
civil law tradition also. A similar position appears in French judicial system:  
Another sign of the French influence, apart from the concise single collective judgment, was the 
individual advisory opinion of the Advocate General that precedes the judgment; this finds its 
provenance in French law, in the Cour de Cassation, the Supreme Court in private law and criminal 
law. A similar function is performed in the Conseil d’État by the Commissaire du Gouvernement 
(Government Commissioner) although, unlike his counterpart with the same appellation in the other 
administrative courts, this official is not a member of the Conseil d’État at all…593 
Another scholar also points out that “[t]his system [of Advocate General] is clearly meant to 
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compensate for the fact that each state has been assigned one judge, which shows the degree of 
importance which has been attached to the representativeness of the ECJ.”594 
To sum up this section, the features of the EU’s “domestic” adjudication of trade issues 
have their roots in the EU legal tradition and culture, regarding the issues of judicial review, 
style of judgments, application of principles in EU jurisprudence (including principle of 
proportionality, principle of legitimate expectations, and principle of equal treatment), centrality 
of the person and protection of fundamental rights, principle of due process, and system of 
Advocate General. 
Summary  
EU practices and experiences in international trade negotiations, international trade disputes, 
“domestic” legislation, and “domestic” adjudication f trade issues provide us with abundant 
materials to study the process of legal indigenization of WTO law at the Union level.  
As one of the sponsors and leading members of the WTO, the EU participates actively in 
multilateral trade and FTA negotiations. Some common characteristics exhibited by various 
proposals with a comprehensive coverage of issues submitted by the EU are: (1) emphasis on the 
overall goal of the institutions at issue, (2) emphasis on the constituents of the DSB (especially 
the panel) as well as other procedural issues; (3) a solid style of proposals, (4) a focus on 
sustainable development, (5) confidence in sharing experiences and submitting proposals, (6) an 
emphasis on regional trade agreements, (7) a unique attitude toward S&D treatment, and (8) an 
emphasis on the role of principles and guidelines i improving current WTO law and procedure. 
These characteristics of EU trade negotiations can partially find their roots in the legal 
tradition and culture of the Union. EU law, whether or not having developed into a unique legal 
order, has received influence from both the civil law tradition (mainly as manifest in the French 
and German legal systems) and the common law tradition (from the English legal system). 
Consequently, the characteristics of EU practices may have their roots in the civil law tradition, 
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the common law tradition, and, to the extent that tere is such a thing, the EU law tradition. 
The role of judges, notwithstanding the views expressed by some common law scholars, is 
significant in the civil law tradition with regard to their functions of finding correct laws, 
applying the law correctly, and controlling procedures (including those relating to court 
investigation). The significance attached to the rol of judges by the civil law tradition can 
partially account for EU efforts to establish permanent panelists. 
The central status of principles in civil law countries explains the EU’s emphasis on 
guidelines or principles in recommending proposals on further negotiations. The preeminent 
status of jurists in the civil law tradition has explained EU efforts to entrust authority to an 
independent group of experts to influence the AD/CVD investigations within the WTO Members. 
Sustainable development, as one of its fundamental strategies, leads the EU to place its focus on 
S&D treatment into a sustainable context.  
Since the establishment of the WTO, the EU has beeninvolved in quite a number of 
international trade disputes, in which its legislation (as such) and application of law (as applied) 
have been challenged. Behind these specific practices are EU ideologies that might conflict with 
the multilateral system. The conflicting practices or ideologies mainly comprise the methods of 
interpreting WTO agreements, the relationship betwen trade preferences in the FTAs and 
multilateralism, and the application of general principles of law originating in the civil law 
tradition. 
The methods adopted by the EU in interpreting WTO agreements – those addressing 
“proper or ordinary meaning,” “object and purpose” of the articles at issue, context of 
negotiations, and principles of general international law – are consistent with the EU’s 
approaches to legal interpretation originating in both the civil law tradition and the common law 
tradition. 
EU opinion that trade preference in FTAs is the stepping stone to multilateralism and 
fundamental mechanisms of the WTO accounts for partially he EU’s practices in establishing a 
most complex regime of regional trade preferences, in which the multilateral mandate – MFN 
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treatment –is at the bottom.  
Taking general principles as the foundation of EU arguments in front of the DSB reflects 
the EU’s “domestic” practice of frequently applying general principles of law in its 
jurisprudence. 
The authority of trade legislation is enjoyed by the Union exclusively. In some 
circumstances, the Union may authorize this power to the Member States. At the Union level, 
trade legislation, being a part of the Common Commercial Policy which covers broad topics 
such as import, export, trade defence, trade barriers, and IPR protection. Furthermore, EU trade 
law usually takes the form of basic regulation. 
The style of trade regulations can be traced back to the concept of law or of the legal rule in 
civil law countries (especially France). EU trade regulations usually begin with a  strong and 
long that contains the legal basis, background, purposes and principles of the regulation at issue. 
The effect of direct application of EU trade regulations within its Member States can 
effectively avoid the risk of taking a more complicated path of WTO-Union-States to indigenize 
the WTO agreements into domestic legal systems.  
As for adjudication, EU trade regulations are administered by the Commission and the 
Council, and both the ECJ and the General Court have jurisdiction over trade cases at Union 
level. The determinations made by the Commission and the Council, especially those on trade 
defence issues, take the form of “regulation,” which has general legal binding force within the 
EU. Importantly, individuals are given the rights to bring actions against both specific 
determinations and basic regulations. Action for annulment, direct action for compensation, and 
preliminary ruling are three main actions that have be n brought regarding trade issues. The style 
of the judgments is relatively solid. And the opinio s of Advocates Generals are highly respected 
by the ECJ. 
Broad authorization of judicial review has been entrusted to the ECJ, influenced by the 
legal systems of EU Member States (especially civillaw countries), the style of courts 
judgments stands for a combination of French and German styles. The ideology of applying 
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general principles of law is in the Union courts alo inherited from the civil law tradition. 
Furthermore, the Union courts have established their own thresholds of application of these 
general principles in trade cases. Centrality of the person and protection of fundamental rights 
originating in civil legal systems have also appeared in “domestic” adjudication of trade issues 
within the EU. The system of Advocates General in the Union adjudication represents high 
respect given to jurists by the civil law tradition. 
  
 
274 
Appendix 5.1  
(Pertinent passages in main text are found largely in subsection IB7 of Chapter 5) 
Excerpts of EU- TN/CTD/W/20, EU-TN/TE/W/47, and EU-TN/TE/W/56 
 
The WTO Work Program on Special and Differential Treatment 
Some EU Ideas for The Way ahead 
Communication from the European Communities (TN/CTD/W/20) 
 The following communication dated 18 November 2002 has been received from the 
European Communities. 
_______________ 
…  
12. Several delegations have made suggestions as to these working assumptions or 
guidelines. We suggest that the following would be particularly useful in steering our future 
work: 
(a) All S&D treatment proposals should be evaluated against the following basic 
criterion: will this aid the economic development of developing countries and their fuller 
integration of developing countries into the trading system, as opposed to creating what has 
been described as permanent exclusion or second tier Membership of the system? The 
following sub-set of criteria will help to answer this question.  
(b) S&D treatment provisions should be seen as steps towards, or flexibilities within, a 
common system of rights and obligations rather thana parallel set of rules in themselves. …  
(c) Given that S&D treatment is intended to assist integration of Members into the 
WTO system, S&D treatment provisions should be understood to be an operational part of 
the integration process, often of a temporary nature, and reflecting developing countries’ 
specific capacities, limitations or needs in a given area. Their application by Members 
should thus be regularly reviewed, and Members should cease to apply, or rely upon, such 
provisions as soon as the problems they were designd to compensate for no longer 
apply. … 
(d) Since the aim of S&D treatment is the integration of developing countries into the 
multilateral trading system, it follows that S&D treatment provisions which are trade 
expanding should be preferred to those which are trde estrictive. The latter should remain 
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exceptional in nature. 
(e) In evaluating proposals made by Members to modify existing S&D treatment 
provisions, the previous level of utilization of the provision in question should be known, 
and the reasons for this identified. Where S&D treatment provisions have been shown not 
to have been used or not to have had the impact on Members’ integration for which they 
were originally designed, it is obvious that they should be carefully reconsidered, and either 
abandoned or modified.  
(f) The current categorisations of developing countries for S&D treatment purposes are 
LDCs and developing countries more generally. …  
(g) It should however be feasible to accept further differentiation amongst developing 
country users of S&D treatment in specific cases, or within specific agreements, preferably 
based on some simple and transparent criteria that would reflect in an objective manner the 
very different institutional capacities of different Members, their ability to participate in 
international trade, their income levels, or the ability of their economies to adjust to fuller 
rights and obligations. …  
(h) The corollary of this is that there is a relationship between the extent of S&D 
treatment that may be sought or applied, and the dev loping country Members who could 
qualify for it. … 
(i) There should be a more clearly articulated relationship between extent of 
commitments, lengths of transitional periods for assumption of commitments, and the 
provision of technical assistance to help meet commit ents.  This relationship should be 
put on firmer foundations in those agreements and areas where it is most relevant. …
 
Market Access for Environmental Goods 
Communication from the European Communities (TN/TE/W/47) 
Paragraph 31(iii) 
In this first submission to the Committee on Trade nd Environment Special Session and fifth 
submission to the NAMA negotiating group, the European Communities wishes to clarify its 
approach to achieve the objectives Ministers set with regard to the negotiations on 
environmental goods under paragraph 31 (iii) of the Ministerial Declaration. 
_______________ 
 
…  
II. GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
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6. The European Communities considers that the identification of environmental goods 
should be guided by the following principles: 
• Environmental goods should be defined in order to contribute to the fulfilment of 
national and internationally agreed environmental priorities. Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements and the MDGs, in particular on access to afe water and sanitation, provide 
useful guidance on the environmental objectives that are relevant for the identification of 
environmental goods. Pollution prevention, resource s  reduction and waste minimization 
could also be guiding priorities that are included in both Agenda 21 and the WSSD Plan of 
Implementation.    
• Any definition should encompass categories of interest to all Members. In 
particular, Members should welcome contributions by developing countries defining 
products of their interest. 
 
EC Submission on environmental goods 
Submission by the European Communities (TN/EE/W/56) 
Paragraph 31 (iii) 
 The following communication, dated 4 July 2005, is being circulated at the request of 
the Delegation of the European Communities. 
_______________ 
… 
The selection of environmental goods is guided by two main principles: 
 - They contribute to the fulfilment of national and i ternational environmental 
priorities including Multilateral Environmental Agreements, the Millennium Development 
Goals (in particular on access to safe water and saitation), Agenda 21 and the WSSD Plan 
of Implementation.  
 - They encompass categories of interest to all WTO Members including developing 
countries. 
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Appendix 5.2  
(Pertinent passages in main text are found largely in subsection IB8 of Chapter 5) 
Excerpt of EU-TN/GL/GEN/109 
Independent Group of Experts for the Enforcement  
of Initiation Standards 
Submission from the European Communities  
 The following communication, dated 19 April 2006, is being circulated at the request of 
the Delegation of the European Commission. 
 The submitting delegation has requested that this paper, which was submitted to the 
Rules Negotiation Group as an informal document (JOB(06)/90) also be circulated as a formal 
document. 
_______________ 
… 
Proposed solution 
 -  We believe that it is worth pursuing the option of the creation of a group of independent 
experts, and to examine in particular, the way such a group would work in practice. Thus, we are 
considering proposing that:  
 -  Any Member subject to an investigation which considers that the evidence contained in 
the complaint does not fulfil the requirements of Articles 5.1, and 5.2 of the ADA or that the 
authorities of the importing country have not acted in accordance with Articles 5.3, 5.4, 5.6 and 5.8 
of the ADA, could call upon the group of experts in order to obtain an independent assessment of 
the facts. 
 -  The Member carrying out the investigation would be required to provide the necessary 
assistance, in particular by providing to the group the facts on which the decision to initiate was 
based. It could be discussed whether third parties should be allowed to participate in this process.  
 -  The group of experts should be composed of highly experienced officials in AD. … 
 -  Although the opinion issued would not be binding (i.e., the investigating authority could 
proceed with the investigation or decide to terminate it and tackle the problems found before 
initiating a new investigation), the opinion of the group of experts could be presented as additional 
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evidence before DSU proceedings.  Even if not legaly binding, successive negative opinions on a 
Member’s initiation standards would highlight unsustainable systemic breaches of the ADA. 
  
 
279 
Appendix 5.3  
(Pertinent passages in main text are found largely in subsection IIIA of Chapter 5) 
Illustrations of EU Basic Regulations on Trade 
 
• Council Regulation (EC) No. 1225/2009 [on protection against dumped imports from 
countries not members of the European Community];  
• Council Regulation (EC) No. 1236/2005 of 27 June 2005 [concerning trade in certain 
goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment];  
• Council Regulation (EC) No. 1061/2009 of 19 October 2009 [establishing common rules 
for exports];  
• Council Regulation (EC) No. 260/2009 of 26 February 2009 [on the common rules for 
imports];  
• Council Regulation (EC) No. 597/2009 of 11 June 2009 [on protection against subsidised 
imports from countries not members of the European Community];  
• Council Regulation (EC) No. 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 [setting up a Community regime for 
the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items];  
• Council Regulation (EC) No. 116/2009 of 18 December 2008 [on the export of cultural 
goods];  
• Council Regulation (EC) No. 625/2009 of 7 July 2009 [on common rules for imports from 
certain third countries]; 
• Council Regulation (EC) No. 717/2008 of 17 July 2008 [establishing a Community 
procedure for administering quantitative quotas];  
• Council Regulation (EC) No. 427/2003 of 3 March 2003 [on a transitional product-specific 
safeguard mechanism for imports originating in the People’s Republic of China and amending 
Regulation (EC) No 519/94 on common rules for imports from certain third countries];  
• Council Regulation (EC) No. 625/2009 of 7 July 2009 [on common rules for imports from 
certain third countries]; and  
Council Regulation (EC) No. 3286/94 of 22 December 1994 [laying down Community 
procedures in the field of the common commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the 
Community’s rights under international trade rules, in particular those established under the 
auspices of the World Trade Organization.]  
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CHAPTER 6.  LEGAL INDIGENIZATION AND THE WTO 
 
As defined in Chapter 2, legal indigenization of WTO law is a two-way process. That is, the 
indigenization process has both an inward direction and outward direction. On the one hand, the 
Members have characterized their rights or obligations under multilateral trade rules in ways that 
are consistent with their own legal traditions and cultures (i.e. the inward direction). On the other 
hand, they have consistently tried to develop a set of trade rules at the multilateral level that can 
best fit into their own legal systems or traditions (i.e. the outward direction). The preceding three 
chapters analyze how China, the United States, and the European Union have tried to indigenize 
WTO law in international trade negotiations, in international trade disputes, in domestic 
trade-related legislation, and in domestic trade-related adjudication.  
The purpose of this chapter is different. The aim here is to observe the significance of legal 
indigenization at the multilateral level from the prspective of the WTO itself. Three questions 
are raised on this point. (1) To what extent have the Members indigenized the multilateral rules 
and practices? (2) How has legal indigenization been r flected in their efforts in further trade 
negotiations? (3) What are the implications of lega indigenization for the WTO? These three 
questions are addressed separately in the following parts and answered collectively in the 
Summary with which this chapter concludes. 
I. Indigenized WTO Agreements and Practices 
Both the process and the outcomes of the efforts to neg tiate WTO agreements, as well as 
practice of WTO adjudication emerging from those agreements, have shown evidence of 
imbalanced influence from the Members. Generally, the more powerful a Member is, the more 
influence it can exercise, especially in an outward di ection, over the agreements and their 
application. Three examples – the United States and the multilateral antidumping mechanism, 
the rules for applying the notion of “legitimate exp ctations,” and the admissibility of amicus 
curiae submission in the DSB proceedings – are analyzed in the following paragraphs in order to 
demonstrate three aspects of indigenized WTO agreements and adjudication: (1) how certain 
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members have influenced the negotiations and conclusion of WTO agreements; (2) how the 
organization has under taken efforts to establish its own rules for applying a notion borrowed 
from the civil law tradition; and (3) how a member persuaded the Appellate Body to admit 
amicus curiae submissions in light of the fact thate rules are unclear on the admissibility of 
such submissions.  
A. The United States and the Multilateral Antidumping Mechanism 
Since the emergence of the GATT in 1947, the development of multilateral rules on 
antidumping have undergone four important stages: (1) Article VI of GATT 1947, covering 
Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties, (2) the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1968 (the Kennedy Code), (3) the Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1979 (the Tokyo 
Code), and (4) the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade of 1994 (the ADA 1994). The development of multilateral antidumping rules 
can be regarded as a combined result of influence coming from several sources – from the U.S. 
antidumping legislation and practices, from concerns a d criticisms thereon made by other 
members, and from an exercise of the de facto “decisive” power of the United States as well as 
the EU over multilateral negotiations.   
1. History of U.S. antidumping legislation  
An examination of the history of U.S. antidumping le islation can explain that, in addition 
to the willingness of indigenizing multilateral rules, the achievement of expected outcome of a 
country at the multilateral level also depends on its capacity of promoting outward 
indigenization. In this instance, the capability of the United States to influence the multilateral 
antidumping rules relies heavily on its own relatively mature legal system of antidumping. In 
addition, the U.S. antidumping legislation, especially that existed before 1947, was an important 
source of multilateral rules.  
Before Article VI of the GATT 1947 emerged, the United States had developed a solid legal 
mechanism for handling antidumping claims – that is, claims that imported goods were being 
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“dumped” on U.S. markets at unfairly low prices. It was a mechanism which was established 
mainly by the Sherman Act of 1890, the Revenue Act of 1916, the Antidumping Act of 1921, and 
the Tariff Act of 1930. 
In some opinions, the genesis of U.S. antidumping legis ation can be traced to 1890, when 
Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act, which dealt in general with unfair trade.595 
However, this law was not applicable to imported goods, even though it prohibited the 
monopolization of the U.S. domestic market,596 taking into account the fact that the U.S. 
domestic market had not been unified at that time. 
Under Title VIII of the Revenue Act of 1916, the con ept of dumping in international trade 
was formally addressed for the first time in the United States. The following excerpt gives a brief 
introduction of this act: 
The Act’s antidumping provisions were rooted more in the concepts of unfair trade under U.S. 
antitrust law than in tariff law. Borrowing the term of “market value” established in the Tariff Act of 
1913, section 801 of the new law declared the importati n and sale of articles “sold at a price 
substantially less than market value or the wholesale price of such articles” to be unlawful.597 
Due to the weaknesses revolving around applicability pointed out by the following excerpt, 
the 1916 Act was, in fact, an ineffective piece of legislation with regard to antidumping: 
Violation of the 1916 Act was punishable by serious criminal and civil penalties (injured parties 
could recover treble damages). However, as a criminal statute, the Act was subject to strict 
interpretation, and the level of proof required andthe need to show an intent to injure a domestic 
industry severely curtailed its effectiveness. The failure to assign the task of enforcement to a 
specific government agency also contributed to the Act’s ineffectiveness.598 
In order to overcome the ineffectiveness of the 1916 Act identified above, the Antidumping 
Act of 1921 was enacted on May 27, 1921. The 1921 Act gave much attention to substantive 
                                                 
595 Terence P. Stewart, Susan G. Markel & Michael T. Kerwin, Antidumping, in THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: 
A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) (Terence P. Steward ed., vol. 2) 1383, 1401 (1993). 
596 K.D. Raju, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AGREEMENT ON ANTI-DUMPING: A GATT/WTO AND INDIA 
LEGAL JURISPRUDENCE 13 (2008). 
597 According to most authorities, the intent of the exporter would be a factor to establish dumping, for 
dumping was illegal only if such act or acts be done with the intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the 
United States, or of preventing the establishment of an industry in the United States, or of restraining or 
monopolizing any part of trade and commerce in such articles in the United States. Stewart, Markel & Kerwin, 
supra note 595, at 1402. 
598 Id. at 1403. 
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issues, such as the definitions of certain significant terms including “purchase price,” “exporter’s 
sales,” “foreign market value,” and “cost of production.”599 In addition, it 
granted the Secretary of the Treasury the responsibility to determine whether a U.S. industry was 
being injured, or was being threatened with injury, by imports sold in the U.S. at prices less than 
“fair value”.600 
A few years later, the Tariff Act of 1930 set out provisions on procedural issues, mainly 
with regard to the imposition of antidumping duties and the review of such duties.601 
2. Article VI of the GATT 1947 
The first multilateral rules on antidumping came in the form of Article VI of the GATT 
1947. Although Article VI is a short section and does not provide detailed rules for administering 
the mechanism (except for the definition of dumping a d some other basic parameters), the 
incorporation of antidumping issues into the GATT was a benchmark of the multilateral trading 
system. As pointed out in the excerpt below, this incorporation was an outcome of the insistence 
of the United States: 
In November 1945, the United States issued a pamphlet entitled Proposals for Expansion of World 
Trade and Employment, which contained several proposals, including some rules for international 
trade and an outline for an International Trade Organization (ITO). The report was published and 
                                                 
599 The 1921 Act specified how the prices were to be det rmined, through definitions of the concepts of 
“purchase price” (the price paid for the imports when purchased by a buyer independent of the exporter), 
“exporter’s sales price” (the price for imports purchased “by or for the account of the exporter”), “foreign market 
value” (the home market price of the exporter), and“cost of production” (the sum of costs associated with the 
production of the goods exported, including general xpenses and profit). The Act specified that imported 
merchandise was to be considered dumped “if the purchase price or exporter’s sales price is less than t e foreign 
market value (or, in the absence of such value, than t e cost of production),” and that such merchandise was to be 
assessed by the customs authorities a “special dumping duty” equal to the difference in prices (no criminal penalties 
or damages to plaintiffs were imposed). I . at 1404. 
600 Id. at 1403-1404. 
601 The 1930 Act is confided in Title 19 Customs Duties of the United States Code. Parts II and III of Subtitle 
IV Countervailing and Antidumping Duties of Title 19 elaborate on procedural issues of the imposition and review 
of antidumping duties.  
Part II Imposition of Antidumping Duties deals with issues of: imposition of antidumping duties, procedures for 
initiating an antidumping duty investigation, preliminary determinations, termination or suspension of i vestigation, 
final determinations, assessment of duty, treatment of difference between deposit of estimated antidumping duty and 
final assessed duty under antidumping duty order, conditional payment of antidumping duty, and establishment of 
product categories for short life cycle merchandise. 
Part III Reviews; Other Actions regarding Agreements deals with issues of: administrative review of 
determinations, special rules for section 1675(b) and 1675(c) reviews; special rules for injury investiga ions for 
certain section 1303 or section 1671(c) countervailing duty orders and investigations, required consultations, 
definitions, and special rules. 
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sent to other governments for their review. It specifically addressed the problems with cartels, and 
suggested that one function of the ITO be to formulate “a general definition of circumstances under 
which antidumping and countervailing duties may properly be applied to products imported from 
other members.”  
Largely at the insistence of the United States, one of the areas addressing in the original General 
Agreement was unfair trade in the form of dumping ad subsidized exports. There was general 
support in the negotiations for allowing the impositi n of antidumping and countervailing duties 
under a multilateral agreement, as long as such duties were imposed where conditions had been 
properly investigated.602  
During the negotiations of Article VI, the scope of the definition of dumping became one of 
the major areas of disagreement arising among the partici ants. Supported by developed 
countries including the United States, a relatively narrow definition was adopted ultimately, as 
reviewed below: 
First, with regard to the scope of the definition, early in the negotiations the parties established tat 
there were four types of dumping: price, service, exchange, and social. Opinion on the definition of 
dumping was divided into two camps. On one side were the developing countries, who argued that 
almost all forms of unfair trade practices should come under the dumping heading, rather than just 
price dumping. Such a broad definition would have left open a wide range of retaliatory actions… 
In contrast, the developed countries (the U.S., the U.K., Canada, and other British Commonwealth 
countries) favored a more limited definition. Their basic position did not exclude other types of 
dumping from international consideration, but it deemed non-price dumping as beyond the 
parameters of the antidumping articles and the technical sub-committee. In the end, the more narrow 
definition was adopted. 603 
3. The Kennedy Code 
The lack of specificity of Article VI provided a large space for countries to implement it in 
accordance with their own legal systems and existing laws, a flexibility that would naturally lead 
to conflicts among trading partners. In the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations, 
therefore, the United States established its own objectives in the antidumping negotiations – that 
is, to develop a set of rules that could increase procedural transparency of antidumping 
mechanisms in its trading partners, as iterated below: 
While the U.S. was a frequent user of antidumping law, American exporters regularly faced 
                                                 
602 Id. at 1405-1406. 
603 Id. at 1406-1407. 
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accusations of dumping. It was the U.S. position that e antidumping investigations of its trading 
partners were overly secretive, with no public divulgence of the reasoning behind decisions. An 
increase in procedural transparency in the administration of the systems of the United States’ trading 
partners was, therefore, a major concern. … 
Although the United States faced criticism of its antidumping laws on issues such as the standard of 
injury, it was prepared to negotiate a more unified s t of international antidumping standards… 
The initial U.S. position on the negotiations was that agreement had to be reached on the broad 
conceptual and philosophical aspects of antidumping before discussion of specific issues of 
procedures and administration could take place. The U.S. representative to the Group on 
Antidumping Policies regarded procedural matters as an essential part of any international 
agreement but did not believe that a discussion of procedures was the best way to initiate a 
negotiation of an international antidumping agreement. …604 
In the Kennedy Round, the U.S. antidumping legislation and practices which had 
established a sophisticated antidumping mechanism by both conceptual provisions (as in the 
1921 Act) and procedural provisions (as in the 1930 Act), became the focus of discussion, as 
recalled below. 
While the U.S. was not alone in criticism it received for its antidumping system, the importance of 
the U.S. market in the world economy made it a special focus. U.S. antidumping law was more 
developed and specific than that of a number of other countries, which engendered detailed 
examination by other countries. In addition, the transparency of the American system permitted 
other parties to examine the U.S. antidumping regim closely. 605 
As indicated above, the U.S. legislation on antidumping invited criticisms from other 
negotiators in the Kennedy Round. One of the concerns was that the U.S. legislation itself was 
not consistent with Article VI of the GATT 1947, especially regarding its injury standards: 
[W]hile Article VI specified that dumping and subsidization must result in “material injury” to a 
domestic industry for duties to be assessed, the U.S. Antidumping Act of 1921 specified only that a 
domestic industry must be or be likely to become “injured.” While Article VI did not define material 
injury, the subtle difference in phrasing in the U.S. legislation would in time become an area of 
contention, as many of the other contracting parties held that the U.S. standard for injury was 
significantly lower than that specified in other countries and under Article VI.606 
The criticisms from other negotiators covered a broader scope of issues than merely the 
                                                 
604 Id. at 1421-1422.  
605 Id. at 1423. 
606 Id. at 1409. 
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standard of establishing “injury.” For instance, the United Kingdom raised concerns about the 
U.S. law regarding such matters as these: 
…[T]he U.S.’s division of responsibilities between the Treasury Department (which first determined 
dumping) and the Tariff Commission (which subsequently determined injury)…[t]he withholding of 
appraisement by the U.S. … the ability of United States authorities to initiate antidumping 
investigations. …the U.S. procedure on quantity discounts in the home market in the determination 
of fair value. … [the U.S.] regulations on the disclo ure of information received in antidumping 
investigations [which were considered] inequitable toward foreign respondents accused of dumping, 
“and inhibit[ed] exporters from presenting their case to the best effect” … [the fact] that decisions 
of the U.S. Tariff Commission were unpredictable, bcause U.S. law had no formal standards as to 
what constituted injury or how to determine causality.607  
In addition to the concerns raised by the United Kingdom, the dispute over the U.S. practice 
of regarding a regional industry to be “an industry of the United States” was an extremely 
contentious one. Nevertheless, with the support of a number of countries, such as Denmark, 
Sweden, and Australia, the concept of recognizing a regional industry was ultimately adopted by 
the Kennedy Round.608 
4. The Tokyo Code 
In the post-Kennedy era, the United States made some modifications to its antidumping law, 
which also brought about concerns from its trading partners, especially the EC. Various issues of 
U.S. legislation, such as “sales at a loss,”609 “allowances relating to price comparability,”610 
“determination of material injury,”611 and “regional protection,”612 triggered vigorous 
                                                 
607 Id.  
608 See id. at 1423-1429. 
609 “The U.S. Congress amended the U.S. Antidumping Act of 1921 in the Trade Act of 1974. The 1974 
amendment included a provision describing how sales in the home market were to be treated if made at prices less 
than the cost of production. It provided that when there was reasonable ground to believe that products were being 
sold below cost, an investigation would be undertaken regarding the cost of production.” Id. at 1442-1443. 
610 “Generally, the U.S. would allow adjustments for any expenses that were incurred because of one specific 
sale or group of sales. These expenses included dirct material and labor costs as well as related factory overhead 
expenses.” Id. at 1446. 
611 “Many were concerned that the U.S. in particular hd initiated investigations without sufficient evidence of 
injury, thus creating unwarranted burdens for innocent exporting countries. Even though pleased that the U.S. had 
abandoned the ‘de minimis doctrine,’ signatories continued to be concerned over the future U.S. interpretation of the 
phrase.” Id. at 1447-8. 
612 In 1964, the United States began assessing the impact of goods imported at less than fair value on regional 
markets. The U.S. Constitution requires that all duties be applied uniformly throughout the country. As a result, 
before issuing an affirmative injury determination, the International Trade Commission must “be confident that 
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complaints. Consequently, although antidumping was not considered a priority in the area of 
non-tariff barriers at the early stages of the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations,613 
the concerns from other negotiators about the U.S. legislation led to the adoption of a new code 
on antidumping in the Tokyo Round. As one authority has emphasized, the revision of the 
Kennedy Code in the Tokyo Code was largely based on European negotiators’ concerns on 
certain U.S. legislation and practices: 
Largely based on European negotiators’ previously mentioned concerns regarding injury standards 
(and in conflict with the concerns of the developing countries), the Tokyo Round Agreement revised 
the Antidumping code so that it was no longer necessary to show that dumping was the principal 
cause of injury when contributing factors existed.614 
5. Anti-dumping Agreement (ADA) 1994 
Early in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, the U.S. legislation once 
again became the focus of discussion and criticism. Two examples are the U.S. definition of 
“industry”615 and its use of cumulation.616 Despite such criticisms, the United States still 
submitted several proposals in the early stages of the Uruguay Round, focusing on various issues 
of antidumping rules, such as those relating to clarific tion, injurious dumping practices, and 
circumvention.617 
When the Uruguay Round entered into the phase of draft iscussion, the United States 
                                                                                                                                                
regional impacts have the proscribed injurious effect on an industry as a whole when considering the magnitude of 
regional injury attributable to [less than fair value] imports.” Id. at 1449. 
613 Id. at 1436. 
614 Id. at 1456. 
615 “In response to the U.S. enactment of the Trade an T riff Act of 1984, a number of signatories objected to 
the U.S. definition of “industry” in that legislation, which stated that the domestic industry for the production of 
wine included the producers of grapes. For example, the EC stated the U.S. definition of industry: “clearly departed 
from Article 4:1 of the Code.” Id. at 1475. 
616 “A number of signatories, especially developing countries, express objections to the use of cumulation by 
certain parties in their antidumping proceedings in determining whether the domestic industry had been injured by 
dumped imports. In a discussion of the U.S. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, the Nordic Countries representative stated 
that it was “not clear how this would be applied over time if it included imports which were negligible in volume 
and market share, and if imports already subject to an idumping measures would also be included.” Id. at 
1475-1476. 
617 “The representative of the United States introduce a submission in December of 1987 that proposal called 
for clarification of Code remedies regarding the concept of recidivist (or repeat) dumping and consideration of 
possible revision of the Code to deal with diversionary practices taken by companies to avoid antidumping duty 
orders.” Id. at 1486-1507. 
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began to exercise its de facto “decisive” influence on the drafts of antidumping a reement. 
Briefly, due to the strong criticism from the United States as well as the EU, the drafts of Carlisle 
I,618 Carlisle II,619 New Zealand I, New Zealand II, New Zealand III,620 and the Ramsauer 
text621 were disqualified as the foundation multilateral agreement. Instead, because of support 
from the United States and the EU, the Dunkel Draft successfully served as the basis of further 
discussion and led to the conclusion of ADA 1994.622 
To sum up, based on a domestically well-developed mchanism in the United States, the 
country can be said to have successfully incorporated the issues of antidumping into the 
multilateral trading system. And this incorporation ccurred over many decades. The adoption of 
a narrow definition of dumping in Article VI of the GATT 1947, the first multilateral 
antidumping rules, had been insisted on by the U.S.-led group of developed countries. In the 
Kennedy Round, a new code on antidumping was negotiated and concluded, originating in the 
                                                 
618 “Deputy Director-General Carlisle drafted his proposed negotiating text and distributed the document on 
July 6, 1990, after considering the country positions set forth in the Informal Group over the previous several 
months and in anticipation of the Trade Negotiations Committee meeting of July 1990. The first draft, Carlisle I, 
incorporated certain provisions proposed by the U.S. and EC on anti-circumvention…The United States indicated 
that it ‘understood that the Acting Chairman would revise the paper on the basis of recent informal discussion [and] 
expressed its strong belief that any such revision maintain the balance that had been in the original paper.’” Id. at 
1515-1517. 
619 “The second revised antidumping text, commonly referr d to as Carlisle II, was released on August 14, 
1990. This draft incorporated almost all suggestion made by the parties on Carlisle I. Outside the corre tion of 
technical items, the Carlisle II was roundly criticized. The U.S. delegation said it did not consider th  second draft 
an improvement over Carlisle I and that the use of so much bracketed text left too many issues unresolv d.” Id. at 
1519-1521. 
620 “GATT Director-General Arthur Dunkel called a “green room” meeting of top-level negotiators on October 
30 [of 1990]. During this meeting, Dunkel assigned two important tasks to various delegations in an effort to break 
the impasse. First, he asked the New Zealand delegat  to ttempt to address the most contentious antidumping 
issues and to forge a compromises agreement or a text cceptable for future negotiations. At another “green room” 
meeting held on November 12, New Zealand reported that i  had still been unable to achieve a consensus on the text. 
This delay was reportedly attributable, in large part, to strong criticisms from the U.S. and EC. The second text 
drafted by New Zealand also invited much criticism.” Id  at 1522-1525. 
621 “In a final attempt to get the parties to agree on a negotiating text, in late November of 1991, Rudolph 
Ramsauer, head of the informal working group on antidumping, issued an new draft text that was designed to be 
compromise document for continuing negotiations. The Ramsauer text was criticized by the U.S. and the European 
Community, with one EC official quoted as saying that the draft was “not balanced” and ‘not operational.’” Id. at 
1529-1532. 
622 “On December 20, 1991, the Dunkel draft of the Uruguay Round agreement was released, including the 
antidumping text. In the antidumping area, a “private-sector source” was quoted as saying that the U.S. Department 
of Commerce was of the opinion that the Dunkel draft “would mark the beginning of serious negotiations in the area 
of antidumping.” Another source was quoted as saying that the U.S. stood firmly against changes to antidumping 
rules, and that progress on antidumping was related to the overall Uruguay Round agreement. The US still gave 
some criticisms to the antidumping text. After tough negotiations, the antidumping agreement was agreed.” Id. at 
1536-1591. 
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U.S. objectives to develop uniform rules for its trading partners. Despite the criticisms and 
concerns from its trading partners, the U.S. legislation and practices still served as the basis of 
the discussion. Unlike the Kennedy Code, the Tokyo Code, which modified the Kennedy Code, 
was negotiated and concluded out of the EU’s concerns on U.S. legislation and practices in the 
post-Kennedy era. Early in the Uruguay Round, the U.S. legislation and practices on 
antidumping in the post-Tokyo era again raised wide concerns and criticisms from other 
negotiators. In the course of those negotiations, however, the United States, as well as the EU, 
exercised their de facto “decisive” influence and pressed successfully for the conclusion of a 
multilateral agreement based on a draft they supported.   
B. Rules for Applying the Notion of “Legitimate Expectations” 
The notion of “legitimate expectations,” whose origin and contents are analyzed above in 
Chapter 5, is one of the representative concepts developed by the civil law tradition. The 
following excerpt will help us review general meaning of this principle: 
The principle of legitimate expectations concerns the relationship between public administration and 
the individual. It seeks to resolve the basic conflict between the desire to protect the individual’s 
confidence in expectations raised by administrative conduct and the need for administrators to 
pursue changing policy objectives. The principle means that expectations raised as a result of 
administrative conduct may have legal consequences. Either the administration must respect those 
expectations or provide compelling reasons why the public interest must take priority. The principle 
therefore concerns the degree to which an individual’s expectations may be safeguarded in the face 
of a change of policy which tend to undermine them. The role of the administrative court is to 
determine the extent to which the individual’s expectation can be accommodated within changing 
policy objectives.623 
Taking into consideration the influence of European countries on the emergence of the 
GATT, it is no wonder that this notion has been used ince the establishment of the multilateral 
trading system in 1947. The GATT 1947 and WTO dispute settlement practice have established a 
non-violation claim, of which “legitimate expectations” constitutes one of the elements. Under a 
non-violation claim, which is unusual in international law, a benefit that is reasonably expected 
                                                 
623 Robert Thomas, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS AND PROPORTIONALITY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 41 (2000). 
 
290 
by the complaining party must be established.624  
The requirement of “legitimate expectations” to establish a benefit is contained in both the 
GATT and the General Agreement on Trade Services (GATS), as elaborated below:  
Notably, the requirement of existence of “legitimate expectations” of benefit found its way into the 
GATT 1947 disputes settlement practice, even though the Article XXIII:1(b) of GATT 1947 did not 
explicitly refer to it. Similarly, Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994 does not indicate such a 
requirement. The only exception, under the WTO Agreem nts’ relevant Articles, is Article XXIII:3 
of the GATS Agreement, which explicitly requires such a concept for the element “benefits accruing” 
to exist.625 
Article 26.1 of the Understanding of Dispute Settlement (DSU) also gives some elaboration 
of such a non-violation claim, as reviewed by one authority as follows: 
[T]he chapeau of Article 26:1 of the DSU elaborates on the meaning of non-violation nullificat on 
or impairment. It both confirms that DSU procedures apply to this claim, and modifies them…. 
Most significantly, read together, Paras 1(b) to (d) imply a WTO Member prevailing on a 
non-violation nullification or impairment claim has no right to retaliate (i.e., to withdraw 
concessions) against the losing Member. 626 
Furthermore, according to the same authority, the notio  of “legitimate expectations” 
represents an evident distinction between violation and non-violation claims:                   
[A] “violation” claim under Article XXIII:1(a) [] means the complaint alleges the respondent has 
implemented a trade measure violating some provision of GATT (or an accord negotiated 
thereunder). The expectations of the complaint are irrelevant to a “violation” case. What matters is 
whether the disputed measure does, or does not, dergat  from GATT disciplines.627 
Although the civil law tradition, as the place of origin of the notion of “legitimate 
                                                 
624 Kern Alexander & Mads Tønnesson Andenæs, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND TRADE IN SERVICES 
539 (2008). 
625 Id. at 538-539. 
626 The contents of Article 26.1 is summarized as follows: 
First, Para.1(a) calls for a more rigorous pleading, namely, a “detailed justification,” than a typical se. 
Secondly, sub-Para.1(b) makes clear there is no obligation to withdraw a measure. The logic is there is no 
allegation or legal conclusion the measure violates  GATT obligation. Thirdly, sub-Para.1(c) explains a 
decision of an arbitrator about the level of benefits nullified or impaired is not binding on the parties. 
Fourthly, sub-Para.1(d) modifies the preference in Article 22:1 of the DSU, which is for full compliance over 
compensation or retaliation. In effect, sub-Para.1(d) says in a non-violation case, compensation is the 
preferred as a remedy, which follows logically from the fact sub-Para.1(b) does not require full compliance 
(in the sense of withdrawal of the measure). Raj Bhala, MODERN GATT LAW: A TREATISE ON THE GENERAL 
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 1154 (2005) [hereinafter Bhala-GATT]. 
627 Id. at 1152. 
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expectations, is able to provide a sophisticated foundation regarding the application of the 
pertinent notion, the WTO has been trying to develop its own rules in applying this notion. Three 
cases in particular have made significant contributions to establish such rules. Those cases, as 
discussed below, are Japan – Film (the DS 44 case), EC – Computer Equipment (the DS 
62/67/68 case), and EC – Asbestos (the DS 135 case). 
1. Case of Japan – Film  
In the Case of Japan – Film, actions adopted by the Japanese Government affecting the 
distribution, offering for sale, and internal sale of imported consumer photographic film and 
paper were challenged by the United States. The following excerpt gives an explanation of how 
the elements of “legitimate expectations” were established by the DSB in this case. In short, the 
DSB held that in order for expectations of a benefit to be legitimate, the challenged measures 
must not have been reasonably anticipated at the time of negotiations of the commitments 
resulting in such benefit.  
The practice, as developed under the GATT 47/WTO dispute settlement, has established standard 
for determining the existence of expectation and its legitimacy or reasonableness. It has been 
established that in order for expectations of a benefit to be legitimate, the challenged measures must 
not have been reasonably anticipated at the time of n gotiations of the commitments resulting in 
such benefit. If the measures were expected, at that ime, no legitimate expectation of benefits 
accruing to from the relevant agreement, could exist. In Japan-Film, the panel explicitly linked the 
“non-expectation of a measure” with the legitimacy of expectation of improved market access could 
exist.628 
To sum up, the essential elements of the principle of “legitimate expectations”, as 
established in this case involving Japan, are: 
• The existence of expectation basing on action or omission by an actor; and 
• The legally valid justification of the expectation (reasonableness).629  
2. Case of EC – Computer Equipment  
The Case of EC – Computer Equipment is another important one that helped the DSB 
                                                 
628 Alexander & Andenæs , supra note 624, at 539. 
629 Id. 
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establish its rules for applying the notion of “legitimate expectations.” In this case, the European 
Communities’ application of tariffs on local area networks was challenged by the United States. 
One of the pivotal arguments of the United States is that the EU Schedule of Concessions is to 
be interpreted based on an exporter’s legitimate exp ctations. This argument received support 
from the Panel, as summarized by an authority as follows: 
The critical aspect of the American argument concered a concept known in GATT practice as 
“legitimate expectations,” or (more or less equivalently) “reasonable expectations.”630 … 
[T]he Panel felt it appropriate to ascertain the meaning of “ADP equipment” by examining the 
legitimate expectations of an exporting WTO Member.  
[For the Panel,] application of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which 
permits examination of the object and purpose of an accord, indicates that “legitimate expectations” 
have not just a complementary or supplementary role to play, but are an essential interpretative 
device.631  
The finding of the Panel that “legitimate expectations” can be an essential interpretative 
device under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention was, however, reversed by the Appellate Body, 
which completely denied the role of “legitimate expctations” in interpreting a Schedule of 
Concessions. The succeeding excerpt gives a summary of the Appellate Body’s opinion: 
The Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s holding that t e meaning of a tariff concession in a 
Schedule may be ascertained in light of the legitima e expectations of an exporting Member.  
[For the Appellate Body,] [t]he GATT concept of “legitimate expectations,” or “reasonable 
expectations,” arose in the context of, and was design d for, this cause of action, i.e. where there is 
no affirmative claim of a violation of a provision f GATT, but where there is an allegation that 
benefits accruing are being nullified or impaired because of application of a trade measure that may 
be consistent with GATT. … 
[And] the Panel was wrong to think the Vienna Convention called for an examination of the 
legitimate expectations of an exporting WTO Member to assure the security and predictability of 
tariff concessions.632 
The significance of the Case of EC – Computer Equipment is further summarized by the 
                                                 
630 According to Bhala, the gist of the American argument is also what in a basic Anglo-American contract l w 
course would be dubbed “promissory estoppel.” Unfortunately, for the United States, the Appellate Body neither 
applied nor could apply Anglo-American contract law doctrines of promissory estoppel and detrimental reliance. 
Bhala-GATT, supra note 626, at 292. 
631 Id. at 292-293. 
632 Id. at 293-295. 
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same authority: 
The unmistakable message of EC customs Classification case is in a case of alleged violation of 
Article II, the legitimate (or reasonable) expectations of an exporting WTO Member play no role in 
interpreting the scope or nature of tariff concession  granted by, or the terms in the Schedule of 
Concessions of, an importing Member. … If necessary, that is, if the plain meaning of the text if 
ambiguous and its object and purpose is unclear, then t e adjudicator may look to the historical 
background of the Article, and the circumstances of its conclusion. If expectations are to play any 
role, then it is in a case of non-violation nullification or impairment.633 
3. Case of EC – Asbestos 
It is commonly held that the notion of “legitimate expectations” adopted by Article 
XXIII:1(b) of the GATT can only be applied in non-violation cases. Even in the Case of EC – 
Computer Equipment, the Appellate Body affirmed this assumption based on the following 
reasoning:  
Is it permissible to transport the expectations concept from non-violation to violation causes of 
action? The Appellate Body repeated the answer it had given in a 1998 case involving the WTO 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs”), the India – Patent 
Protection Case. The answer is “absolutely not.” If the concept were transported, then the distinction 
between Article XXIII:1(a) violation cases, and Article XXIII:1(b) non-violation cases, would be 
blurred.634 
The significance of the Case of EC – Asbestos, however, lies in the fact that a 
“contradictory” or “inconsistent” conclusion was made by the Appellate Body compared with 
that of the case of EC – Computer Equipment. In this case, the EU’s trade measures affecting 
asbestos and asbestos-containing products were complained about by Canada. In front of both 
the Panel and the Appellate Body, the EU argued as follows: 
[I]t is important first of all to note that there can be no “legitimate expectations” in the case of a 
measure that is taken to protect human health and c therefore be justified, particularly with regard 
to Article XX(b) of the GATT or Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. … 
The EC claim that the rules on “non-violation” apply only if the measure in question does not fall 
under other provisions of the GATT. …   
In the EC’s view, this means that the potential problem of abuse and bad faith, alluded to by Canada, 
is adequately covered by the “chapeau” of Article XX and there cannot be two sets of provisions 
                                                 
633 Id. at 296. 
634 Id. at 294. 
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(non-violation and the chapeau of Article XX) which address the same problem twice.  The EC 
therefore propose that this argument of Canada also be rejected.635 
In addressing the two central arguments of the EU, the Appellate Body first rebutted the 
EU’s argument that Article XXIII:1(b) does not apply to measures that fall within the scope of 
application of other provisions of the GATT: 
The text of Article XXIII:1(b) stipulates that a claim under that provision arises when a “benefit” is 
being “nullified or impaired” through the “application … of any measure,  whether or not it 
conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement”. (emphasis added)  The wording of the provision, 
therefore, clearly states that a claim may succeed, un er Article XXIII:1(b), even if the measure 
“conflicts” with some substantive provisions of the GATT 1994.  It follows that a measure may, at 
one and the same time, be inconsistent with, or in b each of, a provision of the GATT 1994 and, 
nonetheless, give rise to a cause of action under Article XXIII:1(b).  Of course, if a measure 
“conflicts” with a provision of the GATT 1994, that measure must actually fall within the scope of 
application of that provision of the GATT 1994. We … support the view that Article XXIII:1(b) 
applies to measures which simultaneously fall within e scope of application of other provisions of 
the GATT 1994. Accordingly, we decline the European Communities’ first ground of appeal under 
Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994.636 
In the second place, the Appellate Body dismissed th  EU’s argument that Article XXIII:1(b) 
applies to commercial measures only and does not apply to measures pursuing health objectives: 
[W]e look to the text of Article XXIII:1(b), which provides that “the application by another Member 
of any measure” may give rise to a cause of action under that provisi n. The use of the word “any” 
suggests that measures of all types may give rise to uch a cause of action. The text does not 
distinguish between, or exclude, certain types of measure. Clearly, therefore, the text of Article 
XXIII:1(b) contradicts the European Communities’ argument that certain types of measure, namely, 
those with health objectives, are excluded from the scope of application of Article XXIII:1(b).637         
4. Rules for applying the notion of “legitimate expectations” 
In drawing guidance from the cases summarized above, we can conclude that according to 
the DSB practices, the WTO has established its own rules in applying the borrowed notion of 
“legitimate expectations” in multilateral dispute sttlement. These rules have the following 
features: 
                                                 
635 WTO, Panel Report, WT/DS135/R, ¶ 3.515, 3.527 & 3.531, September 18, 2000 [hereinaft r WTO- 
WT/DS135/R]. 
636 WTO, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS135/AB/R, ¶187, March 12, 2001 [hereinafter 
WTO-WT/DS135/AB/R]. 
637 Id. ¶188-189. 
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• The essential elements of the notion include: (1) the existence of expectation basing on 
action or omission by an actor; and (2) the legally valid Justification of the expectation 
(reasonableness). 
• The party complaining under Article XXIII:1(b) has no right to retaliate to the losing 
party. 
• The notion cannot serve as an interpretative device und r Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
• The application of the notion is not limited to cases of commercial measures. 
• The notion can be applied to measures that fall within the scope of application of other 
provisions of the GATT other than Article XXIII:1(b). 
C. Admissibility of Amicus Curiae Submissions 
The influence of WTO Members – and the stronger influence of its stronger members – can 
be seen not only in the formulation and interpretation of WTO agreements but also in the 
practices and procedures followed by the DSB. In particular, the Case of US – Shrimp (the DS 
58 case) demonstrated how the United States persuaded the Appellate Body to establish an 
important rule in judicial proceedings as to the admissibility of amicus curiae638 submissions. In 
the text of the DSU itself, the admissibility of briefs by non-governmental organizations (amicus 
curiae) is not clear. 
In the Case of US – Shrimp, the United States attached to its own brief some briefs from 
non-governmental organizations. The Appellate Body, based on the following reasoning, 
permitted such submission:  
We consider that the attaching of a brief or other material to the submission of either appellant or 
appellee, no matter how or where such material may have originated, renders that material at least 
prima facie an integral part of that participant’s submission. On the one hand, it is of course for a 
participant in an appeal to determine for itself what to include in its submission. On the other hand, 
a participant filing a submission is properly regarded as assuming responsibility for the contents of 
that submission, including any annexes or other attachments. 
In the present appeal, the United States has made it clear that its views “on the legal issues in this
appeal” are found in “the main U.S. submission.” The United States has confirmed its agreement 
with the legal arguments in the attached submission of the non-governmental organizations, to the 
extent that those arguments “concur with the U.S. arguments set out in [its] main submission.” 
… [C]onsidering that the United States has itself accepted the briefs in a tentative and qualified 
                                                 
638 These are briefs filed by a friend of the court, i.e. one that is not a party to the case at bar. Bhala-Dictionary, 
supra note 15, at 22. 
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manner only, we focus in the succeeding sections below on the legal arguments in the main U.S. 
appellant’s submission.639 
One of the grounds on which the United States could s ccessfully persuade the Appellate 
Body to admit the amicus briefs, as indicated by the above excerpt, is that the United States 
emphasized that it had used the briefs submitted “in a tentative and qualified manner.” By 
agreeing with this approach, the Appellate Body established simultaneously a condition for 
admitting amicus curiae briefs – the opinions contained in the briefs concur with the opinions in 
the main submissions largely. Such admission of amicus curiae submissions provides one more 
illustration of the outward indigenization of multila eral practices by an individual member. 
II.  Legal Indigenization in the Context of Further Negotiations 
The efforts of legal indigenization at the multilateral level will almost surely continue to 
influence further negotiations on multilateral trade rules initiated by the Doha Development 
Round (DDA). In Chapters 3, 4, and 5, I analyze how the three members have tried to make their 
participation in international negotiations compatible with their own legal traditions and cultures. 
In this part, I seek to compare, at the multilateral level, competing opinions these countries hold 
toward the same critical topics of the DDA – that is, I emphasize the divergence among their 
opinions arising from the efforts to indigenize multilateral rules. For this purpose, I concentrate 
in the following pages on four topics, both substantive and procedural, that are essential to the 
DDA and that are selected from a wide coverage of multilateral trade negotiations. They are: 
S&D treatment, fisheries subsidies, environment, and the DSU.  
A. Competing (Indigenized) Views on S&D Treatment 
Before we examine the specific proposals made by China, the United States, and the EU on 
S&D treatment, I would like to point out first that the divergence among their opinions on “S&D 
treatment” may particularly derive from their different understanding of the term “development” 
contained in the term “Doha Development Agenda.” My observation of the Chinese proposals 
                                                 
639 WTO, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS58/AB/R, October 12, 1998, ¶88-91 [hereinafter 
WTO-WT/DS58/AB/R]. 
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shows that “sustainability” seems largely a slogan for China. When coming to specific proposals, 
the term “development” mainly refers to social development, especially economic development, 
in developing countries, which can be achieved mainly by improving the treatment granted to 
developing countries by the multilateral system. For the other two members, especially the EU, 
the term “development” stands for “sustainable development,” which should be achieved by 
increasing emphasis on S&D treatment in a broad context of sustainability (such as 
environmental protection) as well as S&D treatment. The EU’s focus on sustainable 
development is demonstrated by the excerpt below cited from its proposals: 
The European Union, like many WTO Members, believes that the Multilateral Trading System has a 
key role to play in the achievement of global sustainable development. This was underlined by the 
4th Session of the WTO Ministerial in Doha and the launch of the Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA).640 
Bearing this in mind, we can better understand, as explained in the following paragraphs, 
the discrepant views among these key players with regard to further negotiations on S&D 
treatment. 
1. China  
In a proposal on antidumping and countervailing duties, China argued that it was necessary, 
according to the Doha Ministerial Declaration, to grant S&D treatment to developing and 
least-developed participants.641 In other words, for China, strengthening S&D treatment should 
be the major approach to realize “development.” Also in this same proposal, China 
recommended some specific provisions with regard to an idumping and countervailing issues, 
which focus more on granting preferential treatment than improving specific rules.642  
                                                 
640 The European Communities, Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs): Implem ntation of the Doha 
Development Agenda, TN/TE/W/1, March 21, 2002 [hereinafter EU- TN/TE/W/1]. 
641 China-TN/RL/W/66, supra note 163. 
642 The suggestions focus on preferential treatment include mainly: (1) lesser duty rule should be mandatory in 
the application of anti-dumping measures by developed country Members on the imports from developing country 
Members; (2) the negligible volume of dumped imports under Article 5.8 should be increased from 3 per cent to 5 
per cent for imports from developing Members; and the existing de minimis dumping margin under Article 5.8 
should be increased from 2 per cent to 5 per cent of export price for imports from developing country Members; (3) 
in the application of anti-dumping measures by develop d country Members on the imports from developing 
country Members, the investigating authorities of the former shall accept the proposal of price undertakings from 
the exports concerned as long as the proposal of the undertaking offsets the dumping margin determined; an  (4) in 
cases of anti-dumping measures taken by developed country Members against exports from developing country 
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In most cases, the pertinent approach adopted by China is to underscore the significance of 
granting S&D treatment but to avoid providing recommendations on specific provisions. The 
following paragraphs can serve as the illustrations f such approach. 
In a proposal on fisheries subsidies, China urged granting S&D treatment to developing 
members: 
Special and differential treatment to developing countries, particularly to the least developed 
countries, is an important principle in the WTO and has been consistently emphasized in previous 
rounds of negotiations. With regard to the fisheries subsidies, it is already pointed out in the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration that participant should take into account the importance of this sector to 
developing countries. Therefore, S&D treatment should be accorded to developing countries while 
participants aim to clarify and improve the disciplines on fisheries subsidies.643 
Similarly, in a proposal on market access for non-agricultural products, China made these 
suggestions relating to granting preferential treatment to developing countries: 
Longer implementation period shall be given to developing country Members and more flexibility 
to least developed country Members with regard to binding of tariffs, conversion of ad valorem 
tariffs, elimination of tariff peaks and tariff escalations. 
Those sectors and products of substantial export interest to developing country Members and least 
developed country Members shall be subject to reduction as priorities in the negotiations. As regards 
the newly-acceded Members, their reduction commitmen s shall be fully taken into consideration 
and no further reduction shall be required.644 
Moreover, in respect of environmental goods, China recommended drafting separately a 
common list and a development list, without further proposing the content of each list. Studying 
closely the Chinese proposals involving S&D treatment, we can observe that, in most cases, 
Chinese proposals: 
• are principled – they only reiterated the significan e of incorporating S&D treatment 
but give no further specific recommendations (except in the proposal on antidumping 
and countervailing duties mentioned above and in the one on DSB discussed in a 
following section of “on reform of the DSB);” 
• give more attention to “treatment” than to “rules-making;” 
                                                                                                                                                
Members, such measures shall automatically cease after five years. And no application to initiate new investigations 
against the same products from the same developing country Members shall be accepted 365 days after ceasing of 
the sunset of previous measures. 
643 China-TN/RL/W/9, supra note 161. 
644 China-TN/MA/W/20, supra note 162. 
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• address little about the different needs among developing or least-developed countries – 
in Chinese proposals, they are all treated as belonging to one single group; 
• address the mandatory nature of S&D treatment; and 
• care little about technical assistance or capacity building. 
Inside China, there always exists a voice arguing that China is playing a game with western 
countries in the WTO under the rules made by these western countries, and that China cannot 
benefit a lot from a game that is controlled by others. S&D treatment, consequently, may become 
an opportunity for China to operate with less limitation imposed by western countries. This 
expected situation is, on the contrary, the one that the United States and other rule-makers have 
been trying to avoid. For these international rule-makers, the emergence of a “second class” of 
countries – subject to a separate set of rules – should not be permitted. China, by contrast, has 
tried to insert such separate rules whenever and wherever possible.  
2. The United States 
For the United States, the approach of negotiating future S&D treatment and provisions 
should be the same as that adopted earlier – that is,  two-step approach which gives priority to 
negotiations on general rules over those on S&D provisi ns.  
This two-step approach advocated by the United States derives from its firm belief that the 
nature of S&D treatment is transnational and exceptional. This belief is illustrated by a proposal 
on the subsidies agreement submitted by the United S ates, as follows: 
The Subsidies Agreement envisions that over time, all countries will be subject to a single set of 
disciplines; the special and differential treatment provisions were not intended to be in effect for 
perpetuity. … Upon reaching “export competitiveness” in a particular product however, developing 
and lesser-developed countries must also phase out their export subsidies with respect to that 
particular product.645 
The nature of S&D treatment as an exception rather than a fundamental mandate of the 
WTO, as held by the United States, was confirmed by the following excerpt from a proposal on 
fisheries subsidies, in which the United States argued that a rule-based system should be 
combined with S&D treatment “only where appropriate”: 
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The United States is confident that the certainty ad predictability of adhering to a rules-based 
system, combined with a thoughtful recourse to special and differential treatment provisions only 
where appropriate, are the best way to promote long-term trade liberalization and economic 
growth.646 
Likewise, in a proposal on market access for non-agricultural products, the United States 
reaffirmed its insistence on the two-step approach of negotiating S&D treatment as follows: 
As a first step in the negotiations, Members should secure agreement on the modalities and a 
common vision for the result of our negotiation. Once achieved, WTO Members should turn to 
more precise and customised approaches to ensure participation by individual developing countries, 
particularly the least-developed country Members, consistent with their individual development 
needs.647 
Recalling the exceptional nature of S&D treatment, the United States addressed the need to 
examine the necessity to incorporate S&D provision before substantive negotiation, as expressed 
below: 
The United States looks forward to working with Members to examine the question of whether 
appropriate transition mechanisms would be necessary to address particular needs [of developing 
countries].648 
3. The EU 
For the EU, sustainability impact assessments (SIAs) lie at the very center of its 
methodology in undertaking further trade negotiations. This is evidenced by the EU’s 
comprehensive research submitted to the WTO with regard to SIAs, and it reflects the emphasis 
(as identified above) that the EU places on sustainability. 649 
The broad understanding of the term “development” as contained in the term “Doha 
Development Agenda” has also been mirrored by the EU’s analysis on the “development 
dimension” of regional trade agreements. In a 2002 proposal, the EU argued that all “economic 
development, structural and regulatory reforms, and sustainable development” should be 
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647 USA-TN/MA/W/18, supra note 298. 
648 USA-TN/TF/W/12, supra note 305. 
649 The European Communities, Sustainability Impact Assessment, WT/COMTD/W/99, WT/CTE/W/208, 
TN/TE/W/3, June 3, 2002 [hereinafter EU-WT/COMTD/W/99]. 
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addressed in order to improve the multilateral mechanism of regional trade agreements.650 
With regard to the proper sequence of negotiating general rules and S&D treatment, the EU 
agreed with the U.S. two-step approach, as expressed below: 
A special and clearly defined developing country package should be prepared once clear, effective 
and updated rules for all WTO Members have been discussed.  Only such a two-step approach will 
allow the identification of those areas where, on top of the general rules, the special needs of 
developing countries call for additional action.651 
Moreover, for the EU, the overarching principle of assessing proposals on S&D treatment is 
to meet the test of aiding development and integration into the WTO system, as opposed to 
permanent exclusion or ‘second class’ Membership.652 
Furthermore, the method by which negotiations should be conducted on S&D treatment in 
multi-topic work programs and in the work of the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) 
is elaborated by the following excerpt contained in a proposal submitted by the EU: 
The EC recalls the link between the work programme on S&D treatment and the overall WTO Doha 
Work Programme, as stated in paragraph 50 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration. In particular, the 
EC notes that the work of the CTD in Special Session will be without prejudice to work in respect 
of implementation of WTO Agreements in the General Council and in other Councils and 
Committees. … S&D questions now being addressed in the negotiations (e.g. on Rules) also would 
not need to be separately addressed in the CTD although the CTD should be aware of those 
discussions so that coherence of approach can be maintained in accordance with paragraph 51 of the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration.653 
The Doha Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns established three 
pillars aimed at strengthening S&D treatment provisi n  which were reiterated in an EU 
proposal.654 In order to implement the pillars, the EU put forwa d several guidelines that would 
                                                 
650 EU-TN/RL/W/14, supra note 465. 
651 EU-TN/CTD/W/13, supra note 458. 
652 EU- TN/CTD/W/20, supra note 463. 
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654 The three pillars reiterated by the EU include: (i) identify those S&D treatment provisions that are lr ady 
mandatory in nature and those that are non-binding in character and identify those provisions that Memb rs consider 
should be made mandatory; (ii) consider ways in which S&D treatment provisions can be made more effectiv , 
including especially ways in which developing countries, in particular the least-developed countries, may be 
assisted to make use of S&D treatment provisions; ad (iii) consider how S&D treatment may be incorporated into 
the architecture of WTO rules. Id. 
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be particularly useful in steering future work on S&D treatment, as enumerated in subsection 
IB7 of Chapter 5.655 
Moreover, according to EU proposals, the improvement of S&D treatment should take into 
account of the needs, interests and specific circumstances of different countries as well as the 
different nature of WTO commitment.656 This approach differs from the Chinese approach 
described above – treating all developing countries as comprising a single group. 
Lastly, the EU has repeatedly emphasized technical assistance and capacity building as a 
part of the task of further strengthening S&D treatment. For example, in a proposal on fisheries 
subsidies, the EU suggested “special help” for some countries:  
Perhaps the best way forward here is to consider a phase-in period of several years for developing 
countries.  During this phase-in, these countries should be given special help via an intensive 
programme on how to set up a comprehensive system for transparency and enforcement which 
could be either WTO based or introduced as a domestic control system.657 
Similar focus on technical assistance and capacity building also appears in the proposals on 
Article VIII 658 and on environmental goods659submitted by the European Union to the WTO.   
B. Competing (Indigenized) Views on Environment 
Environmental issues have steadily taken on more significance in trade agreements and 
negotiations. In the DDA context, two central topics on environmental issues are (i) a 
clarification of the status of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) within the 
multilateral trading system and (ii) the identification of environmental goods. These are 
discussed below, again from the Chinese, U.S. and EU perspective. 
                                                 
655 EU-TN/CTD/W/20, supra note 463. 
656 EU-TN/CTD/W/13, supra note 458. 
657 The European Communities, Fisheries Subsidies, TN/RL/W/178, April 11, 2005 [hereinafter 
EU-TN/RL/W/178]. 
658 The European Communities, Improvements to GATT Article VIII on Formalities and Requirements 
Connected with Importation and Exportation and Related Proposals on Special and Differential Treatment and 
Technical Assistance, TN/TF/W/46, June 9, 2005 [hereinafter EU-TN/TF/W/46]. 
659 The European Communities, EC Submission on Environmental Goods, TN/TE/W/56, July 5, 2005 
[hereinafter EU-TN/TE/W/56]. 
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1. China  
With regard to identifying environmental goods, China has suggested developing separately 
“a common list” and “a development list” of environmental goods, which partially reflects that 
country’s focus on S&D treatment. According to China: 
A Common List means a list for all, which comprises pecific product lines on which there is 
consensus that they constitute environmental goods.  The products included in this list should 
reflect the interests of both developed and developing Members. … 
A Development List is a list for S&D treatment born f om the common list, which comprises those 
products selected by developing and least-developed Members from the common list for exemption 
or a lower level of reduction commitment, with a view to reflecting the principle of less than full 
reciprocity, taking into consideration the needs of their economic development and the vulnerability 
of their relevant domestic industries in the area of environmental goods.660 
On the other issue noted above – the status of MEAs – China has put forward five elements 
that would be used to identify an MEA: 
• Authoritativeness: MEAs should have been negotiated under the auspice  of the United Nations 
system.  The Agreements should be deposited with Secretary-General of the UN or Director 
Generals of the relevant specialized agencies of the UN. 
• Universality: An MEA in question should have a substantial number of contracting parties 
which account for a majority of WTO Members. 
• Openness: The agreement should be open for accession by relevant parties, which is eligible on 
the terms applied to the original contracting parties of the agreement. 
• Impact on trade: MEAs should contain explicit trade measures; the implementation of these 
measures should exert a substantial impact on trade. 
• Effectiveness: A selected MEA should be in force and open for accession.661 
Moreover, China has further suggested five elements for the purpose of identifying a 
special trade obligation (STO): 
• Objective: The measures are designed to achieve the objective of MEAs, i.e., to protect and 
improve environment and to protect natural resources. 
• Trade-related: Measures that we all recognize from the WTO context as being related to import 
and export, and whose implementation can exert an actual impact on trade.   
• Relevance: Trade measures stipulated in MEAs that are related to WTO disciplines. 
                                                 
660 China-TN/TE/W/42, supra note 165. 
661 China-TN/TE/W/35/Rev. 1, supra note 171. 
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• Mandatory: Trade measures that are explicitly provided for and mandatory in MEAs.   
• Specificity: Measures to be implemented must be explicitly provided for and clearly identified 
in the Agreement. They must not be arbitrarily interpr ted or substituted by other measures.662 
In addition, after categorizing STOs into five categories – (1) STOs under preamble of 
MEAs; (2) STOs under provisions of MEAs; (3) STOs under annexes of MEAs; (4) STOs under 
amendments of MEAs; and (5) STOs in the decision of the Conference of Parties (COP) of 
MEAs – China has elaborated their legal effect as follows: 
STOs set out in the provisions and annexes of MEAs are the least disputable.  It is reasonable to 
regard the amendments of MEAs and decisions by the COPs as constituent parts of MEAs.  
However, given the various situations in which the amendments and decisions were made, it is 
preferable that STOs contained therein be identified on a case-by-case basis.663 
Based on the above views expressed by China on identifying MEAs, STOs, and their legal 
effect, it appears that China has tried to identify a relatively narrow scope of MEAs and STOs by 
imposing strict requirements for such identification.  
2. The United States  
The method proposed by the United States to identify environmental goods is simple and 
direct – to list explicitly all the goods that should be identified as environmental goods. This list,
as explained by the United State, is based on a practical, bottom-up approach to identifying 
environmental goods.664 In addition, this approach focuses on end-use critria (e.g., goods 
which are used to clean the environment or to contain or prevent pollution), and does not rely on 
product distinctions based on process or production methods (PPM-based criteria) or end-use 
certificates.665 
As to the issue of MEAs, the United States submitted a paper to the Committee on Trade 
and Environment in June 2002666 setting out ideas to improve cooperation between WTO bodies 
                                                 
662 Id. 
663 Id. 
664 USA-TN/TE/W/52, supra note 286. 
665 Id. 
666 The United States, Contribution of the United States on Paragraph 31(Ii) of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration, TN/TE/W/5, June 6, 2002 [hereinafter USA-TN/TE/W/5]. 
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and MEA secretariats in two main areas: information exchange and observer status. In a 
follow-up proposal of February 20, 2007, the United States gave further elaborations on these 
ideas from the perspectives of “information sessions” and “document exchange.”667 
Moreover, in the same 2007 submission the United States has given its opinion on 
“observer status” within the MEA Secretariats. It has clarified that “the mandate of paragraph 
31(ii) of the Doha Ministerial Declaration concerning criteria for granting observer status is 
limited to the question of observer status for relevant MEA secretariats. The mandate does not 
extend to the more general issue of observer status in the WTO.”668 The U.S. submission 
reaffirms that observer status is decided on a council or committee basis. Furthermore, the 
United States has urged that “in the event that a decision cannot be reached on an MEA observer 
request, WTO bodies be encouraged to invite that MEA to relevant meetings on an ad hoc 
basis.”669 It is evident, compared with the proposals of China, that the attention given to 
MEAs-related issues by the United States is from the perspective more of the organization than 
from that of an individual member. This emphasis partially demonstrates the inclination of the 
United States to view this issue from an organizational more than a member’s perspective and to 
underline the operational more than theoretical aspect of the issue.  
3. The EU 
The EU has put trade-related environmental issues into the context of global governance, 
saying that such issues relate “to the functioning of the global governance system and, in 
particular, to the necessary links between bodies of law dealing with international trade and 
environment which both form part of a global system.”670  
The EU has also worked out some principles regarding both (1) dealing with environmental 
issues in this context of global governance671 and (2) the relationship between 
                                                 
667 USA- TN/TE/W/70, supra note 285. 
668 Id. 
669 Id. 
670 EU-TN/TE/W/1, supra note 640. See also The EU, The Relationship between WTO Rules And MEAs in the 
Context of the Global Governance System, TN/TE/W/39, March 24, 2004 [hereinafter EU-TN/TE/W/39]. 
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environment-related rules and MEAs in the context of a global governance system.672  
Addressing that the WTO’s definition of an MEA should be limited to trade-related 
issues,673 the EU argued that an MEA at issue should exhibit the following features:  
(a) The agreement should have been negotiated underthe aegis of the UN or one of its agencies or 
programmes, such as UNEP, or under procedures for negotiation open for participation of all WTO 
Members; 
(b) the agreement should be open for accession by ay WTO Members on terms which are 
equitable in relation to those which apply to original Members; 
(c) if the agreement is regional in nature, the elem nts above should apply to all countries in the 
region, i.e. openness in negotiation and accession. Moreover, the agreement should also be “open” 
to any countries outside the region whose interests may be affected by the agreement.674 
The above definition and elements demonstrate the EU’s attempt to define MEAs broadly. 
On the one hand, it has not taken “universality” as an element of the MEAs, as China has done. 
On the other hand, it has added regional elements into the scope of MEAs. 
As for STOs are concerned, the EU has classified th environmental measures revolving 
around trade obligations into the following four categories as follows: 
• Trade measures explicitly provided for and mandatory under MEAs. 
• Trade measures not explicitly provided for nor mandatory under the MEA itself but 
consequential of the “obligation de résultat” of the MEA.   
• Trade measures not identified in the MEA which has only an “obligation de résultat” but that 
Parties could decide to implement in order to comply with their obligations.   
• Trade measures not required in the MEA but which Parties can decide to implement if the MEA 
contains a general provision stating that parties can adopt stringent measures in accordance with 
international law.675 
The EU reaffirmed its approach to broadly define MEAs and STOs in a proposal dated May 
14, 2003, working on the relationship between MEAs and the WTO Agreements. In the same 
proposal, the EU underscored the issue of general binding effect of MEAs and all subsequent 
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Conference of the Parties (COP) decisions.676 Furthermore, the EU has worked out two 
principles to guide the identification of environmental goods, as enumerated in subsection IB7 of 
Chapter 5.677  
Resting in these two principles, the EU has classified two general categories of 
environmental goods as well as their subcategories: (1) goods used in pollution control and 
resource management,678 and (2) goods that have a high environmental performance or low 
environmental impacts.679 These categories are broader than those identified by the United 
States. 
Generally, the Chinese proposals suggested a narrow nd theoretical scope of MEAs. The 
United States submitted a relatively broad and operational description of MEAs. The EU 
proposed a similarly broad but theoretical definition thereof. 
C. Competing (Indigenized) Views on Fisheries Subsidies 
The approaches adopted by the three members – the United States, the EU, and China – in 
respect of disciplining fisheries subsidies give us another example of the divergence among these 
countries in their efforts to create and implement future multilateral rules.  
1. China  
The approach adopted by China with regard to discipl ning fisheries subsidies is quite the 
same as that adopted in traditional subsidies discipl nes – that is, to prohibit those distorting 
trade and to exempt those listed in the excerpt below: 
                                                 
676 The European Communities, The Relationship between MEAs and WTO Agreements: “Set out in MEAs”, 
TN/TE/W/31, May 14, 2003 [hereinafter EU-TN/TE/W/31]. 
677 EU-TN/TE/W/56, supra note 659. 
678 This category includes technologies and goods usedin the provision of environmental services for pollution 
control or resource management, and technologies that reduce emissions or resource consumption. The European 
Communities, Market Access for Environmental Goods, TN/TE/W/47, February 17, 2005 [hereinafter 
EU-TN/TE/W/47]. 
679 This category encompasses some of the products identif ed by UNCTAD as products that “cause 
significantly less ‘environmental harm’ than alternative products that serve the same purpose”. It includes goods 
identified on the basis of objective parameters such as composition (e.g., the renewable character of components) 
and/or environmental performance (e.g., energy consumption, efficiency, recycleability/bio-degradability, low/zero 
pollution). Id. 
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Certain subsidies, such as those on infrastructure onstruction, prevention and control of disease, 
scientific research and training, fisherman’s switching to other business, have no adverse effect on 
trade, environment and sustainable development. Moreover, such subsidies contribute to the 
protection of environment and sustainable development of fishery resources. Therefore, these 
subsidies should be defined as “non-actionable” subsidies and should not be challenged.680 
Although China has realized the relationship between fisheries subsidies and sustainable 
development to some extent, the approach it has adopte  is quite traditional, in the sense that, for 
China, the significance of fishery subsidies it hasaddressed still adheres to the effect of subsidies 
on trade distortion, similar to other kinds of subsidies, rather the facet of fishery subsidies that 
relates to sustainability or environmental protection.  
2. The United States  
With regard to fisheries subsidies, the U.S. proposals have used much ink on addressing the 
particular significance of fisheries subsidies and  sustainable way to use them. In a proposal of 
March 19, 2003, the United States recommended expanding the category of prohibited (“red 
light”) fisheries subsidies based on the considerations stated below:  
As an initial matter, it should be emphasized that e goal of clarified and improved rules is to 
provide better disciplines on government programmes that promote overcapacity and overfishing, or 
have other trade-distorting effects.… Better disciplines on fisheries subsidies that promote 
overcapacity and overfishing should also contribute to reductions in illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing, a charge given by world leaders in the Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development. Furthermore, by addressing 
fisheries subsidies, significant environmental and developmental benefits are likely to be realized.681   
In short, the reason for the United States to expand the prohibited fisheries subsidies is that 
these types of subsidies have adverse impact on environment and sustainability, rather trade 
distortion as concentrated on by China. 
3. The EU 
According to a proposal submitted by the EU, it hasmade a clear strategic choice to adjust 
the objectives of its fisheries policy to ensure sustainable development in environmental, 
                                                 
680 China-TN/RL/W/9, supra note 161.  
681 USA-TN/RL/W/77, supra note 275. 
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economic, and social terms. Consequently, one of the outcomes of the reform process is the 
decision to take measures to reach a stable and lasting balance between the capacity of fishing 
fleets and the available resources.682 
The relationship of fisheries subsidies and sustainable development as well as its legal basis 
has been elaborated by the EU as follows:  
It is … evident that restoring and maintaining fisheries resources at sustainable levels will require 
that capacity enhancing subsidies are addressed dirctly to tackle the problem of overcapacity…. 
… The “chapeau” of paragraph 31 reminds negotiators of one of the main aims of the negotiations, 
namely, to enhance “the mutual supportiveness of trade and the environment”. Addressing those 
fisheries subsidies that have negative effects on fisheries resources will undoubtedly contribute to 
this objective. 
Bearing in mind the significance of fisheries subsidies to sustainable development, the EU 
has set out three main pillars of future subsidy disciplines on fisheries: 
 (1) certain types of capacity enhancing subsidies, such as subsidies for marine fishing fleet 
renewal and subsidies for the permanent transfer of fishing vessels to third countries, 
should be prohibited;  
(2) certain types of subsidies – which are necessary in order to achieve the objective of 
reducing fishing capacity, and to mitigate negative social and economic consequences 
of the restructuring of the fisheries sector – should be clearly defined and permitted; and  
(3) provision should also be made for the review of these lists of “prohibited” and 
“permitted” subsidies, both in terms of their operation and to consider whether they 
should be modified to further advance the ultimate aim, which is to match capacity to 
the available fish and so contribute to the sustainable exploitation of fishery 
resources.683 
A scrutiny of the above excerpt reveals that, for the EU, “trade distortion” should no longer 
                                                 
682 The European Communities, Submission of the European Communities to the Negotiating Group on Rules – 
Fisheries Subsidies, TN/RL/W/82, April 23, 2003 [hereinafter EU-TN/RL/W/82]. 
683 The European Communities, Fisheries Subsidies, TN/RL/GEN/134, April 24, 2006 [hereinafter 
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be a standard or element of future subsidy disciplines on fisheries. As reaffirmed by the EU, the 
guiding principle on such discipline should be that “public aid can under no circumstances 
contribute to overcapacity.” 
D. Competing (Indigenized) Views on Reform of the DSB  
In addition to substantive issues, the proposals of the three members referred to above on 
reforming procedural issues have also been made with their own characteristics. As explained 
below, these proposals provide further examples of how future negotiations will also surely 
reflect the kind of “indigenization” explored in earlier chapters. 
1. China  
Chinese proposals on DSB reform can be summarized as “S&D treatment centered.” In its 
2003 proposal on Improving the Special and Differential Provisions in the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, China concentrated on three aspects with regard to the reform of the DSU:  
(1) establishing explicit special and differential (S&D) provisions applicable to all 
developing-country Members; 
(2) implementation of recommendations of the panel or the Appellate Body; and  
(3) shortening the time-frame of dispute settlement. 
As for establishing explicit S&D provisions which would be applicable to all 
developing-country Members, China proposed that: 
(a) Developed-country Members shall exercise due restraint in cases against developing-country 
Members.  …. 
(b) Where a developed-country Member brings a case against a developing-country Member, if the 
final rulings of a panel or the Appellate Body show that a developing-country Member does not 
violate its obligations under the WTO agreements, the legal costs of the developing-country 
Member shall be borne by the developed-country Member initiating the dispute settlement 
proceedings. 
(c) Developed-country Members shall help developing-country Members participate in the dispute 
settlement mechanism in a more effective way through providing technical assistance and capacity 
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building programmes.684 
China also proposed that existing S&D provisions in the DSU be strengthened and made 
more effective. Moreover, it suggested that, as a general S&D principle, any rules that would be 
agreed upon in the future negotiations concerning more tightened trade rules than existing ones 
shall not apply to developing-country Members as appro riate.685 In other words, to China, a 
general S&D principle justifies the exclusion of developing countries from being bound b future 
multilateral rules that would impose stricter WTO obligations. 
With respect to implementation of recommendations of the panel or the Appellate Body, 
China expressed the following opinion relating to full compliance by developed members with 
the DSB recommendations, especially in the disputes involving developing countries. “[A] 
developing-country Member will be in an embarrassing situation of being short of necessary 
means for retaliation, although it has been granted th  authority to suspend its concessions.” 
Therefore, “China supports developing-country Members’ right to request developed-country 
Members to make cash compensations in case of the latter’s failure of compliance.”686 As for 
shortening the time-frame of dispute settlement, China recommended shortening the time-frame 
and exempting developing countries from being bound by the shortened time-frame, “in light of 
the lack of resources of developing-country Members.”687 
After making the above recommendations, China proposed (also in 2003) a draft S&D 
provision containing these recommendations as well as some corresponding changes that it 
proposed in relevant articles of the DSU. These included the provision on establishment of a 
panel, the timeframe for safeguard and antidumping cases (as above), and working 
procedures.688 
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2. The United States  
The U.S. proposals on the reform of the DSB can be summarized as “improving 
transparency and practical issues” and characterized as “specific and practical.” The main points 
made by the United States with regard to transparency include opening meetings, timely access 
to submission, timely access to final reports, and micus curiae submissions.689 In a follow-up 
proposal, the United States underscored the importance of these proposals and gave some 
consideration to corresponding practical issues, such as physical presence of the public in the 
procedure of dispute settlement.690 
3. The EU 
On March 13, 2002, the EU submitted a proposal summarizing its previous proposals on the 
reform of the DSU. According to the EU, although these previous documents were produced in 
the context of the Decision on the Application and Review of the DSU, which is no longer 
relevant for the mandate given at Doha, the EU and its member States believe that the points 
made in those earlier documents remain to a large extent relevant for possible improvements to 
the DSU.691 An overall principle guiding the EU proposals on the DSB is to facilitate the 
earliest possible resolution of disputes. On that point, the EU expressed these views: 
It should be recalled at the outset that the purpose of a dispute settlement procedure is the amicable 
– and quick – resolution of a dispute. In this context, the WTO Members should always endeavour 
to solve the dispute at the earliest possible stage, if possible at the consultation stage but also via 
recourse to good offices or mediation by the Director-General, as provided in Article 5 of the DSU. 
The EC and its member States consider that any improvements of the DSU should contribute 
towards this overall goal of facilitating the earliest possible resolution of disputes. Should early 
resolution or timely compliance not prove possible, pr ference should be effectively given to trade 
compensation over trade-restrictive suspensions of concessions.692 
                                                 
689 USA-TN/DS/W/46, supra note 287. Details are contained in Appendix 4.2. 
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That EU submission also reveals its preference for trade compensation over trade-restrictive 
suspensions of concessions in trade disputes. Although China has also expressed similar 
preference on this point as the EU, their reasons are different. For China, compensation is a more 
feasible way than suspension of concession for developing countries to enforce favorable rulings, 
taking into account their disadvantageous status in the multilateral trading system. For the EU, 
however, trade compensation is preferable because it will not further impair the fundamental 
principle or purposes of the WTO, compared with adverse consequence brought by suspension 
of concessions. 
In the above proposal, the EU recommended “moving from ad hoc to more permanent 
panelists.” It gave four reasons to establish permanent panelists: (1) a growing need for panelists, 
(2) increasing complexity of recent cases, (3) promoting the legitimacy and credibility of the 
panel process, and (4) enhancing the involvement of developing countries.693 As discussed 
earlier in Chapter 5, such proposal reflects one featur  of the civil law tradition – the 
characterized role of judges. Another issue that receiv d emphasis from the EU is “transparency.” 
The reason given by the EU that the proceedings should allow public attendance in the DSB 
proceedings is as follows: 
Because “the aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute” 
(Article 3.7 DSU), continuing to keep panel or Appellate Body proceedings not accessible to the 
public should not be a priori excluded, to the extent one of the parties to a dispute consider that this 
can help to resolve the dispute, for the same reasons that consultations can remain confidential. It 
should indeed be remembered that some disputes have found a solution before the circulation of the 
panel report.694 
The difference between the proposals made by the EU and the United States with regard to 
                                                 
693 Id. “The first reason is that there is a growing quantit tive discrepancy between the need for panelists and 
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public attendance in the DSB proceedings is that: te United States has recommended setting the 
“public presence” as a general right that is commonly e joyed by the public, except in the 
circumstances involving confidential information and or methods of law enforcement. The EU, 
however, has suggested that the authority of deciding whether the dispute can be tried in public 
be vested in the disputing parties: 
The DSU should therefore provide sufficient flexibility for parties to decide whether certain parts of 
the proceeding before the panel or the Appellate Body should be open to the public for attendance. 
At the same time, third parties should also have the right to decide whether their interventions 
should take place in open or closed sessions.695 
The fourth issue that the EU has addressed regarding DSB reform is on clarifications and 
modifications of the DSU itself. The EU has concentrated in this respect on some technical 
issues, and proposed a lengthy draft of corresponding clarifications and modifications as well as 
new articles on permanent panelists, amicus curiae submissions, remand procedure, 
determination of compliance, and examination of mutually agreed solutions.  
As for the issue of dealing with S&D treatment in the context of DSB reform, the EU has 
said that it would agree on the need to provide greate  flexibility in the case of a complaint 
against a developing country.696 It can be safely concluded here that the EU has called for the 
most comprehensive and dramatic reforms in the DSU or DSB among the three members. 
The above comparison on the proposals made by China, t e United States, and the EU on 
four specific areas – S&D treatment, fisheries subsidie , environment, and the DSU or DSB – 
reveals to us that, in some critical elements up for discussion in the DDA, deep divergence exists 
among the three members. If we enlarge the picture to embrace all the WTO members, the 
situation will become extremely complicated, since ev ry member tries to make proposals out of 
its own understanding of the DDA and the multilaterl t ading system, and gives preferences to 
approaches or concepts that can best fit into its own legal tradition and culture as well as its 
political and economic interests. The following table illustrates the divergence of the three 
members in those four areas. 
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Table 6.1 Comparison on proposals made by China, the United S ates, and the EU on further trade 
negotiations 
 China The United States The EU 
S&D 
treatment 
Priority of negotiations; 
Incorporation in every trade 
area; 
Mandatory nature. 
Two-step approach in which 
S&D treatment should be 
negotiated after general rules 
have been achieved; 
The necessity of 
incorporating S&D 
provisions might be 
examined before substantive 
negotiations; 
Exception and transition 
mechanism. 
Two-step approach;  
principles should be used in 
guiding further negotiations;  
part of the mandate of 
sustainability. 
 
Fisheries 
subsidies 
Traditional approach 
(prohibition those causing 
trade distortion plus 
exemption of those arising 
from environmental 
concerns). 
Different with other types of 
subsidies due to its 
significance to sustainability. 
Overall principle of 
struggling against 
overcapacity; 
Trade distortion is not a 
standard with regard to 
further disciplining.  
Environment 
Strict definition of MEAs 
and STOs;  
S&D treatment should be 
incorporated with regard to 
identifying environmental 
goods.  
A simple and direct method 
– identifying all 
environmental goods in a 
complete list; 
the relationship of MEAs 
and trade rules is considered 
from the perspective of the 
organization rather an 
individual country. 
A broad definition of MEA 
and STO;  
broad definition of 
environmental goods;  
the relationship of MEAs 
and trade rules is considered 
in the context of global 
governance. 
DSU 
To give S&D treatment as 
much as possible. 
Transparency and practical 
issues. 
Constituents, new designed 
proceedings, 
implementation, and S&D 
treatment. 
 
III.  General Implications for the WTO  
What are the implications of legal indigenization, both inward and outward, for the WTO? 
The question can be answered from both short-term and long-term perspectives. In the short run, 
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the WTO may avail itself of existing mechanisms, especially the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism (TPRM), to understand, monitor, and even pr dict the process of legal 
indigenization by improving the TPRM functions. In the long run, the WTO may try to reduce 
the space available for “legal indigenization” by negotiating multilateral rules that have both 
more specificity and wider coverage.  
A. In the Short Term 
The TPRM is a mechanism that was established in order to further understand and monitor 
the Members’ domestic trade policies and their implementation. Although the TPRM is not a 
mandatory mechanism, its focus is extraordinarily consistent with that of studying legal 
indigenization among all current WTO. In other words, the TPRM offers a singularly important 
opportunity to address indigenization of the sort explored above. It should aim at providing 
authoritative preference to both country members and the organizational agencies for further 
understanding of specific practices of a certain memb r. The following paragraphs give a brief 
introduction to this mechanism, its specific significance to legal indigenization, and the aspects 
that can be improved to bear fruit in this regard. 
1. Overview of Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) 
The birth of the TPRM is partially attributed to the inefficiency of the notification 
mechanism. It was designed for enlightenment, not eforcement, of WTO mandates. The context 
and purpose of the mechanism are introduced in the following excerpt: 
Until at least the end of Tokyo round of GATT trade negotiations in 1979, the principal form 
mechanism for mutual surveillance of members’ trade policies was notification: still nominally in 
force under WTO today, Article X of the GATT requires that each member make public all changes 
in its trade policies. Notification never worked well, however.... 
As a result of changes introduced in the Tokyo Round, beginning in 1980 the Secretariat prepared 
twice-yearly reports on general developments in the world trading system. The findings of these 
reports were debated at meetings of the GATT Council [] and subsequently published. But this did 
not answer the need for detailed information on trade policies at the level of the individual country.  
[T]he TPRM is intended for enlightenment, not enforcement. It provides an “external audit” of 
members’ trade and economic situation. It is thus a me ns of shedding light on both the policies and 
the practices of member countries – both the direction of trade policy and its implementation – but 
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not for compelling change.697 
2. TPRM and legal indigenization 
The contents of TPR reports are relatively standardized. They typically contain six parts: 
the Economic Environment, Trade Policy Regime: Framework and Objectives, Foreign 
Exchange Regime (in reports from 1991 to 1993) or Foreign Direct Investment and Trade (in 
reports from 1993 to 1996), Trade Policies and Practices by Measure, Trade Policies and 
Practices by Sectors, and Trade Disputes and Consultations.698 
Some of the parts, such as Parts II, IV, and VI, could very appropriately address certain 
aspects of legal indigenization, including the topics discussed above in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 – 
namely international trade negotiations, international trade disputes, domestic legislation and 
judicial practices. The fact is, however, that little attention has been given to these aspects in the 
released reports. Examining the previous TPR reviews on trade policies of the three members 
highlighted above (China, the EU, and the United States), we can find that none of their disputed 
legislation or practices brought under scrutiny by other members to the DSB have been reviewed 
in such reports, even if such legislation or practices definitely constitute an indispensable part of 
domestic trade policies and their implementation. 
Such ineffectiveness may be partially attributable to the fact that such reports are prepared 
by an economist699 rather by lawyers. It is true that the WTO is an international economic 
organization. But it is an international organization n the first place, and it necessarily relies 
heavily on both domestic and international rule making and judicial practices. Therefore, legal 
perspective should be given more weight – or at least the same weight as the economic 
perspective – in TPR reports.  
The ineffectiveness of the TPRM as a tool to understand, monitor, or predict legal 
indigenization does not, however, derive solely from its predominantly economic, not legal, 
perspective. Its shortcomings can also be attributed to a variety of substantive weaknesses and 
                                                 
697 Donald B. Keesing, IMPROVING TRADE POLICY REVIEWS IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 4-6 (1998).  
698 Id. at 16-17. 
699 Id. at 10. 
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limitations of the mechanism, as pointed out in the next subsection.  
3. Concerns regarding TPRM 
One expert has identified several substantive weaknsses in the published TPR reports. 
Although his assessment dates from more than a decade ago, the situation has not changed much 
since that time: 
• TPRs need to avoid the temptation to focus only on developments of the past few years, and 
instead take a longer-term historical perspective that puts current policy and recent changes in 
meaningful context. ... 
• TPRs should not only report and analyze the likely impact of recently announced or 
implemented policy reforms but should also comment forthrightly, albeit cautiously, on their 
credibility and sustainability. 
• TPRs need to overcome a bias toward optimism and saying what the country under review 
would like to hear. … 
• TPRs need to pay more attention to the “bottom line”: they should make more of an effort to 
summarize total taxes on imports and calculate the total costs of protection.... 
• The extension of multilateral negotiations during ad fter the Uruguay Round to a much 
broader range of issues demands that TPRs likewise extend and deepen their analyses into a 
number of subject areas.... 
• Some emerging issues pose serious problems at the level of the global trading system as a 
whole but not necessarily at the level of individual countries, and thus fall through the cracks of 
the country-oriented TPRM process. …700 
Moreover, the same observer has suggested several mthods for improving the TPR in order 
to address the concerns listed above. These methods include: (1) taking a longer-term 
perspective, (2) questioning the credibility and sustainability of reform, (3) avoiding bias, (4) 
analyzing the cost of protection, (5) widening breath of coverage, and (6) controlling the length 
of review.701 
Actually, if we put the above concerns in the context of legal indigenization, it will be 
apparent that the TPRM has not efficiently provided the assessment of one member’s legal 
indigenization. Even though the TPRM gives some attntion to legal regime, the depth of 
                                                 
700 Id. at 50-51. 
701 See id. at 26-41. 
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pertinent report is insufficient to understand the process of legal indigenization within a certain 
country. For instance, no report has successful played n efficient role in predicting or alerting 
potential risks of trade relationships among the memb rs. This insufficiency will definitely 
impair the operational significance of the TPRM.  
The conclusion that these observations lead us to is that the TPRM has functioned thus far, 
unfortunately, on the basis of a short-term, biased, economic, narrowly-focused perspective. This 
should, in my view, change. In order to understand, monitor, or predict legal indigenization 
within the Members, the TPR reports should take into account all the elements influencing this 
process, such as the country’s underlying legal tradition, its larger legal system, its judicial 
environment, and the trends it has shown in administering domestic law or international 
agreements.   
To sum up, in the short term, the TPRM is offers an eminently feasible path to realize 
further understanding, monitoring or predicting of legal indigenization taking place in the 
Members. However, in order to realize that purpose, th  TPRM should first give priority to legal 
issues over economic issues. Then the TPRM should make improvement to overcome its 
institutional shortcomings or limitations as identified above. 
B. In the Long Term 
Since the space for Members to indulge in legal indigenization is largely decided by the 
multilateral rules themselves, the most effective and fundamental method of reducing the space 
for the Members to indigenize WTO law in the long run must be to improve those multilateral 
rules. The more specific the agreements are, and the more comprehensive their coverage is, the 
less room they will leave for the Members to indigeniz  the rules.  
This raises fundamental questions of global governance, which may be envisioned as a 
spectrum. At one extreme end of that global governance spectrum, we might see the WTO 
promulgating rules that can be directly applied domestically by the Members. In this regard, the 
EU has provided us a good example of “regional governance.” But whether this end can be 
achieved at the global (as opposed to a regional) level seems unlikely. Among the numerous 
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obstacles, one might be the United States, which is not likely to accept a set of multilateral rules 
conflicting with its domestic law or to give priority to international law over domestic law. 
Another obstacle might be the fact that different lvels of development among 153 members 
make it infeasible to adopt a single set of rules directly applied at the domestic level.  
The reality, therefore, is that for quite a long period, legal indigenization is almost surely 
unavoidable. Despite this reality, global governance of some sort – that is, institutional authority 
such as that granted to the WTO – can still play a positive role in reducing or eliminating the 
negative influence of legal indigenization, assuming that the organization has the capacity (and 
the will) to fully understand, monitor, and predict such process. This positive role can be realized 
by making rules as specific and widely-encompassing as possible.   
Summary  
The analysis of this chapter partially answers the qu stions raised at the beginning of the 
chapter. Let us recap briefly. 
As to the extent to which the Members have indigeniz d the organization, the three 
examples – (1) the United States and the multilateral antidumping mechanism, (2) rules of 
applying the notion of “legitimate expectations,” and (3) the admissibility of amicus curiae 
submissions – demonstrate the following points: 
• the WTO agreements have been largely influenced by certain members’ domestic 
legislation and practices, concerns thereon raised by other members, and their de facto 
“decisive” power on multilateral negotiations;  
• the WTO, although it has borrowed some notions from individual countries or legal 
traditions, has been trying to establish its own rules on applying such borrowed notions 
or principles;  
• even if some issues have not been clearly regulated in the DSU, the practices and the 
reasonable arguments of the Members, especially certain powerful members, can still 
persuade the DSB to adopt general rules with regard to the proceedings for dispute 
settlement.  
   As to how the Members have tried to indigenize further trade negotiations (that is, 
negotiations designed to expand on or reform existing rules), the comparison of the proposals 
submitted by China, the United States, and the EU on four central areas of the Doha Round – 
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S&D treatment, fisheries subsidies, environment, and the DSU – demonstrates the deep 
divergence with regard to the attitude, approach, or concept adopted by these three members.As 
for the third question posed at the beginning of this c apter – what are the implications of legal 
indigenization for the WTO – the answer can be given from both a short term perspective and a 
long term perspective. Above all, we should bear in m d that thus far, legal indigenization has 
not been avoided. Looking forward in the short run, it seems that the WTO mechanisms, 
especially the TPRM, should give priority to legal issues, in order to understand, monitor, and 
predict legal indigenization, by improving the mechanism itself. In the long run, the focus should 
be to reduce the opportunity (the space) for Members to engage in legal indigenization granted 
to the Members. This might be accomplished by developing specific and widely-encompassing 
multilateral rules in the context of global governance.  
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CONCLUSION  
– The Context, Concept, and Significance of Legal Indigenization 
 
The review of the literature pertinent to the theme of this dissertation establishes its two 
fundamental hypotheses. One is that the insufficiencies of the WTO system provide the 
possibility and necessity of legal indigenization within the WTO members. The other hypothesis 
is that the WTO members’ practices with the WTO have shown their willingness to indigenize 
WTO law.  
Responses at the international level to legal fragmentation in world trade prior to World 
War II brought about the emergence of the multilateral trading system that contributed greatly to 
legal globalization. However, legal globalization, which is exemplified by WTO law, has been 
undermined by the inherent and acquired problems of the multilateral trading system. Therefore, 
legal globalization still needs further responses from its participants – and this takes the form of 
legal indigenization.  
The concept of indigenization has been defined in various disciplines such as 
decolonization, anthropology, and culture. In the context of international law, it refers to the 
process or ideology in which domestic authorities, when behaving as international actors, make 
and implement international and domestic rules in a way appealing to their native features 
(especially legal tradition and culture), as responses to globalization led by a defective global 
legal system, for the purpose of getting an advantageous position in the context of globalization. 
As shown in this definition, the process of legal indigenization comprises two directions. One is 
the outward direction – domestic legal traditions ad cultures try to influence the rule-making 
and dispute settlement at the international level. The other is the inward direction – domestic 
legal traditions and cultures try to influence the implementation of international rules 
domestically, especially regarding domestic legislation and adjudication of trade issues. In the 
context of international law, the term indigenization differs from two other relevant terms – 
globalization and localization in some aspects such as actors, backgrounds, leverages, purposes, 
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influential scope, and legal consequences.  
Based on the concept of legal indigenization, the substantive process of legal indigenization 
that has taken place within China, the United States, and the EU have been explored in the 
foregoing pages, starting with China 
Legal Indigenization and China  
In international trade rule-making, China has given special attention to S&D treatment. This 
characteristic typically reflects China’s emphasis on substantial equality in international 
economic affairs. Furthermore, its proposals addressing substantive matters exhibit vagueness as 
a common feature – which has its roots in China’s tr di ional attitude of instrumentalism toward 
international law as well as its lack of confidence in substantial participation in international 
rule-making. The Chinese proposals on procedural issue  have their roots in Chinese legal 
history. Significantly, China’s long experience with procedural matters prompts it to focus on 
administrating litigations rather realizing procedural justice.  
In international trade disputes, China’s ideologies relating to (1) protecting subjects 
involving illegality, (2) moral control by publications, and (3) centralized trade rights – which 
have traced their origins into Chinese legal tradition and culture – were challenged by its trading 
partners.  
As for domestic legislation on trade, one of its characteristics is that the degree of 
specification of trade laws and regulations increases while legal effect of these laws descends. 
On the one hand, this characteristic is consistent with the historic practices of legislation in 
dynastic China; on the other hand, it caters to the legal culture reflected by contemporary 
China’s legal regime, considering that (1) since trade issues, especially trade remedy issues are a 
new area to China, it is appropriate of enact “temporary” rules with relatively low legal effect, 
which can subject to frequent supplements or adjustmen s; and (2) the procedure to amend 
administrative regulations and departmental rules ar  much simpler than that to amend laws (in a 
narrow sense).  
Another characteristic of domestic legislation on trade is that the contents of such 
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legislation address the facet of “managing” rather “r gulating” foreign trade. This reflects the 
age-old ideology that the state’s function regarding foreign trade lies in mostly management and 
even control. In dynastic China, the main contents of trade legislation were management and 
control of foreign trade. In contemporary China, stte management of trade in China was 
practiced until the WTO accession. 
As for domestic adjudication of trade issues, the Supreme Court has designated immediate 
or higher level of the people’s courts to exercise jurisdiction over judicial review of 
administrative determinations on trade issues. The domestic adjudication of trade issues in China 
has also demonstrated several features relating to: (1) the classification of trade cases, (2) 
applicable laws in trade disputes, (3) jurisdiction over trade cases, and (4) types of judgments. 
All these features have their roots in Chinese legal tradition and culture.  
Legal Indigenization and the United States 
After examining legal indigenization of WTO within China, we shifted our focus to that 
process within the United States. The participation of the United States in international trade 
rule-making exhibits some features: (1) the confidence in leading international rule-making, (2) 
the cautiousness toward S&D treatment, and (3) an emphasis on procedural justice as well as 
international rule of law – all of which can find their origins in U.S. legal tradition and culture.  
In FTA negotiations, the United States acts with cautiousness in selecting FTA partners and 
takes effort to stimulate both political and economic reforms within its partners, which appeals 
to its pursuance of both national interests and expected reforms in its trading partners.  
In the international trade disputes involving the United States as respondent, two pertinent 
U.S. ideologies relating to its attitude toward inter ational trade regime were challenged by its 
trading partners: one is so-called “unilateralism,” the other is extra-territorial application of U.S. 
law. Both ideologies have also been deeply influenced by U.S. legal history and its long-term 
practice.  
The comprehensiveness and thoroughness U.S. domestic legislation on trade reflected a 
great influence of the civil law tradition on this traditional common law country. A subordinate 
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status of international law within U.S. legal system and the retaining of embargo policy further 
reveal the historically-rooted legal practices.  
Domestic adjudication of trade issues within the United States also reflects some U.S. 
characteristics. Judicial review of administrative determinations is carried out by specialized 
courts on trade – the CIT and the CAFC. The efficien y of judicial review of administrative 
determinations on trade issues might be impacted by two kinds of deference within the U.S. 
judicial system. One is administrative deference given by the CIT and the CAFC to the 
administrative agencies which made the determinatios at issue. The other is the “expertise” 
deference given by the United States Supreme Court t  the CIT and the CAFC.  
Legal Indigenization and the EU 
An examination of legal indigenization of WTO law within the EU follows the study of the 
United States. The characteristics of the EU’s participation in international trade rule-making – 
which include: (1) emphasizing overall goal and principles in trade negotiations, (2) solid style 
of the proposals, (3) strengthening the functions of the DSB (especially panels), (4) relying 
heavily on independent experts, and (5) adhering sustainable development – reflect certain 
characteristics of the civil law tradition, which has given significant influence to the formulation 
of EU legal culture.  
 The international trade disputes revolving the EU as respondent reflect the EU ideologies 
and practices that seem conflicting with those of its trading partners. One of these ideologies is 
its broad range of approaches to interpreting pertin n  WTO provisions, which are, again, 
consistent with those adopted by the civil law tradition. The other kind of EU practices that has 
invited concerns from its trading partners revolves around its unique opinion in respect of the 
prevailing effect of trade references in FTAs over those in the multilateral system.  
As for “domestic” legislation on trade, the EU adopts the legislation style typically used in 
the civil law countries. It also clarifies in its legislation the relationship between WTO law and 
EU law – that is, the fundamental purpose of EU trade legislations is to implement the WTO 
agreements.  
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“Domestic” adjudication of trade issues within the EU exhibits some unique features 
compared with those in China or the United States: (1) the types of actions involving trade issues 
usually take the forms of actions for annulment, preliminary ruling, and direct action for 
compensation; (2) judgments of trade issues cases employ a style that the civil law countries 
typically adopt; (3) the Union Courts rely on application of general principles of law in its 
jurisprudence, as influenced by the civil law tradition; (4) the Union Courts practice a restricted 
and careful use of case law, as partially influenced by the common law tradition; and (5) the 
system of Advocate General reflects the high status of jurists in the civil law tradition.  
Legal Indigenization and the WTO 
Having examined legal indigenization of WTO law within three individual members, we 
shed the light on this process at the multilateral l vel. The multilateral antidumping mechanism, 
the principle of “legitimate expectations” in the DSB jurisprudence, and the admissibility of 
amicus curiae submissions in the dispute settlement procedure constitute three illustrations of 
how the WTO rule-making and adjudication have been heavily influenced by its members’ legal 
traditions and cultures. Moreover, the discrepancies among the three members relating to four 
aspects of future negotiations – S&D treatment, enviro ment and trade, fisheries subsidies, and 
reform of the DSB – have demonstrated that how different legal traditions and cultures might 
impede a future consensus within the organization.  
The general implications of legal indigenization for the WTO can be observed both in the 
short term and in the long term. In the short run, an urgent need for improving further 
understanding among the members appears. At the multilateral level, one option might be the 
improvement of Trade Policy Review Mechanism. In the long run, legal indigenization might 
provide a new clue for the WTO to design its blueprint. Considering that domestic legal tradition 
and culture is relatively solid and stable, discrepancies among the Members that originate from 
their own legal traditions and cultures should be taken into account seriously in the future 
construction of the organization.  
The main findings of the foregoing chapters have partially answered the two questions 
raised by Chapter 1 – that is, (1) how the legal tradi ions and cultures will influence the WTO 
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operations at the multilateral level, and (2) how the legal traditions and cultures will influence 
the WTO operations at the domestic level. These findings demonstrate that it is a common and 
inevitable phenomenon that an individual member will negotiate multilateral rules and 
implement its WTO commitments on the ground of its own legal tradition and culture. Moreover, 
the degree of legal indigenization within the three m mbers varies. As implied by the above 
analysis, we may sense that legal indigenization within China goes to the highest degree among 
the three members, considering that it has to absorb the international system established largely 
on the basis of western concepts and rules into its own legal system that is quite different from 
the western systems. By contrast, legal indigenization within the EU may cause the least twisting 
of the multilateral rules, partially because the consistency and compatibility between its legal 
tradition and culture and the international regime. The degree of legal indigenization within the 
United States may fall somewhere in the middle. In many cases, it has to balance between 
international rule of law it advocates and strong beliefs in its own legal practices.  
Therefore, even if a unified rule can be achieved at the multilateral level, it will not 
definitely bring out unified results of implementation at the domestic level. This observation 
might be essential to figuring out the realistic bakground of the WTO’s operations. Specifically, 
on the one hand, considering that some discrepancies among the Members arising from their 
own legal traditions and cultures are difficult, and even impossible, to eliminate, it is of practical 
significance for the organization to distinguish betw en those kinds of consensus that can be 
achieved at the multilateral level among different l gal traditions and cultures and those that 
cannot. On the other hand, the organization should pay sufficient attention to the issues of how 
to reduce the possibility or the degree of legal indigenization by its multilateral mechanisms.  
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